Understanding Objectivism Vs. Being an Objectivist

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Whoop-de-do. If a mother bear knows she has more than one cub, is she doing math?

Merlin,

Not that I know of.

But a quantity is involved.

Or do you deny that with your "Whoop-de-do"?

Bob bases his "category theory" concept of math on a plural, then says no quantities are involved.

Do you, like Bob, deny that "more than one" is a quantity?

I really can't believe I am discussing something as obvious as this. The arguments are coming off as vanity, not idea...

Michael

[galtgulch]

Shi'ite Objectivism (the kind that Rand and Peikoff expostulate) also claims mathematics is the science of quantity, which at best is only a half truth.

Bob,

Science of measurement, not science of quantity.

From ITOE, "Cognition and Measurement," p. 7.

Mathematics is the science of measurement.

All quantities can be measurements if used as a standard for such. Not all measurements are quantities, especially ordinal measurements, which can exist in any quantity. Math reflects this perfectly.

Actually it is imprecise to say that about quantity if quantitative relationships are considered, i.e., "bigger than," "smaller than," etc. The above statement is more precise as "Not all measurements are [fixed] quantities..."

In the "bigger than," "smaller than" sense, math does deal with quantities, since some quantity must be present to be compared to another.

English is a poor language for these things at times since the same word can mean so many different things.

Michael

Michael,

You want measurement? How about: 150,905 members of the Campaign For Liberty. Now we all know that some will scoff and point out that it would take tens of millions of votes to win a presidential election. But we are going to start with a variety of lower offices which require far less signatures to get on the ballot. As I understand it the plan and dream is to find a candidate to run for every Congressional seat in the whole country. Reality will show!

gulch

[BaalChatzaf]

Michael,

You want measurement? How about: 150,905 members of the Campaign For Liberty. Now we all know that some will scoff and point out that it would take tens of millions of votes to win a presidential election. But we are going to start with a variety of lower offices which require far less signatures to get on the ballot. As I understand it the plan and dream is to find a candidate to run for every Congressional seat in the whole country. Reality will show!

gulch

Added: Delenda Cartago Est.

[merjet]

Whoop-de-do. If a mother bear knows she has more than one cub, is she doing math?

Merlin,

Not that I know of.

But a quantity is involved.

True, but quantity is a far wider concept than number or math. "More" or "less" is sufficient for quantity, but they do not imply a number or that one is doing math.

Do you, like Bob, deny that "more than one" is a quantity?

Of course not, but see my last answer.

[BaalChatzaf]

Whoop-de-do. If a mother bear knows she has more than one cub, is she doing math?

Merlin,

Not that I know of.

But a quantity is involved.

Or do you deny that with your "Whoop-de-do"?

Bob bases his "category theory" concept of math on a plural, then says no quantities are involved.

Do you, like Bob, deny that "more than one" is a quantity?

I really can't believe I am discussing something as obvious as this. The arguments are coming off as vanity, not idea...

Michael

All you need for "more than one" is "not the same" or "!="

The set A has more than one element if there exists x, y in A such that x != y.

More than one is not a quantity. At most it is the property of of quantity.

There are mathematical systems that are NOT about quantities. So quantity is not a necessary thing for an intellectual construct to be a mathematical system. Mathematics is -essentially- the art/science/discipline of abstract structures and their inter-relationships such as isomorphism and homomorphism. The formal logic of objects and their properties (predicate logic) is an example of a mathematical system that is not essentially about quantity. It is more about declarative propositions about things. Aristotle's system of categorical assertions and its associated syllogistic logic was not about quantity. That system is a restricted form of predicate logic and rendered as a formal system it is a mathematical system that is NOT about quantities and measurement at all.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Rich Engle]

I think that last post gave me a bleeder.

[thomtg]

Thom,

[...]

1. Is being something a thought process or an action process? If being an Objectivist is an action process, then it doesn't matter what you think, it matters how you act. Both Rand and N.Branden were always action-centered when it came down to it.

2. If by understanding Objectivism you become an Objectivist, then doesn't that extrapolate to mean that understanding any other philosophical positions, you become a follower of those positions too? If I truly grasp a religion that is founded on principles of logic and epistemology, would I then become a religious follower by default? If not... does it mean I can never grasp anything without becoming identified to and defined by it?

