My final Rant(s)

[Ellen Stuttle]

Clarifying addendum.

I wrote above: "Questions raised by Objectivism I think are of much importance to attempts to solve [the volition vis-a-vis science] problem."

Probably those here who have some familiarity with my views know this, Bob, but you might not. So I add that I don't think Rand's specific theory of volition is correct, though I think she provides leads. But I think Objectivism raises questions which are of importance on the issue.

Ellen

___

[Paul Mawdsley]

Ellen,

There is a handful of people in this world I would love to sit down with over coffee and compare notes because I think the exchange could be fascinating and synergistically productive. You are definitely one of them. Our interests are very similar and our noses seem to be pulling us in the same general direction. You have a standing invitation for coffee in my house.

Paul

[Judith]

I am fine with saying I am largely an Objectivist oriented thinker or my perspective is predominantly grounded in Objectivist principles but I am not an Objectivist package. For example, one of the most important principles guiding my models and understanding of the world, especially my social world, is the causal principle that is contained in field theory. The idea that an entity can be conceived as being a node in a web of relationships who's actions are determined by the information contained in the field as a whole is very important for understanding quantum physics and social dynamics. It is, however, an idea that is viewed as contradicting Objectivism's basic causal orientation, especially in the social realm. Post Modern philosophy is grounded in this causal principle. Look at the Objectivists' evaluation of Post Modernism and you will see how Rand and most who call themselves Objectivists have chosen one perceptual orientation over another. Objectivism is very much defined by what concepts and principles it is against. I am not against all the same concepts and principles. Therefore, perhaps I am not an Objectivist.

I generally call myself an Objectivist without worrying too much about fine-tuning the definition because most of the people who hear me don't have a clue regarding what an Objectivist is anyway, and I have to tell them. But regarding your last sentence, I say, "Says who?" Leonard Peikoff? Ayn Rand? You? Me? No one really owns Objectivism any more than anyone owns Aristotelianism or Platonism, much as Rand is spinning in her grave at my saying so. Do all Platonists believe the same thing? Does one have to agree with everything Aristotle believed to call one's self an Aristotelian? Rand called herself an Aristotelian, but she disagreed with Aristotle on many things. I feel free to disagree with Rand on things about which I think she was wrong and still call myself an Objectivist. I think the basic principles of Objectivism are, summed up in one sentence, a commitment to reality. I want to know the truth about things, and damn the cost. I say that makes me an Objectivist, and a better one than many of those who are in the orthodox circles fussing about who's immoral and who's not.

Judith

[Guyau]

Bob,

You wrote "I'm quite interested to learn what ideas of hers you conclude are "original, true, important" and why."

The first is Rand's idea that concepts of any particulars can be fashioned according to a principle of suspensed particular measurement values along certain magnitude dimensions shared by particulars falling under those concepts. I have written a little about the precursors of this idea in the history of philosophy in my first essay (1990) on Rand's theory. This conjecture is important as a distinct position in the theory of universals. It has implications for metaphysics and for philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of science. I continue to develope the measurements-omitted theory of universals and to put it to work in problems current in the philosophy of mathematics and science. We can discuss Rand's theory in this forum very nicely I think. I will place the Abstract for my original essay, as well as the Abstract for my most recent essay (2004) in this area as an appendix to this post.

The second is Rand's idea that value occurs only on account of the existence of life. Where there is value, there is life; and where there is life, there are values. Ellen has also found this insight a good one. I have not published work in this area, though you will find remarks of mine in this area in internet posts. I would like to say just a bit about the history of this idea right here. The first thinker who really got some grip on this idea was a philosopher who was probably as unknown to Rand as he is unknown to participants here today. His name is Marie-Jean Guyau. His theory of ethics was individualistic, against Utilitarianism, and purely secular. His book presenting this theory is A Sketch of Morality without Obligation or Sanction (1885). I think you would enjoy reading this book very much. Nietzsche read it in spring and early summer of 1885 and changed his old tune PDQ as to the baselessness of his own ethic. There was Guyau---"Brave Guyau" as Fritz calls him---setting out a purely secular and individualistic and rational ethics based on a broad principle of biology. But Guyau's ethics is not egoism. Thereafter, Fritz began to insist uniformly that his own ethics was based on a principle of biology, although one different from Guyau's. It would be a good project to compare the different conceptions of life, at all its levels, held up by Guyau, Nietzsche, and Rand and the different moral theories they derive therefrom.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

