Possible Problem with Objectivist Ethics

[l_chaim29]

I have been doing some medical reading lately and have found out that pain does not neccessarily indicate that there is an impediment to ones survival. Specifically I have found out that one can feel pain long after one has healed from an injury and also that one can feel pain when there is no evidence that there is an actual injury that one has suffered (the last is experienced in a disorder known by the name "pain disorder".

After reading this I seriously wondered whether the Objectivist morality could say or imply that there is a reason why either of these problems should be considered to be problems by those who are experiencing thiem (and therefore that they should try , if possible, to take some kind of action because of it (e.g. to get some kind of help from a medical professional who would know how to treat one for such types of pain.)

The reason I wondered this is that the Objectivist ethics seems to me to say that all of our valid reasons for acting come from the fact life is conditional; it follows, Objectivists seem to say, that one should value those things which are in support of human life. Why then would one want to take action in order to deal with the fact that one has pain which is no indication that one's life is in threat(i.e. that the requirements of your survival as set by your nature were threatened.)

[pbmaltzman]

Why then would one want to take action in order to deal with the fact that one has pain which is no indication that one's life is in threat(i.e. that the requirements of your survival as set by your nature were threatened.)

Well, on a practical level, BECAUSE IT HURTS. Pain at that level might not threaten your life, but it would definitely interfere with your "activities of daily living," and it would interfere with your enjoyment and productivity in life. Plus, it would be damned annoying.

[BaalChatzaf]

Why then would one want to take action in order to deal with the fact that one has pain which is no indication that one's life is in threat(i.e. that the requirements of your survival as set by your nature were threatened.)

Well, on a practical level, BECAUSE IT HURTS. Pain at that level might not threaten your life, but it would definitely interfere with your "activities of daily living," and it would interfere with your enjoyment and productivity in life. Plus, it would be damned annoying.

Pain, for the most part, is associated with things that are objectively -bad- for one. Occasionally pain of short duration is a a result of actions necessary to protect one's life or health.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited June 22, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[l_chaim29]

Why then would one want to take action in order to deal with the fact that one has pain which is no indication that one's life is in threat(i.e. that the requirements of your survival as set by your nature were threatened.)

Well, on a practical level, BECAUSE IT HURTS. Pain at that level might not threaten your life, but it would definitely interfere with your "activities of daily living," and it would interfere with your enjoyment and productivity in life. Plus, it would be damned annoying.

I meant why would an Objectivist qua objectivist. I thought that this would be understood by the way that I presented my post.

[Reidy]

Rand said in "The Objectivist Ethics" that the ability to feel pain is a necessary condition of knowing what's good or bad for us. She'd be in trouble on these points only if she'd said it was always and infallibly sufficient.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

l_chaim29 (Christopher),

Welcome to OL.

The pleasure/pain mechanism is the theoretical basis of value in Objectivism for conscious beings. It is considered as a normative sensation. Here is the quote from The Virtue of Selfishness, "The Objectivist Ethics," pp. 18-19.

Now in what manner does a human being discover the concept of "value"? By what means does he first become aware of the issue of "good or evil" in its simplest form? By means of the physical sensations of pleasure or pain. Just as sensations are the first step of the development of a human consciousness in the realm of cognition, so they are its first step in the realm of evaluation.

The capacity to experience pleasure or pain is innate in a man's body; it is part of his nature, part of the kind of entity he is. He has no choice about it, and he has no choice about the standard that determines what will make him experience the physical sensation of pleasure or of pain. What is that standard? His life.

The pleasure-pain mechanism in the body of man—and in the bodies of all the living organisms that possess the faculty of consciousness——serves as an automatic guardian of the organism's life. The physical sensation of pleasure is a signal indicating that the organism is pursuing the right course of action. The physical sensation of pain is a warning signal of danger, indicating that the organism is pursuing the wrong course of action, that something is impairing the proper function of its body, which requires action to correct it. The best illustration of this can be seen in the rare, freak cases of children who are born without the capacity to experience physical pain; such children do not survive for long; they have no means of discovering what can injure them, no warning signals, and thus a minor cut can develop into a deadly infection, or a major illness can remain undetected until it is too late to fight it.

Since emotions are subconscious value judgments in Objectivist theory, the bases of all emotions are pleasure/pain.

