Isidore-Auguste-Marie-François-Xavier . . . Comte

[william.scherk]

Thanks to the patient drumming of Barbara Branden and Ted Keer, especially the idea that the poor old mug should be afforded respect for the meaning of the word, I asked myself, "Well, what meaning did the old mug give for his word, what job did it do in his system, and what did he have to say about psychology?"

I asked myself about psychology because I wondered how the hell he figured the only ethical system fit for human beings was one of those beings in thrall to ideals of altruism, self-sacrifice, the Other -- to higher callings.

And wouldn't you know, but the answer wasn't what I thought it would be. For one thing, Comte had disdain for psychology as a science, and omitted it from his didactic model, as its products and processes were deemed inobservable. Sociology, however, he deemed social physics. He had a hierarchy of knowledge and a scheme for its acquisition, holding that one must begin with mathematics, move on to astronomy, then to physics, chemistry, biology and ultimately to sociology. A 'Postiviste' it seems! As 'social physics,' sociology implies a rational, systematic examination of human behaviour, which makes me think that his 'altruism' -- as an ethical mainstay of an ideal society, as a prescription, was at least partly derived from what he saw as evidence of behavioural universals.

And sure enough, what was the apotheosis? Well, a church, a rational church, a Religion of Humanity, with its doctrines united under love . . . that most distinctly human attribute and action.

A final note on Comte and then an excerpt and a link to wherein my ignorance was breached -- he believed that there could be a 'final science' beyond his uppermost social physics. And this ultimate field of knowledge, built upon the lower orders as a holon is built of its supervening simpliciters, was, well, an abstract morality.

The French philosopher and social theorist Auguste Comte is known as the originator of sociology and ‘positivism’, a philosophical system by which he aimed to discover and perfect the proper political arrangements of modern industrial society. He was the first thinker to advocate the use of scientific procedures in the study of economics, politics and social behaviour, and, motivated by the social and moral problems caused by the French Revolution, he held that the practice of such a science would lead inevitably to social regeneration and progress.

Comte’s positivism can be characterized as an approach which rejects as illegitimate all that cannot be directly observed in the investigation and study of any subject. His system of ‘positive philosophy’ had two laws at its foundation: a historical or logical law, ‘the law of three stages’, and an epistemological law, the classification or hierarchy of the sciences. The law of three stages governs the development of human intelligence and society: in the first stage, early societies base their knowledge on theological grounds, giving ultimately divine explanations for all phenomena; later, in the metaphysical stage, forces and essences are sought as explanations, but these are equally chimerical and untestable; finally, in the positive or scientific stage, knowledge is secured solely on observations, by their correlation and sequence. Comte saw this process occurring not only in European society, but also in the lives of every individual. We seek theological solutions in childhood, metaphysical solutions in youth, and scientific explanations in adulthood.

His second, epistemological law fixed a classification or hierarchy of sciences according to their arrival at the positive stage of knowledge. In order of historical development and thus of increasing complexity, these are mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology and sociology. (Comte rejected psychology as a science, on the grounds that its data were unobservable and therefore untestable.) Knowledge of one science rested partly on the findings of the preceding science; for Comte, students must progress through the sciences in the correct order, using the simpler and more precise methods of the preceding science to tackle the more complex issues of later ones. In his six-volume Cours de philosophie positive (The Positive Philosophy) (1830–42), Comte gave an encyclopedic account of these sciences, ending with an exposition of what he regarded as the most advanced: social physics or ‘sociology’ (a term he invented). The sociologist’s job would be to discover the laws that govern human behaviour on a large scale, and the ways in which social institutions and norms operate together in a complex yet ultimately predictable system.

In his later work, Comte fleshed out his vision of the positive society, describing among other things a Religion of Humanity in which historical figures would be worshipped according to their contribution to society. Despite such extravagances, however, the broader themes of his positivism – especially the idea that long-standing social problems should be approached scientifically – proved influential both in France and, through J.S. Mill’s early support, in England.

[from an exceedingly good introduction to Comte that I wish I had forked up a long time ago, at the blog Compossível, História da Filosofia]

Edited September 8, 2008 by william.scherk

[kiaer.ts]

Thanks, I've bookmarked the blog.

[BaalChatzaf]

[from an exceedingly good introduction to Comte that I wish I had forked up a long time ago, at the blog Compossível, História da Filosofia]

Once again, a nifty posting, WSS. Excellent!

Comte would have been a choice target for Poppers guns. See -The Open Society and Its Enemies- by Karl Popper.

Through purely "scientific" thought this social mechanic would have reduced the human race to cogs and gears.

