Empathy, weaponized

[Brant Gaede]

6 hours ago, Ellen Stuttle said:

I think you need a better blender.

Ellen

LOL!

--Brant

searching

[Brant Gaede]

That's Ross Lavatter with two T's. He pleaded guilty in 2010 to securities fraud and something to do with a prostitution ring and got 3 years. He probably pleaded to avoid a multiplicity of charges at trial. He is a retired radiologist.

No one can afford justice in a federal court. The risk is way too high. (This has nothing to do with whether he was a bad guy.) 

--Brant

[Peter]

2 hours ago, Brant Gaede said:

That's Ross Lavatter with two T's. He pleaded guilty in 2010 to securities fraud and something to do with a prostitution ring and got 3 years. He probably pleaded to avoid a multiplicity of charges at trial. He is a retired radiologist.

No one can afford justice in a federal court. The risk is way too high. (This has nothing to do with whether he was a bad guy.) 

--Brant

Thanks for clearing it up Brant. Darn but he was smart, with very short, concise letters. I had heard that he was "the agent" for several aspiring actresses in Vegas. He may have committed TWO victimless crimes and went to prison for it.     

[anthony]

A "blender"? That is indeed what we do and are, Brant. The body which is electric:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tG-wl2qqD7Y

 

[anthony]

The stirring words to a fine piece of music:

I sing the body electric
I celebrate the me and to come
I toast to my own reunion
When I become one with the sun

And I'll look back on Venus
I'll look back on Mars
And I'll burn with the fire
Of ten million stars
And in time and in time
We will all be stars

I sing the body electric
I glory in the glow of rebirth
Creating my own tomorrow
When I shall embody the Earth

And I'll serenade Venus
I'll serenade Mars
And I'll burn with the fire
Of ten million stars
And in time and in time
We will all be stars

Yeah, ooh, yeah!
Yeah, yeah!

We are the emperors now
And we are Czars
And in time and in time
We will all be stars!

I sing the body electric
I celebrate the me and to come
I toast to my own reunion
(my own reunion)
When I become one with the sun

And I'll look back on Venus
I'll look back on Mars
And I'll burn with the fire
Of ten million stars
And in time and in time
(And in time and in time)
We will all be stars!

[Ellen Stuttle]

23 hours ago, Brant Gaede said:

That's Ross Lavatter with two T's. He pleaded guilty in 2010 to securities fraud and something to do with a prostitution ring and got 3 years. He probably pleaded to avoid a multiplicity of charges at trial. He is a retired radiologist.

I didn't hear anything about securities fraud, if that was part of the mix.  I think it was 2014.  Why I think that is because Ross asked me for a character attestment, but the timing was terrible from my standpoint because I was developing wet macular degeneration (subsequently gotten under control) in my left eye, and I wasn't willing to try to read the relevant charges, counter-statements, etc., or to get involved without learning the details.

As I understood the charges, they pertained to his participation in running an "escort service."

He was a radiologist as part of a joint practice group.  His employment was severed because of the legal charges against him.  I don't know if he's gone back to work somewhere, if somewhere would have him.  (Based on things he said when medical issues came up on the Atlantis lists, and on his sharp intellect, I figure that he was very good at his profession.)

---

21 hours ago, Peter said:

I had heard that he was "the agent" for several aspiring actresses in Vegas.

Ross lived in Phoenix, Arizona.  I never heard anything about his "agenting" "several aspiring actresses in Vegas."

Ellen

[Peter]

Thanks Ellen. I found a few references for “Ross” and we had several “Ross’s” over the years, but only a few for “Lavatter” which were not relevant or about the two cities of Vegas and Phoenix as Ross’s stomping grounds. But I trust Ellen’s judgment that he was in Phoenix. I think one reason I remember it being Las Vegas is because prostitution is legal there.   And below, Doris Gordon was with Libertarians For Life, or LFL and anti-abortion. Peter

Notes. From: "Doris Gordon"  To: <atlantis Subject: ATL: Re: Re: LFL:  When does the slate begin to fill up? Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2001 06:58:30 -0400. > Scientific observations and using Reason are the best way to define the beginning of "Personhood."

But that's exactly what LFL has done in our various articles.  We've provided the correct scientific facts of human embryology. And we've defined "person," provided a syllogism showing that the onset of the person is at fertilization.  And we've provided arguments in support of that syllogism.

 > The complete LFL position of rights existing at conception is untenable in my objective, non-emotional opinion.

What marker line do you find tenable?  Do you have an argument for your marker that you find convincing?

 > However, Doris is correct in starting with the Branden/Randian argument of partial rights for children and certain obligations for people who bring human life into existence.

I am not aware of any place where either Branden or Rand said "partial rights".  It's certainly not a concept that I use, let alone see as correct.

 >This is the only method I can imagine for objectively countering George H. Smith’s logically extreme example: Is it correct within an integrated theory of  “Human Rights” for a woman to completely own her personal body, even if she is carrying a child, and even to the extent that she has the right to commit suicide, and consequently kill the fetus?

 > I am not in sympathy with the Hannibal Lector/ Ross Lavatter? / Official Objectivist position one bit.

The pivotal question is personhood.  No prenatal personhood, end of debate. Given prenatal personhood, parental obligation logically follows – despite the woman's and the man's right to control his or her own body.

Interestingly, neither Rand nor Branden ever provided a systematic, substantial defense of the Objectivist position.  Rand's statement that the fetus is "nonliving" flies in the face of high school biology. And oddly, Rand once included the unborn in the category "man."  It's in her article "Man's Rights." Doris Gordon, Libertarians for Life

From: BBfromM To: atlantis Subject: Re: ATL: Abortion & Choice Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2001 18:55:46 EST Bill Dwyer wrote: . . . suppose . . . you find a newborn baby at your door when you arrive home from work.  And let's suppose that the baby is deformed and will require expensive, time consuming care not only as an infant but also as a child and young adult.  Suppose further that no one else wants the infant, because of the burden of caring for it.  Are you responsible to provide for its needs, or can you evict it, knowing that it will die as a result? I think the answer is obvious.  Since you are not required to raise and care for it, you may properly evict it or euthanize it (which would be the more humane alternative). >>

I agree with your overall point, but emphatically not with this example. There always have been and presumably always will be orphanages or their equivalent to which one could take this child. I cannot agree that it would be right to evict the child, knowing that it will die as a result; it would be morally monstrous. You are now talking about a human life, not a fetus, and surely we can expect that life should be respected and not destroyed without every conceivable effort to find an alternative. For myself, who does not want children and never has, should I find a deformed infant – perhaps another Izak Perlman -- on my doorstep, I would keep and care for it as long as was necessary to find it shelter and care, however much it interfered with my plans. I shudder at the psychology of anyone who would do less. If we as Objectivists do not cherish human life, then I don't know who will. Barbara

From: "George H. Smith" To: "*Atlantis" <atlantis Subject: ATL: Re:  Abortion & Choice Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2001 16:18:23 -0600

Ellen Stuttle wrote: "I'm interested by the way you're drawing the line between obligation and non-obligation.  If I understand you correctly, you're limiting obligation to what you've called in an earlier discussion "perfect rights."