Pleasure/pain evolved as a survival mechanism. Like all of our survival mechanisms, it can malfunction and, of course, when advanced medication is used, the context changes vastly from what it was evolved to perform. There is simply no way for the unconscious organism to evaluate specific drugs or invasive surgery, etc., as being good in survival terms.

I do agree with the part about pleasure/pain being a survival mechanism and also being on the level of sensations. I do not agree that it is the entire basis of emotions. (For a more empirical-based notion of the bases of emotions, called affects, see here.)

The pleasure/pain mechanism is not an absolute standard that supercedes normative cognition. It is merely the starting point and the basic standard under normal contexts.

There is a danger in using only pleasure/pain as an ethical standard. It is a short-term reaction and one falls off into hedonism. As cognition allows man to think mid-term and long-term in addition to short-term, the standards for ethics change accordingly to include known results of causes.

Michael

[Wolf DeVoon]

Let's speak candidly about pleasure (having a good time). Allowing for individual taste and constitutional deficits, it remains that travel will broaden your understanding of pleasure. It may be enough to relocate and work in two dozen US states and foreign countries, as I have. But what matters most is society. I learned a great deal in prison, for instance; adventure is infinite opportunity to discover pain.

I've also dined with princes, poets, and A-list Hollywood superstars. I met Mrs Thatcher and watched her interact with Bush Sr and Helmut Kohl at a NATO summit. I've been married four times and held children and grandchildren in my arms. I've also been cheated, jilted, slandered, sandbagged, and threatened with death (by guys who really meant it). The goal of freedom in the widest sense is to integrate and transcend each experience and to go forward, unchained, unbroken.

It is altogether too easy to get stuck in an emotional groove. The ultimate tyranny is habit nestled in parochial expectation. The Unknown is supposed to be unexpected, by definition. Remaining in your familiar sandbox is risk-averse. You have to go to grow. Exploration is a transformative challenge, and it has little to do with "liking" or "disliking" anything.

W.

[l_chaim29]

l_chaim29 (Christopher),

Welcome to OL.

The pleasure/pain mechanism is the theoretical basis of value in Objectivism for conscious beings. It is considered as a normative sensation. Here is the quote from The Virtue of Selfishness, "The Objectivist Ethics," pp. 18-19.

Now in what manner does a human being discover the concept of "value"? By what means does he first become aware of the issue of "good or evil" in its simplest form? By means of the physical sensations of pleasure or pain. Just as sensations are the first step of the development of a human consciousness in the realm of cognition, so they are its first step in the realm of evaluation.

The capacity to experience pleasure or pain is innate in a man's body; it is part of his nature, part of the kind of entity he is. He has no choice about it, and he has no choice about the standard that determines what will make him experience the physical sensation of pleasure or of pain. What is that standard? His life.

The pleasure-pain mechanism in the body of man—and in the bodies of all the living organisms that possess the faculty of consciousness——serves as an automatic guardian of the organism's life. The physical sensation of pleasure is a signal indicating that the organism is pursuing the right course of action. The physical sensation of pain is a warning signal of danger, indicating that the organism is pursuing the wrong course of action, that something is impairing the proper function of its body, which requires action to correct it. The best illustration of this can be seen in the rare, freak cases of children who are born without the capacity to experience physical pain; such children do not survive for long; they have no means of discovering what can injure them, no warning signals, and thus a minor cut can develop into a deadly infection, or a major illness can remain undetected until it is too late to fight it.

Since emotions are subconscious value judgments in Objectivist theory, the bases of all emotions are pleasure/pain.

Pleasure/pain evolved as a survival mechanism. Like all of our survival mechanisms, it can malfunction and, of course, when advanced medication is used, the context changes vastly from what it was evolved to perform. There is simply no way for the unconscious organism to evaluate specific drugs or invasive surgery, etc., as being good in survival terms.

I do agree with the part about pleasure/pain being a survival mechanism and also being on the level of sensations. I do not agree that it is the entire basis of emotions. (For a more empirical-based notion of the bases of emotions, called affects, see here.)

The pleasure/pain mechanism is not an absolute standard that supercedes normative cognition. It is merely the starting point and the basic standard under normal contexts.

