Deleted Thread - The Mind-Body Dichotomy in David Kelley’s philosophy

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Robert Campbell

Aug 18 2006, 06:46 PM

Victor,

I'm going to try to make one main point per post here. Otherwise, I'd end up trying to write a treatise--and I need to put my writing efforts into other projects for a while.

So let's do moral agency.

Only living organisms that are capable of self-consciousness can be moral agents. Ideas are aspects of how certain organisms function. They are means by which sufficiently advanced agents attempt to understand and interact with the world outside of them (and, if they are self-conscious, with the world inside of them).

So the point that Barbara made has nothing to do with dichotomies, abysses, gulfs, or diremptions between mind and body.

As Michael has been saying, we judge ideas to be bad or evil in a derivative sense: if the actions that would logically follow, if the ideas are true or correct, are contrary to an individual-human-life-based standard of morality, then we say that the ideas are bad.

Attributing agency to ideas is a form of intrinsicism, and a classic rationalistic error.

Robert Campbell

PS. Just because Leonard Peikoff inveighs against rationalism a lot, and even provides useful tips for avoiding it in some of his lectures, it does not follow that Peikoff himself has avoided rationalism. His written work, even post-Understanding Objectivism, is full of what he himself calls "rationalist polemics."

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 18 2006, 07:17 PM

You’re all ganging up on me! That’s not fair!

Seriously, I must say that certain positions are being attributed to me that do nothing but fight some ‘straw abstraction.’ [You like that? Straw abstraction?;]

For example, who the hell ever said that “ideas are moral agents”? This has been bounced around more often then Perigo’s man-tits on a trampoline.

And: Who the hell is equivocating on a mass murderer and a diet failure? Casting such a comparison as being equally evil is, I agree, theatre of the absurd.

BUT even here, one examines the total context: is the dieter a person who is in control and does, as a matter of fact, take care of their health, and this lapse is merely an exception? Perhaps they want to shed a few pounds for summer. OR is this person someone who has been told by a doctor that a stroke is around the corner if they don’t cease with their bad eating habits, and that this “diet lapse” is but one example of ongoing, characteristic evasions? Has their excess weight been a problem on their heart? Why are they eating this food--to stave off depression, the so-called "comfort food." WHEN are they eating it? Before bed-time?

Are these two dieters now interchangeable?

Context, context, context! The TOTAL context!

Anyway, some more thinking…and posting later.

One more thing: Again, I speak for me--and only me. I'm coming at these questions via my own understanding and NOT via a party-line branch. I'm not an ARI-ian in sheep's clothing coming over to OL. This is understood, right? ;)

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Robert Campbell

Aug 18 2006, 09:35 PM

Victor,

Party lines aside, you quoted Peikoff's "Fact and Value" yourself. And the present bundle of issues about moral judgment is normally understood, within the "Objectivist community," in terms of Peikoff's formulation vs. Kelley's, although, as you point out, there may be other relevant ways to formulate it.

The underlying point, in my last post, needs to be made more explicit. Adult human beings are extremely complex. One reason for this is that we have all developed a hierarchy of "levels of knowing," starting with Level 1, which interacts with the external environment and enables us to know things about that environment, but which cannot know anything about itself. Babies and toddlers function exclusively at Level 1. Around age 4, we acquire the abillity to function at Level 2, which can interact with and know (some aspects of) Level 1. Level 2 functioning includes knowing that we and others can have false beliefs; it includes being able to set goals about the kinds of goals we should have; and it includes placing the events of our lives in what developmental psychologists call "autobiographical memory." By the time we have reached adulthood, we have normally moved into Level 3 and even Level 4 (higher levels are possible, though not terribly common). Moral philosophy is a Level 4 activity, by and large; action in the world is a Level 1 activity.

Putting aside the lower-knowing-level properties that we either can't get at from a higher level, or that could be gotten at with some technical assistance that no one has come up with yet, there are lots of possibilities, within an organism with this kind of "mental architecture," for goal and value conflicts--both within the levels and up and down them.

The last two paragraphs aren't derived from anything in the Randian literature; they're part of a psychological theory originated by Mark Bickhard. But I suspect you may be able to see their relevance here.

If you expect a straight-line relationship between consciously held philosophical ideas and particular actions, you are not taking cognizance of the way that human beings actually function. Expecting a straight line from Level 4 ideas to Level 1 actions perfectly consistent with every implicatin of the Level 4 ideas is what you would do if you were treating Level 4 ideas as capable of acting in the environment all by their lonesome.

Another way to approach some of these issues is to contrast Rand's moral theory with the moral theories of the Ancient Greek eudaimonists. Rand is normally clear that merely feeling an emotion is not the same as acting on it. It's the action that matters from a moral standpoint. Nathaniel Branden's latter-day notion of self-acceptance develops that particular insight more consistently than Rand did.

Aristotle, on the other hand, included feeling the right way in a particular context as part of each virtue. So courage, for him, wasn't so much a matter of what you do when you are afraid, as of when you feel afraid to begin with (there are nuances in his treatment, but that's the gist of it).

The Stoics pretty consciously strove to be "purer" than Aristotle, in several different ways. For them, intending to do something was essentially the same as doing it. So wanting to murder the guy who hacked this site would be just as bad, from a classical Stoic point of view, as actually murdering him. (The Stoics would have been just fine with those sections of the Sermon on the Mount that pertain to anger and lust.)

So Rand didn't believe in "evil feelings." Peikoff claims not to... but, whenever you encounter Peikovian rhetoric about being in conformity with reality vs. being in the grip of unreality/nonexistence/the zero, you need to stop and ask what's going on. Because, say, if you want to kill someone when you know you shouldn't do that, and you won't actually carry out the action, aren't you already not completely in conformity with reality, by Peikoff's lights? And since underneath it all there's just reality vs. the zero, which side does your feeling put you on now?

Robert Campbell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 18 2006, 10:01 PM

Robert,

[it looks like your post above was be-headed, so I can only respond to what I have read.]

Yes, I have quoted Fact and Value, and so what? There’s nothing Party-line about it. I have also read books [and heard lectures] by Kelley on various subjects--and I am in large agreement and have profited from them greatly. Yes, Truth and Fact has a great deal of validity to me. I’m still a cult of one.