I'm making the classical distinction between (1) juridical (or legally enforceable) obligations versus (2) purely moral (or non-enforceable) obligations. For centuries the former were called "perfect" obligations and the latter "imperfect" obligations. Hence many Christian libertarians maintained that charity is an imperfect rather than perfect obligation -- so charity should be a matter of conscience, not law. (This is merely an illustration; I'm not saying that I agree with it.)

Ellen wrote: "But I think what Barbara was getting at is one's sense of obligation to one's values.  And I think the question she was raising (she can correct me if I'm wrong) was:  What kind of person would close the door on a baby lying on the doorstep?"

I agree with Barbara on this. A moral obligation, as I have explained before, is a type of rational constraint. We are morally obligated to do x if our moral values logically demand (i.e., "constrain" us) to do x. ence, as I suggested in my first response to Dave Thomas, what we regard as our moral obligations will reflect our basic values, which in turn constitute essential elements of our character.

Thus, in considering whether or not to help the abandoned infant, I must choose between exerting a minimal effort to save an innocent human being or, by ignoring the situation, doom it to certain death. And since I place a very high value on innocent human life, I think I have a moral obligation to help the infant. That is to say, I am constrained by my basic values to render minimal assistance (at least), and to refuse this help would be a betrayal of those selfsame values.

Suppose I refused to help the infant and it died as a result. I would afterwards feel ashamed and remorseful, because I would feel that I had done something that was clearly wrong, given my values. Suppose I met another person (a professed libertarian) who had allowed the infant to perish (even though he could have easily saved its life), but who felt no remorse whatever about his act of omission. How would I evaluate this person? I would judge him to be extremely callous, a person with an underdeveloped or warped conscience. I would regard him as a person who had virtually no regard for innocent human life; and since this concern is the emotional soul of the libertarian approach to individual rights, I would also doubt the sincerity of his libertarianism.

In other words, I would not accuse him of injustice in the strict sense, but of a moral blindness that would make it very difficult to believe that he truly appreciates the animating force that breathes life into the abstract theory known as libertarianism. Although an abstract theory of justice is bereft of feelings, this is not true of those who embrace that theory. The theory of individual rights has always been driven by those with a passionate concern for innocent human beings -- and, incidentally, I think this was true of Ayn Rand as well. Ghs

[Peter]

I thought I would find some old letters of Ross Levatter. But because he signs off as Ross L. or Ross (just dropping in for a moment) Levatter and also and starts with the call sign “DXIMGR,” it is difficult to sort them out. Again I hope there are no duplicates. Delve into the mind of Doctor Levatter.  And thanks for the indulgence of the owners of OL. Peter

 From: DXIMGR@aol Dear list-members, I thought a fellow list-member was being perhaps a little harsh when s/he said, in a personal note to me about Bill Dwyer I've been allowed to quote from:

----

I often have the impression, when I read [Bill Dwyer's] replies to posts, that he starts replying before he's even finished reading, that he answers paragraph by paragraph as he goes along, with no attempt to grasp the over-all message, and still less attempt to understand nuances.

One image which I have of Bill's mind is that it's like a rolidex (sp?) with set answers to issues A - Z. It seems that certain phrases trigger pre-packaged responses -- responses which he's repeated time and time again with little variation. ... I think he *is* serious about philosophical subjects, but that there's something wrong with the way he processes such that he keeps going round and round the same grooves and doesn't truly *register* anything that might push him out of the grooves. He's frustrating.

While fully willing to grant this fellow-poster's point about the level of frustration Bill elicits, I thought the point that "he starts replying before he's even finished reading, that he answers paragraph by paragraph as he goes along, with no attempt to grasp the over-all message, and still less attempt to understand nuances" was a little much. Then I read Bill's response to my satire "Stop me before I choose again", cleverly titled "Re: Stop me before I choose again".

Bill writes: [quoting my character]  >> Killer: "You ask that as if I had a choice. I was determined to do it. Given the circumstances, I couldn't have done otherwise."

[Bill responding]  >First of all, soft determinism does not deny that we make choices.

Yet later, in responding to another argument, Bill writes, quite clearly I'd say:

 >Central to the doctrine of soft determinism, as to any form of determinism, is the view that that actor could *not* have chosen differently. Now, Bill, I'm going to ask you to do something for all the people following along online. Explain why it is wrong to say "Given the circumstances, I couldn't have done otherwise" when it is right to say "Central to the doctrine of soft determinism...is the view that that actor could *not* have chosen differently." And explain to the readers why you think it is correct to describe an action as a choice even though you agree that "GIVEN the circumstance, [the actor] couldn't have done otherwise".

But Bill has more problems than just explaining the above to you readers. For example, Bill quotes my satire:

 >> Cop: "You mean to say you CHOSE to do this, and for THAT very reason  you were DETERMINED to do this."

 >>Killer: "Exactly, once I had made my choice, THAT is what determined what  I'd do."

 >> Cop: "But could you have chosen otherwise?"

Killer: "Yes and no. I could have so chosen; but then THAT decision would  have DETERMINED what I did. It's not like I have free will about these things, of course; it's merely that I could have chosen differently."

Bill responds:  >What??  This is nonsense.  No soft determinist would say anything like this. Central to the doctrine of soft determinism, as to any form of determinism, is the view that that actor could *not* have chosen differently.

Now in this and previous posts, Bill has stated that (part of) what determines one's action is one's choices. How is this to be interpreted? Are choices independent variables that contribute to the action, or dependent epiphenomena that are themselves explained by more fundamental causal factors (such as Dennis May's neural networks)? If the latter, we find ourselves on the road to hard determinism. If the former, what is the point of Bill's strong objection ("This is nonsense.")? I very clearly stated that if the killer had chosen differently whatever action he chose would have been determined. This is Bill's position, whether he now wishes to acknowledge it or not. Bill, to be frank, it's one thing if people simply think you're foolishly wrong on a position. It's another when they think you're constantly shifting your foolishly wrong position to desperately win an argument, as if there's some prize given out on ATL, and not even for correct reasoning, but simply for duration of argument.