Chris

Christopher,

For the most part, any word that ends with the suffix "-ism" denotes an idea or set of ideas integrated into one unit. My original post makes the claim that since an idea is a cognitive product, it needs but cognitive actions to produce it conceptually. Moreover, only if the grasp of the idea is assented to be true does the person understanding some X'ism become an X'ist. And since cognitive actions are sufficient to understand and to be an idea's believer, existential actions on an accepted idea is a separate concern, albeit a moral one.

Given the above summary, I would answer your Point 1 as follows: To be something cognitive entails a thought process and not an action process; but to be something moral entails an action process existentially. You want to be an Aristotelian? Seek to understand Aristotelianism, which, according to Rand, stands for the supremacy of reason (as opposed to mysticism or skepticism) in the acquisition of knowledge of reality. (ARA 148) You want to be an honorable man? Do honorable deeds in accordance with the moral code you acquired cognitively. In other words, you become a particular moral agent when you understand and assent to a code of morality, but you become moral (or immoral) when you act existentially.

On your Point 2, I refer back to my original post to emphasize the importance of understanding "understanding" in order to understand anything. The understanding of Objectivism is merely a concrete example to showcase my claims. So, I would answer you affirmatively with respect to any system of ideas, philosophical or otherwise. If my analysis of "understanding" is correct, the real difficulty is in reaching true understanding.

The cognitive actions involved in understanding anything require methods of inquiry and methods of verification. Firstly, oftentimes, people don't know what they believe, let alone discern what others claim. Their methods of inquiry, of belief-formation, are faulty, which cause them either to fail to extract the communicated thoughts from what they hear or read, or to fail to abstain from inventing thoughts they wish to have heard or read. Secondly, oftentimes, people claim to understand something quite well, but they don't, which become evident when they express their thoughts. Their methods of verification are faulty, which cause them either to fail to weed out nonsense and falsity, or to fail to assent crucial truths.

Raising more emphasis to this difficulty, here is a quotation from David Kelley. I've quoted this often in my live discussion meetings, and I will probably bring it up from time to time on here:

Understanding propositions is a vital skill in reasoning. When we take a position on an issue, we are asserting that a certain proposition is true. If we can't distinguish between propositions that are similar but not identical, then we don't really know what we believe, and we can't tell whether someone else's position contradicts our own.

It is an astounding truism that an agreement or disagreement without understanding isn't worth a damn. And arguing for a misunderstanding is the stuff that straw men are made.

Feel free to quote me on this snippet. :-)

To reiterate, it is impossible to be in a state of understanding X'ism while not being an X'ist. I do think however that the converse is possible; it is plainly evident that there are people who claim themselves to be X'ists but who, upon speaking their thoughts, do not understand X'ism.

[thomtg]

Thom,

[...]

... does it mean I can never grasp anything without becoming identified to and defined by it?

Chris

This question recurred yesterday evening after my gang of friends, we went out to watch the latest Star Trek movie.

What about the status of Star Trekkers? Well, anyone who has read books and watched enough Star Trek TV episodes, cartoons, and movies; and who really understands Gene Roddenbery's fictional universe and assents to its imaginative truth, is a Star Trekker. Of course, the whole saga is plain fantasy; so he should not confuse the imaginative order with the real order of things. Nevertheless, the principle of understanding X'ism and being an X'ist, operates just the same in either order.

So in a sense the answer to your question, Chris, has a loophole. Being a Star Trekker is perfectly fine. Wearing Star Fleet uniforms and greeting each others in alien languages in everyday life, on the other hand,... that's not cool, ... but that's a separate (psychological) issue.

[BaalChatzaf]

So in a sense the answer to your question, Chris, has a loophole. Being a Star Trekker is perfectly fine. Wearing Star Fleet uniforms and greeting each others in alien languages in everyday life, on the other hand,... that's not cool, ... but that's a separate (psychological) issue.

qPlah!

Ba'al Chatzaf (I wish I were a Klingon, but I am a Vulcan instead).

[Reidy]

Where would you put people who understand Objectivism but don't buy into it? Michael Huemer seems to have an excellent grasp of the theory, as do most of the non-Objectivist presenters at the ARS/APA sessions, but I can't see calling them Objectivists.

[Dragonfly]

I understand Objectivism all too well.

[Brant Gaede]

I understand Objectivism all too well.