ABSTRACT

“Capturing Concepts” by Stephen Boydstun

Objectivity Volume 1, Number 1, Pages 13–41

Concepts are thoughts indicating and specifying kinds and sets of items. Concepts are marked and evoked by words. Starting with that general view of concepts, Boydstun brings the research of developmental cognitive psychologists to bear on philosophic accounts of what concepts are and how we acquire our earliest concepts. He reviews the phenomena of categorical perception, perceptual recognition, and iconic representation (i) for their contributions to our concepts and (ii) for the ways they are different from our earliest genuine concepts

Boydstun examines Ayn Rand’s distinctive theory of concepts as abstractions from perceptual concretes by a process of measurement-omission. He draws forth the theory’s kinships with the views on abstraction of Aquinas and Ockham, as well as its contradiction of the view of Berkeley and Hume. Boydstun holds to Rand’s view of what concepts are, the view of concepts standing as with measurements omitted from the particulars they subsume. Rand’s conjectures concerning the formation of our earliest concepts are critically reviewed in light of developmental psychological research: on the acquisition of language; on the early method of classification, by overall similarity; on the emergence of a principle of identity privileged over similarity; and on the eventual ability to organize classifications according to abstracted ordinal dimensions.

ABSTRACT

"Universals and Measurement" by Stephen Boydstun

The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Volume 5, Number 2, Pages 271-305

Boydstun argues that Rand's measurement-omission analysis of concepts implies a distinctive magnitude structure for metaphysics. This is structure beyond logical structure, constraint on possibilty beyond logical constraint. Yet it is structure ranging as widely as logical structure through all the sciences and common experience. Boydstun uncovers this distinctive magnitude structure, characterizing it by its automorphisms, by its location among the mathematical categories, and by the types of measurement it affords. He uncovers a structure to universals implicit in Rand's theory that is additional to recurrence structure.

[Paul Mawdsley]

I feel free to disagree with Rand on things about which I think she was wrong and still call myself an Objectivist. I think the basic principles of Objectivism are, summed up in one sentence, a commitment to reality. I want to know the truth about things, and damn the cost. I say that makes me an Objectivist, and a better one than many of those who are in the orthodox circles fussing about who's immoral and who's not.

Judith,

Thanks for being the voice of the alternate perspective within me. I have made no final decisions as yet. It's strange that it all comes down to definitions. On the "Talents" thread Michael is suggesting differing definitions are the root of much animosity. I am struggling with perspectives based on different definitions within myself. I'll let you know who wins, if I don't kill myself in the process.

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Ellen,

Despite your misgivings, you definitely are not an intruder. Nor is Bob, for the record. It is not wrong to criticize Rand here on OL. I think it is a necessary part of thinking for yourself.

I don't like wholesale condemnations of the "she's a psycho" type. This is not because I venerate Rand. It is simply because it is not true. I personally know what effort it takes to create a large scale work (I once wrote an hour long cantata for 250 musicians that I conducted and that took me 4 years to write). Leaving aside comparisons of quality (my work is still in need of improvement), it takes a lot of stubbornness to finish something like that. I definitely do not think I am a "psycho" for being that stubborn.

Rand got stuck on some of her ideas in that way. This is part of the creative mentality. Does anyone think Richard Wagner was a psycho? He had some really strange habits. You get the picture.

Rand also got some things really wrong. The most glaring for me is trying to apply her observations to 100% of all possible cases almost all the time. I have written about this before. She had some marvelous insights that apply to a whole bunch of cases, but not all. Yet she often proclaimed them as if they did apply to all.

I could go on, but I don't want this to appear as a gratuitous Rand bash. When Rand's insights are applied to the proper cases, they are admirable. Some are even breathtaking in their clarity.

Notice that just as I don't like the "Rand is a psycho" type commentary, I also don't like the "Rand was a goddess" type either. I don't like criticism or commentary that calls for people to turn their minds off, and I find these paths do precisely that.

