New Developments re Harriman Induction book

[Robert Campbell]

...in general, my area was theoretical particle physics. I got disillusioned in graduate school after going through the whole, uh, PhD qualifying process and so on, and uh, it was time for me write my dissertation, I'd completed all my course work, and I looked around at what theoretical particle physicists were doing, and they were just creating mathematical formalisms and any time you ask physical questions they, um, told you well that's metaphysics we don't talk about that. Um, so, ah, I ended up dropping out, and targeting nuclear bombs instead, for a while.

Again, I can't sympathize in the slightest.

Conventional opinion was maybe not so well organized in psychology, but to this day I remember another grad student telling me, "Campbell, if you want to do metaphysics, you can do it from age 35 to age 80." In other words, not in grad school, or while on the tenure track. He was far from alone in that opinion.

Ignoring the advice didn't prevent me from getting the degree, or finding a job.

Robert Campbell

[BaalChatzaf]

BC wrote: "...the Standard Model of Particles and Fields which predicts to an accuracy of twelve decimal places following the decimal point."

1) What makes it the "best" physical model ever?

2) How does one determine whether the prediction was accurate?

Expensive and accurate laboratory equipment. That is how we know how accurate the theory is. We do it the old fashioned way: we test the theory empirically.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

...in general, my area was theoretical particle physics. I got disillusioned in graduate school after going through the whole, uh, PhD qualifying process and so on, and uh, it was time for me write my dissertation, I'd completed all my course work, and I looked around at what theoretical particle physicists were doing, and they were just creating mathematical formalisms and any time you ask physical questions they, um, told you well that's metaphysics we don't talk about that. Um, so, ah, I ended up dropping out, and targeting nuclear bombs instead, for a while.

Again, I can't sympathize in the slightest.

Conventional opinion was maybe not so well organized in psychology, but to this day I remember another grad student telling me, "Campbell, if you want to do metaphysics, you can do it from age 35 to age 80." In other words, not in grad school, or while on the tenure track. He was far from alone in that opinion.

Ignoring the advice didn't prevent me from getting the degree, or finding a job.

Robert Campbell

Writing and defending your dissertation is the core of PhD seeking. Maybe his advisor found a way to discourage him from making a fool of himself by folding his tent. In any case, physicists seem not to worry too much about your degree if you can actually do the work, which means Harriman, if competent, could have a body of published work in peer-reviewed journals regardless. Does he? It is possible, however, that he is competent--I can't judge that--and his explanation isn't disingenuous.

--Brant

[dsaum]

I believe in the Q&A following his lecture on why Kant is the author of the modern destruction of physics he said that he didn't get a doctorate because he couldn't tolerate the epistemology taught in grad school.

I just went to the trouble of looking it up and transcribing what he said, for accuracy's sake:

...in general, my area was theoretical particle physics. I got disillusioned in graduate school after going through the whole, uh, PhD qualifying process and so on, and uh, it was time for me write my dissertation, I’d completed all my course work, and I looked around at what theoretical particle physicists were doing, and they were just creating mathematical formulisms and any time you ask physical questions they, um, told you well that’s metaphysics we don’t talk about that. Um, so, ah, I ended up dropping out, and targeting nuclear bombs instead, for a while.

So I didn't recall it exactly right, though I was in the ballpark. The last part sounds like Bob K talking.

No shit!

I’m afraid that’s an oversimplified reading of the upcoming Theory of Alimentary Waves.

I seem to remember from the Q/A for Harriman's 1998 audio lectures "The Philosophic Corruption of Physics" that he said he was then in physics grad school in California (Claremont?) and he was trying to get the physics department there to allow him to use his historical analysis of how Kant corrupted physics as his PhD thesis. For some reason this did not work out as he expected. His dislike for modern physics is touched on in the last few pages of The "Logical Leap", but it will be the meat of his forthcoming "The Anti-Copernican Revolution". I bet this will earn him a high score on the Physics Crackpot Index: http://math.ucr.edu/home/baez/crackpot.html

[George H. Smith]

I just went to the trouble of looking it up and transcribing what he said, for accuracy's sake:

...in general, my area was theoretical particle physics. I got disillusioned in graduate school after going through the whole, uh, PhD qualifying process and so on, and uh, it was time for me write my dissertation, I’d completed all my course work, and I looked around at what theoretical particle physicists were doing, and they were just creating mathematical formulisms and any time you ask physical questions they, um, told you well that’s metaphysics we don’t talk about that. Um, so, ah, I ended up dropping out, and targeting nuclear bombs instead, for a while.

