Is Intuition superior to reason?

[Peter]

here are a sampling of letters on the subject of Intuition from OWL.

And here a few excerpts to get your engines gunning.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

The excerpts:

In fact it is kind of a running joke that objectivists just 'know' who each other are in a crowd by their 'way' of looking.

Rand argued in her fiction writing lectures that it would be not only counterproductive but literally impossible for an artist *consciously* to justify each choice he makes while creating a work. The only workable method is to rely on your subconscious while writing and then *edit later* using your conscious judgment.

In fact, in a sense, Rearden's character is this very journey from sense-perception of "something is wrong" to "explicit knowledge" that his premises were wrong.

From: Michael Hardy <hardy@math.mit.edu>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Intuition

Date: Sun, 20 May 2001 17:23:07 -0400 (EDT)

Mike Rael stated in his post of 5/17/01 that:

Rand herself was about as intuitive as they come.

John Kimball <kimball@ncia.net> objected (5/18):

The Random House College Dictionary defines intuition as the: '1. direct perception of truth, fact, etc., independent of any reasoning process; immediate apprehension ..' This appears to fly in the face of Rand's basic epistemology as I could not find no reference to the concept of intuition in any of the major works by Rand. This seems to be an unwarranted assumption on the part of Mr. Rael. I would appreciate having the references that would justify this conclusion.

The word "intuition" appears to admit several definitions, one of which was endorsed by Leonard Peikoff in an article in the 1985 volume of _The_New_Scholasticism_, titled "Aristotle's Intuitive Induction." Peikoff explained that the way in which we become aware of the truth of logical axioms cannot be by logical deduction --- that would clearly be circular reasoning --- but is a rational cognitive process that involves coming to understand the concepts involved and what the proposition says, and that that process is called "intuitive induction."

"Intuition" also means something like "emotional without feeling", which needs to be explained more long windedly, and less mysteriously to be understood. Recall Peikoff in his 12-lecture basic course saying an emotion results from a super-rapid subconscious evaluation of something as good or bad. At one point in that course he tersely mentioned that a similar super-rapid subconscious process could result in a conscious hunch, whose justification is not conscious. That is also called "intuition." Perhaps Mike Rael had that in mind.

Mike Hardy

From: Jackie Goreham <chrissycrunch@objectivists.every1.net>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: My stay at the hospital...what happened

Date: Mon, 21 May 2001 14:23:52 -0700 (PDT)

I would have to say that I agree that Objectivism and intuition do not mix, that there is some evidence that what Rand lived and what she wrote had a slight disconnect in this area. After all, this was a woman who described love at first sight with her husband and also described it in her main characters (Roark and Francon and Taggart and Galt). In fact it is kind of a running joke that objectivists just 'know' who each other are in a crowd by their 'way' of looking.

I think it is important, if somewhat difficult, to separate Objectivism the philosophical system from Rand, the woman. The philosophy allows for no contradictions, but we know the person lived some.

As for the topic at hand, I know only one objectivist and that's my boyfriend. I have never met another in person. If I were to make all people I know pass a philosophical test I would be a very lonely person indeed. There is value to be found in relationships with people who think differently than I do.

Jackie Goreham

From: Jeff Lindon <jefrey@monkey.org>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition

Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 09:04:08 -0400 (EDT)

I agree with Kurt's distinction (5/19) between senses of "intuition", and have often thought that the term takes unfair abuse.

Along the lines Kurt suggests, I think of an intuition (in its secularized sense) as a conscious awareness of pre-verbal subconscious processes. Depending on a person's psycho-epistemology, those processes will be predominantly rational or irrational. Granted that intuition is *not* a means of knowing, I do wonder whether it's a necessary stage one goes through (even if only briefly) when grappling with large, difficult problems.

Suppose that after thinking about a complex problem for a while, you can think of several different ways of proceeding, but you're not sure which is best. How do you decide -- not which is best, but which to *investigate* first? Well, your subconscious is munching on lots of things, and the only conscious awareness you have of those calculations is a "sense" or "feel". Let's say you sense that one approach to solving the problem will prove to be the best. If pressed on the issue, you may have a hard time giving concrete reasons for your sense, precisely because you don't understand the problem. But you have to decide how to proceed *somehow*, and the fact is that if you've cultivated a rational psycho-epistemology, your subconscious will generally do a good job in these kinds of "preliminary evaluations". Sometimes it takes the conscious mind a lot of (necessary) effort to see just *how* good our intuitions actually are.

Consider artistic creation as an example. Rand argued in her fiction writing lectures that it would be not only counterproductive but literally impossible for an artist *consciously* to justify each choice he makes while creating a work. The only workable method is to rely on your subconscious while writing and then *edit later* using your conscious judgment. Hopefully (and with practice, over time), your subconscious judgments come to embody your conscious principles fairly consistently. But the conscious mind is always the final arbiter. (My experience as a composer confirms the value of this method.)

(I would add here that I am not convinced that one could always verbalize *all* the reasons one had a particular intuition. Also, in my own experience, if my conscious mind contradicts my intuition, there is very often something that my conscious mind is missing. Again, that feeling does not constitute *proof* that the conscious mind is wrong, but if one knows that one has a predominantly rational psycho-epistemology, then such intuitions should set off warning bells.)

I reconcile Rand's attacks on intuition with the position she takes elsewhere by supposing that she would suggest a word other than "intuition" for what I have been describing. That makes the term a little bit like "faith", which I've discovered that many people use simply to mean "confidence". But whereas the alternative between "confidence" and "faith" is obvious, I can't think of a better alternative to "intuition" off-hand.