So don't feel you are an intruder on OL. I believe that you are an exemplary type of person--the type I seek--and I find it an honor to know you. I extend that commentary to Bob, also, if he will give up the same sweeping generalizations that he condemns from the other end. I was attracted to Bob's mind and independent thinking already on RoR. The fact that he has stuck around is an indication that some of the issues have not left his mind and are still under his skin. I definitely do not judge him as an attention hog. He's bothered and has unfinished business.

If we can get away from insults, I think good things can be discussed and new insights developed.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

On the other hand, I find her fascinating; I also find her attempt to produce a viable secular morality very important. I think that the world scene is desperately in need of a really good secular morality. I also think that there are enormous problems in reconciling such a morality with current science -- the basic problem pertaining to the issue of volition. The current scientific picture leaves us with a "volition" which can't be anything more than I'd call "illusory," a "volition" which is a paper tiger, which has no causal clout. On the other hand, I think that the very enterprise of science is impossible without a volition which does have causal clout. So in my view there's a really big bad problem in need of being solved. Questions raised by Objectivism I think are of much importance to attempts to solve this problem. Furthermore, I have a strong interest in the psychological/social dynamics of belief systems -- the role and effect of such systems in human life. And the Objectivist world is a place which provides a lot of material pertinent to this interest.

Ellen

_

I'm beginning to think that determinism and volition are different sides of the human conduct coin and that determined doesn't necessarily mean had-to-be-determined this or that way. All had-to-be means is that's what happened and hindsight is 20/20. Volition determines, determines determines, people determine, exogenous factors determine, an act of validation is determined but not the content of the validation save for the determined factors considered, etc. For truth to be validated objectivity must be possible and we can't toss out that without tossing out rationality itself, which must be irrational if done for that's all that'd be left, but that's impossible for irrationality is essentially a negative concept and to drop rationality means dropping irrationality too. Human conceptual knowledge simply is not possible without rationality (volition) and objectivity. To embrace the contrary is to embrace a contradiction by turning rationality into a stolen concept by using it in an attempt to deny it. So "The Contraction of Determinism" must be based on a misunderstanding of what determinism really is, a determinism that has no room for volition. You cannot prove that nothing could have been different, but that phony determinism is only what Nathaniel Branden addressed.

--Brant

[Paul Mawdsley]

...The current scientific picture leaves us with a "volition" which can't be anything more than I'd call "illusory," a "volition" which is a paper tiger, which has no causal clout. On the other hand, I think that the very enterprise of science is impossible without a volition which does have causal clout. So in my view there's a really big bad problem in need of being solved. Questions raised by Objectivism I think are of much importance to attempts to solve this problem.

I'm beginning to think that determinism and volition are different sides of the human conduct coin and that determined doesn't necessarily mean had-to-be-determined this or that way...

I see determinism as a concept that has grown out of the action-to-action view of causation. On this view an entity's action is initiated and directed by the transfer of energy from other entities that interact with it. All actions of a given entity must necessarily be determined by external antecedent factors because its behaviour would not otherwise change without the transfer of energy. Used as a guiding epistemological principle, this concept of causation has led to the development of science as we see it today.

Unfortunately, the action-to-action view of causation that has given rise to science and determinism is incompatible with volition. Volition requires that an entity be able to initiate and direct the action of consciousness from within the entity that acts. So volition requires that an entity's action not be determined by external antecedent factors. This stands in direct contradiction to the concept of action-to-action causation and the deterministic worldview that has shaped science.

What then are our options?

1) We can conclude contradictions exist.

2) We can conclude that the deterministic worldview which arises from action-to-action causation is an accurate description of reality and volition is an illusion.

3) We can conclude that volition is real and action-to-action causation and determinism are not an accurate description of reality.

If we assume the first conclusion, we have no epistemological ground to stand on. If we assume the second, we have to justify the illusory status of volition and discard the value of our intuition, as many from a scientific slant would suggest. If we assume the third conclusion, we have to discard a profoundly powerful concept of causation and find a replacement for it that integrates the evidence of the sciences and the evidence of volition. I opt for the latter and I think Rand made an important step in pointing the direction of a more inclusive concept of causation.