As a fellow dropout myself -- first from high school, then from college -- I find Harriman's explanation quite reasonable. Some people have a higher tolerance for bullshit than others. My tolerance level has always been very low.

Some of the criticisms of Harriman on this thread strike me as over the top. This includes some of the criticisms that have been leveled against his book. All historical accounts, including histories of science, include statements that some historians find objectionable. And these include not only interpretations but matters of hard fact as well. All histories are written from certain theoretical perspectives, and a given perspective will determine which facts a given historian views as relevant. Anyone who believes that there is one "standard" account of the history of science hasn't read much if anything in the field.

Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Harriman's book should not be criticized. On the contrary, I have offered a number of criticisms myself. What I object to is the suggestion that his errors, whatever they may be, imply incompetence.

Harriman may deserve some lumps for his manner of dealing with the McCaskey brouhaha, but let us not forget that McCaskey was not forcefully conscripted into the upper echelon of the ARI hierarchy. Was he so naive as to suppose that his dissent from a Peikoff-sanctioned project would carry no consequences? Who knows? Was Robespierre surprised when the engine of terror he helped to create was turned against him?

Ghs

[sjw]

As a fellow dropout myself -- first from high school, then from college -- I find Harriman's explanation quite reasonable. Some people have a higher tolerance for bullshit than others. My tolerance level has always been very low.

Some of the criticisms of Harriman on this thread strike me as over the top. This includes some of the criticisms that have been leveled against his book. All historical accounts, including histories of science, include statements that some historians find objectionable. And these include not only interpretations but matters of hard fact as well. All histories are written from certain theoretical perspectives, and a given perspective will determine which facts a given historian views as relevant. Anyone who believes that there is one "standard" account of the history of science hasn't read much if anything in the field.

Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Harriman's book should not be criticized. On the contrary, I have offered a number of criticisms myself. What I object to is the suggestion that his errors, whatever they may be, imply incompetence.

Your statements do not apply to a person who is immune to criticism, particularly while simultaneously grasping at unearned power and control over other people, and more importantly, over history (Ayn Rand's unpublished journals etc.). At many junctures people have tried to correct Peikoff/Harriman and what they get in return is ostracism. This isn't just something that happened with McCaskey. This happened with Travis Norsen (judging by his remarks at Noodlefood), McCaskey, and others (in a minor way it happened with me during a Peikoff lecture on this subject -- though I wasn't important enough to be ostracized).

Harriman may deserve some lumps for his manner of dealing with the McCaskey brouhaha, but let us not forget that McCaskey was not forcefully conscripted into into the upper echelon of the ARI hierarchy. Was he so naive as to suppose that his dissent from a Peikoff-sanctioned project would carry no consequences? Who knows? Was Robespierre surprised when the engine of terror he helped to create was turned against him?

Ghs

True. I think I've expressed the same sentiment elsewhere.

Shayne

Edited November 22, 2010 by sjw

[Starbuckle]

George H. Smith writes: "Harriman may deserve some lumps for his manner of dealing with the McCaskey brouhaha, but let us not forget that McCaskey was not forcefully conscripted into the upper echelon of the ARI hierarchy. Was he so naive as to suppose that his dissent from a Peikoff-sanctioned project would carry no consequences? Who knows? Was Robespierre surprised when the engine of terror he helped to create was turned against him?"

I agree, but I wouldn't be tentative about whether Harriman deserves lumps for his treatment of McCaskey. Harriman has certainly not registered any objection as the sequels to his complaints to Peikoff played out. Of course, the internal targets of these excommunications always had had information about the way things are; and as the years pass, the information keeps piling up. It does seem to me that the most distinguished and relatively independent-minded ones are the biggest targets or perhaps most likely to get sick of the straightjacket. I don't know much about McCaskey. But first in the post-Passion period there was Kelley, who failed at being a co-smearer of Barbara Branden; then, a few years later, George Reisman, right as he was publishing his monumental tome Capitalism that does more to make the moral and practical case for unhampered markets than all the ARI offerings put together.