-Jeffrey Lindon

From: Matthew Ferrara <educator@att.net>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Intuition as second-order epistemological integration

Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 10:31:19 +0000

Just to weigh-in on the intuition-question:

I do not think that intuition is counter-Objectivism in any way; in fact, from what I can tell from Rand's writings, she's not entirely counter-intuitive (in both meanings of that phrase): Note that some of her characters like Rearden and even Cherryl (Taggart's wife) take long journeys toward knowledge by identifying, clarifying, and reflecting upon a "peripheral sense" or what we could call "gut feeling" that something in their experience was not "quite right." They then proceed to investigate their surroundings and then come to clear, rational knowledge that the people around them are acting in an irrational manner, guided by their feelings. Many times in Atlas, Rand refers to a character's sensation of something on the "edge" of their cognition that is fleeting, but re- occurs often enough to induce them to further pursue clarification. In fact, in a sense, Rearden's character is this very journey from sense-perception of "something is wrong" to "explicit knowledge" that his premises were wrong.

I think it is too easy to simply "reject" intuition because it is often equated with feelings, which are also often "rejected" by Objectivist thinkers in an off- hand manner. Rather, I think that intuition has to be put in its proper position in the epistemological hierarchy. Many great scientific discoveries have come from what we would call an "intuitive" notion of an hypothesis or experiment, which led to the discovery of a result that then was clarified "backwards" so to speak to a more full, explicit knowledge. Thinkers like Suzanne Langer or Polanyi (The Tacit Dimension) have excellent discussions on this "metacommunicative" or not-yet-expressed dimension of human thought.

It is important, from the standpoint of Objectivism, to make sure that intuition is not considered a "primary" tool to knowledge and not used as the sole basis to guide one's overall actions or life; but like emotions, intuition is a second-order activity of the rational mind.

It may help to start from a definition: I think intuition can be considered just like Rand's concept of emotions: Both are indicators or feedback-mechanisms (positive and negative) of one's thought processes. Intuitions are often "not-yet-clarified" or emerging recognitions of facts of reality. In some ways, they may be recognitions of fact that have happened faster than linguistic or fully-logical expression has occurred - although such description later emerges.

Intuition in this sense would not be the same as "revelation" or mere "gut-impulse" that religious or psychologies of noumenal-worlds/minds would have us believe (always refreshing to bash Kant this early in

the morning! grin!). And while it may not be a "rigorous" tool of knowledge like "pure logic" it still may play a valid function in cognition, so long as it remains a "stage" of knowledge and not the final or determining aspect of it.

Good morning!

Matthew Ferrara

From: Brian Gordon <briangordon@livetolearn.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition

Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 09:07:16 -0700

All,

Intuition is indeed a fascinating topic, as we all use it, yet it seems at first glance to run counter to objectivism. In fact, Nathaniel Branden has pointed out that sometimes one's intuition is correct while one's reason is not.

I think that intuition is an unconscious conclusion one has reached – the criteria and decision-making process are unconscious. This does not mean that some reasoning has not taken place, simply that one is unaware of it. I once took an excellent course entitled "The Skilled Facilitator's Workshop", in which the participants' goal was to learn to facilitate group meetings effectively and to improve the group's ability to function. This involved pointing out inappropriate behaviors, areas of conflict, and so on, and oftentimes I (and others) would pick up on things intuitively rather than explicitly. When I asked the instructor about this, his point was this: Whatever you have noticed intuitively, there is evidence for, and you must bring that evidence into your consciousness. You cannot present your intuitive beliefs to anyone, because then they lack any facts to deal with. It was a great workshop! Very objectivist, now that I look back on it.

Brian Gordon

From: Ming shan <mingshan87@hotmail.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition

Date: Thu, 24 May 2001 22:28:18

Merlin Jetton wrote (5/22):

> I wish to second Kurt Keefner's remarks (5/19) about "secular" intuition.

I wish to third them; I have not seen as much common sense brought to the discussion about intuition in a long time. He definitely based his remarks on careful observation.

>Indeed, this form of intuition is a requirement for being a skilled, or more skilled, mathematician. Here, of course, it is hardly a mere, mystical feeling. Consider the mathematician in search of a solution to a problem, which might be a path to a proof. By analogy, this intuition is the ability to see the glimpses of light down a possible path before the path is more fully lit through fuller exploration and work.

OK, that's great, but what about the mathematician who had it the most, in abundance, Srinivasa Ramanujan? This guy filled notebook after notebook after notebook with incredibly complex and deep theorems and formulae of Number Theory, but he rigorously proved not one of them. He had a power of insight that is rare, even among mathematicians. He could see clearly what the solution would be to something, and he did not need to prove it, because he already knew it was right. Some mathematicians these days are busy going through his notebooks and rigorously proving the entries he put down; so far, it's all panning out. That's how good the guy was at this type of insight.

My point is this: surely R's power of insight does not really come from "reason." The proof is that the man barely had a high schooler's understanding of trigonometry.

What we are calling intuition here strikes me as very much the same thing that Spinoza called "the third kind of knowledge." But he said that it only arises from "the second kind," which is reason. But if it only arises from it, then (1) it is surely different from it, and not the same thing, and (2) it is superior to reason.

Mingshan

From: Mike Rael <moochy_hope@yahoo.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: Re: OWL: Intuition as second-order epistemological integration

Date: Thu, 24 May 2001 08:48:52 -0700 (PDT)

Good morning yourself, Matthew:)

I really appreciate the way you fleshed out my original post on this subject, though I doubt you had the intention of doing that I don't have the energy or patience to check through Atlas, for example, to bolster up my position about intuition. I just know what I know.

I really have no criticism at all. You point out that Rand's characters use intuition (true). You mention that intuition is a stage of knowledge only (true). You say that intuition is part of the creative process (true). You infer that reason is the final arbiter of knowledge (true).

About my only disagreement is that intuition is not simply the unconscious filling-in of holes in logic that have been derived at superspeed. Ain't nuthin' wrong with gut impulses, Matt. Sometimes, for whatever reason, gut impulses are right while our "rationally derived" reason is wrong! That's why some women going down the bridal path need to heed it when they get a strong inner feeling that they shouldn't be there--despite all the "logic" that insists they are in the right place!

best always,

Mike

From: James H Cunningham <jameshcunningham@juno.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition

Date: Fri, 25 May 2001 23:42:28 -0400

Ming Shan wrote (5/24):

"[the 'third kind of knowledge' - intuition, as in the case of Srinivasa Ramanujan] is superior to reason."