Robert, I’m not a professional [or even well-read] in the felid of your expertise, and I’m not terribly interested in this specialized felid. A little interest maybe, but not much. Nothing personal. I’m more interested in the ‘cognitive functions’ open to all human beings, whatever our differences—the genus of human knowledge---that’s open to all human beings and that has, therefore, moral import. I know that in your field, words like “virtue” and “evil” sounds like so much verbiage from a by-gone religious age. I use it in the Objectivist meaning.

In any event, if the current intellectual fashions in your felid are seeking a loop-hole to exclude or excuse the field of ethics or volition, that’s another subject. [i say this because nothing else comes to my mind as to WHY you would bring up those “levels of knowing.”] What’s the wider context that you would do so, other than that these subjects can be interesting when considered outside the current discussion?

Victor

edit: Your full post came in. Okay, interesting stuff, Robert. I do not argue that 'feelings' can be evil. I'm only talking about the volitional use or miss-use of one's mind, that which does, in fact, have moral import---whatever the complexities of the human mind. Period.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 18 2006, 10:26 PM

Robert,

To quote you above: "...So Rand didn't believe in "evil feelings." Peikoff claims not to... but, whenever you encounter Peikovian rhetoric about being in conformity with reality vs. being in the grip of unreality/nonexistence/the zero, you need to stop and ask what's going on. Because, say, if you want to kill someone when you know you shouldn't do that, and you won't actually carry out the action, aren't you already not completely in conformity with reality, by Peikoff's lights? And since underneath it all there's just reality vs. the zero, which side does your feeling put you on now?"

Since you mention Peikoff’s Fact and Value, I am reminded of one section that does apply to your post. Maybe it's the same thing you have in mind.

In the Peikoff article, the following is offered for consideration:

In a specific context, a man is appropriately held untarnished for an unreasonable idea, as Peikoff states, so long as he himself does not act on it.

Let me offer the Peikoffian argument: if you conclude that--though you are innocent of any wrongdoing--the death of, say, the hacker would be a wonderful thing, but you then remind yourself of his rights and hold yourself in check by refraining from killing him, you may be free of blame and can even be, it is further suggested, given a certain moral credit: "Michael kept that bad idea within his own mind," one could say, "he did not allow it to lead to the destruction of the innocent. [Although, the question of innocence is in question;]

Still, to that degree, Peikoff makes clear, and in actual practice, you are moved by the recognition of reality. MSK knew better and acted accordingly. Also remember, he was the vicitm of a wrong-doing! His anger is natural!

What of the committed irrationalists?

“But this kind of analysis does not absolve the philosophic advocates of unreason,” Peikoff states. “In regard to him, one cannot say: ‘He implicitly advocates murder, but does not himself commit it, so he is morally innocent.’ Peikoff illustrates that “The philosopher of irrationalism, though legally innocent of any crime, is not “keeping his ideas within his own mind”—but rather he is swaying them on the world and into actual practice.

Encouragement of this kind is a form of action: it represents an entire life spent on subverting man's mind at its base, Peikoff declares, and he asks this crucial question: “Can anyone honestly hold that such advocacy pertains not to 'action,' but merely to the world of ‘ideas,’ and therefore that verdicts such as ‘good’ and ‘evil’ do not apply to it?

This is a brilliant example, among other things, of context-keeping. NOBODY is arguing that there are Evil Feelings. So what's this talk about 'evil feelings'? Another straw abstraction.

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Rich Engle

Aug 19 2006, 10:50 AM

"In the order of precedence, I would say that we couldn’t even evaluate Stalin’s actions—if we couldn’t FIRST evaluate his ideas, or perhaps more to the point: his ideology."

Not to keep being a buttinski, on this diatriabe, but Victor- how do you evaluate the ideas of someone who is (was) clearly mentally flawed, pathological. Stalin's "ideas" to me are largely invalidated, because organically, the man was sick. Stalin was insane. Clinically effing insane. Same thing with Manson, many others. Talk about psychoepistemology going way wrong.

What things before him did he latch onto and use? Does it matter? Hitler was a little different, in that he had a smarter staff. They made incredible use of mythology, primordial symbols, and synthesized a new cult of personality, a "new" (yeah, right) mythology.

Stalin had no "ideology." He was feral, he was a smart animal- he simply used the most ready tools at his disposal, including philosophical ones, and twisted them into what he needed. I doubt he was even aware of the inner workings, unless maybe sometimes people broke it down for him a bit (personally, I would have never done that if I were working for Stalin, because it might look like you were affronting his "intelligence," of which he had little, and then next thing you know, ka-pow). Attila. Ayn Rand 101.

Basket cases like Stalin, Manson, Mussolini, et al are poor examples for this discussion, IMHO. To my mind, the only interesting thing you can study from these charismatic, filthy animals is on the psychological level, in terms of what elements they drew from- what worked, what didn't, what they were attracted to.

Pathology, Victor. When integration goes wrong you get pathology.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Robert Campbell

Aug 19 2006, 11:15 AM

Victor,

It would be extremely unwise for Objectivists to ignore psychology. Objectivism is a naturalistic philosophy, maintaining that how people ought to think depends on how they actually function cognitively, and how they ought to value and ought to live depends on how they actually value and what they actually need to live.

What's more, there is plenty of psychology in Rand's writings. If you decide that it is all "just philosophy," requiring no specialized knowledge and no specialized equipment, you're going to end up freezing the psychology that Rand put in there, misidentifying it as philosophy, and failing to adapt to new ideas and discoveries in psychology.

FYI, I don't consider "virtue" a relic of a religious age. I teach a course on moral development that covers Aristotle and refers to what he was up to as "virtue ethics." What's more, you'll find that the Positive Psychology movement openly champions virtue ethics.

Nor do I consider "evil" a relic of religion. But I do think that one should make judgments about evil with considerable care.

Further, I am among a minority of psychologists who defend the notion of free will. (I'll just be blunt here and comment that a lot of my colleagues are still afraid to mess with the issue.)