[Starbuckle]

I wrote: "How does one determine whether the prediction was accurate?"

BC wrote: "Expensive and accurate laboratory equipment. That is how we know how accurate the theory is. We do it the old fashioned way: we test the theory empirically."

I probably was unclear. I didn't mean, How do we test a testable theory? I understand about the experiments and things. I guess what I was trying to ask was, "How does one double-check the measurement?"

What is being predicted in your example to the nth decimal place? Is it the location of an atom? An electron? In the macro world, if I want to doublecheck the length of a table edge, I just lay down the ruler again and turn to the other fellow in the room. "SEe? Twenty-two inches, give or take a quarter-inch, just as I said." Can the accuracy of the sort of measurement to which you are alluding be double-checked in this way to the 12th decimal place?

A couple other questions have also occurred to me about your previous post. What makes the Standard Model of Particles and Fields the "best" physical model ever? And are you sure that you and Harriman are referring to the exact same theoretical claims?

Edited November 22, 2010 by Starbuckle

[George H. Smith]

As a fellow dropout myself -- first from high school, then from college -- I find Harriman's explanation quite reasonable. Some people have a higher tolerance for bullshit than others. My tolerance level has always been very low.

Some of the criticisms of Harriman on this thread strike me as over the top. This includes some of the criticisms that have been leveled against his book. All historical accounts, including histories of science, include statements that some historians find objectionable. And these include not only interpretations but matters of hard fact as well. All histories are written from certain theoretical perspectives, and a given perspective will determine which facts a given historian views as relevant. Anyone who believes that there is one "standard" account of the history of science hasn't read much if anything in the field.

Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Harriman's book should not be criticized. On the contrary, I have offered a number of criticisms myself. What I object to is the suggestion that his errors, whatever they may be, imply incompetence.

Your statements do not apply to a person who is immune to criticism, particularly while simultaneously grasping at unearned power and control over other people, and more importantly, over history (Ayn Rand's unpublished journals etc.). At many junctures people have tried to correct Peikoff/Harriman and what they get in return is ostracism. This isn't just something that happened with McCaskey. This happened with Travis Norsen (judging by his remarks at Noodlefood), McCaskey, and others (in a minor way it happened with me during a Peikoff lecture on this subject -- though I wasn't important enough to be ostracized).

The fact that a book was written within an orthodox institutional framework has no bearing per se on its competence. Orthodox Catholics, for example, have written many worthwhile historical accounts.

There are potentially two good things about orthodox histories.

First, the reader knows at the outset the theoretical perspective of the historian, and this enables the reader to assess the historian's claims, especially the more controversial ones, within that context, and question or reject those that result from obvious bias. This is far preferable to reading historians who claim to possess no theoretical presuppositions or who decline to state what they are.

Second, although an orthodox "plumb line" history can lead to unintentional distortions and exaggerations, it can also highlight valuable insights that more eclectic histories might overlook.

I don't know what you mean by "grasping at unearned power and control over other people." We are talking about a voluntary organization here, not a government.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

I seem to remember from the Q/A for Harriman's 1998 audio lectures "The Philosophic Corruption of Physics" that he said he was then in physics grad school in California (Claremont?) and he was trying to get the physics department there to allow him to use his historical analysis of how Kant corrupted physics as his PhD thesis. For some reason this did not work out as he expected. His dislike for modern physics is touched on in the last few pages of The "Logical Leap", but it will be the meat of his forthcoming "The Anti-Copernican Revolution". I bet this will earn him a high score on the Physics Crackpot Index: http://math.ucr.edu/...z/crackpot.html

The "philosophical corruption" of physics has produced the following: just about every electronic device that we use and the best understanding of what the Cosmos is doing (expanding at an accelerated pace). Some corruption.

When Objectivists get going on physics I tend to become a bit testy.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[sjw]

I don't know what you mean by "grasping at unearned power and control over other people." We are talking about a voluntary organization here, not a government.