I'm sorry to keep dumping on Bill here, but what do those committed to honest philosophical debate, where some effort to understand and not distort one's opponent's position is taken as a measure of rectitude and civility, think of the following?

[Bill, quoting my satire] >>Cop: "Your position is that you killed all these people, chose to do so  for reasons of your own, methodically planned and carried out your plan, but that you couldn't have done otherwise because you were determined (by outside causes) to do this."

 >>Killer: "I usually don't find police so philosophically astute. That's it exactly."

 [and Bill jumps in}  >No soft determinist would say that his choices are determined by *outside* causes.  He would say that his values and motives -- his internal psychological state -- determines them.

Now here is the entirety of what I said in that passage:

 >>Cop: "Your position is that you killed all these people, chose to do so for reasons of your own, methodically planned and carried out your plan, but that you couldn't have done otherwise because you were determined (by outside causes) to do this."

 >>

 >>Killer: "I usually don't find police so philosophically astute. That's it exactly."

 >>

 >>Cop: "And one of the "outside" causes is your CHOICE  (YOUR choice) to so act."

 >>

 >>Killer: "With reasons, yes. I mean, it's not as if I come up with reasons, preferences, or motives arbitrarily. It's not as if human beings are capable of generating reasons ex nihilo. It's not as if we can spontaneously emit self-generated preferences. Everything has to observe causal law. Everything is therefore determined."

Again, I have to ask Bill why he thinks I'm distorting his position (rather than simply showing his actual position to be humorously far-fetched) when I say one can't do otherwise than what one did because actions are determined by causes that include one's choices, reasons, preferences, and motives. Does Bill NOT agree with my killer/philosopher when he says that human beings are not capable of generating reasons ex nihilo (out of nothing), that we can't emit self-generated preferences (preferences which are not themselves the result of some at root external influence)? Surely Bill MUST agree with the killer on this, else he's be dangerously close to being an advocate of free will.

Bill, please estimate for the readers if your rejoinder "No soft determinist would say that his choices are determined by *outside* causes.  He would say that his values and motives -- his internal psychological state – determines them" would have been as effective had you chosen to add the very next line in the satire: "Cop: "And one of the "outside" causes is your CHOICE  (YOUR choice) to so act." Killer: "With reasons, yes."?

Bill goes into a lengthy discussion of how soft determinism doesn't lead to a rejection of ethical or legal responsibility. I am aware of that. Perhaps that is why Bill will be unable to quote any passage of my satire that suggests otherwise. My arguments were entirely epistemological, not ethical or legal. The mere fact I chose a killer and cop as my philosophical protagonists in a fictional dialog does not imply my arguments dealt with legal issues (I didn't even seriously discuss the insanity plea, Bill; that was a laugh line.)

Then we come to a section that I think really shows Bill's confusion on this issue:

 >> Killer: "I decided that if a coin flip led to heads coming up, I'd spray  the crowd with bullets from my high-powered automatic weapon."

 >>

 >> Cop: "Isn't that sort of arbitrary?"

 >>

 >> Killer: "Well, the coin flip, yes. The decision, no. Whimsical, perhaps, but certainly not arbitrary. It functioned as a reason to perform an action; actions are not causeless.

[Bill responds}

 >Normally, when someone flips a coin, he does so because he needs to make a decision between two alternatives, both of which are equally acceptable, so he flips a coin as a means of deciding.  In this case, it's rather implausible to think that a killer would operate in this manner, although I suppose its conceivable.  In any case, it says nothing against soft determinism, as far as I can see.  I've already granted Ross's point about arbitrary choices, which I thought was a good one.

----

That's it? "It's rather implausible to think that a killer would operate in this manner." I think Bill underestimates the value of fiction for making philosophic points. Rand would be disappointed.

A coin flip is a tool, a literary tool in this case, but also a tool for decision making. Bill's point is that our preferences are reasons, and therefore our actions taken because of our preferences are determined (by our reasons). What if one has no preferences? In a perverse interpretation of Austrian economics, which says we reveal our preferences in our actions, Bill argues that whatever we choose reveals our preferences and therefore was determined by our preferences, and THEREFORE we couldn't have done differently. So obviously, he has to deal with how people handle choice in the face of indifference (a wide area of study in economics).

Bill seems to think it's an answer to say that if you were choosing between A and B, you can toss a coin and decide that if heads comes up you do A, if tails you do B; then if it comes up heads, that means you are determined to do A because of the coin toss (your reason, which determines matters for you).

But that doesn't take serious account of the fact the coin toss is just a tool. You could have done B using the same coin and the same result as well as a rule that is formally identical to the one above: If heads comes up you do B, if tails comes up you do A. The fact with which Bill refuses to grapple is that if you could do A or B depending on an (arbitrary) toss of a coin, that is just another way of saying you could do A or B, whichever you choose. Which is another way of saying we have free will. Which motivated me to write a fictional story of a killer who obviously has chosen on his own to gun people down, and humorously explain it by saying he was determined by the fact the coin came up heads. Humor doesn't work when explained, but philosophy does.

Bill concludes:  >Ross, it's not that I object to satires per se.  It's just that this one strikes me as glib and irresponsible, in that you haven't taken the time to understand the position that you're satirizing.

Gee, professor Dwyer, I'm awful sorry sir. Do I have to stay after class?

Now, THAT was an example of glib and irresponsible satire. My original effort, however, was both more clever and philosophically sound. I should mention to Bill, if he's ever in a mood for introspection, that I've had several offlist personal emails from listmembers, one of which captured the general tenor of the messages; it was titled (based, I suspect, on Bill's quoted statement above) "The pot and the kettle". The respondent added, to clear up any confusions: "Meanwhile, defending Ross' honor against possible implications of the title:  insofar as I'd noticed, Ross DID take the time to understand Bill's position.  He understood it perfectly." I think that poster is correct, but, ultimately these things have to be decided by each individual for him or herself. Bill probably agrees. We both think you should let reason be your guide. Bill thinks that means you'll be determined to reach only one answer. In this case, there is a sense in which I agree.  Ross Levatter

From: "George H. Smith" To: "*Atlantis" Subject: ATL: Re: Thalidomide and thoughts about rights Date: Sat, 5 May 2001 11:12:25 -0500

I wrote: "As for thalidomide -- what a woman ingests into her own body is her business, and her business alone. It's called self-ownership."