Objectivism claims too much for itself. This made sense in the 1950s and 1960s for the sake of intellectual and cultural battles in which the foes of Objectivism ignored too much and Ayn Rand was bitch-slapping the collectivists. It was essentially a matter of gathering your forces in one place so you'd be noticed and paid attention to.

--Brant

[thomtg]

Considering the many comments lately about theism on OL, I thought it might be interesting to use the idea to exemplify and contrast further my analysis of understanding X'ism versus being an X'ist.

To begin, let's quote Barbara Branden in a recent post elsewhere, where she asserts a logical link between assenting to the truth of a belief and being its believer: "... one cannot ... claim to be a Christian while denying the existence of God..." I interpret this to mean, if you deny the belief of God's existence, then you cannot be a Christian. The contrapositive of this hypothetical proposition is, if you are a Christian, then you believe that God exists. More generally, Barbara's statement becomes, if you are a theist, then you assent theism to be true. From the general statement, we can infer logically that if you take theism to be false, you are therefore an atheist.

By this logic, if you are an Objectivist, then you assent Objectivism (or some stipulated core part) to be true. And if you deny Objectivism to be true, then you are not an Objectivist.

The hypothetical relationship which Barbara asserts is much stronger than the one I have been discussing in the present thread. Where she asserts "If you are an X'ist/ian, then you believe/understand X'ism," the converse position I have argued is weaker, "If you believe/understand X'ism, then you are an X'ist/ian."

What is the difference? Setting aside the obvious but tangential difference of "mere belief" versus "understanding," the difference of interest in the present context is that Barbara's formulation completely removes fake Christians or fake theists. If you don't have the belief (and think it true), then you are not its believer. In my formulation, I admit the possibility of fake Objectivists. I make no claim about the status of those who don't understand Objectivism but who nevertheless claim to be Objectivists.

So, it would seem that my formulation aims at the cognitive condition of understanding. If you understand X'ism, being an X'ist automatically follows as a consequence. Barbara's formulation, on the other hand, aims at self-identifying. If you don't understand X'ism, you cannot be an X'ist. The two converses complement and strengthen each other. And while I happen to agree to the truths of both, I have only defended, "If you understand X'ism, you are an X'ist."

If this hypothetical relationship is true, which I have earlier argued to be true, one can see the impossibility of the combination of someone simultaneously understanding Objectivism but not being an Objectivist. This is tantamount to claiming impossibly for somone to understand atheism to be true but not being an atheist. With this formulation, I remove fake or mis- understanding; I deny the existence of the non-Objectivists who understand X'ism.

On my formulation, I think it is more honest cognitively for someone to say he is not an Objectivist than for him to say that he understands Objectivism but is not an Objectivist. Conversely, in Barbara's formulation, it is more honest for someone to misconclude and say that Objectivism is false than for him to say that he is an Objectivist but believes the core of Objectivism to be false.

[Brant Gaede]

Well, yes, but what is Objectivism, really.

--Brant

[xblade0]

Hey, you got math debate in my philosophy debate!

I'm gonna rewind this thread.

Rather interesting that base mechanics such as quantitive theory are still being fought over in social circles, but I think it uncovers a more pertinent question: if mathematics is defined as "the science of numbers and their operations, interrelations, combinations, generalizations, and abstractions and of space configurations and their structure, measurement, transformations, and generalizations" (source: Merriam-Webster), how can we, in good sense, apply and then remove a basic tenet and classify it under one term? To many, myself included, the foundation of mathematics is a relation between terms, which would seem to imply a quantity created through the relation of identity, or at least the relation of terms. (X and Y being different by assertion that we define them as such) If we are to say there is no quantity in certain cases, how can there be relation in these cases, and therefore, how can they be mathematics?

Sorry, to spam Webster, but I believe quantity defined as "the aspect in which a thing is measurable in terms of greater, less, or equal or of increasing or decreasing magnitude; or ;the subject of a mathematical operation" is applicable. According to this, the example of the bear's cubs and the running gnus would be considered both quantity and mathematics.

[tjohnson]

If we are to say there is no quantity in certain cases, how can there be relation in these cases, and therefore, how can they be mathematics?

Your argument depends on your definition of mathematics, which is perfectly good, but it is not the only one possible. If mathematics was defined as "a language of relations and multi-dimensional order capable of exact treatment at a given date", for example, one could come to very different conclusions. Relations are not quantities but they are used in counting and measurement.