And how?

Surely I could not begin to understand - let alone create - such intricate mathematical theorems without relying on a conscious reasoning process; indeed, to decide what I shall eat for dinner takes enough thought on its own, and I have not enough leisure for those high pursuits. Are you saying that Ramanujan's intuition is superior to my reason, when I cannot even decide my diet without some mental plodding-out?

When I was a child I was forced to put two and two together - when I eat food that tastes bad, I dislike putting it my mouth; and when I dislike putting something in my mouth I should not eat it - but now it is intuitive that I not eat food that I dislike; still I went through conscious reasoning at some point, so I should hardly think that my intuition is contrary to and higher than reason. It is simply something that followed.

And why is what you describe above intuition, in the non-reasoning sense? Ramanujan was equipped with a mind more able to grasp complex truths than mine or yours, and quickly; that he needed to think less does not mean that he needed to not _think_ at all; why not consider that his 'reasoning ability' was sufficiently inborn that no real effort was required to prove to himself that he _was_ correct? It is not necessary for me to 'think' to add simple sums, and I am rarely asked to prove my answers afterward; why is it so much to think that a man of a much greater mind can handle greater thoughts, without striking the call of superiority to reason?

Anyone who theorizes must do so before proving any theories he puts forth. If Ramanujan had proven his own work, would you consider it less intuition and more reason?

James H Cunningham

From: "Ming shan" <mingshan87@hotmail.com>

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: James on intuition

Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 08:18:49

>James:

> >Ming Shan wrote (5/24):

> >"[the 'third kind of knowledge' - intuition, as in the case of Srinivasa Ramanujan] is superior to reason."

> >

> >And how? And why is what you describe above intuition, in the non-reasoning sense?

> >Ramanujan was equipped with a mind more able to grasp complex truths than mine or yours, and quickly; that he needed think less does not mean that he needed not _think_ at all;

>

>Mingshan:

>Well, I never said nor implied that the man was not *thinking*; that depends on your definition of the word.

>

>why not consider that his 'reasoning ability' was sufficiently inborn that no real effort was required to prove to himself that he _was_ correct?

>

>That was exactly my point; the problem, though, was the relationship between that "inborn ability" and "reason." It is not necessary for me to 'think' to add simple sums, and I am rarely asked to prove my answers afterward;

>

>That's fine, but you're not a mathematician. No one is asked to prove anything when it's just "simple sums," but mathematicians are required to prove what they claim. That's an integral part of mathematics.

>

> >why is it so much to think that a man of a much greater mind can handle greater thoughts, without striking the call of superiority to reason?

>

>Because of a simple fact that you're neglecting in R's case: he had only the skimpiest of education in any kind of "formal" mathematics.

>Something like "reason" was not necessary in his case therefore. My full statement was My point is this: surely R's power of insight does not really come from "reason." The proof is that the man barely had a high schooler's understanding of trigonometry.

>

>Also because, it's not the thoughts we are debating about, but the way those thoughts occurred.

>

> >Anyone who theorizes must do so before proving any theories he puts forth. If Ramanujan had proven his own work, would you consider it less intuition and more reason?

>

>No, simply because, again, it's not the thoughts or their proof that's interesting, but *how* those thoughts occurred in the first place. And in R's case, he had so many occurring to him that were deep and important.

>

>Love,

>Mingshan

From: Roger Bissell <AchillesRB@aol.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: What is Intuition?

Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2001 01:52:12 EDT

The recent discussion of the nature of intuition has been quite interesting, and I would like to suggest another way of looking at intuition in re thinking. As against the idea some suggest that intuition is relatively more unconscious and thinking relatively more conscious, I think it's more helpful to see them both as different kinds of conscious cognitive processes. In support of this, here are some ideas I have gleaned recently from a non-Objectivist thinker, along with some personality-type-related thoughts stimulated by his ideas...

Howard Margolis in PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION (U. of Chicago Press, 1987) claimed that cognitive activity tends to be either a combination of broad focus with loose "scan control," which he labeled "intuitive" -- or a combination of narrow focus with tight "scan control," which he labeled "analytical," which is reasonably synonymous with "thinking." Since induction would seem as though it should work better in the former case (intuitive preference), while deduction would seem as though it should work better in the latter (thinking preference). I find this approach very persuasive.

However, I want to suggest another way of looking at it. I think that what Margolis is describing as "intuition" by loose focus, broad scan control is actually ~extraverted~ intuition (intuition directed toward the "outer world," which is the kind of intuition that is used by introverted thinkers, who are not nearly so analytical as their extraverted thinking brethren (and sistern...?). And the form of intuition used by extraverted thinkers may not even be recognized as such by them -- focused as they are on assessing the external world and how it can be changed, improved, corrected, etc. – but their intuition almost surely has a tighter focus and narrower scan control (since internal or "introverted" and thus not ranging around in the environment, but instead in their own internal store of ideas) than the kind used by introverted thinkers. In compensation, though, the thinking of TJs (extraverted thinkers) is easier to apply in flexible, broad fashion to assessing and planning things in the world than the thinking of TPs (introverted thinkers).

In other words, I think Margolis' model is somewhat oversimplified, but helpful in aiming us in the right direction. His suggestion that a stronger preference for intuition would make one's thinking relatively fuzzier is an interesting hypothesis, but the type results I have seen do not bear this out. My wife has a stronger intuitive preference than thinking, but she is a very precise thinker--and I have a stronger preference for thinking than for intuition, but I am a much fuzzier thinker than her. So go figure! Perhaps we are the exception to the rule, but I think the answer lies elsewhere. I am very precise and focused in my inductive, model-building process, but this is not usually regarded as thinking, but rather intuition. My wife is very precise and focused in her deductive, analytical process, but her strong inner vision, being more in the "tacit" dimension, is overlooked by those who see only her logical thinking process.

I encourage others to read Margolis' work, but discussion of the above is welcome, in any case.