And Ross Levatter replied: "Just to be clear... "Is George's position that a pregnant woman who:

"a) knows she is pregnant

b) intends to deliver the baby

c) knows that ingesting thalidomide at this particular point in her pregnancy will in essence guarantee a horrible birth defect in her progeny, but will do her, herself, no harm and who, with this clear (and factually correct) knowledge takes thalidomide has, once the child is born, violated NO rights of the child? We all grant it is an immoral act, and focus here only on rights-violating...illegal actions...actions that are actionable, that require restitution."

Yes, this is my position. Consider an analogous case of a woman who plans on becoming pregnant, intends to deliver the baby, and knows that ingesting drug X will damage her unfertilized eggs and cause a deformed baby to be born. She then has sex, conceives, and gives birth to a deformed child. Has she violated anyone's rights? No, because there previously existed nothing whose rights were capable of being violated.

The unfertilized egg is part of the woman's body; it is not a separate and distinct being with rights. And the same is true of the fertilized egg.

Is knowingly (or with a high degree of probability) to give birth to a deformed child a violation of that child's rights? If so, this would be a strong argument against permitting badly deformed people from bearing children, if it is likely that their defects will be transmitted to their offspring. If it is said that such people do not  deliberately seek to damage their future children, and that this distinguishes their case from that of our hypothetical Thalidomide Thelma,  I would point out that Deformed Delilah likewise *deliberately* gives birth to a deformed child if she meets criteria similar to those spelled out by Ross, viz: she intentionally becomes pregnant, plans to deliver the baby, and knows (with a high degree of probability) that her deformities will be inherited by her child. Has Deformed Delilah therefore violated the rights of her deformed child, and must she provide restitution or be punished in some way? No, of course not. Might we question the ethics of her actions? Yes, of course, but that is another matter.

Ross wrote: "Presumably, if there WERE a drug (call it drug X) that could cause a normal baby to "morph" into an individual with the same defects a thalidomide-baby was born with, and if a mother (or anyone) gave that drug to a normal baby with the understanding of what would occur, THAT person WOULD be guilty of a rights violation."

Yes, of course, but that is because a baby is a distinct and separate being with rights -- rights that are compossible with the mother, who is also a distinct and separate rights-bearing agent. In the previous case, the woman is altering her own body, which includes the zygote or fetus. Thalidomide Thelma may intend to cause deformities in her future child, but, at the time of ingesting the drug, she is altering her own body and so is acting within the sphere of her self-sovereignty, however much we may condemn her action morally. And, in making this decision to give birth to a deformed child, Thalidomide Thelma is making the same kind of decision as Deformed Delilah.  Both are making a decision to bring a deformed child into the world. Is this a crime or violation of rights? If it is for Thalidomide Thelma, then it must be a crime for Deformed Delilah as well, for both women have knowingly decided to create a deformed child that would not otherwise exist. The only difference lies in *when* this decision is made. Deformed Delilah makes the decision at the moment of becoming pregnant, whereas Thalidomide Thelma makes the same decision later on, after conception has occurred. This time difference, however, is juridically irrelevant. If it is a violation of rights deliberately to bring a deformed child into the world, then Deformed Delilah is as guilty of this crime as Thalidomide Thelma.

Of course, not every woman who took Thalidomide gave birth to a deformed child, just as not every baby conceived by a deformed woman will necessarily inherit her defects, so we are dealing in both cases with matters of probability. But suppose, in objection to my parallel, it is said that Deformed Delilah, unlike Thalidomide Thelma, does not *desire* that her baby end up with deformities. Now, I don't really see the relevance of this -- especially if her desire is highly unrealistic -- but let us tighten up the example a bit in any case. Suppose Deformed Delilah does indeed hope that her baby will end up badly deformed, just as she is, because Deformed Delilah, having been shunned by others all of her life, wants a baby she can identify with and relate to. Thus, if we know that Deformed Delilah, just like Thalidomide Thelma,  does indeed *want* to give birth to a deformed child, may we then forcibly prevent her from becoming pregnant or (as Ross suggests) may her future child demand restitution from her?

Let us add yet another twist. Suppose a drug becomes available that will greatly lessen the chance that Deformed Delilah's baby will be severely deformed. May we now forbid her from conceiving unless she agrees to take this drug? And if she has already conceived, can we then force her to ingest the drug without her consent? In other words, if it is now possible (again, with some degree of probability) for Deformed Delilah to give birth to a normal child, does this make it juridically impermissible for her to conceive without taking the prescribed drug?

This is an interesting case, because it is nearly identical to the case involving Thalidomide Thelma. Both women can easily prevent their children from being born with serious birth defects, but both – one ctively, the other passively --  choose not to do so.

 Where I stand in both cases should be abundantly clear. Deformed Delilah has the right to give birth, knowingly and deliberately, to a deformed child. And so does Thalidomide Thelma.

We should bear in mind that a woman can ingest  many things which might affect the future health of her child. Smoking or drinking, for example, might damage a fetus and therefore lead to a child that is less healthy than it would otherwise be. The principle involved here applies to far broader range of cases than Thalidomide Thelma and other extreme (or "stress") cases.

How a pregnant woman (or anyone else) uses or disposes of her own body is within her sovereign moral jurisdiction. This principle is, and must be, absolute or it will eventually be eroded way with the death of a thousand qualifications. Someone must make the decisions concerning her own body, and that "someone" will either be herself or another person. If the *ultimate* right of decision-making lies with the woman, then she is a self-owner. If not, if someone else is vested with the juridical authority to decide how her body shall be used, then she is not a self-owner. It's that simple.

If  others morally disapprove of a woman's decisions and actions, then they have a right to persuade her by voluntary means. They do not have the right to coerce her. This, after all, is what it means to have a right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Some people may have an extremely warped conception of what will make them happy. But respecting the rights of such people, warped or not, is the price we pay for living in a free society. Ghs

From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Philosophical conclusions...hypothetical situations (was Abortion) Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2001 17:00:00 EST George H. Smith wrote  >"Yet it is equally important that we understand the word "being." A fetus is not a separate and distinct "being" apart from the mother."

 >And Doris Gordon replied:  >"What about embryos in petri dishes or cold storage tanks?  If artificial wombs come into use, what about fetuses residing in them? ...

 And George responded:  >What do petri dishes and cold storage tanks have to do with anything?