What I am convinced is a pure religious relic is the concept of "Satanic." And so far as I can determine, those Objectivists who rail against "the Brandens," David Kelley, Chris Sciabarra et al. are judging them, as least by implication, as Satanic.

It would be interesting to make a survey of OPAR and see how often Leonard Peikoff refers to hell, the devil, and the like, in a context that indicates that he regards these ways of talking as acceptable. The total number of such occurrences, in a book that purports to explicate and defend a rational philosophy, ought to be zero.

Robert Campbell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Robert Campbell

Aug 19 2006, 11:45 AM

Victor,

I want to back up what Michael said, up-thread, about proportionality in judgment.

A flagrant abuse of judgment, in Objectivist circles, consists in going so far over the top that comparisons become impossible or meaningless.

Some people confuse such flagrant abuses with being passionate, or being KASS or what have you. Nope. They're just flagrant abuses.

And these abuses pertain to epistemological judgment as much as they do to moral judgment.

Consider Fred Weiss or Mike Mazza, for instance. Both have said that Ayn Rand: The Russian Radical is arbitrary when it isn't meaningless, and meaningless when it isn't arbitrary. Not that the book is tendentious, or makes poor arguments about certain issues, or provides insufficient data to back some of its conclusions... nope, it's just arbitary, or meaningless.

Such disproportionate judgment leads promptly to absurd conclusions. Mr. Mazza says he has read RR three times. But if his judgment of the book were correct, he wouldn't be able to read it for comprehension just once.

Another absurd conclusion: having written off RR as arbitrary cum meaningless, what can Mr. Weiss do with Immanuel Kant's writings? He has to dismiss them as more arbitrary-cum-meaningless, if arbitrariness-cum-meaninglessness could admit of degrees in the first place.

Besides, anyone who follows Mr. Weiss by brushing off Kant in such a manner is committing intellectual suicide, when Kantians still substantially outnumber Objectivists in the academic world.

Similarly, we get Thomas Lee, one of the few thoughtful ARIans over at SOLOP, wondering out loud how any defender of "the Brandens" could be seriously putting forward moral judgments about the way that ARIan writers have treated their work. The implication is that "the Brandens" are Satanic, purely evil, so how can one complain of any wrongs done to them?

Well, if "the Brandens" are exemplars of 100% pure, unadulterated evil, where do Hitler and Stalin and Mao and Pol Pot and Colonel Mengistu and Saddam and Charles Manson go? How the hell do you outdo pure evil? Where to do the knowing perpetrators of irrationalistic philosophy even go? (Peikoff, like Rand, assumes that if you put forward ideas that are irrationalistic by implication, you must know exactly what you are doing, at every moment.)

Where do you even put people who don't like ARI, and argue that ARI spokespersons should not be trusted on certain issues? Well, according to Diana Hsieh, anyone in that category is the moral equivalent of a Holocaust denier.

This kind of crap is not new, in Objectivist circles. There are antecedents for it in Rand's own writings. Back in 1972, when I worked for Ergo, the editors published an editorial in which they ripped Tricky Dick Nixon for a series of malfeasances, culminating (in their eyes) with his diplomatic visit to Communist China. They concluded that this series of acts constituted ironclad proof that he ought to be "hung for treason" (that's a direct quote). Yet, who did they think everyone should vote for in November? You've got it... Tricky Dick Nixon.

Objectivists who carry on like this aren't just devaluing their moral currency. They aren't merely disregarding Jelly Roll Morton's sage musical advice to keep your glass half-full, cause otherwise you won't be able to add any more to it. They haven't just relocated themselves to the funny farm. They are putting a major roadblack in the path of any non-Objectivist who might otherwise be inclined to take Randian ideas seriously.

Robert Campbell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Rich Engle

Aug 19 2006, 01:26 PM

Thanks for spending some writing time with us, Robert. Always a treat.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 19 2006, 02:45 PM

Victor,

Well of course we are ganging up on you. We have to trounce the enemy at all costs and win win win!

The dieter and dictator thing is an example out of The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand to illustrate the need for degrees of moral worth. The arguments are in answer to the controversy surrounding "Fact and Value" by Peikoff and the essays by Schwartz.

You seem to be unfamiliar with Kelley's work. You mentioned the “brilliant example” of context keeping by Peikoff by claiming that teaching (you call it "encouragement" and Peikoff and Kelley call it "advocacy") is a form of action. You should be familiar with Kelley’s comments on this if you had read them. Kelley specifically states teaching ("advocacy") is a form of action (see the quote further on). However, Peikoff accused him of the contrary, albeit before Truth and Toleration came out.

Regardless, Peikoff proposes moral equivalency and finds Marxists professors just as evil as Stalin – simply because they both act on the same professed idea. For no other reason. It doesn't matter what the act was. Kelley finds the actions of the professor wrong, but makes the HUGE distinction between murder (where victims had no choice and died) and persuasion (where the persuaded had a choice and lived).

You mentioned context. Well look at the following context in Kelley’s own words and then see if you can honestly attribute the same degree of evil (if not more as some do) to the professor as you do to Stalin – or whether you think that appraisal is just a bit exaggerated. The passage is from The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand, p. 48-49.

I want to comment in this regard on the distinction I drew in “A Question of Sanction” between the Soviet tyrants and the academic Marxist. If we ask who was causally responsible for the mass murderers that occurred in Soviet Russia, the answer is: Stalin and those who worked with and for him. The deaths occurred with their knowledge and by their order. These men were the proximate causes of the deaths, and were fully responsible for them. What then was the role of the intellectuals? Together with the antecedent cultural factors that existed in Russia, intellectuals were responsible for creating the conditions in which it was possible for the killers to gain power, and to kill on such a massive scale.