Best regards,

Roger Bissell (INTP)

From: Jackie Goreham <chrissycrunch@objectivists.every1.net>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition as second-order epistemological integration

Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2001 13:16:58 -0700 (PDT)

Mike, I don't know to whom you are referring, but eliminating emotion is Vulcan, not Objectivist. I repeat that if there is a disconnect between your emotions and your thoughts then you have made an error somewhere. There should be no disconnect. Emotions tell us nothing other than that we are having an emotion. We must use reason to identify its cause. It might be a tip off that something is wrong, sure, why not. Like a symptom... But our emotions are not "right" or "wrong" really. It's just that they either do or do not fit the context. They are only right or wrong based on our thoughts: reason.

Jackie Goreham

[BaalChatzaf]

Intuition sniffs out the path that reason should follow with precision.

Intuition leads to discovery. Reason is the engine of justification.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[anthony]

Intuition sniffs out the path that reason should follow with precision.

Intuition leads to discovery. Reason is the engine of justification.

Ba'al Chatzaf

That's a good one Bob.

It seems self-defeating to just dismiss as illogical a talent that we possess; only because we can't figure how it works, completely.

(My old Concise Oxford gives some interesting spin-offs from intuition : 'intuitionalism', 'intuitionism', 'intuitivism'.

This last one is a 'doctrine that ethical principles are matters of intuition.'

Which is definitely un-Objectivist.)

But good ole intuition (literally, 'in-seeing', I think) can be a powerful tool. It's totally sensible to my mind that recognitions, connections and integrations are going on beneath one's conscious level all the time.

I suppose the trick is to know when to, and when not to, draw from it.

Tony

[psychoanaleesis]

here are a sampling of letters on the subject of Intuition from OWL.

And here a few excerpts to get your engines gunning.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

The excerpts:

In fact it is kind of a running joke that objectivists just 'know' who each other are in a crowd by their 'way' of looking.

Rand argued in her fiction writing lectures that it would be not only counterproductive but literally impossible for an artist *consciously* to justify each choice he makes while creating a work. The only workable method is to rely on your subconscious while writing and then *edit later* using your conscious judgment.

In fact, in a sense, Rearden's character is this very journey from sense-perception of "something is wrong" to "explicit knowledge" that his premises were wrong.

From: Michael Hardy <hardy@math.mit.edu>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Intuition

Date: Sun, 20 May 2001 17:23:07 -0400 (EDT)

Mike Rael stated in his post of 5/17/01 that:

Rand herself was about as intuitive as they come.

John Kimball <kimball@ncia.net> objected (5/18):

The Random House College Dictionary defines intuition as the: '1. direct perception of truth, fact, etc., independent of any reasoning process; immediate apprehension ..' This appears to fly in the face of Rand's basic epistemology as I could not find no reference to the concept of intuition in any of the major works by Rand. This seems to be an unwarranted assumption on the part of Mr. Rael. I would appreciate having the references that would justify this conclusion.

The word "intuition" appears to admit several definitions, one of which was endorsed by Leonard Peikoff in an article in the 1985 volume of _The_New_Scholasticism_, titled "Aristotle's Intuitive Induction." Peikoff explained that the way in which we become aware of the truth of logical axioms cannot be by logical deduction --- that would clearly be circular reasoning --- but is a rational cognitive process that involves coming to understand the concepts involved and what the proposition says, and that that process is called "intuitive induction."

"Intuition" also means something like "emotional without feeling", which needs to be explained more long windedly, and less mysteriously to be understood. Recall Peikoff in his 12-lecture basic course saying an emotion results from a super-rapid subconscious evaluation of something as good or bad. At one point in that course he tersely mentioned that a similar super-rapid subconscious process could result in a conscious hunch, whose justification is not conscious. That is also called "intuition." Perhaps Mike Rael had that in mind.

Mike Hardy

From: Jackie Goreham <chrissycrunch@objectivists.every1.net>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: My stay at the hospital...what happened

Date: Mon, 21 May 2001 14:23:52 -0700 (PDT)

I would have to say that I agree that Objectivism and intuition do not mix, that there is some evidence that what Rand lived and what she wrote had a slight disconnect in this area. After all, this was a woman who described love at first sight with her husband and also described it in her main characters (Roark and Francon and Taggart and Galt). In fact it is kind of a running joke that objectivists just 'know' who each other are in a crowd by their 'way' of looking.

I think it is important, if somewhat difficult, to separate Objectivism the philosophical system from Rand, the woman. The philosophy allows for no contradictions, but we know the person lived some.

As for the topic at hand, I know only one objectivist and that's my boyfriend. I have never met another in person. If I were to make all people I know pass a philosophical test I would be a very lonely person indeed. There is value to be found in relationships with people who think differently than I do.

Jackie Goreham

From: Jeff Lindon <jefrey@monkey.org>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition

Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 09:04:08 -0400 (EDT)

I agree with Kurt's distinction (5/19) between senses of "intuition", and have often thought that the term takes unfair abuse.

Along the lines Kurt suggests, I think of an intuition (in its secularized sense) as a conscious awareness of pre-verbal subconscious processes. Depending on a person's psycho-epistemology, those processes will be predominantly rational or irrational. Granted that intuition is *not* a means of knowing, I do wonder whether it's a necessary stage one goes through (even if only briefly) when grappling with large, difficult problems.

Suppose that after thinking about a complex problem for a while, you can think of several different ways of proceeding, but you're not sure which is best. How do you decide -- not which is best, but which to *investigate* first? Well, your subconscious is munching on lots of things, and the only conscious awareness you have of those calculations is a "sense" or "feel". Let's say you sense that one approach to solving the problem will prove to be the best. If pressed on the issue, you may have a hard time giving concrete reasons for your sense, precisely because you don't understand the problem. But you have to decide how to proceed *somehow*, and the fact is that if you've cultivated a rational psycho-epistemology, your subconscious will generally do a good job in these kinds of "preliminary evaluations". Sometimes it takes the conscious mind a lot of (necessary) effort to see just *how* good our intuitions actually are.