There is a danger in using only pleasure/pain as an ethical standard. It is a short-term reaction and one falls off into hedonism. As cognition allows man to think mid-term and long-term in addition to short-term, the standards for ethics change accordingly to include known results of causes.

Michael

I was under the understanding that since man's life in Objectivism means "the requirments of man's survival, given his nature" (I believe those were Craig Biddle's words) that one should, in Objectivism be concerned only with trying to value those things which are in support of man's survival (and taking action against those things which are against man's survival). I therefore could not (and still can't) understand why Objectivsm would imply that one ought to try and take corrective action against pain that was no indication that one's survival was under threat. For example, some chronic forms of pain are especially mild and do not neccessarily interfere with a persons ability to do the things it takes to survive (that is, to sustain one's life). Why then would Objectivism say that you should take corrective action against such a type of pain if it doesnt' help you to survive any better than you could without taking the corrective actioin.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

l_chaim29 (Christopher),

I normally don't like the rhetorical form of "Objectivism says." In places where this form is popular, I have noticed a tribal element in the air that leads away from individualism and honest individual effort at thinking. Peer pressure is the result by making one take sides with "Objectivism." That is intimidating and I intensely dislike the way I have seen this used as an intellectual whip.

I prefer quoting a passage (especially from Rand) and commenting on that. In terms of "says who," I am far more interested in what Christopher says, especially if he is thinking for himself. He is the one with whom I am discussing, not "Objectivism."

There are principles we can deduce and induce from some basic observations and axiomatic premises, many of which were presented by Ayn Rand. About pain specifically, it is obvious that chronic pain is an unpleasant form of living at the least, and life-draining as it gets worse, so if one can eliminate it after determining that doing so is not life-threatening, why not?

The parts in Objectivist literature that deal with "man qua man" as a standard of ethics has been the subject of much debate. All this statement tries to do is establish that a human being as an entity has a specific identity with a specific set of characteristics. Survival with severe impairment of such characteristics is not a premise on which to develop an ethical system. We develop a value system based on what a human being needs (inherent needs like food, etc.) and what can be developed (his mind—cognitive and emotional).

One characteristic is that happiness is an optimal state for human existence. To the extent that pain detracts from happiness or obstructs it, getting rid of needless pain can be considered ethically correct. I consider this more of a practical matter than ethical. In my own view, the individual must decide how much pain he can tolerate without this interfering with his happiness. It is beside the point to draw up a one-size-fits-all ethical principle for it (meaning that happiness of the individual is not the standard).

Then it becomes a contextless rule for collective obedience, not a principle.

Michael

[l_chaim29]

l_chaim29 (Christopher),

I normally don't like the rhetorical form of "Objectivism says." In places where this form is popular, I have noticed a tribal element in the air that leads away from individualism and honest individual effort at thinking. Peer pressure is the result by making one take sides with "Objectivism." That is intimidating and I intensely dislike the way I have seen this used as an intellectual whip.

I prefer quoting a passage (especially from Rand) and commenting on that. In terms of "says who," I am far more interested in what Christopher says, especially if he is thinking for himself. He is the one with whom I am discussing, not "Objectivism."

There are principles we can deduce and induce from some basic observations and axiomatic premises, many of which were presented by Ayn Rand. About pain specifically, it is obvious that chronic pain is an unpleasant form of living at the least, and life-draining as it gets worse, so if one can eliminate it after determining that doing so is not life-threatening, why not?

The parts in Objectivist literature that deal with "man qua man" as a standard of ethics has been the subject of much debate. All this statement tries to do is establish that a human being as an entity has a specific identity with a specific set of characteristics. Survival with severe impairment of such characteristics is not a premise on which to develop an ethical system. We develop a value system based on what a human being needs (inherent needs like food, etc.) and what can be developed (his mind—cognitive and emotional).

One characteristic is that happiness is an optimal state for human existence. To the extent that pain detracts from happiness or obstructs it, getting rid of needless pain can be considered ethically correct. I consider this more of a practical matter than ethical. In my own view, the individual must decide how much pain he can tolerate without this interfering with his happiness. It is beside the point to draw up a one-size-fits-all ethical principle for it (meaning that happiness of the individual is not the standard).

Then it becomes a contextless rule for collective obedience, not a principle.