But there’s a difference in degree of responsibility. Stalin was personally responsible for the deaths. He did not actually pull the trigger; he had accomplices. But the deaths occurred because of his exercise of political power he possessed as an individual. Had Stalin not existed, the leader who succeeded Lenin might not have been so brutal or killed on so wide a scale. By contrast, no one intellectually is fully responsible for creating conditions in which a Stalin was possible. The academic Marxist of my example was one voice among countless others; had he not existed, the result would not have been noticeably different, even if no one else took his place. Some critics of “A Question of Sanction” have said that the academic Marxist is guiltier than Stalin, because his ideas were the underlying cause of the horrors. This argument is doubly fallacious: first in attributing causal agency to the ideas themselves, and secondly for investing that agency in every individual adherent of the ideas, treating each one as fully responsible for effects that occurred only because millions of the other people embraced the same ideas. This is the kind of irrationality we see in current liability law, where someone marginally responsible for an accident may be sued for the full amount of the damages.

More important however, there is a difference in the nature of their responsibility. Stalin was a murder; he intended to kill, and he carried out his intention. His victims had no choice in the matter; he did not have to persuade them to volunteer for immolation. The academic by contrast, was an exponent of ideas. Even though his ideas were incompatible with man’s nature as a rational being, the office he occupied in the causal chain was consistent with that fact: he was engaged in persuasion, in the effort to provide reasons for his political views. Even if he was intellectually dishonest, and his views were caused by evasion, his advocacy of Marxism could have an effect only by eliciting the willing assent of his listeners. If we believe in free will, we must assume that they freely endorsed and adopted his position, that his arguments were not causes affecting them willy-nilly. I am not denying that such advocacy is a form of action, as Peikoff seems to think. I am simply noting the difference between two kinds of action: murder and persuasion. Objectivists, of all people, should be alive to that distinction.

Notice, Victor, where he keeps talking about degree of blame using “rationality-irrationality” as a black-and-white standard of judgment of epistemological kind, with life-death as the standard of ethcial measurement, whereas Peikoff talks about evil as being the black-and-white standard of epistemological kind (the blame itself – the moral judgment - as a type of metaphysical state of being of an entity), but with life-death as the standard of both epistemological and ethical measurement.

Peikoff jumps the epistemological level of philosophy when he equates values with facts, essentially saying they are different attributes of the same thing. But a value to the perceiver is not a metaphysical attribute of an entity. The entity exists independently of the perceiver and objectivity is the attempt to discover what the entity is so he can compare it against what he is and assign value to it. Peikoff attempts to put alien value in the very identity of the entity itself.

(Granted, something, because of its own nature, can inherently be dangerous to a human being, but we are talking about evil as a moral judgment of improper choice in addition to impact on life. A constant switching of meanings of "evil" - to include volition and impact on life one minute and exclude one or the other the next - is one of the problems of Peikoff's approach.)

Peikoff also holds that ideas turn people into puppets of their own accord – essentially that people have no volition – when he talks about the influence of philosophy on a culture. There are quotes from him galore on this in The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand.

These are the mistakes he makes that allow him to equate the same degree of evil to a small-town Marxist professor in Nowhere, USA, with a mass murderer. It allows him to blank out evidence on a massive scale in making a moral judgment. This is called moral equivalency. Kelley calls this approach intrinsicism.

I have prepared a timeline of events and links I will shortly post in the David Kelley Corner. Interestingly enough, nobody has really come out and accused Kelley of a mind-body dichotomy except Diana Hsieh in an article of March this year entitled “http://www.dianahsieh.com/blog/2006/03/dav...chotomy-in.html” – and you here on OL. I am starting to suspect that you rely more heavily on Hsieh than on Peikoff. Actually, I just skimmed back through her article and you actually do rely heavily on it to the extreme, using much the same terminology (Utilitarians, consequentialists deontologists, etc.), the same quotes and the same conclusions.

The closest anyone came before to accusing Kelley of a mind-body dichotomy was Robert Tracinski, “http://www.lyceum.dk/tracinski.html” citing a “method/content dichotomy,” whatever that is (he makes terrible confusion between method of concept integration and method of concept use), and Peikoff, who cited a “cognition and evaluation” dichotomy in “http://www.aynrand.org/site/PageServer?pag...=objectivism_fv,” where he escaped the fact that Kelley states that evaluation is a form of cognition, not something opposed to it.

I will have the most all of the main links on both sides to look at.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 19 2006, 02:54 PM

Robert: "Besides, anyone who follows Mr. Weiss by brushing off Kant in such a manner is committing intellectual suicide, when Kantians still substantially outnumber Objectivists in the academic world."

Well, I’m glad to hear you say this. This backs-up the main thesis in another post of mine: The Hatred of Objectivism is the Hatred of Objectivity. I try to explain that a significant majority of intellectuals are of a Kantian stripe—and therefore their hostility of Rand [for those who know of her] is due to her philosophy, being an objective philosophy. For those who don’t know her---well, they are at war with the very concept of objectivity.

Question for Robert: Would you agree that there are degrees of evil?

By the way, I commended Barbara’s indictment of the “true believer” mentality that infiltrates Objectivist circles. It was as cogent as anyone as ever written. Too often Objectivist circles have been plagued with backbiting, hysterical denunciations, zealous sectarianism and unjust inquisitions.*(1) Being the “cult of one” that I am, I try to distance myself from the party-line types. We do see this craving to humiliate and debase a person before a crowd.**(2.1) People lobby and organize well around a common villain, and they turn off their rational faculty in the process.**(2.2) Too often, they don’t care for justice and rationality. It’s the simple pleasure plunge of disgracing somebody that becomes so intoxicating. We all know this is true. It's as old as humanity itself. These creatures cultivate obnoxiousness and cruelty and do so as if it were a virtue.**(2.3) They are a disgrace.

I don’t agree with this theatrical view of the Brandens as palm-massaging evil incarnate—in the religious sense. You said: “Objectivists who carry on like this are devaluing their moral currency" or something like this. I agree. [NOTE FROM MSK: It was actually Robert Campbell who said this in Post 33 above.]

But it does not mean one can’t have serious philosophical disagreements with them. I do. If you are casting me under common banner among those do, you are doing me an injustice.

Unlike many others, I treat the Brandens [especially in this case, Barbara Branden] with all due respect and have amended my past behavior. But I have many disagreements with her as I do Kelley—and this is obvious. I’m here to discuss ideas and to enjoy a “community” of thinking people.

There will be philosophical disagreements, yes, but I’m not here to morally judge anybody. My point is this: please don’t include me in the SLOP crowd. You fail to recognize me as the highly individualized non-gang person that I am.