This is an interesting response. I assume George agrees with the following non-controversial claims about libertarian rights theory and philosophy:

1. A rights theory must be systematic, not ad hoc; it must explicate principles that can be tested when applied to novel contexts.

2. Examining hypothetical counterfactual situations are useful in philosophical analysis because it allows one to test the boundaries of one's theory (among other reasons).

So, granted that CURRENTLY human fetuses, which CAN be fertilized and created in a petri dish, cannot be fully developed outside the womb, doesn't it create an interesting "what if" question?

A scientist fertilizes an ovum, grows it to an embryo in a petri dish, transfers it to his (privately created, financed, and developed) "artificial womb", and grows it to the mid-third trimester. Then he puts it in the grinder and makes sandwiches. (this is taken from an old article on abortion in the philosophy literature of the 1970s.) Has he violated the rights of the fetus? Presumably the fetus, if another 6 weeks had passed and it had emerged from the artificial womb, would have had rights. The fetus IS, in this case, an independent being. What would happen in 6 weeks that would give the fetus rights then, but not now? Now the fetus is inside a machine owned by someone else, that keeps him alive. We don't assume that rights-bearing individuals

lose their rights when they are placed or place themselves in such devices, even when owned by others. When we fly, we are inside a machine owned by others that keeps us alive, but still retain our rights to life. The airline company cannot toss us overboard if they found we snuck on without paying a bill. Even though they have no contractual obligation to fly us anywhere, they cannot kill us; similarly if I accept a ride in your car, once you hit the highway going 80 mph, you can't simply change your mind about your intentions to me, your passenger. You might insist I vacate the car at the next stop, but you can't throw me out. You can't kill me. Similarly, if we put a person in the hospital on life-sustaining machinery, we can't willy-nilly remove them even if we own the equipment (and even if they don't pay the bill).

Of course, those traveling as passengers in planes or cars, those attached to life-saving machines in hospitals...these people already HAVE rights. So the situation is different. But the fetus in the artificial womb IS an independent entity, an "individual being" as George defined it. It WOULD have rights when it emerged from the womb in 6 weeks. I understand on libertarian theory why the fetus in a woman's womb cannot have rights that are not compossible with the woman. I understand why it cannot have a right to life if the woman has a right to suicide. And I agree the woman does have a right to suicide. Nonetheless, it SEEMS, given the counterexample above, that there must be something more to the fetus acquiring rights than simply being physically separate. DOES the fetus in the artificial womb have rights? If so, property under the control of the scientist/womb owner must be used in ways that he may disapprove of, to maintain the fetus for the next 6 weeks.  (The scientist cannot turn off the electricity, dismantle the womb for spare parts, etc.) If the fetus DOESN'T have rights, then something else besides physical separation, required for compossibility, is going on.

Is it, perhaps, the ability to live separately from life-sustaining processes provided by others (wombs, natural or artificial) that generates the attainment of rights? Of course, we have to be very careful how we define these matters, else those on dialysis, or other life-sustaining devices, will lose their natural rights. Some would argue that even infants, once born, cannot sustain themselves...food and shelter must be provided by others. Of course, that's true in large part for most of us. Granted, we can provide services for others and get food and shelter in return, but the crux of the matter is that most all of us would die without food and shelter provided by others engaging in voluntary interactions with us, and in this infants get food and shelter the same way...their parents or guardians voluntarily provide it. IF it's the ability to live separately from the life-sustaining processes provided by others that generates rights, could others (in a free society) insist that the woman in the mid-third trimester of pregnancy who wants to commit suicide must undergo a Cesarean section first (just as we insist the woman about to jump 20 cars remove the one-year old strapped to her back)? I ask this as a question, not an advocate of the position.

A second thought experiment: Conjoined (Siamese) twins. Does Twin A have a right to life? If Twin B commits suicide, it will necessarily kill Twin A. One line of thought is that neither have a right to commit suicide because in their case to commit suicide necessarily makes one guilty of murder. Yet not having a right to suicide implies one is not a self-owner; if self-ownership is the foundation of one's right to life, this would imply neither twin has a right to life. Yet if that were the case, committing suicide would lead to the death but not murder of the conjoined twin, because murder is the killing of one who has a right to life. Does this admittedly atypical situation help us clarify the relationship between physical separation and individual rights? Is the Siamese Twin case like a fetus gone wild, a fetus that never separates, and that is as big as you are...a fetus that can fight back? :-)

I write this not because I disagree with George's approach to rights theory, or even because I disagree with his conclusions about abortion. I am a strong supporter of legal abortion. I write this simply because the theoretical issues are quite interesting and because George, though he clearly has thought about these matters long and hard, has not addressed some aspects of this issue as fully as I'd like to see. (Not that he has to, of course...) Ross Levatter

From: "Jeff Olson" To: "atlantis"  Subject: ATL: Ross' "time-stream" theory of rights (or: The second-coming of Scott Ryan) Date: Tue, 8 May 2001 08:55:28 -0700

Ross Levatter speculated: <<How about this: Perhaps one aspect of rights, one facet of their makeup (so to speak) not previously discussed, is that they flow in both directions along the time stream. The fact you have rights today means you had rights yesterday, and it means that if you are still alive you will have rights tomorrow. Notice: this does NOT give the fetus rights, but is DOES give the child rights against actions that were done to him as a fetus.>>

Leave it to Ross L. to come up with a "time-travel" or "quantum-effect" theory of rights.  (It reminds me of the Schrodinger's Cat paradox, where we don't know if the cat's truly dead until we open the box -- and the cat is not actually dead *or* alive until we do.  In this case, we don't know if the fetus has rights until we "open the future box" and see if he or she is alive.)

One implication of Ross' "time-stream" model is the strong presumption that the fetus has rights in the present; after all, the fetus will, in all likelihood, grow into a rights-bearing child – so why not proceed on that assumption now?

The persuasiveness of this argument depends largely on how we view the probability of the "potential" becoming the "actual."  If the fetus' progression to rights-bearing adult is highly probable, perhaps nearly a fait accompli, then some kind of "pre-emptive" rights might seem reasonable.  Imagine that you knew your dog would be transformed into a fully cognizant adult human, say, in the next thirty minutes (for those who crave thought-experiment quandaries, please substitute various lengths of time or degrees of transformation-probability).

If we knew the transformation was imminent, would it be okay to rush the presently "rightless" dog to the pound (imagine, after the lethal injection, that the transformation occurs)?  I would have, to put it mildly, strong reservations about that.