Ghs

Any cult is a voluntary organization, that doesn't also mean that it doesn't have a certain kind of control, in spite of the fact that its the acolytes who give it control. And the biggest cult on the planet is the government, and most people do in fact consent to it.

Shayne

[9thdoctor]

I seem to remember from the Q/A for Harriman's 1998 audio lectures "The Philosophic Corruption of Physics"

That's where the material I transcribed came from. I didn't provide a cite earlier.

Some of the criticisms of Harriman on this thread strike me as over the top.

Uh-oh, now I'm afraid I overdid it with the part about peristaltic waves and the proboscis. Not taking it back.

[BaalChatzaf]

I wrote: "How does one determine whether the prediction was accurate?"

BC wrote: "Expensive and accurate laboratory equipment. That is how we know how accurate the theory is. We do it the old fashioned way: we test the theory empirically."

I probably was unclear. I didn't mean, How do we test a testable theory? I understand about the experiments and things. I guess what I was trying to ask was, "How does one double-check the measurement?"

Measurement is a kind of experiment. Many physical quantities can be measured in several and sundry ways.

We either perform a replication of the experiment (preferably) by an independent party (that eliminates observer bias) or doing an alternate experiment (which must be replicated) that implies the same verification. Almost all physical experiments can be done in several and sundry ways. That is the protocol for establishing an experimental result as kosher.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited November 23, 2010 by BaalChatzaf

[Starbuckle]

"The 'philosophical corruption' of physics has produced the following: just about every electronic device that we use and the best understanding of what the Cosmos is doing (expanding at an accelerated pace). Some corruption. When Objectivists get going on physics I tend to become a bit testy."

You're not being very specific with respect to what criticisms you're criticizing.

There are critiques by non-Objectivist physicists about, for example, the suppositions of string theory. (See Smolin's The Trouble With Physics: The Rise of String Theory, The Fall of a Science, and What Comes Next and Woit's Not Even Wrong: The Failure of String Theory and the Search for Unity in Physical Law .) The Heisenberg uncertainty princple can be regarded as simply elaborating a measurement problem, but it has also been contended that it means that subatomic particles don't even come into existence until they are observed (whatever that could possibly mean). And isn't it possible that there can be both reasonable and unreasonable theorizing about physics (just as there is, say, about atmosphere and climate)? Presumably neither Harriman nor anyone else who finds problems in modern physics would claim that we don't know enough about subatomic particles to be able to build microchips. So your characterization seems like a straw man.

IF someone is stating, "All modern physics is corrupt," and that's all that you're responding to, I would agree that that kind of blanket indictment doens't make any sense. It's a non-starter. But if you have a more specific criticism of a more specific criticism of any modern trends in physics, I would be interested to hear it. Irritation is not an argument.

Edited November 23, 2010 by Starbuckle

[Starbuckle]

BC writes: "Measurement is a kind of experiment. Many physical quantities can be measured in several and sundry ways. We either perform a replication of the experiment (preferably) by an independent party (that eliminates observer bias) or doing an alternate experiment (which must be replicated) that implies the same verification. Almost all physical experiments can be done in several and sundry ways. That is the protocol for establishing an experimental result as kosher."

I am being unclear. I was referring to a _specific_ measurement. I was also asking what entity you referring to with respect to its being measured to the 12th decimal place. Are you referring only to its size, to its location in space, or what?

[George H. Smith]

I seem to remember from the Q/A for Harriman's 1998 audio lectures "The Philosophic Corruption of Physics" that he said he was then in physics grad school in California (Claremont?) and he was trying to get the physics department there to allow him to use his historical analysis of how Kant corrupted physics as his PhD thesis. For some reason this did not work out as he expected. His dislike for modern physics is touched on in the last few pages of The "Logical Leap", but it will be the meat of his forthcoming "The Anti-Copernican Revolution". I bet this will earn him a high score on the Physics Crackpot Index: http://math.ucr.edu/...z/crackpot.html

The "philosophical corruption" of physics has produced the following: just about every electronic device that we use and the best understanding of what the Cosmos is doing (expanding at an accelerated pace). Some corruption.