***

Rich, old buddy.

Please stop banging on that Stalin drum. Your points are dully noted. Stalin was only mentioned to serve as an example, and I don’t mean make him exclusive. Don’t miss out on my large point by focusing in one concrete—even if that concrete is a poor example. Whatever the case was with "Uncle Joe", this does not mean that there aren’t evil men who embrace evil ideologies. Can we agree on that? [i’m reminded here of Rand’s essay The Psychology of Psychologizing].

"In the order of precedence, I would say that we couldn’t even evaluate [Rich, fill in the blank here] actions—if we couldn’t FIRST evaluate his ideas, or perhaps more to the point: his ideology." I stand behind my general point here, and this is one aspect where I disagree with Kelley.

Here's a good question: how are we to evaluate those who knew what Stalin was about--yet warmly called him 'Uncle Joe'?

NOTE FROM ADMINISTRATOR:

* Plagiarized from Post 21 by Barbara Branden from the "Objectivism's Plague: Questions" thread on OL. The original passage reads as follows:

(1)

The spectacle of people whose most fundamental dedication is not to the spread of important philosophical ideas, but to backbiting, hysterical denunciations, fanatical sectarianism, and inquisitions.

(Note: This is a borderline plagiarism since it is short and there is some paraphrasing, but it qualifies for the present context since the plagiary pattern is so well established.)

** Plagiarized from Post 29 by Michael Stuart Kelly from the "Objectivism's Plague: Questions" thread on OL. The original passages read as follows:

(2.1)

What we witness in the Objectivist movement, however, is the urge to humiliate a person before a crowd – time and time again.

(2.2)

People organize well around a common villain. The strength stops there, however. Scapegoating is only a strong selling point in terms of emotions. When it is overused, it makes people turn off their critical rational faculty.

(2.3)

... but there are some independents – especially Solo Passion, where obnoxiousness is cultivated as a virtue.

(Note: These three are borderline plagiarisms since they are short and there is some paraphrasing, but they qualify for the present context since the plagiary pattern is so well established and they all come from the same post.)

OL extends its deepest apologies to Barbara Branden.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 19 2006, 03:11 PM

M,

Fast note: The whole way that Kelley is approaching ethics IS Utilitarian and denontology--it's general philosophy 101, actually---not Diana 101. I can provide you with tons of material to show that Kelley's approach is that of general philosophy and is in the Utilitarian camp. Kelley's language reeks of those classic philosophers, and this is his way to make Objectivism more agreeable to the intellectual establishment. Can't you see that? It's Objectivism watered-down. The name change of Kelley's organization plays to this as well.

Utilitarians and Consequentialists maintain that the moral status of an action (i.e., whether the action is morally right or wrong) depends on the action's consequences. In any situation, the morally right thing to do is whatever it will have the best consequences.*(1) If you maintain that ideas are not good or evil---only actions---THIS is an aspect of the mind-body split.

I do take Kelley's words on their own.

I know the language of general philosophy and Kelley's talks are littered with it. Diana merely sees what I see, and what anybody would see well-versed in philosophy. I have 18 years of it up my ass.

Victor

NOTE FROM ADMINISTRATOR:

* Plagiarized from “An Introduction to Ethics, Part 2, Some Objectivist Theories” by Andrew Latus. The original passage reads as follows:

(1)

Consequentialists

maintain that the moral status of an action (i.e., whether the action is morally right or wrong) depends on the action's consequences. In any situation, the morally right thing to do is whatever will have the best consequences.

OL extends its deepest apologies to Andrew Latus.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 19 2006, 03:52 PM

Victor,

I am not making a claim of plagiary. (There are plenty of others elsewhere who like to do that with glee, even when it is not really founded.)

However, your article shows a logical and chronological sequence of ideas very similar to Hsieh's, including the same terminology and quotes at the same points, etc. And you show that you are not very familiar with Kelley's work - the very work you are critiquing. You only show familiarity with the quotes from Kelley cited by Hsieh and Peikoff. Not good.

Why not read Kelley's work as carefully as you read Hsieh and Peikoff?

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Rich Engle

Aug 19 2006, 04:59 PM

Victor,

I don't bang drums. For one, I'm a guitar player. :yes: That was a little snarky of you, saying that and telling me what not to do, and such, but hey, whatever, I'm down.

Bob Campbell said most of what needed said about neglecting psychology.

So here's a bit more banging (I'll go down to a 7A jazz stick)-

I don't think it would have been much different no matter what philsophy he read. A psycho-killer is a psycho-killer (although Stalin was too much a coward to do his own killing). Pick any sick-ass monkey you want, it's always the same story. Not worth discussing where it came from. These are the extreme cases.

Now, it's interesting to look at the nature/nurture issue, and proclivity. As in how the Aryan movement knows how to target and indoctrinate. Same with cults- the leaders know what to look for.

As far as the Papa thing, hell, all kinds of misconceptions and ass-kissing, and fear-based behaviors come out when the head lunatic is driving the bus.

Another interesting question- how much moral judging (tempting though it is to go full boat) can you make on the psychotic killing leaders of the world. My answer? None- spend your time hunting them down and exterminating them before they kill more innocents. I don't give a rat's ass.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 19 2006, 05:51 PM

Victor,

I just posted in the David Kelley Corner a whole lot of links to the appropriate online literature concerning the schism and a timeline.

Selective timeline and links of the Kelley-Peikoff schism

Most all of the things we are discussing have already been covered on both sides of the fence. In order to raise the level of our discussion, I suggest we read (and reread) through all of the essays on our own (there are not so many to make this impossible, but enough to make it hard work). I have tried to be selective and use some quality control in the selection.

The events are not so important as the philosophical disagreements that caused them. If these issues are as personally important to you as they are to me, I think you will find the work well worth it.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 19 2006, 08:48 PM

Michael,

But I have read David Kelley's book Truth and Toleration, I just don’t have the re-issue of it. Of course, I read Peikoff's Fact and Value. I AGREE with Peikoff. My contention is that Kelley’s take on moral questions does contain a mind-body dichotomy, and significant passages, as cited by me, or anyone else slap the person familiar with Objectivism and general philosophy in the face.