Ross' "time-travel" theory poses a rather unpleasant quandary for those who see the issue of fetal rights in black and white (or, as I call it, "either-or").  If his assertion is unqualifiedly true, that a child has rights and therefore a fetus (*may*?) have rights, then it would seem reasonable to prevent harm to the fetus in the same sense that it would seem reasonable to prevent the owner from taking his dog to the pound.

In sum, given that the presumption of future rights is strong, and that Ross' argument is substantially correct, then we might rightfully prevent all manner of injuries to the fetus -- including the ingestion of substances or other physical actions that may cause harm – and Ross' transformation into Scott Ryan is complete. :-8

This is all I have time for this morning, since I must, regrettably, depart for work.  I am loath to leave, but someone has to protect the presently rightless young piano players from suffering future harm due to musical discord....  More on this later. Jeff

 From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Three Quick Questions for Bill Dwyer Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 10:22:37 EST

1. Could Bill please address what he imagines the legal code of a free society, working under Objectivist legal principles, would be as regards his view of emergencies? It would seem that in any putative rights violation, judges and juries would have to not only deal with objective issues (A ate B's bread) but also extremely subjective issues (A claims he was in an emergency situation...A claims he *thought* he was in an emergency situation...expert witness C claims A could have lasted x more days without B's bread...neighbor D claims he would have offered bread to A had A asked...etc...) Does Bill have no concern that arbitrating such more elaborate issues might aggregate more power than is prudent in the hands of the government? Would he be surprised, for example, to find politically favored groups or individuals find themselves in more emergency situations than others?

2. Does Bill claim Rand's famous aphorism in Atlas Shrugged should, more explicitly, be read as: "I swear, by my life and my love of it, that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine, unless I find myself in an emergency, in which case I will be free to ignore the second clause."?

3. Assuming Bill's interpretation of Rand's philosophy is correct, there is an interesting question arising from the Atlas Shrugged plotline; on the assumption that the collapse of the entire economy constitutes a true emergency (transportation was breaking down; Mouch couldn't get his grapefruit juice, mass starvation was likely only days away), why were Wesley Mouch and Jim Taggert wrong to torture Galt in order to force him to save the economy? Surely Galt has no right not to be tortured if Mouch and the others find themselves in an emergency situation and torturing Galt is the only way they see they might be able to save themselves. D oes Bill think they were right to torture Galt? Ross (just dropping in for a moment) Levatter

From: DXIMGR@aol.com To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Immigration in the eyes of a Russian immigrant Date: Mon, 10 Dec 2001 23:40:38 EST

 Barbara and Nathaniel Branden agree on the following summary (in NB's words) of Ayn Rand's position on immigration:

 << Like [Barbara], I have no recollection, although I am fairly certain what she would say.  She would say, I think, that in a true laissez-faire society there should be open immigration, but that cannot be justified in a welfare state for obvious reasons.  As with so many issues, there is no "ideal" answer for problems arising in a mixed economy.>>

 It is quite sad that Nathaniel and Barbara see Ayn Rand's view as essentially similar to Greg Johnson's and David Rasmussen's. There certainly is nothing principled in what is being claimed as Rand's view. Did she also think that selfishness would work as an ethical code in a laissez-faire society but that in a mixed economy there was no ideal ethical answer?

 Did Rand think that taxation should be abolished, but only in a laissez-faire society, that you couldn't call for ending taxation in a mixed economy?

 Rand was herself an immigrant, one who loved the vision of Lady Liberty's outstretched hand. I cannot believe, despite Nathaniel and Barbara's protestations, that Rand--always checking premises--would argue for immigration restrictions because of the welfare state rather than arguing for free immigration and ending the welfare state. Or did she here believe, in this one case, in choosing the lesser of evils? Ross Levatter

From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Three Quick Questions for Bill Dwyer Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 10:22:37 EST

1. Could Bill please address what he imagines the legal code of a free society, working under Objectivist legal principles, would be as regards his view of emergencies? It would seem that in any putative rights violation, judges and juries would have to not only deal with objective issues (A ate B's bread) but also extremely subjective issues (A claims he was in an emergency situation...A claims he *thought* he was in an emergency situation...expert witness C claims A could have lasted x more days without B's bread...neighbor D claims he would have offered bread to A had A asked...etc...) Does Bill have no concern that arbitrating such more elaborate issues might aggregate more power than is prudent in the hands of the government? Would he be surprised, for example, to find politically favored groups or individuals find themselves in more emergency situations than others?

 2. Does Bill claim Rand's famous aphorism in Atlas Shrugged should, more explicitly, be read as: "I swear, by my life and my love of it, that I will never live for the sake of another man, nor ask another man to live for mine, unless I find myself in an emergency, in which case I will be free to ignore the second clause."?

 3. Assuming Bill's interpretation of Rand's philosophy is correct, there is an interesting question arising from the Atlas Shrugged plotline; on the assumption that the collapse of the entire economy constitutes a true emergency (transportation was breaking down; Mouch couldn't get his grapefruit juice, mass starvation was likely only days away), why were Wesley Mouch and Jim Taggert wrong to torture Galt in order to force him to save the economy? Surely Galt has no right not to be tortured if Mouch and the others find themselves in an emergency situation and torturing Galt is the only way they see they might be able to save themselves. Does Bill think they were right to torture Galt?

Ross (just dropping in for a moment) Levatter

From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Nothing New Under the Sun... Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2001 20:52:05 EST

Bill Dwyer is nothing if not consistent. The following comes from a discussion I engaged in with him back in 1999...

Dear List-readers, Hmmm...this is very bad. According to Bill Dwyer, I am not simply wrong. I am WRONG! See for yourself:

 I said:   > It does not follow...that because in some unusual situation it might be ethical to steal, that therefore such theft does not violate the rights of those from whom one stole. Rights are social, not individual ethical, principles.

 Bill replied:   > WRONG!  If Ross has a right to a certain piece of property, then Billshould refrain from stealing it. However, if it is ETHICAL for Bill to steal it, then it is NOT the case that Bill should refrain from stealing it, in which case, Ross cannot have a right to it.

 Furthermore, I said: > I believe those who have been writing that ethical principles can NEVER broach ANY exceptions are inadvertently falling back on a religious RULE-ORIENTED view of ethics. This was not Rand's approach ....

 And Bill replied: > WRONG!  A principle admits of NO exceptions QUA PRINCIPLE Bill clarified that the principle is not "stealing is always wrong" (which might admit of exceptions), but

> The principle is: STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG, except when one's survival requires it!And to that principle, there are no exceptions.