Consider artistic creation as an example. Rand argued in her fiction writing lectures that it would be not only counterproductive but literally impossible for an artist *consciously* to justify each choice he makes while creating a work. The only workable method is to rely on your subconscious while writing and then *edit later* using your conscious judgment. Hopefully (and with practice, over time), your subconscious judgments come to embody your conscious principles fairly consistently. But the conscious mind is always the final arbiter. (My experience as a composer confirms the value of this method.)

(I would add here that I am not convinced that one could always verbalize *all* the reasons one had a particular intuition. Also, in my own experience, if my conscious mind contradicts my intuition, there is very often something that my conscious mind is missing. Again, that feeling does not constitute *proof* that the conscious mind is wrong, but if one knows that one has a predominantly rational psycho-epistemology, then such intuitions should set off warning bells.)

I reconcile Rand's attacks on intuition with the position she takes elsewhere by supposing that she would suggest a word other than "intuition" for what I have been describing. That makes the term a little bit like "faith", which I've discovered that many people use simply to mean "confidence". But whereas the alternative between "confidence" and "faith" is obvious, I can't think of a better alternative to "intuition" off-hand.

-Jeffrey Lindon

From: Matthew Ferrara <educator@att.net>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Intuition as second-order epistemological integration

Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 10:31:19 +0000

Just to weigh-in on the intuition-question:

I do not think that intuition is counter-Objectivism in any way; in fact, from what I can tell from Rand's writings, she's not entirely counter-intuitive (in both meanings of that phrase): Note that some of her characters like Rearden and even Cherryl (Taggart's wife) take long journeys toward knowledge by identifying, clarifying, and reflecting upon a "peripheral sense" or what we could call "gut feeling" that something in their experience was not "quite right." They then proceed to investigate their surroundings and then come to clear, rational knowledge that the people around them are acting in an irrational manner, guided by their feelings. Many times in Atlas, Rand refers to a character's sensation of something on the "edge" of their cognition that is fleeting, but re- occurs often enough to induce them to further pursue clarification. In fact, in a sense, Rearden's character is this very journey from sense-perception of "something is wrong" to "explicit knowledge" that his premises were wrong.

I think it is too easy to simply "reject" intuition because it is often equated with feelings, which are also often "rejected" by Objectivist thinkers in an off- hand manner. Rather, I think that intuition has to be put in its proper position in the epistemological hierarchy. Many great scientific discoveries have come from what we would call an "intuitive" notion of an hypothesis or experiment, which led to the discovery of a result that then was clarified "backwards" so to speak to a more full, explicit knowledge. Thinkers like Suzanne Langer or Polanyi (The Tacit Dimension) have excellent discussions on this "metacommunicative" or not-yet-expressed dimension of human thought.

It is important, from the standpoint of Objectivism, to make sure that intuition is not considered a "primary" tool to knowledge and not used as the sole basis to guide one's overall actions or life; but like emotions, intuition is a second-order activity of the rational mind.

It may help to start from a definition: I think intuition can be considered just like Rand's concept of emotions: Both are indicators or feedback-mechanisms (positive and negative) of one's thought processes. Intuitions are often "not-yet-clarified" or emerging recognitions of facts of reality. In some ways, they may be recognitions of fact that have happened faster than linguistic or fully-logical expression has occurred - although such description later emerges.

Intuition in this sense would not be the same as "revelation" or mere "gut-impulse" that religious or psychologies of noumenal-worlds/minds would have us believe (always refreshing to bash Kant this early in

the morning! grin!). And while it may not be a "rigorous" tool of knowledge like "pure logic" it still may play a valid function in cognition, so long as it remains a "stage" of knowledge and not the final or determining aspect of it.

Good morning!

Matthew Ferrara

From: Brian Gordon <briangordon@livetolearn.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition

Date: Tue, 22 May 2001 09:07:16 -0700

All,

Intuition is indeed a fascinating topic, as we all use it, yet it seems at first glance to run counter to objectivism. In fact, Nathaniel Branden has pointed out that sometimes one's intuition is correct while one's reason is not.

I think that intuition is an unconscious conclusion one has reached – the criteria and decision-making process are unconscious. This does not mean that some reasoning has not taken place, simply that one is unaware of it. I once took an excellent course entitled "The Skilled Facilitator's Workshop", in which the participants' goal was to learn to facilitate group meetings effectively and to improve the group's ability to function. This involved pointing out inappropriate behaviors, areas of conflict, and so on, and oftentimes I (and others) would pick up on things intuitively rather than explicitly. When I asked the instructor about this, his point was this: Whatever you have noticed intuitively, there is evidence for, and you must bring that evidence into your consciousness. You cannot present your intuitive beliefs to anyone, because then they lack any facts to deal with. It was a great workshop! Very objectivist, now that I look back on it.

Brian Gordon

From: Ming shan <mingshan87@hotmail.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition

Date: Thu, 24 May 2001 22:28:18

Merlin Jetton wrote (5/22):

> I wish to second Kurt Keefner's remarks (5/19) about "secular" intuition.

I wish to third them; I have not seen as much common sense brought to the discussion about intuition in a long time. He definitely based his remarks on careful observation.

>Indeed, this form of intuition is a requirement for being a skilled, or more skilled, mathematician. Here, of course, it is hardly a mere, mystical feeling. Consider the mathematician in search of a solution to a problem, which might be a path to a proof. By analogy, this intuition is the ability to see the glimpses of light down a possible path before the path is more fully lit through fuller exploration and work.

OK, that's great, but what about the mathematician who had it the most, in abundance, Srinivasa Ramanujan? This guy filled notebook after notebook after notebook with incredibly complex and deep theorems and formulae of Number Theory, but he rigorously proved not one of them. He had a power of insight that is rare, even among mathematicians. He could see clearly what the solution would be to something, and he did not need to prove it, because he already knew it was right. Some mathematicians these days are busy going through his notebooks and rigorously proving the entries he put down; so far, it's all panning out. That's how good the guy was at this type of insight.

My point is this: surely R's power of insight does not really come from "reason." The proof is that the man barely had a high schooler's understanding of trigonometry.