Kelley statements stand on there own.

I have read the works of David Kelley and find, as I have maintained already, many of his stated philosophical positions clearly depart from Objectivism. In other areas of his writings [those supplied by Michael] seem quite simpatico and consonant with Objectivism, which only points out to me the various contradictions in his work [it is no accident that Barbara’s article, being sympathetic to Kelley’s works, is also littered with contradictions]. Mind you, I’m grateful to Michael for furnishing me his own selected excerpts---it’s a rather generous concession on his part to illustrate the contradictions in Kelley’s work---that are exhibited in Barbara’s article. ;)

The fundamental issue regarding the Peikoff and Kelley split concerns a proper understanding of Objectivism, particularly the relationship between “the true and the good” as Peikoff put it. Is this correct?

Again, therefore, I wanted to address this section from Barbara’s article (or re-address it) as it has not even been glossed over, but ignored. Here it is:

Barbara wrote: “If the boy were an adult who had seen something of the world, who had had an education, who had heard intelligent opinions in conflict with those he’d been taught, then yes, we could consider him evil—evil because he has so corrupted his thinking that he is willing to ignore the evidence he has heard and seen. But in so concluding, we would be taking his context into consideration, the fact that he is educated, that he has traveled, that he has learned of other ways of living and of thinking.”

Did you read it? I consider this section—alone---a contradiction to the overall spirit or thesis of the article—that is, as I understand it, that we cannot judge “ideas” as either good or bad, but merely as correct or incorrect. Am I right? However, in the above excerpt, we are told of a boy who grows to adulthood and who has an education and who “had heard intelligent opinions conflict with those he’d been taught” and who has, nevertheless, retained and advocates (and may very well act on his philosophy in one form or another) the ideas taught to him at a very young age---and, from Barbara herself, we are told that, yes, we can appropriately judge this man as evil---and that we can judge him evil given the nature of his ideas, their content, and the manner in which they are held. The man is evil. Therefore, this being so, it undercuts the entire thesis of the article. [As this section is written, I agree with what is being communicated].

THIS passage shows the contradictions that a mind-body dichotomy philosophy like Kelley's will lead to. I can see that--all my my lonesome. I know general philosophy and I know Objectivism, and I know a contradiction when I see one, as I know a mind-body IMPLICATION when I see one.

But returning to the question of moral judgment: Let me, though, still ask this: Obviously you can’t jump into another person’s mind to see HOW they hold an idea to make an ethical evaluation of that person. It’s only when that person’s ideas are given physical manifestation that you can then judge that person and act accordingly. That is your position? Is that right?

But would you agree that YOU can sort out a range of ideas in your mind—and the alternatives that they present---and judge them as ‘good’ or ‘bad’ from which to choose and give physical action to?

Let’s see if I got the perspective of one aspect of Kelley’s philosophy correct: The act of evasion or rationalization is not evil, it is a “choice of alternatives.” Ideas may aid the perpetration of evil actions--but they are in no way responsible for producing those actions. This is Kelley’s position. So the choice of actions is an “independent primary” and mental processes have no identity and cannot be evaluated ahead of time. I say they can. “Human action,” Peikoff writes, “is not merely physical motion; it is a product of a man’s ideas and value judgments, true or false, which themselves derive from a certain kind of mental cause; ultimately, from thought or from evasion. Human action is an expression of a volitional consciousness.”

This integral connection between thought and action is missing from Kelley’s position. His example of the “honest academic Marxist” is crucial here. Marxism is not a set of “detached intellectual methods and ideas.” Marxism implies and encloses a set of values which are fundamental to it, as any avowed Marxist have made clear to me--and as can be found in all the literature. It is an entire worldview--not an isolated "idea". You see, to sustain the principles of the ”dictatorship of the proletariat” and “from each according to his ability, to each according to his need” and so forth, any Marxist, I submit, must hold an entrenched hatred for reason and rational self-interest in principle! He must also accept evasion as a virtue, blanking out the devastation that Marxism has produced. "Unless one lives under a rock," Barbara writes "I see no way in which one can be unaware of this [the destruction of communism]. But they don't live under a rock! They are evil--and their evil ideas will carry out in action.

Peikoff: “Just as every ‘is’ implies an ‘ought,’ so every identification of an idea's truth or falsehood implies a moral evaluation of the idea and of its advocates. The evaluation, to repeat, comes from the answer to two related questions: what kind of volitional cause led people to this idea? and, to what kind of consequences will this idea lead in practice?"

This Academic Marxist is evil. He is evil just like Barbara’s “educated Arab man” who had heard “intelligent opinions in conflict with those he’d been taught.” However, according to Kelley—to return to that---no set of values is primary to Marxism, and this is just factually wrong. To Kelley, nevertheless, an academic Marxist may be honest, rational, and pro-life and pat little dogs on the head---yet still uphold his belief in Marxism! This is a contradiction. For me, as for other Objectivists, they are “crusading irrationalists”—all of them: the originators, leaders and intellectual spokesmen.

We can see below that Barbara's views are the same as Kelley's. She writes:

"I suggest that in today’s world, most people who embrace communism are, indeed, intellectually corrupt, not because the idea per se is evil, but because the anti-life consequences of creating a communist state have so clearly and universally been demonstrated. Unless one lives under a rock, I see no way in which one can be unaware of this."

Note that communists are "intellectually corrupt"--but their ideas are not evil. They advocate collectivism--yet they are not evil. They support it in many different ways--yet they are not evil. That, alone, is yet another contradiction.

I suppose anything short of actual mass murder is not evil?

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Robert Campbell

Aug 19 2006, 09:06 PM

Victor,

Do I believe there are degrees of evil? Sure. There are people who have never committed a genuine crime, but take delight in the miseries or misfortunes of others, to which they are motivated to contribute whenever they can. Such folks are not on Stalin's level of evil, not on a garden-variety robber or murderer's level of evil, but they still rate as evil in my book.