Michael

Michael,

Would it be fair to say that, at least according to you, the Objectiivist statement about man's life being the standard of morality does NOT mean that "survival" is the standard. In other words, do you think that Ayn Rand could be talking about some standard other than mere survival (without sacrifices from self to other(s) or other(s) to self)? If so, can you tell me briefly what you think it means to have "man's life" as the standard of morality? I myself have wondered just exactly what Ayn Rand meant by this standard as I do not think that Ayn Rand was actually very clear on what exactly she meant by it.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

l_chaim29 (Christopher),

I have a problem with the concept of human nature in Objectivism. It is correct in terms of identifying rationality as the differentia for the definition of man, but my problem resides in the genus. Rand identified man as "rational animal," with "rational" being the differentia and "animal" the genus. Then Objectivist literature usually forgets about the animal part and only deals with the rational (and sometimes slips in an emotional part for good measure).

But, "man qua man" includes the animal part. When you talk "animal," you talk growth-aging-death, reproduction, caring for the young, herding (or grouping of some sort), group leader, instincts, and a whole host of considerations. These are usually hot-button topics for Objectivists, but they are all within the nature of man, so they should be covered by ethics. A normal life under normal circumstances include all of them (and in apparently contrary cases like gays and reproduction, all gays have contact with reproduction by being born and having a mother, and they usually have the physical equipment to reproduce if needed).

Rand is often taken to task by her enemies for being vague about this idea, but that is because she bashed so many for being vague. Even so, I would not call her "vague." I would say she did not "flesh out" the animal part, or even at times outright denied it. The basic idea is correct, though. There are not enough details and the treatment is too top-heavy to be exclusive and all-encompassing. But it is an excellent starting point.

Michael

[BaalChatzaf]

Rand is often taken to task by her enemies for being vague about this idea, but that is because she bashed so many for being vague. Even so, I would not call her "vague." I would say she did not "flesh out" the animal part, or even at times outright denied it. The basic idea is correct, though. There are not enough details and the treatment is too top-heavy to be exclusive and all-encompassing. But it is an excellent starting point.

Michael

Rand deified humanity, especially strong male humans. Ironically her awe and love of -men- was mirrored in the attitude of Leni Raffenstahl, the brilliant German film maker. Her movie -Olympiad-, made for the 1936 Olympics in Berlin glorified the male athlete. The shots of the male athletes were both breathtaking and beautiful. Her sense of awe was very close to Rands even if her politics were on the other side of the Galaxy.

Rand saw Man (generically) as heroic and even god-like. In that regard she was an optimist.

I have a different view of our kind. My take is this: Man is the smartest, baddest ape in The Monkey House. Factually, I am closer to reality than is Rand. Sub specie aeterna, we are not a nice bunch. We are not very clean and we are bad-ass.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dragonfly]

Rand deified humanity, especially strong male humans. Ironically her awe and love of -men- was mirrored in the attitude of Leni Raffenstahl, the brilliant German film maker. Her movie -Olympiad-, made for the 1936 Olympics in Berlin glorified the male athlete. The shots of the male athletes were both breathtaking and beautiful. Her sense of awe was very close to Rands even if her politics were on the other side of the Galaxy.

It was Leni Riefenstahl. As far as I remember the movie also glorified female athletes, and also showed naked women.

Rand saw Man (generically) as heroic and even god-like. In that regard she was an optimist.

"Man" was definitely Rand's god; one of her arguments against God was that the idea of God was insulting and degrading to man, as it implied that the highest possible is not to be reached by man. So out with God and Man in his place!

[BaalChatzaf]

Rand saw Man (generically) as heroic and even god-like. In that regard she was an optimist.

"Man" was definitely Rand's god; one of her arguments against God was that the idea of God was insulting and degrading to man, as it implied that the highest possible is not to be reached by man. So out with God and Man in his place!

And so on back to The Monkey House.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[l_chaim29]

l_chaim29 (Christopher),

I have a problem with the concept of human nature in Objectivism. It is correct in terms of identifying rationality as the differentia for the definition of man, but my problem resides in the genus. Rand identified man as "rational animal," with "rational" being the differentia and "animal" the genus. Then Objectivist literature usually forgets about the animal part and only deals with the rational (and sometimes slips in an emotional part for good measure).