[xblade0]

That's where I'm confused. Mathematics is relation, but how can we make relations when we have nothing to relate? Logic would seem to state that an action without an actioned object cannot be completed. If we are comparing nothing (non-quantity), how can we compare?

Then again, maybe I misunderstand. I'm working on the principle that any symbol is a quantity because it is defined as something over nothing, and must be related to another symbol in order to give the operation more than a reflexive meaning.

[tjohnson]

That's where I'm confused. Mathematics is relation, but how can we make relations when we have nothing to relate? Logic would seem to state that an action without an actioned object cannot be completed. If we are comparing nothing (non-quantity), how can we compare?

Then again, maybe I misunderstand. I'm working on the principle that any symbol is a quantity because it is defined as something over nothing, and must be related to another symbol in order to give the operation more than a reflexive meaning.

The relations are between the symbols only, in pure mathematics. For example, suppose we have the set S, {a,b,c,d,e,f} and we define a relation, R, such that (a,b)=>e and (c,d)=>f. Now the set R(S) is {e,f}, where R(S) is S after transformation by R. It's all about associating symbols and following rules of transformation.

[thomtg]

Considering the many comments lately about theism on OL, I thought it might be interesting to use the idea to exemplify and contrast further my analysis of understanding X'ism versus being an X'ist.

To begin, let's quote Barbara Branden in a recent post elsewhere, where she asserts a logical link between assenting to the truth of a belief and being its believer: "... one cannot ... claim to be a Christian while denying the existence of God..." I interpret this to mean, if you deny the belief of God's existence, then you cannot be a Christian. The contrapositive of this hypothetical proposition is, if you are a Christian, then you believe that God exists. More generally, Barbara's statement becomes, if you are a theist, then you assent theism to be true. From the general statement, we can infer logically that if you take theism to be false, you are therefore an atheist.

By this logic, if you are an Objectivist, then you assent Objectivism (or some stipulated core part) to be true. And if you deny Objectivism to be true, then you are not an Objectivist.

The hypothetical relationship which Barbara asserts is much stronger than the one I have been discussing in the present thread. Where she asserts "If you are an X'ist/ian, then you believe/understand X'ism," the converse position I have argued is weaker, "If you believe/understand X'ism, then you are an X'ist/ian."

What is the difference? Setting aside the obvious but tangential difference of "mere belief" versus "understanding," the difference of interest in the present context is that Barbara's formulation completely removes fake Christians or fake theists. If you don't have the belief (and think it true), then you are not its believer. In my formulation, I admit the possibility of fake Objectivists. I make no claim about the status of those who don't understand Objectivism but who nevertheless claim to be Objectivists.

So, it would seem that my formulation aims at the cognitive condition of understanding. If you understand X'ism, being an X'ist automatically follows as a consequence. Barbara's formulation, on the other hand, aims at self-identifying. If you don't understand X'ism, you cannot be an X'ist. The two converses complement and strengthen each other. And while I happen to agree to the truths of both, I have only defended, "If you understand X'ism, you are an X'ist."

If this hypothetical relationship is true, which I have earlier argued to be true, one can see the impossibility of the combination of someone simultaneously understanding Objectivism but not being an Objectivist. This is tantamount to claiming impossibly for somone to understand atheism to be true but not being an atheist. With this formulation, I remove fake or mis- understanding; I deny the existence of the non-Objectivists who understand X'ism.

On my formulation, I think it is more honest cognitively for someone to say he is not an Objectivist than for him to say that he understands Objectivism but is not an Objectivist. Conversely, in Barbara's formulation, it is more honest for someone to misconclude and say that Objectivism is false than for him to say that he is an Objectivist but believes the core of Objectivism to be false.

Well, yes, but what is Objectivism, really.

--Brant

If you want a core set of integrated ideas of what Objectivism is, I would refer you to a short summary excerpted here in Dec. 23, 2006 by MSK. If my understanding of "understanding" is correct (see top Post #1 and Post #32), understanding this core will enable anyone to become an Objectivist.

[Xray]

Is it possible to understand Objectivism and not be an Objectivist? I think not.

But of course this is possible. For understanding a thought system/ideology does not have as a necessary sequitur that one becomes a supporter.

For example, my finally fully understanding the ideology of the religious denomination I happened to have been born into (catholicism) led me to "resign my membership" there.

As for objectivsm - it is built on the premise that there exist objective values. This premise is a fallacy imo.

Edited June 2, 2009 by Xray