I need to put some context around my remark that Kantians significantly outnumber Objectivists in academia. Where this is most noticeable is in philosophy--and it is not wise to take philosophy departments as representative of academia as a whole. Also, some people may latch on to Kantian ideas because they have a mistaken notion of objectivity, instead of a conscious intention to do away with it. If you want a flat-out rejection of objectivity, you'll find it among the pomos. But in the United States, pomos normally dwell in English or Comp Lit or Victim Group du Jour Studies, not in Philosophy.

I can tell you from my own familiarity with David Kelley's work (which includes lectures and a few conversations, not just his published articles) that he is not a consequentialist, as that term is normally understood in moral philosophy. Diana Hsieh tried to hang that tag on him when she publicly denounced him, but there is no substance to her claims. If any of the principals of TAS/TOC has had consequentialist leanings, it would be Will Thomas in his early days there, when his view of ethics was strongly colored by his training in economics. But Thomas has moved a good distance from his old views during the last decade.

There's even less basis for charging Dr. Kelley with thinking of deontology as "the only alternative" to consequentialism. In fact, terminology of deontological origin ("morally permissible" and so on) has come into vogue with some of the ARIans. Diana Hsieh talks this way now, so does Greg Salmieri, and so (in her new book) does Tara Smith. The only philosopher I know in the TOC orbit who has used such terminology is Irfan Khawaja, but he left TOC 6 or 7 years ago, before he'd finished grad school.

No one should forget that Dr. Kelley was trained as a Peikovian. He became affiliated with Ayn Rand after the NBI days were over. Until the last couple of years before his expulsion from the fold he did pretty much what Peikoff expected him to do. (For instance, he refused to contribute to Den Uyl and Rasmussen's edited volume on Rand when they invited him.) Even today, Kelley's philosophical disagreements with Peikoff are rather limited. I find his published review of OPAR thoroughly understated in its criticisms. And I doubt that it would occur to him that Peikoff ever lifted anything (outside the self-esteem area) from Nathaniel Branden.

Robert Campbell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 19 2006, 09:24 PM

Thank you, Robert. You always write interesting posts.

Anyway...consequentialism, very simply put, is the view that the correctness (rightness, goodness) of moral conduct is judged in terms of its results (consequences). If you do take key passages from Kelley's work, you find this. But he will contradict himself in other key selections.

edit: In addendum to writing about philosophy, he has the separate agenda to “sell” Objectivism to the intellectual establishment—an establishment that is hostile to it. In my view, this has effected the quality of his work.

As stated, I studied general philosophy at York, here in Toronto, and also had the pleasure to take a course with John Ridpath. [Philosophy up the ass, as I say]. Ridpath and I had very, very interesting conversations about all of what is being covered in these posts. I can grant, in a selective manner, the value of Kelley's work--Ridpath was not convinced of any of my positive remarks. But I did stand up for him.

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 19 2006, 09:55 PM

Victor,

Forgive my asking, but do you understand the difference between epistemology and ethics? I just wrote extensively about it and you glossed over it, repeating the Peikoff party line, as if it didn't exist. Did you understand what I wrote? (Seriously.)

Your next-to-last post has a few blatantly wrong statements - and once again I attribute this to lack of familiarity with Kelley's works. Maybe you read Truth and Toleration years ago, but you have forgotten most of it.

I have put too much time in this today, so I will only give one example. You stated:

Let’s see if I got the perspective of one aspect of Kelley’s philosophy correct: The act of evasion or rationalization is not evil, it is a “choice of alternatives.”

Dead wrong. It could not be more wrong.

It shows that not only are you not familiar with Kelley, it shows you haven't assimilated yet the components of moral evaluation (of which irrationality is one). The decision to engage the rational faculty is the start of moral evaluation and can be evaluated separately. Kelley was VERY CLEAR about that. He stated that the mental actions that produced an idea AND the consequences are the main components of moral evaluation. "Mental actions" means choosing faith or choosing reason, then using it.

What I find strange is that Kelley stated that actions are good or evil because actions are derivative from ideas. You want to claim that an idea is good or evil in itself, then state something about an action as your question ("The act of evasion or rationalization is not evil..."). You made a statement about an action. Why not talk about whether a boat, for instance, is good or evil? That's an idea without an action.

You also completely gloss over degree of moral culpability.

You can do as you please, but so long as you keep misstating Kelley's (and Barbara's) ideas as you are doing, when you make a judgment that they contradict themselves and then you can't back it up because your understanding is wrong, you put yourself in a contradictory position. Saying that you disagree once you get the idea right is one thing. Getting it wrong and then disagreeing with that wrong understanding is not a good use of your mind.

Once again, I suggest proper reading of the material I provided links to - both on the pro-Kelley side and on the anti-Kelley side, if for nothing more than to get a refresher on what Kelley actually wrote.

Also, and I mean this in the friendliest manner possible, we should go slower. One point at a time. Your sweeping statements (like Kelley's or Barbara's works are full of contradictions) based on wrong information will result in nothing but a lot of wasted time. Let's try to understand first, then judge. Deal?

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 19 2006, 09:56 PM

Rich, my apologies to you if I came across a little snippy, it’s not how I wish to convey myself. I think you are a very easy-going, fun-loving cool cat, man. You see, this is what happens when I hang-out with musicians.

I must admit that I’m a tad frustrated with some of the dialogue here, and it came out a little bit and some of it splattered on you. I’m frustrated because I hate being put into any “group” or “organizations” as if I were some marionette unduly influenced by ARI or TOC [the organization formerly known as Prince] or ABC or D-I-C-K organization. I want none of it—no matter what discriminating kudos I may give to one of the members of any organization. I don’t like to be “identified” with any society.

This also brings up my dismay with Roger, as I actually do think I’m seen as an ARI covert of some kind, and I’m here on a mission [private or otherwise] to undermine OL [Or is that a little extreme?] That’s just the rabid, foaming-from-the-mouth kind of individualist I am. I don’t like organizations for the most part…I prefer to deal with individuals. It's too bad, cuz I like the guy. I spent weeks reading his posts way before I jumped into this cyber universe.

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 19 2006, 10:03 PM

Victor,

Please let me know who is painting you as a hidden ambassador for ARI, or some such, intent on disrupting OL. I didn't get that impression from the posts so far.