I am surprised the Objectivists have not attributed Comte's thinking to the Evil Kant.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited September 8, 2008 by BaalChatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

It is interesting that he coined the term "sociology."

All Objectivists know he coined the term "altruism" because Rand mentioned it, but I doubt many know he also fathered sociology.

I suppose I will get around to reading him one day. It is also interesting that (from this introduction) he thought he could "discover the laws that govern human behaviour on a large scale," but essentially dismiss studying the mind (psychology). From your quote about him in another thread, he apparently thought you could study bumps on the head instead (phrenology).

Michael

[kiaer.ts]

From your quote about him in another thread, he apparently thought you could study bumps on the head instead (phrenology).

Originally, phrenology (phren-/brain-) was motivated by the discovery that damage to certain brain areas had certain predictable effects. For example, damage to Broca's and Wernicke's areas of the brain produces specific types of speech defects. (My grandmother had Wernicke's aphasia due to a stroke - the effect was clinically quite remarkable.) Quackery was one of the great passtimes of the Victorian age. That the study of brain areas led, among charlatans, to a belief that one could divine character traits from skull shape (which was obviously determined by brain morphology) should not in and of itself discredit the names of early people identified with the label phrenologist.

Stephen Jay Gould wrote an essay defending early phrenologists. One can see a depiction of a man with a rather mild form of Wernicke's aphasia on House, MD.

[william.scherk]

I suppose I will get around to reading him one day. It is also interesting that (from this introduction) he thought he could "discover the laws that govern human behaviour on a large scale," but essentially dismiss studying the mind (psychology).

Comte's Religion of Humanity certainly struck a chord in your second country, Michael. Except for an un-consecrated Temple in Paris, the remaining temples of his religion are found only in Brazil!

See the odd site from which this photo comes.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

William,

Several French intellectuals and religious figures down there have blossomed, but have not been too successful in the rest of the world. Allan Kardec is another. He is HUGE in Brazil.

Brazil is a curious melting pot.

Michael

[Barbara Branden]

1. "The French philosopher and social theorist Auguste Comte is known as the originator of sociology and ‘positivism’, a philosophical system by which he aimed to discover and perfect the proper political arrangements of modern industrial society. He was the first thinker to advocate the use of scientific procedures in the study of economics, politics and social behaviour, and, motivated by the social and moral problems caused by the French Revolution, he held that the practice of such a science would lead inevitably to social regeneration and progress."

2. "Comte rejected psychology as a science, on the grounds that its data were unobservable and therefore untestable."

If only the directly observable is a source of knowledge, and psychology is an invalid pseudo-science, then what does "originator" mean? -- or "aim"? -- or "discover"? -- or "thinker"? -- or"proper"?-- or "study"? "or motivated by"?

Barbara

[kiaer.ts]

Several French intellectuals and religious figures down there have blossomed, but have not been too successful in the rest of the world. Allan Kardec is another. He is HUGE in Brazil.

From that link:

He was already in his early fifties when he became interested in the wildly popular phenomenon of spirit-tapping. At the time, strange phenomena attributed to the action of spirits were reported in many different places, most notably in the U.S. and France, attracting the attention of high society. The first such phenomena were at best frivolous and entertaining, featuring objects that moved or "tapped" under what was said to be spirit control. In some cases, this was alleged to be a type of communication: the supposed spirits answered questions by controlling the movements of objects so as to pick out letters to form words, or simply indicate "yes" or "no."

As a teacher with some scientific background (he had never attended a university), Rivail decided to do his own research. Not being a medium himself, he compiled a list of questions and began working with mediums and channelers to pose them to spirits. Soon the quality of the allegedly communication with spirits appeared to improve.

Rivail used the name "Allan Kardec" allegedly after a spirit identified as Zefiro, whom he had been communicating with, told him about a previous incarnation of his as a Druid by that name. Rivail liked the name and decided to use it to keep his Spiritists writings separate from his work, basically books for high school students.

Almost nothing whatsoever is know of Druidism. Why didn't Zefiro tell us something more interesting about it than that there was once a Druid named Allan? Why not give us a translation for the lost language of the Etruscans? Why not dictate the lost plays and books of the Greeks? Why always the banal, never the profound? Why have an afterlife if all it consists of is learning the family gossip of the dead?

[BaalChatzaf]

If only the directly observable is a source of knowledge, and psychology is an invalid pseudo-science, then what does "originator" mean? -- or "aim"? -- or "discover"? -- or "thinker"? -- or"proper"?-- or "study"? "or motivated by"?