What we are calling intuition here strikes me as very much the same thing that Spinoza called "the third kind of knowledge." But he said that it only arises from "the second kind," which is reason. But if it only arises from it, then (1) it is surely different from it, and not the same thing, and (2) it is superior to reason.

Mingshan

From: Mike Rael <moochy_hope@yahoo.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: Re: OWL: Intuition as second-order epistemological integration

Date: Thu, 24 May 2001 08:48:52 -0700 (PDT)

Good morning yourself, Matthew:)

I really appreciate the way you fleshed out my original post on this subject, though I doubt you had the intention of doing that I don't have the energy or patience to check through Atlas, for example, to bolster up my position about intuition. I just know what I know.

I really have no criticism at all. You point out that Rand's characters use intuition (true). You mention that intuition is a stage of knowledge only (true). You say that intuition is part of the creative process (true). You infer that reason is the final arbiter of knowledge (true).

About my only disagreement is that intuition is not simply the unconscious filling-in of holes in logic that have been derived at superspeed. Ain't nuthin' wrong with gut impulses, Matt. Sometimes, for whatever reason, gut impulses are right while our "rationally derived" reason is wrong! That's why some women going down the bridal path need to heed it when they get a strong inner feeling that they shouldn't be there--despite all the "logic" that insists they are in the right place!

best always,

Mike

From: James H Cunningham <jameshcunningham@juno.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition

Date: Fri, 25 May 2001 23:42:28 -0400

Ming Shan wrote (5/24):

"[the 'third kind of knowledge' - intuition, as in the case of Srinivasa Ramanujan] is superior to reason."

And how?

Surely I could not begin to understand - let alone create - such intricate mathematical theorems without relying on a conscious reasoning process; indeed, to decide what I shall eat for dinner takes enough thought on its own, and I have not enough leisure for those high pursuits. Are you saying that Ramanujan's intuition is superior to my reason, when I cannot even decide my diet without some mental plodding-out?

When I was a child I was forced to put two and two together - when I eat food that tastes bad, I dislike putting it my mouth; and when I dislike putting something in my mouth I should not eat it - but now it is intuitive that I not eat food that I dislike; still I went through conscious reasoning at some point, so I should hardly think that my intuition is contrary to and higher than reason. It is simply something that followed.

And why is what you describe above intuition, in the non-reasoning sense? Ramanujan was equipped with a mind more able to grasp complex truths than mine or yours, and quickly; that he needed to think less does not mean that he needed to not _think_ at all; why not consider that his 'reasoning ability' was sufficiently inborn that no real effort was required to prove to himself that he _was_ correct? It is not necessary for me to 'think' to add simple sums, and I am rarely asked to prove my answers afterward; why is it so much to think that a man of a much greater mind can handle greater thoughts, without striking the call of superiority to reason?

Anyone who theorizes must do so before proving any theories he puts forth. If Ramanujan had proven his own work, would you consider it less intuition and more reason?

James H Cunningham

From: "Ming shan" <mingshan87@hotmail.com>

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: James on intuition

Date: Tue, 29 May 2001 08:18:49

>James:

> >Ming Shan wrote (5/24):

> >"[the 'third kind of knowledge' - intuition, as in the case of Srinivasa Ramanujan] is superior to reason."

> >

> >And how? And why is what you describe above intuition, in the non-reasoning sense?

> >Ramanujan was equipped with a mind more able to grasp complex truths than mine or yours, and quickly; that he needed think less does not mean that he needed not _think_ at all;

>

>Mingshan:

>Well, I never said nor implied that the man was not *thinking*; that depends on your definition of the word.

>

>why not consider that his 'reasoning ability' was sufficiently inborn that no real effort was required to prove to himself that he _was_ correct?

>

>That was exactly my point; the problem, though, was the relationship between that "inborn ability" and "reason." It is not necessary for me to 'think' to add simple sums, and I am rarely asked to prove my answers afterward;

>

>That's fine, but you're not a mathematician. No one is asked to prove anything when it's just "simple sums," but mathematicians are required to prove what they claim. That's an integral part of mathematics.

>

> >why is it so much to think that a man of a much greater mind can handle greater thoughts, without striking the call of superiority to reason?

>

>Because of a simple fact that you're neglecting in R's case: he had only the skimpiest of education in any kind of "formal" mathematics.

>Something like "reason" was not necessary in his case therefore. My full statement was My point is this: surely R's power of insight does not really come from "reason." The proof is that the man barely had a high schooler's understanding of trigonometry.

>

>Also because, it's not the thoughts we are debating about, but the way those thoughts occurred.

>

> >Anyone who theorizes must do so before proving any theories he puts forth. If Ramanujan had proven his own work, would you consider it less intuition and more reason?

>

>No, simply because, again, it's not the thoughts or their proof that's interesting, but *how* those thoughts occurred in the first place. And in R's case, he had so many occurring to him that were deep and important.

>

>Love,

>Mingshan

From: Roger Bissell <AchillesRB@aol.com>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: What is Intuition?

Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2001 01:52:12 EDT

The recent discussion of the nature of intuition has been quite interesting, and I would like to suggest another way of looking at intuition in re thinking. As against the idea some suggest that intuition is relatively more unconscious and thinking relatively more conscious, I think it's more helpful to see them both as different kinds of conscious cognitive processes. In support of this, here are some ideas I have gleaned recently from a non-Objectivist thinker, along with some personality-type-related thoughts stimulated by his ideas...

Howard Margolis in PATTERNS, THINKING, AND COGNITION (U. of Chicago Press, 1987) claimed that cognitive activity tends to be either a combination of broad focus with loose "scan control," which he labeled "intuitive" -- or a combination of narrow focus with tight "scan control," which he labeled "analytical," which is reasonably synonymous with "thinking." Since induction would seem as though it should work better in the former case (intuitive preference), while deduction would seem as though it should work better in the latter (thinking preference). I find this approach very persuasive.