When Objectivists get going on physics I tend to become a bit testy.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Harriman's opinion about the "philosophical corruption" of modern physics does not affect his admiration for the virtues of QM qua mathematical system. On the contrary, in Logical Leap (p. 248), he writes:

As a mathematical formalism, quantum theory has been enormously successful. It makes quantitative predictions of impressive accuracy for a vast range of phenomena, providing the basis for modern chemistry, condensed matter physics, nuclear physics, and optics. It also made possible some of the greatest technological innovations of the twentieth century, including computers and lasers.

Before reflexively dismissing Harriman as a modern Luddite, you should take some time to understand what he has to say.

Ghs

[Robert Campbell]

Some of the criticisms of Harriman on this thread strike me as over the top. This includes some of the criticisms that have been leveled against his book. All historical accounts, including histories of science, include statements that some historians find objectionable. And these include not only interpretations but matters of hard fact as well. All histories are written from certain theoretical perspectives, and a given perspective will determine which facts a given historian views as relevant. Anyone who believes that there is one "standard" account of the history of science hasn't read much if anything in the field.

George,

I don't believe that there is one standard account of every line of development in the history of science. Not even of the emergence of modern physics in the work of Galileo and Newton.

I do expect any competent historian of science to be aware that accounts vary and to be able, when necessary, to compare his or her account with others and explain why his or her rendition might be better.

I really wonder whether Harriman is able to contrast his account of, say, Galileo's thinking on key issues in mechanics with other major accounts. He never seems to get very far before he starts turning the accounts into straw men and Satanizing their proponents.

Of course, I do not mean to suggest that Harriman's book should not be criticized. On the contrary, I have offered a number of criticisms myself. What I object to is the suggestion that his errors, whatever they may be, imply incompetence.

Harriman may deserve some lumps for his manner of dealing with the McCaskey brouhaha, but let us not forget that McCaskey was not forcefully conscripted into the upper echelon of the ARI hierarchy. Was he so naive as to suppose that his dissent from a Peikoff-sanctioned project would carry no consequences? Who knows? Was Robespierre surprised when the engine of terror he helped to create was turned against him?

Two issues here.

One: Harriman's manner of responding to McCaskey's criticisms strongly indicates to me that he is either unable or unwilling to characterize McCaskey's position accurately and fairly. Further, that he is either unable or unwilling to present counterarguments of any cogency. Either his competency isn't up to it or his attitude stands in the way of it.

This is why I've been encouraging Harriman to keep "replying to critics" as he recently started doing on his blog.

It's a lot like what happened with Jim Valliant and his book. All by itself, The Passion of Ayn Rand's Critics raised more than a few questions about Valliant's competency. Over time, Valliant's defenses of the book and rejoinders to critics removed all doubt.

Of course, Harriman is more competent than Valliant; nearly everyone is.

And he writes better than Valliant; nearly everyone does.

What Harriman and Valliant appear to have in common is reliance on Leonard Peikoff to sponsor them and protect them. (Not that Peikoff's sphere of influence extended to Wikipedia, as Valliant vainly hoped; Harriman may be more a little more accurate in estimating his mentor's reach.)

And, like Peikoff in his later days, neither Harriman nor Valliant sees responding to critics as answering the critics' arguments. When it's feasible, one deals with critics by ignoring them. When it isn't, one destroys their reputations or gets them thrown out of the organization.

Two: Did John McCaskey know what the gig was when he took it?

I presume that he did, because Ayn Rand's unpublished material was being rewritten before McCaskey opened the Anthem Institute; a year after Anthem got going, Andrew Bernstein did his turn in sackcloth and ashes for publishing in the Journal of Ayn Rand Studies; Valliant's book was published in 2005 with Peikoff's blessing; in 2006, Travis Norsen was crossed off the ARI speakers' list and Peikoff declared that anyone not obeying his fatwa to pull the lever for Democrats didn't truly understand Objectivism; and on they marched. McCaskey would have had to be remarkably foolish not to notice any patterns.

Does it follow that Harriman's conduct toward McCaskey is excusable? No, for the reasons given above.