Barbara

You have put your finger on the Achilles Heel of logical positivism. If a science were restricted to only that which could be directly or nearly directly perceived* then it would be very restricted in what it could predict and would provide very little understanding of what is going on in the cosmos. Things like "originator", "aim" etc. (as you have listed above) correspond to hypothetical causal entities such as atom, electron, proton, neutron, field etc.. These not directly observed hypothetical or inferential entities are precisely what we need to grasp or understand what is going on Out There but not directly observable. A science based only on the directly perceptible would not be wrong, but it would be woefully incomplete and very unsatisfying. Humans not only want to know -what-, but -how- and -why-. The -how and the -why- require entities not directly seen, heard, smelled, felt etc.. We could not understand how we understand without assuming underlying actions produced by our intellect. We get a hold of these primarily through introspection and comparing our introspection with the behavior we observe in others like us. (NB: Note that "like us" is an assumption that the folks we see and talk to have the same internal works that we do). This is the theory laden aspect of our psychological understanding.

Ba'al Chatzaf

*The things we see through a telescope are not directly perceived. They are visual artifacts created by the optical (or other physical) properties of the instruments we use in connection with the visual apparatus of our brains. Yet they are just as "real" as what we get with our unaided senses. But to understand what out instruments tell us we have to hypothesize how the instruments works, and this is done very often in terms of that which is not perceived directly and unaided. This is the measure of how -theory laden- our "factual" explanations and observations are. We need a theory of optics to explain how we see things right side up, since the simple lens in our eyes produce an inverted image on the retina (check that out using a simple magnifying glass).

[Ellen Stuttle]

We need a theory of optics to explain how we see things right side up, since the simple lens in our eyes produce an inverted image on the retina (check that out using a simple magnifying glass).

The image on the retina has no more causal significance in the process of seeing than has the visibly (to the sighted) red color of hemoglobin to the process of oxygen transport.

You've fallen yourself there into the legacy of confusing seeing an "image" with seeing the world.

Ellen

___

[Dragonfly]

The image on the retina has no more causal significance in the process of seeing than has the visibly (to the sighted) red color of hemoglobin to the process of oxygen transport.

Oh yes, it has. No image on the retina: nothing is seen. An unsharp image on the retina: only a hazy view. Block a part of the image on the retina: the blocked part is not seen, etc. If that isn't a causal relationship, I don't know what is. The image on the retina is digitized and processed just as the image of a camera lens on the sensor chip of a digital camera is digitized and processed.

Where Bob is wrong, is when he claims that we need a theory of optics to explain how we see things right side up. The image on the retina is the end of the optical part. From there it is a question of processing by the brain. That we perceive the world with things right side up is a psychological effect. If we invert the image once more with special glasses, we'll perceive the world at first upside down, but after a certain period (constantly wearing those special glasses) we perceive it again as normal, our brain has adapted to the new situation. There is a correlation between the internal geometry of the image on the retina and the way we perceive the world, but the orientation of the image in the eye is not relevant, our gravity sensors and our proprioception tell us what's up and what's down.

[BaalChatzaf]

Where Bob is wrong, is when he claims that we need a theory of optics to explain how we see things right side up.

Actually we need a theory of how the visual cortex works to invert the inversion without a compound lens being involved. Perhaps I did not make myself sufficiently clear. A simple lens, such as the lens in our eye produces an inverted project on the retina. Where we need a theory of optics is to account for -magnified- virtual images produced by compound lenses. The virtual magnified image is an artifact and a geometrical construct derived from projecting the inbound rays to the other side of the lens. In any case there is an assumption that light rays are straight lines (this goes back to Euclid's book on Optics).

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited September 9, 2008 by BaalChatzaf

[Jerry Biggers]

It is interesting that he coined the term "sociology."

All Objectivists know he coined the term "altruism" because Rand mentioned it, but I doubt many know he also fathered sociology.

I suppose I will get around to reading him one day. It is also interesting that (from this introduction) he thought he could "discover the laws that govern human behaviour on a large scale," but essentially dismiss studying the mind (psychology). From your quote about him in another thread, he apparently thought you could study bumps on the head instead (phrenology).

Michael

Comte may have been a "founder" of the discipline, sociology (although it is a rather hazy area as to exactly where "social thought" theory was supplanted by sociological theory). However, let us not forget that a staunch defender of individualism, liberty, and laissez-faire, HERBERT SPENCER, is also credited as a "father" of sociology.