 So, to summarize:

1. Bill objects to my distinguishing categories of behavior: I suggested that because they deal with different questions (ethics dealing with individual choice based on principles of value; rights dealing with political principles over proper control of scarce resources), an action might (rarely) be rights-violating, though ethical. Bill argues that if it is ethical for him to take something of mine, I do not have a right to it. (Fortunately, Bill does not know where I live. :-> ) Bill createsa modus tollens to "prove" this, but as is typically the case with syllogistic reasoning, the difficulty is in the premises. Bill's major premise ("If Ross has a right to the property, then Bill shouldn't steal it.") is the issue in contention. My very point was that ethics and rights do not superimpose, so that (rarely) an action might be ethical (it is right for you to do it) and still violate rights.

 2. Bill reiterates, though never really grappling with my point about principles as heuristics, that principles are absolutes, when interpreted contextually.

 But here's the problem: If I'm WRONG that, say, stealing Bill's wallet, when my life depends on it, is still rights-violating, why does Bill think he has a right to his wallet? And if I'm WRONG that Bill has a right to his wallet when taking it is necessary for my survival, why does Bill continue to want to call it "stealing"?

 According to Bill, it would seem we have no rights to anything. For

> if it is ETHICAL ... to steal [A], then [you] cannot have a right to [A].

 But,

  > The principle is: STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG, except when one's survival requires it!

 It follows that if A's survival depends on anything, no one has a right (against A) to that thing. We could imagine Rand's response: "You are saying my RIGHTS are hostage to the survival needs of the next bum who comes along?" :-)

...

 

It is, in fact, established law that in emergency circumstances A *can* use B's property without his permission. One classic example is a ship in a storm using someone's dock without permission. However it is also established law that the ship owner must pay for the use of the dock after the storm (and also that the dock owner can charge only standard fees, not the market-clearing price during storms). This seems completely consistent with my point (that it is ethical to use the dock, but you still violated the dock owner's rights, and subsequently have to pay for the use, a form of restitution). It seems inconsistent with Bill's interpretation, for if survival turns an otherwise right-violating action into an act that doesn't violate rights, why should you be forced to pay anything?

 

Let's examine the case of the ship in the storm more carefully, because Bill has clarified that an important ethical principle is:

 

  > STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG, except when one's survival requires it!

and furthermore clarified that to this principle there are no exceptions.

 

So let's stipulate that your life, and the crew's life, are not in danger from the storm. It's merely that if you don't dock, the ship will founder and be rendered economically worthless, costing you millions. Apparently then it *would* be unethical to dock without permission, because your life wasn't in danger, and there are no other exceptions to the *rule* about not stealing. Similarly, if your house is burning down, you and the

family are safely out, using your neighbor's hose on your house is unethical (...you and your neighbor hate each other and he has made it EXPLICITLY clear you cannot use his property without permission). And would it be ethical to use the hose if you were safely out but your loved ones weren't. Is "the survival of loved ones" also an exception to "STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG"?

 

But perhaps Bill would like to add other Ptolomeic-like contexts to STEALING IS ALWAYS WRONG. Epicycles like "except when the owner of the thing stolen, if rational, would freely offer it" or "except in

emergencies" or "except when the value of the thing lost by not stealing exceeds the value of the thing stolen" come to mind. Then we'd have an inviolable principle, with no exceptions (except it's getting a little

hard to remember the principle in all its contextual detail).

 

And yet, at that point, isn't it sounding a lot like what I described in the first place: principles as heuristics that admit of rare exceptions based on standards? We have two methods of describing ethical principles. Both lead to the same conclusions. In one we describe principles as rules that accept no exceptions, and develop progressively more complicated contexts to account for anything that would seem to be an exception. In the other we describe principles as heuristics, with occasional exceptions anticipated since principles are guides to the achievement of goals based on standards, and like all guides occasionally fail to reach the goal.

 

... I think viewing principles as guidelines with the appreciation you should have justifications for exceptions is simply a more honest and clear-headed view than claiming principles are rules that one never deviates from and then announcing new contexts for the application of the rules whenever one comes across what would otherwise be a deviation.

 

I hope my clarifications have convinced Bill that I'm not WRONG!, but at most only wrong. Perhaps even right.

Sincerely,

 

Ross Levatter

[Clearly, my hope here was a false one.]

-------

From: DXIMGR@aol.com

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: DR's errors or Ellen's...

Date: Mon, 26 Nov 2001 03:26:44 EST

 

Ellen L., who has been very restrained in her criticism of David Rasmussen, let him have it on the basis of one of David's recent posts. Ellen makes a number of legitimate points, but her initial one is, I believe, a  isreading:

 

David had said:

>Israel has the racist immigration policy that all "Jews" are eligible to "return" to Israel, while no other religion or ethnicity has a right to enter the country.

 

And Ellen replied:

<<First, not everyone agrees that Israel can dictate what is a Jew. There is not total agreement on this one.  And I suspect that they do *not* disallow others than Jews - they just don't guarantee their entry.  People go for pilgrimages and as tourists constantly, and there are those Christians and others who stay.>>

 

But David did not say Israel PROHIBITS non-Jewish immigration. He merely said that Israel GUARANTEES Jewish immigration. His phrase " 'return' to Israel" relates to obtaining Israeli citizenship. His phrase "no other religion or ethnicity has a right to enter the country" refers not to tourists but to non-Jews seeking Israeli citizenship.

 

All the details of who constitutes a Jew--a topic of close to no interest to me--is a function of this policy. If nothing (other than personal issues) hung on whether one called oneself a Jew or not, you wouldn't need detailed rules. But the Nazis had to round up Jews, and in that context people, including some Jews, understandably denied they were Jews. And Israel guarantees to let in Jews, and in that context people, including some non-Jews, understandably assert they are Jews. In both cases, there is a need for detailed decision procedures, rules, and objective standards. Much of the remainder of Ellen's response to David is a result of disagreement as to the details of these standards: historical vs. current usage; official policy vs.

common usage, etc.

 

The other point I would make contra Ellen concerns Israel Shahak. Ellen says:

 

<<I don't know who this Israel Shahawk is but he is full of it.>>

 

I haven't read Israel Shahak (note correct spelling), but I have heard the name. And a few minute's search on Amazon found the following:

 

Editorial Review from Booklist

"Shahak, who came to Israel in 1945 after surviving the concentration camp in Belsen during the Holocaust, contends that the potential for Israel's right-wing Jewish religious movements to seize power represents a threat to the peace of Israel and to the Zionist movement. He posits that Israel as a Jewish state constitutes a danger not only to itself and its inhabitants, but to all Jews and to all other people and states in the Middle East. Shahak, who was raised as an Orthodox Jew, condemns what he sees as discrimination against non-Jewish citizens of Israel. The real test facing both Israeli and Diaspora Jews is the test of their self-criticism, which must include the critique of the Jewish past. Most disturbing, Shahak insists that the religion, in its classical and talmudic form, is "poisoning minds and hearts.""