Robert Campbell

[Robert Campbell]

Harriman's opinion about the "philosophical corruption" of modern physics does not affect his admiration for the virtues of QM qua mathematical system. On the contrary, in Logical Leap (p. 248), he writes:

As a mathematical formalism, quantum theory has been enormously successful. It makes quantitative predictions of impressive accuracy for a vast range of phenomena, providing the basis for modern chemistry, condensed matter physics, nuclear physics, and optics. It also made possible some of the greatest technological innovations of the twentieth century, including computers and lasers.

Before reflexively dismissing Harriman as a modern Luddite, you should take some time to understand what he has to say.

George,

I dunno.

Taken in isolation, Harriman's brief statement about quanum mechanics reads like effusive praise.

Read in context, it comes through as anything but.

The reader who started the book on page 1 could be pardoned for concluding that, in David Harriman's eyes, QM is the next best thing to worthless.

Robert Campbell

[kiaer.ts]

Harriman may deserve some lumps for his manner of dealing with the McCaskey brouhaha, but let us not forget that McCaskey was not forcefully conscripted into the upper echelon of the ARI hierarchy. Was he so naive as to suppose that his dissent from a Peikoff-sanctioned project would carry no consequences? Who knows? Was Robespierre surprised when the engine of terror he helped to create was turned against him?

That raises an interesting question. Is it even conceivably possible for someone to be a good Objectivist, that is, someone fully read in the canon, without being aware of the history of the movement? What is one to think who reads VOS and sees that Branden is "no longer associated with Ayn Rand or her Philosophy" (who says so?) while Branden is alive and well and living on the internet? The first thing that occurred to me at 17 was: "Affair gone sour!" Indeed, how could there not have been sexual tension between the two? BB's book only confirmed my suspicions. So, how could someone be so interested in Objectivism as to join forces with the ARI but be so incurious as to the principals, or so blind or indifferent to the irrational injustices of ostracism and unpersonning and loyalty oaths and so forth? There is obviously some sort of compartmentalization going on with anyone interested enough to work with the ARI but selfblinded enough to tolerate its claim to morality and reason.

[George H. Smith]

Harriman's opinion about the "philosophical corruption" of modern physics does not affect his admiration for the virtues of QM qua mathematical system. On the contrary, in Logical Leap (p. 248), he writes:

As a mathematical formalism, quantum theory has been enormously successful. It makes quantitative predictions of impressive accuracy for a vast range of phenomena, providing the basis for modern chemistry, condensed matter physics, nuclear physics, and optics. It also made possible some of the greatest technological innovations of the twentieth century, including computers and lasers.

Before reflexively dismissing Harriman as a modern Luddite, you should take some time to understand what he has to say.

George,

I dunno.

Taken in isolation, Harriman's brief statement about quantum mechanics reads like effusive praise.

Read in context, it comes through as anything but.

The reader who started the book on page 1 could be pardoned for concluding that, in David Harriman's eyes, QM is the next best thing to worthless.

Robert Campbell

Harriman's objection is not to the technical findings of QM per se, as expressed in its mathematical "formalisms," but to the philosophy of science and its application to QM. He makes this quite clear on p. 6:

How did we arrive at this bizarre contradiction -- with scientists developing technology that exploits our detailed knowledge of atomic structure, while philosophers bewail or revel in the alleged impotence of reason to grasp even relatively simple facts?

Harriman then quotes E. Bright Wilson (a Harvard professor of chemistry), in part, as follows:

[it] is very unsatisfactory that no generally acceptable theory of scientific inference has yet been put forward....Mistakes are often made which would presumably not have been made if a consistent and satisfactory basic philosophy had been followed.

It is important to keep in mind a recurring theme in Logical Leap, namely, that science, including physics, should be concerned with describing physical reality in terms of causal relationships. While not denying the practical value of mathematical formalisms, Harriman argues that physicists should seek a deeper level of understanding. His discussion of Ptolemy is significant in this context. In accord with standard histories of astronomy (e.g., those by Kuhn and Toulmin), Harriman criticizes Ptolemaic astronomy for its construction of mathematical and geometrical fictions that were designed to "save the appearances" by generating accurate predictions, while exhibiting little or no concern for the underlying physical reality.