One of Spencer's disciples (or dare I say, "intellectual heir"?), WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, is considered a father of American sociology. In addition, Sumner was as staunch a defender of individualism and laissez-faire as was Spencer. Both Spencer and Sumner have been labeled as "social darwinists." However, this is a distortion (possibly, intentionally, by Richard Hofstadter) of their position.

Incidentally, Auguste Comte served as a "secretary" (and "intellectual heir") to Henri Saint-Simon (until he broke with him) and adopted (Saint-Simon said, "stole") almost all of Saint-Simon's concepts into his own Positivist philosophy (with the notable exceptions of Saint-Simon's scorn of government bureaucracy and defense of the "entrepreneurial class.")

Saint-Simon, by the way, was not a "Utopian Socialist," (as Engels labeled him) and at times flirted with laissez-faire and other classical liberal concepts. For a rather startling intellectual "anticipation" of one of Rand's key concepts and themes in Atlas Shrugged, see Saint-Simon's "A Parable," his first major publication, which resulted in his arrest and trial by the French government for "sedition." Luckily for him, he was a fast talker and convinced the court of his innocence.

[Ellen Stuttle]

The image on the retina has no more causal significance in the process of seeing than has the visibly (to the sighted) red color of hemoglobin to the process of oxygen transport.

Oh yes, it has. No image on the retina: nothing is seen. An unsharp image on the retina: only a hazy view. Block a part of the image on the retina: the blocked part is not seen, etc. If that isn't a causal relationship, I don't know what is. The image on the retina is digitized and processed just as the image of a camera lens on the sensor chip of a digital camera is digitized and processed.

Well, I suggest that you need a refresher on Hume's warning against presuming causation from constant conjunction. ;-)

The idea that it's the image on the retina which triggers the nerve impulse predates the photon theory of light, according to which it's absorbed photons which are the causal trigger to the nerve impulse. If photons aren't striking the photo-sensitive cells, there's conjunctly no image; if the stream of photons isn't striking in a way positioned for maximum edge discrimination, vision is hazy, and conjunctly the retinal image isn't sharp; if part of the image is blocked, conjunctly photons aren't striking the photo-sensitive cells in the blocked area; but it isn't the image which is triggering the nerve impulse.

The rest of your post I don't disagree with.

Ellen

___

[Dragonfly]

Well, I suggest that you need a refresher on Hume's warning against presuming causation from constant conjunction. ;-)

And how would you prove causation?

The idea that it's the image on the retina which triggers the nerve impulse predates the photon theory of light, according to which it's absorbed photons which are the causal trigger to the nerve impulse. If photons aren't striking the photo-sensitive cells, there's conjunctly no image; if the stream of photons isn't striking in a way positioned for maximum edge discrimination, vision is hazy, and conjunctly the retinal image isn't sharp; if part of the image is blocked, conjunctly photons aren't striking the photo-sensitive cells in the blocked area; but it isn't the image which is triggering the nerve impulse.

But the image on the retina is nothing but the aggregate set of photons that strike the retina. The photon description is merely a more detailed, microscopic description and the image description a macroscopic description of the same thing. A similar example of two different levels of description: a gas that moves a piston. In the thermodynamic description it is the pressure of the gas that causes the movement of the piston, in the statistical mechanics description it is the effect of the momentum of individual gas molecules striking the molecules of the piston. Both descriptions are equally valid. In the eye example the photon description focuses on the sampling mechanism and the image description on the geometry of the image. The phrase "stream of photons isn't striking in a way positioned for maximum edge discrimination" is completely uninformative (it sounds like officialese) if you don't translate it into the language of optical images.

[Robert Campbell]

Auguste Comte is a historically important thinker, too often overlooked today.

Over in my "Corner," there's a link to my short article on Auguste Comte, Ayn Rand, and altruism:

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...ost&p=32423

I've read Comte's Catéchisme Positiviste and excerpts from his Système de Polité Positive (I wonder how many human beings since John Stuart Mill have read all four volumes of the latter).

Comte's objection to psychology was partly scientific (he believed that psychology could be reduced to neurophysiology, and that phrenology, in turn, was a legitimate way of doing neurophysiology). But it was partly moral. He believed that the study of individual human actors would promote selfishness and personnalité (a very bad word, in the Comtean lexicon).

So Comte wanted to make sociology a science, in place of psychology, in order to promote collectivism. Karl Marx is usually taken to be another founder of sociology; obviously, collectivism didn't bother him a whole lot either. But there is no necessary connection between the study of human society and collectivism, as Herbert Spencer was fortunately able to remind us.