There is a model of causation that gives volition its "causal clout" and integrates the evidence of the sciences. Our job is to build this model of causation. That's right, "build it." Hume was right. We cannot observe causation. Nor is causation simply an abstraction of concrete observations. The application of the imagination and the rational faculty is required. To identify the nature of causality we must first build models of the various classes of entities (inanimate, vegetative, animate, conscious, volitional) and their interactions, and then abstract the principles of causation that are observed to be common among these models.

One thing that strikes me, we have to get past the problem of viewing energy as some ghostly substance that is transferred from one entity to another. This is the idea that traps us in determinism. This is why I have suggested in other threads that we consider energy to be an intrinsic property of entities who's orientation or direction of action can be changed, but which is never transferred from one entity to another. If the evidence of science can be integrated from such a view of causation then we can escape the grip of determinism. Since energy is considered an intrinsic principle of entities, there is no problem, in principle, with volition requiring that an entity be able to initiate and direct the action of consciousness from within the entity that acts. The integration of mind and body is possible.

Paul

Edited December 23, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[Judith]

It's strange that it all comes down to definitions. On the "Talents" thread Michael is suggesting differing definitions are the root of much animosity.

I said elsewhere that when I was in my 20s I relished that kind of discussion, but now I no longer have the patience for it. Words are terribly important when you're trying to get someone else to understand you. Clarity is a religion for me. But when it's all hypothetical, I just can't get myself excited about it.

Judith

[Paul Mawdsley]

I said elsewhere that when I was in my 20s I relished that kind of discussion, but now I no longer have the patience for it. Words are terribly important when you're trying to get someone else to understand you. Clarity is a religion for me. But when it's all hypothetical, I just can't get myself excited about it.

Judith,

I know what you mean. My early twenties was the time of my most vigorous arguments. Now I no longer care if the other person sees the world as I do. In fact, I respect his right not to. I look for people who have used their minds to independently piece together a strong, authentic, and personal perspective. The great thing about such people is they always have a different perspective from me. This means I get to explore a whole new way of looking at the world. I guess one of the biggest differences today from when I was in my twenties is that I am more oriented now to developing my perspective. Then I was more oriented to justifying it and defending my right to it. This tends to make one more closed to other points of view.

As far as words go, it's always been important that words have a very specific meaning to me. I've always had solipsistic tendencies so I never used to care much if others shared the same meanings. There is a class of words that includes the word "talent" for which the definitions are relative because they merely represent a class of experienced phenomena. There is no thing, action of a thing, or interaction of things that you can point to and absolutely say, "That is talent." Its definition is then vague and socially decided.

It has been my policy to step aside of such words and the discussions that surround them. If I want to understand a subject, I bypass such socially defined words and seek instead to ground my thinking in words/images that represent entities, actions of entities, and interactions of entities. I find this makes my thinking more objective and keeps me out of the quicksand of terms like "talent." On the downside, this does lead me to struggle with some philosophical discussions that are grounded in words that categorize phenomena rather then represent entities and their actions. This is why Stephen Boydstun's writing hurts my mind. I really have to focus to follow what he says. (I must say it is worth the effort though.)

Paul

Edited December 23, 2006 by Paul Mawdsley

[studiodekadent]

I will add that I was most 'not amused' by Bob's Argumentum ad Insanitum. Arguing that Rand and Objectivists are inherently mentally ill and have problems is a pure insult. Also, you have to remember that the standard of a 'disorder' is IF the traits listed in the DSM have a detrimental effect on your life (impair your achievement of your values). This is not just stated by Nathaniel Branden in "Mental Health vs. Mysticism and Self-Sacrifice" but also in the introduction of the full version of the DSM.

This demonstrates that, strictly speaking, DSM criteria only reflect actual disorders within certain contexts. No behavior is inherently pathological. A disease is not something you do, but something that happens to you. See Thomas Szasz for more details on this matter.

Now, Rand herself may well have had some personal difficulties or problems with living happily. It is well known she had a period of depression (which is an emotional condition but not inherently a disease) after the publication of Atlas Shrugged. I dont blame her, given the brutal attacks upon her that followed. This does not imply she was insane or afflicted with 'psychopathology.'

She displayed characteristics rather common, to paraphrase Kelley, those who fight a lonely battle of ideas.

The above analysis applies to individual Objectivists, I would also imagine.