(I'm asking friendly, not accusingly.)

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 19 2006, 10:30 PM

Michael, I gave your post a cursory once-over, as I have been busy today. That's the price for being a famous Toronto artist. My intention was to read it carefully, so don’t feel I glossed over it to ignore it totally. And don’t feel that your dialogue with me is for naught. Regarding Barbara’s article, I do see it laced with contradictions, and I DID provide an example to “back it up.” I’m sorry, that’s how I see it. No offence.

Regarding what you say about “slowing it down”—yes I agree. Any suggestions as to how we should proceed so that this conversation will be truly fruitful? [Even if neither comes away agreeing with the other].

To answer your question:

Epistemology: VALID KNOWLEDGE

Fundamental to Objectivism is its definition of reason: [and we all know it, right?]

Ayn Rand solved, as far as I’m concerned, the problem of exactly how your knowledge is based on the information from your senses.

The key structure in Objectivist epistemology would be thus:

1.Your senses are valid.

2.You can choose to focus your mind.

3.You can form and use concepts properly.

4.You can make concepts objective.

5.You can be certain.

Do you agree?

Ethics: LIFE

As always Ayn Rand goes to the nature of existence and seeks facts to solve any problem. All living organisms, she observes, face the issue of life versus death. Life is always conditional and unless an organism takes appropriate actions to survive, it will die.

Humans have a conceptual faculty and this gives them a wide open set of survival alternatives.

This CONCEPTUAL FACTULITY, which we, as human beings, possess, is the bridge from epistemology to ethics. Life is thought AND it is action---you can't part the two. Do you agree? Do I pass?

EDIT: Robert C wrote: "Do I believe there are degrees of evil? Sure. There are people who have never committed a genuine crime, but take delight in the miseries or misfortunes of others, to which they are motivated to contribute whenever they can. Such folks are not on Stalin's level of evil, not on a garden-variety robber or murderer's level of evil, but they still rate as evil in my book."

It seems that Robert and I are more on the same page...even if sometimes we are reading a different book. He's a professional intellectual [yes?] and can engage in highly abstract, dry talk with the best of em'---but here he is simple and direct. I agree with this.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 20 2006, 01:07 AM

Victor,

That's pretty good. I would question a couple of points, but they are not essential.

For now let's just stay with epistemology. Concept formation.

Do you understand the difference between cognitive abstractions and normative abstractions as given in "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art" in The Romantic Manifesto? (I think it is a crying shame Rand did not deal with this issue in Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology.)

Try to forget Peikoff and Kelley right now. Here is a quote from Rand to chew on. I only want you to focus on the cognitive part for now, but within the context of what will ensue (normative). The quote is from that essay.

Consider the enormous conceptual integration involved in any statement, from the conversation of a child to the discourse of a scientist. Consider the long conceptual chain that starts from simple, ostensive definitions and rises to higher and still higher concepts, forming a hierarchical structure of knowledge so complex that no electronic computer could approach it. It is by means of such chains that man has to acquire and retain his knowledge of reality.

Yet this is the simpler part of his psycho-epistemological task. There is another part which is still more complex.

The other part consists of applying his knowledge—i.e., evaluating the facts of reality, choosing his goals and guiding his actions accordingly. To do that, man needs another chain of concepts, derived from and dependent on the first, yet separate and, in a sense, more complex: a chain of normative abstractions.

While cognitive abstractions identify the facts of reality, normative abstractions evaluate the facts, thus prescribing a choice of values and a course of action. Cognitive abstractions deal with that which is; normative abstractions deal with that which ought to be (in the realms open to man's choice).

Ethics, the normative science, is based on two cognitive branches of philosophy: metaphysics and epistemology. To prescribe what man ought to do, one must first know what he is and where he is—i.e., what is his nature (including his means of cognition) and the nature of the universe in which he acts. (It is irrelevant, in this context, whether the metaphysical base of a given system of ethics is true or false; if it is false, the error will make the ethics impracticable. What concerns us here is only the dependence of ethics on metaphysics.)

Once again, try to forget Peikoff and Kelley. Just focus on cognitive abstractions. Rand stated that "cognitive abstractions identify the facts of reality," and "cognitive abstractions deal with that which is."

This is not ethics. It is epistemology.

Try to understand that on an abstraction level - on the level of forming concepts. Once that becomes clear, think about the following statement:

This is not ethics ("the normative science"). It is epistemology ("metaphysical base").

Notice that man has not entered the picture yet on an abstraction level. He is there abstracting, but what he is abstracting is everything but what to do about his own needs and desires. He is merely looking at the world around him to see what exists. Once that becomes clear, think about the following statement:

This is not ethics ("the normative science" - good/evil). It is epistemology ("metaphysical base" - true/false).

Notice that the "metaphysical base" is nothing more than cognitive abstractions.

This is jumping ahead, but now see if the following statement is clear: "It is irrelevant, in this context, whether the metaphysical base of a given system of ethics is true or false; if it is false, the error will make the ethics impracticable. What concerns us here is only the dependence of ethics on metaphysics."

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 20 2006, 03:43 AM

M, I think I know where you are going with this, and once I get more time to read and mull over the relevant readings to this topic, I’ll answer your post. It seems you found a good direction here.

***

A somewhat related questions pops in my head, and I want to post it now [before I forget it] for consideration. Kelley’s repeated emphasis on “toleration” and “benevolence” as being sourly lacking in Ayn Rand’s philosophy just sounds like so much more pleading and pandering to popular feelings. After all, do not all of Rand’s writings on the concept of “justice” take care of the questions of 'benevolence' and such?

“To remain alive, he must ACT, and BEFORE he can ACT he MUST KNOW the NATURE and PURPOSE of HIS ACTIONS."

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 20 2006, 07:03 AM

Victor,

Dayaamm! It never gets any better.

... “toleration” and “benevolence” as being sourly lacking in Ayn Rand’s philosophy...

I am unaware of any place where he ever said that it was lacking in Rand's philosophy. Whoever taught you about Kelley, they taught you wrong.

Just epistemology for now. Just epistemology. And just Rand for now. Forget about Kelley and Peikoff.

Michael