But, "man qua man" includes the animal part. When you talk "animal," you talk growth-aging-death, reproduction, caring for the young, herding (or grouping of some sort), group leader, instincts, and a whole host of considerations. These are usually hot-button topics for Objectivists, but they are all within the nature of man, so they should be covered by ethics. A normal life under normal circumstances include all of them (and in apparently contrary cases like gays and reproduction, all gays have contact with reproduction by being born and having a mother, and they usually have the physical equipment to reproduce if needed).

Rand is often taken to task by her enemies for being vague about this idea, but that is because she bashed so many for being vague. Even so, I would not call her "vague." I would say she did not "flesh out" the animal part, or even at times outright denied it. The basic idea is correct, though. There are not enough details and the treatment is too top-heavy to be exclusive and all-encompassing. But it is an excellent starting point.

Michael

Thanks Michael, I liked that post a great deal:)

[Brant Gaede]

Rand is often taken to task by her enemies for being vague about this idea, but that is because she bashed so many for being vague. Even so, I would not call her "vague." I would say she did not "flesh out" the animal part, or even at times outright denied it. The basic idea is correct, though. There are not enough details and the treatment is too top-heavy to be exclusive and all-encompassing. But it is an excellent starting point.

Michael

Rand deified humanity, especially strong male humans. Ironically her awe and love of -men- was mirrored in the attitude of Leni Raffenstahl, the brilliant German film maker. Her movie -Olympiad-, made for the 1936 Olympics in Berlin glorified the male athlete. The shots of the male athletes were both breathtaking and beautiful. Her sense of awe was very close to Rands even if her politics were on the other side of the Galaxy.

Rand saw Man (generically) as heroic and even god-like. In that regard she was an optimist.

I have a different view of our kind. My take is this: Man is the smartest, baddest ape in The Monkey House. Factually, I am closer to reality than is Rand. Sub specie aeterna, we are not a nice bunch. We are not very clean and we are bad-ass.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Adolescents have a deep need for heroes as mentoring role models. The quality of those role models has a great deal to do with how they turn out as adults. Someone doesn't have to end up in bad asshood, but I think it's desirable to be able to take care of yourself in a world of bad asses. And you can be a bad ass who looks like a good ass. My idea of an heroic person is someone who does heroic things, not someone who poses or is posed as one. The posing is okay for art, especially sculpture (The David, not Nazi or Soviet "realism") or even in novels, but to regard one's husband that way--in Rand's case it seems to have started out in a good way, but ended badly. As for Raffenstahl, she was the Dr. Stadler of movie-making.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

Adolescents have a deep need for heroes as mentoring role models. The quality of those role models has a great deal to do with how they turn out as adults. Someone doesn't have to end up in bad asshood, but I think it's desirable to be able to take care of yourself in a world of bad asses. And you can be a bad ass who looks like a good ass. My idea of an heroic person is someone who does heroic things, not someone who poses or is posed as one. The posing is okay for art, especially sculpture (The David, not Nazi or Soviet "realism") or even in novels, but to regard one's husband that way--in Rand's case it seems to have started out in a good way, but ended badly. As for Raffenstahl, she was the Dr. Stadler of movie-making.

--Brant

Raffensthal was not even that. She was an ethical imbecile, devoid of ethical or moral discernment. Totally clueless in this regard. However she sure know how to frame a shot!

Ba'al Chatzaf

[l_chaim29]

Why then would one want to take action in order to deal with the fact that one has pain which is no indication that one's life is in threat(i.e. that the requirements of your survival as set by your nature were threatened.)

Well, on a practical level, BECAUSE IT HURTS. Pain at that level might not threaten your life, but it would definitely interfere with your "activities of daily living," and it would interfere with your enjoyment and productivity in life. Plus, it would be damned annoying.

Pam,

Since this pain would not neccessarily ineterfere with your productive life (it would have to be a case of more SEVERE pain to do this at least, and some pains like I'm describing are known for being usually mild), and also because that's just not the only thing to consider here, I love your comment that it "would be damned annoying"... I laughed when I read that because I consider it to be the same way and, in fact, that is SUFFICIENT reason to me... However, if you read the post closer, I was asking for a response of a different kind than the one you gave. I don't desire to try and go into just what it was I was asking for right now (that would involve to much thought than I want to give it right now), but I wanted to say that I appreciating the "damn annoying" comment... That's just how I feel about it. lol