However, I want to suggest another way of looking at it. I think that what Margolis is describing as "intuition" by loose focus, broad scan control is actually ~extraverted~ intuition (intuition directed toward the "outer world," which is the kind of intuition that is used by introverted thinkers, who are not nearly so analytical as their extraverted thinking brethren (and sistern...?). And the form of intuition used by extraverted thinkers may not even be recognized as such by them -- focused as they are on assessing the external world and how it can be changed, improved, corrected, etc. – but their intuition almost surely has a tighter focus and narrower scan control (since internal or "introverted" and thus not ranging around in the environment, but instead in their own internal store of ideas) than the kind used by introverted thinkers. In compensation, though, the thinking of TJs (extraverted thinkers) is easier to apply in flexible, broad fashion to assessing and planning things in the world than the thinking of TPs (introverted thinkers).

In other words, I think Margolis' model is somewhat oversimplified, but helpful in aiming us in the right direction. His suggestion that a stronger preference for intuition would make one's thinking relatively fuzzier is an interesting hypothesis, but the type results I have seen do not bear this out. My wife has a stronger intuitive preference than thinking, but she is a very precise thinker--and I have a stronger preference for thinking than for intuition, but I am a much fuzzier thinker than her. So go figure! Perhaps we are the exception to the rule, but I think the answer lies elsewhere. I am very precise and focused in my inductive, model-building process, but this is not usually regarded as thinking, but rather intuition. My wife is very precise and focused in her deductive, analytical process, but her strong inner vision, being more in the "tacit" dimension, is overlooked by those who see only her logical thinking process.

I encourage others to read Margolis' work, but discussion of the above is welcome, in any case.

Best regards,

Roger Bissell (INTP)

From: Jackie Goreham <chrissycrunch@objectivists.every1.net>

To: objectivism@wetheliving.com

Subject: OWL: Re: Intuition as second-order epistemological integration

Date: Mon, 4 Jun 2001 13:16:58 -0700 (PDT)

Mike, I don't know to whom you are referring, but eliminating emotion is Vulcan, not Objectivist. I repeat that if there is a disconnect between your emotions and your thoughts then you have made an error somewhere. There should be no disconnect. Emotions tell us nothing other than that we are having an emotion. We must use reason to identify its cause. It might be a tip off that something is wrong, sure, why not. Like a symptom... But our emotions are not "right" or "wrong" really. It's just that they either do or do not fit the context. They are only right or wrong based on our thoughts: reason.

Jackie Goreham

To all of you. I did not have time to sift through all your replies but there is an obvious flaw to the person who proposed the question. It cannot be that intuition is superior to reason because reason is the faculty which identifies and integrates sensory percepts and intuition is only an automatic product of one's reasoning mind. How can one rely on intuition without having the processor that integrates concepts? Intuition will only produce garbled answers when a person has chosen to abdicate the use of his reason. Besides, reason and emotion and/or intuition must never oppose one another. If there is a split between these, then surely there has been a mistake somewhere. As Galt mentioned, (although I cannot quote at present, since I do not have the book with me)not to simply accept statements as truths. Question everything and prove or disprove that statement and find the answer out for yourself. If you are mistaken at the end, look back at your premises, you will find that one of them is wrong. To surmise, use Logic i.e. an 'IF' - 'THEN' statement.

[Selene]

David:

Is it rational to act on deep imprinting, or intuition when it proves to be effective?

Adam

[BaalChatzaf]

Intuition is essential for discovery. Reason is essential for justification. Both discovery and justification are required for any progress in science and technology.

I am not sure how this works for art.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Peter]

David wrote:

“. . . there is an obvious flaw to the person who proposed the question. It cannot be that intuition is superior to reason because reason is the faculty which identifies and integrates sensory percepts and intuition is only an automatic product of one's reasoning mind. How can one rely on intuition without having the processor that integrates concepts? Intuition will only produce garbled answers when a person has chosen to abdicate the use of his reason.”

End quote

The “obvious flaw” in the question (not the person) was deliberately stated provocatively, to get more replies. The strategy was meekly successful.

Congratulations David! You have passed the *trick* Objectivist question. In the original posting I included old letters from a defunct site, though some of the people who wrote back then, have migrated to Objectivist Living. Never feel an obligation to read everything or to answer. You may freely associate as you please, though some respondents will get petulant if you do not answer. Set up a pay-pal account and charge them by the minute.

David wrote:

Besides, reason and emotion and/or intuition must never oppose one another. If there is a split between these, then surely there has been a mistake somewhere . . Question everything and prove or disprove that statement . . . If you are mistaken at the end, look back at your premises, you will find that one of them is wrong. To surmise, use Logic i.e. an 'IF' - 'THEN' statement.

End quote

Adam responded:

Is it rational to act on deep imprinting, or intuition when it proves to be effective?

end quote

I have no training in psychology and I do not want to steal David’s thunder, but I had an interesting thought. Hunches do work. A person looking for their lost keys, or gamblers have hunches and they do work. Nearly half the time, when a gambler tells the blackjack dealer to “Hit me,” he beats the house. But if all hunches are not evaluated and tallied, then there is a selective remembrance of positive outcomes.

The person who makes important decisions in life, by saying to themselves, “Am I feeling lucky?” is much closer to disaster, than the reasoning person.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[Dragonfly]

Besides, reason and emotion and/or intuition must never oppose one another. If there is a split between these, then surely there has been a mistake somewhere.

You shouldn't believe everything Galt says. It is in fact the beauty of intuition that it often opposes our conscious reasoning. Sure, there must then be a mistake somewhere, but the odds are that the mistake is in the conscious reasoning, as that must often be based on insufficient data. Therefore intuition is an excellent complement to logical reasoning.

PS. please don't quote whole posts, especially those that are already far too long anyway.

[Christopher]

I find myself agreeing with both Ba'al and Dragonfly here.

[psychoanaleesis]

Besides, reason and emotion and/or intuition must never oppose one another. If there is a split between these, then surely there has been a mistake somewhere.

You shouldn't believe everything Galt says. It is in fact the beauty of intuition that it often opposes our conscious reasoning. Sure, there must then be a mistake somewhere, but the odds are that the mistake is in the conscious reasoning, as that must often be based on insufficient data. Therefore intuition is an excellent complement to logical reasoning.