Comte's positivism was less extreme than some later version have been—he wagged his finger whenever anyone offered a causal explanation, but was willing to accept common sense notions of data, instead of trying to analyze physical objects into clumps of "sense data" or what have you. All the same, he could be pretty narrow-minded about scientific questions. In the Catechism, he rails against "pedantocratic" physicists who speculate about the temperatures of stars, on the grounds that such astrophysical matters have no practical relevance to human beings, and no one will ever be able to collect relevant data...

Robert Campbell

[Ellen Stuttle]

Well, I suggest that you need a refresher on Hume's warning against presuming causation from constant conjunction. ;-)

And how would you prove causation?

You're the one who made an assertion about causation, DF.

I'll try to get back to the rest of your comments in December. I think you're falling into a trap which has long beset the study of visual perception. But I can confidently predict a lengthy dispute if we try to discuss the subject, and I'm out of time for lengthy disputes this fall -- I already got behind with my household-project schedule by spending too much time on induction.

So...later, I hope. (If I can come back to it later, I'll start a new thread on the topic in the Science & Math forum. Comte's "positivist" philosophy isn't irrelevant to the history of theories of visual perception, but I think that discussing the nitty-grittys would best be done on a thread specifically about theory of perception.)

Ellen

___

[Dragonfly]

You're the one who made an assertion about causation, DF.

And you suggested that this assertion was not valid, therefore I ask you what your criterion for a valid assertion about causality is.

But I can confidently predict a lengthy dispute if we try to discuss the subject,

Ha! I'm looking forward to it!

[Ellen Stuttle]

You're the one who made an assertion about causation, DF.

And you suggested that this assertion was not valid, therefore I ask you what your criterion for a valid assertion about causality is.

It's a question to which I'm not prepared to give a "definitive" answer, but whatever my "criterion" is, it isn't constant conjunction.

Nor do I think that constant conjunction is your criterion, despite your appearance of adopting that criterion in your post #12. You've written much more sophisticated analyses of what "cause" means than "If that isn't a causal relationship, I don't know what is" in other posts on other threads. For instance, a thread on which Shayne Wissler posed a badly framed question about a baseball (or some sort of human-impelled ball) striking a window. I'll leave you to look up the reference. ;-)

Ellen

___

[Neil Parille]

I've read little of Comte, but Hayek devotes a lot of attention to him in The Counter-Revolution of Science. I also have read De Lubac's The Drama of Atheist Humanis which talks about Comte's religion.

Some conservative sociologists, such as R. Nisbett, believe Comte is important and somewhat conservative.

-NEIL

[Dragonfly]

It's a question to which I'm not prepared to give a "definitive" answer,

Hmmm...

Nor do I think that constant conjunction is your criterion, despite your appearance of adopting that criterion in your post #12. You've written much more sophisticated analyses of what "cause" means than "If that isn't a causal relationship, I don't know what is" in other posts on other threads. For instance, a thread on which Shayne Wissler posed a badly framed question about a baseball (or some sort of human-impelled ball) striking a window. I'll leave you to look up the reference. ;-)

Well, I supposed you would be able to fill in the missing parts yourself...

[william.scherk]

Auguste Comte is a historically important thinker, too often overlooked today.

Over in my "Corner," there's a link to my short article on Auguste Comte, Ayn Rand, and altruism:

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...ost&p=32423

I've read Comte's Catéchisme Positiviste and excerpts from his Système de Polité Positive (I wonder how many human beings since John Stuart Mill have read all four volumes of the latter).

Thanks, Robert, for the note on Catechism Positiviste. I had earlier looked up and read the trio of JARS articles (Robert Bass, your critique, his response) where Comte and altruism were in discussion. Your critique was especially helpful as an argument for retaining or valourizing the original Comtean definition -- although finding his coinage and use of the term is not so straightforward.

Many references to Comte's altruism, as cited further up in the thread (Rand, Peikoff, Kelley, Thomas) tell us what Comte meant, but none so far had actually forked up the term in his own words. Several other references online were clear that Comte had coined the term in 1851, but were unclear or contradictory about exactly where one could find the example.

I found the full text of Catechism Positiviste at the French National Library, along with many others of his voluminous works, and now have found the full text in English via Google Books (this link takes readers to a results index of appearances of 'altruism').

Your critique of Bass was quite clear and straightforward -- his two pieces I could not get my head around, either due to his woolly approach or to my ingorance.

I will take the journey into Catechisme Positiviste and report back once I have emerged. From my initial readings of Comte in French and English, I must say he seems to have been one of those folks whose ability to create a vast system was only exceeded by his obsessiveness and vainglory. The details of the actual catechism of the Church of Humanity are staggeringly precise, and strike me as more than a little bit mad.