Harriman's objection to modern physics runs along similar lines. Immediately after the passage I quoted in my last post, where Harriman praises the mathematical formalisms of QM, he writes:

Yet, as a fundamental theory of physics, [quantum physics] is strangely empty -- "a skeleton scheme of symbols," to use the eloquent phrase of Sir Arthur Eddington. It gives a mathematical recipe for predicting the statistical behavior of particles but fails to provide causal models of subatomic processes.

This is a reasonable criticism. It is altogether too easy to focus on the flaws in Logical Leap -- his treatment of Kant, for example, is rife with the predictable Randian nonsense -- and overlook or minimize the legitimate things that Harriman has to say.

Having written many book reviews myself over the years, I know that all books, and especially books on philosophy and history, are vulnerable to legitimate criticisms. Therefore, if a reviewer decides that he wants to trash a book, he can simply focus on the problematic areas while ignoring the worthwhile aspects.

Herbert Spencer once remarked that the primary purpose of many reviewers is to show how much more clever they are than the author. I fear that some OL members, understandably disturbed by the antics of ARI, are unwilling to give Harriman's book a fair hearing.

Ghs

[sjw]

Herbert Spencer once remarked that the primary purpose of many reviewers is to show how much more clever they are than the author. I fear that some OL members, understandably disturbed by the antics of ARI, are unwilling to give Harriman's book a fair hearing.

Ghs

I would be friendlier to Harriman's ideas if I thought he were actually concerned for the truth. But when he says "essentialize" I think he means "lie."

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

Herbert Spencer once remarked that the primary purpose of many reviewers is to show how much more clever they are than the author. I fear that some OL members, understandably disturbed by the antics of ARI, are unwilling to give Harriman's book a fair hearing.

Ghs

I would be friendlier to Harriman's ideas if I thought he were actually concerned for the truth. But when he says "essentialize" I think he means "lie."

Shayne

Where, specifically, does Harriman "lie" in Logical Leap?

All historians, or at least all good historians, "essentialize." This is a matter of degree.

Ghs

[sjw]

Where, specifically, does Harriman "lie" in Logical Leap?

All historians, or at least all good historians, "essentialize." This is a matter of degree.

Ghs

I didn't say he lied in that book, although he does sanction misrepresentation and even characterizes it as "induction" (the part about Galileo allegedly misleading the people by saying the pendulum formula was correct even though Galileo had doubts). But nothing angers me more about ARI than their rewriting of history, Harriman has been part of what RC has called the "rewrite squad."

Obviously essentializing is essential -- so long as it's honest. Anyway, I'm addressing your issue with being "over the top." I'd have a nice "Christian" attitude about Harriman if I thought he was honestly mistaken where he had gone wrong. We're all human, we all can make mistakes, and abstract ideas are difficult. But I don't think it's the case that he's merely mistaken. I think systematic dishonesty is afoot.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

Where, specifically, does Harriman "lie" in Logical Leap?

All historians, or at least all good historians, "essentialize." This is a matter of degree.

Ghs

I didn't say he lied in that book, although he does sanction misrepresentation and even characterizes it as "induction" (the part about Galileo allegedly misleading the people by saying the pendulum formula was correct even though Galileo had doubts). But nothing angers me more about ARI than their rewriting of history, Harriman has been part of what RC has called the "rewrite squad."

Obviously essentializing is essential -- so long as it's honest. Anyway, I'm addressing your issue with being "over the top." I'd have a nice "Christian" attitude about Harriman if I thought he was honestly mistaken where he had gone wrong. We're all human, we all can make mistakes, and abstract ideas are difficult. But I don't think it's the case that he's merely mistaken. I think systematic dishonesty is afoot.

Shayne

I cannot reconcile what you say in the first paragraph with what you say in the second. You begin by denying that you are accusing Harriman of lying in Logical Leap, but you go on to accuse him of "systematic dishonesty." And judging from the context (i.e., your comment about essentializing and my "over the top" remark) this latter charge also refers to Logical Leap.

So which is it?

Ghs

[Mike11]

Generally speaking when the word "essentials" is used by the ARI self serving distortions of fact, otherwise called 'lies', follow. Though I have not read TLL it seems like the same process is at work given the McCaskey issue.