PS. please don't quote whole posts, especially those that are already far too long anyway.

Okay, I apologize for quoting the whole post earlier. I'm new in this forum. Thanks for the advice.

Regarding you main statement, I did not say that I merely believed in what Galt said but I have indeed proven it. Again, intuition is the product of reasoning i.e. It only produces what it has been fed. It cannot actually oppose but only follow through. If you have applied sound reasoning to new experiences then you can be assured that your intuition will not fail you the next time around.

I think what you are proposing here are cases of "dangerous situations" i.e. feeling that harm may come in one form or another. In cases such as these, if you find that your intuition/emotion opposes your conscious thoughts then it must have been because before you have experienced/known about/witnessed a similar situation before and are currently contradicting it consciously because 'new' or extraneous data/evidence has come to light.

The possible outcomes I see are as follows: A. You follow your intuition and succeed, you live and learn. B. You follow your intuition and fail, you get embarrassed and you learn. C. You don't follow your intuition and succeed, you live and learn or D. You don't follow your intuition and pay dearly because of this (worst scenario: you die). Perhaps after the ordeal you'd process it consciously and hone your intuition further. Haven't you heard of the proverb: Fool me once, shame on you...?

Only reasoning and consequently intuition does not necessitate that you should be even fooled. Sharpen your mind enough and it will cut through everything like a hot knife through butter.

Edited February 22, 2010 by David Lee

[psychoanaleesis]

David:

Is it rational to act on deep imprinting, or intuition when it proves to be effective?

Adam

First of all, what "deep imprinting" are you talking about? The knowledge left to you by your parents? HA! I did say, also as AR through Galt eloquently stated that you should question EVERYTHING and seldom should you take an idea from another person granted. Weigh and discriminate as carefully relative to the stakes you are taking although ideally, a sin is still a sin, an error is an error and if you accept a false premise, you fall into a trap and should it prove beneficial to you, then you may place a 'little faith' in that person for those sort of situation. As for intuition, yes, by all means although you should re-evaluate afterward. Learn. I also read (I'm not sure if you wrote or quoted it) in cases of gambling. Notice that you stated 'almost half of the time...'. Your scenario has provided the answer that should suffice.

[psychoanaleesis]

Congratulations David! You have passed the *trick* Objectivist question. In the original posting I included old letters from a defunct site, though some of the people who wrote back then, have migrated to Objectivist Living. Never feel an obligation to read everything or to answer. You may freely associate as you please, though some respondents will get petulant if you do not answer. Set up a pay-pal account and charge them by the minute.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

Thanks Peter. I see here too that moths are indeed attracted to light.

[Peter]

I just printd the following letter to "What's Happening" and thought I would also put it here to get a comment from the Psych guys.

Peter

Brant wrote:

While it's appropriate to accept Peter's apology and I do . . . . ”

End quote

You may feel a bit shell shocked, as do I at times, when your good intentions are denied.

I don’t just thank you for your service and for your illustrious family. Thanks for being a good sparing partner.

To shift gears. I heard on the news about a week ago about a study to decrease PTSD or post traumatic stress disorder. Medics in the Iraqi and Afghanistan war had been giving morphine to “slightly injured” soldiers, and in some cases, mentally injured, traumatized soldiers, right on the battlefield. I want to congratulate the brass for not requiring a strict accounting of every drop.

The consequence of quickly dispensed morphine was greatly decreased PTSD. They think it may work to ward off mental problems, because the brain will not totally process the horror it went through. It is individual initiative on the part of some medics, who risked having their own honor questioned by doing the honorable thing. I thank all medics for their extraordinary service to their country and to their fellow soldiers.

Their intuitive action, backed by reasoned research, may save a generation of patriots from what would have awaited them when they slept at night.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[Peter]

Ba'al Chatzaf wrote:

Intuition is essential for discovery. Reason is essential for justification. Both discovery and justification are required for any progress in science and technology . . . I am not sure how this works for art.

end quote

The formula you use is excellent. That last sentence got me wondering.

I drew things when I was a kid, played an instrument, and I doodle now, but I have never painted a picture or created a work of art. I wonder what percent of humans ever do create a work of art?

A doodle is done in an absent minded fashion. I would think a painting would be thought out and planned before starting.

I remember reading Director Steven Spielberg (Close Encounters of The Third Kind) storyboards every shot before he begins to shoot, whereas Robert Altman (Nashville) seemed to wing the whole process and the actors had a lot of latitude.

I think most of the intuition for Spielberg would be in the storyboarding phase, while Altman would be continuously relying on intuition – at least until the editing stage.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[psychoanaleesis]

I just printd the following letter to "What's Happening" and thought I would also put it here to get a comment from the Psych guys.

Peter

To shift gears. I heard on the news about a week ago about a study to decrease PTSD or post traumatic stress disorder. Medics in the Iraqi and Afghanistan war had been giving morphine to “slightly injured” soldiers, and in some cases, mentally injured, traumatized soldiers, right on the battlefield. I want to congratulate the brass for not requiring a strict accounting of every drop.

The consequence of quickly dispensed morphine was greatly decreased PTSD. They think it may work to ward off mental problems, because the brain will not totally process the horror it went through. It is individual initiative on the part of some medics, who risked having their own honor questioned by doing the honorable thing. I thank all medics for their extraordinary service to their country and to their fellow soldiers.

Their intuitive action, backed by reasoned research, may save a generation of patriots from what would have awaited them when they slept at night.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

Peter, the medics took a shortcut because the drugs forcibly suppressed the shock they should be processing right now. In the meantime, that was the best option available which I support since what they did is to the best of their knowledge and competency as far as their training goes. The soldiers with PTSD however may need help but have to seek using their own free will as no amount of medicine can cure a man who is unwilling to recover. If they do decide to be helped, one psychotherapy that is widely accepted and thoroughly researched is the Eye Movement Desensitization and Reprocessing or EMDR Website I think, this is the best, long-term option they have.