 

This is from a review of his book *Jewish History, Jewish Religion: The Weight of Three Thousand Years*, paperback version published in December, 1994, 128 pages, co-authored with Gore Vidal. (Is Gore Vidal a noted anti-Semite? I haven't heard this.)

 

Now I can understand why Ellen L. and many other list members are loath to take David Rasmussen's word for it that Israel discriminates against its non-Jewish citizens. But doesn't a desire to be objective require considering such claims when made by a Holocaust survivor who has lived in Israel for decades and who is a nationally recognized human rights advocate? When learning his position would require reading little more than 100 pages and spending less than $20 (Amazon sells Shahak's book for $18.95)? Ellen indicated she doesn't know whether or not Israel practices torture. And yet doing an Internet search of "Israel" AND "torture" yields over 15,000 hits. I admit most of them may be off base, but there are dozens from reputable

sources (i.e., sources none of us would spend any time questioning if they were reporting on other topics) to study. To what extent does objectivity require spending even a little time reviewing such sources? Ross L.

 

From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: The latest innovations in rights theory...from Ellen Moore Date: Wed, 16 May 2001 15:27:18 EDT

 

Ellen Moore writes: <<I do not think that physical force was used in this case - that IS my point. But it IS an objectively immoral violation of rights.  To my knowledge this has never been considered within Objectivist literature.  I think this, and other similar cases, do deserve to be considered objectively. This is my point.>>

 

It seems clear from her writing that Ellen Moore assumes all immoral activity is a type of rights violation. In this she deviates from Ayn Rand, though she shares much with Torquemada and Cotton Mather.

 

This is just one more example of Moore taking Rand out of context, apparently unappreciative of the nature and function of rights in a free society. Given her allergies to libertarianism, and consequent lack of significant study in this area, this is not overly surprising. Ross L

 

From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Proceeding Along Two Parallel Cases..Date: Sat, 19 May 2001 17:44:26 EDT Dear List members,

Bill Dwyer has kindly responded to my concern that his conception of coercion, like Ellen Moore's, is overly inclusive. My concern is that a combination of the absence of absolute honesty in a transaction on the part

of the seller coupled with extremely poor entrepreneurship (extremely naïve expectations) on the part of a buyer could plausibly be made into a rights violation using Bill's approach, which stresses expectations rather than title transfers. This adds a level of subjectivism to rights violations that vitiates the power of rights to clearly demarcate to third parties (largely capable of appreciating only the objective evidence of the interaction) who has the use and disposal of the property.

 

I am mindful of George's admonition to not try and develop rights theory "by example"; I agree that examples must be properly interpreted in the context of a rights theory and by themselves often prove less than the advocate believes. (I, too, am not at all convinced, for example, that Ms. Moore's rights were violated even though the Canadian court found they were. Is Ms. Moore aware that Canadian courts believe people have positive rights to health care? Does she think that makes it so?)

 

Nonetheless, let us review one example I gave Bill, and his response:

>Consider two parallel cases: Case 1: A offers to sell stock X to B after claiming knowledge of secret background information that indicates a high likelihood of stock X doubling in price in the next week. B buys the stock from A. The price of X plummets. A was lying.

 

 > Case 2: A offers to sell stock X to B after claiming knowledge of secret background information that indicates a high likelihood of stock X doubling in price in the next week. B buys the stock from A. The price of X plummets. A was wrong, though not lying.

 >

 > Using Bill's notion of "force", it would seem that in Case 1 A forcefully took B's money, committing a rights violation. Yet in Case 2 this is not true. Yet the objective conditions are the same in case 1 and case 2. Only A's knowledge state, which cannot affect B in any way, changes. So if Case 1 is an example of A violating B's rights, Case 2 must be as well. This reductio demonstrates, I believe, that Case 1 does NOT constitute a rights violation. It constitutes an example of poor entrepreneurship on B's part.

 >

 > (If Bill thinks the difference in A's knowledge state IS a crucial difference as to whether a right was violated or not, he should consider the implications of a government empowered to secure information not merely on objective facts about court cases, but also the defendant's "knowledge state". Seems sort of intrusive to me.) >

 

Here's what I see as the thrust of this example: To the outside observer (the judge, the jury, the third-party observer), Case 1 and 2 are identical. A sale occurs based on certain expectations; the expectations are not met. Ex-post, the buyer is dissatisfied. I ASSUME Bill does NOT believe Case 2 violates rights. I believe that commits him to saying that Case 1, objectively the same, also doesn't violate rights. However, Bill's definition

of force, and consequent notion of rights violation, commits him to saying Case 1 DOES violate rights. So he tries to justify his different assessments of Case 1 and 2...

 

Well, we do consider the defendant's knowledge relevant to culpability, don't we?  Suppose a grocer sells his customer milk that is tainted with salmonella, causing the customer to become ill.  If the grocer didn't know that the milk was contaminated and could not have been expected to, because his supplier misled him (say), then he is not responsible for violating the customer's rights.  But suppose the grocer did know, and sold the milk to the customer anyway.  Then he ~is~ responsible.  The state of the grocer's knowledge is crucial in determining his culpability.

 

Maybe I'm wrong, but I always thought culpability comes in AFTER determining a rights violation has occurred. I think it important to narrow the power of the state to investigate people's thoughts to that subset of the populace ALREADY FOUND GUILTY. It is true that the motives and attitudes of those FOUND GUILTY have something to do with what TYPE of crime they commit. For example, the grocer who knows salmonella is in the milk and sold it hoping to poison someone is guilty of murder (assuming someone dies), whereas the grocer who sells the milk without knowing about the salmonella but who was in a position to know and recklessly didn't bother to check may be guilty of manslaughter, while the grocer who maintained standards and practices may be guilty only of a civil action, and the grocer who didn't know, couldn't have known, and was himself the victim of a plot against his store may not be guilty of anything. Notice, however, a difference between Bill's example and mine (the stock purchase example): mine requires naivety on the part of the buyer as well as possible mendacity on the part of the seller (with, in Bill's view, the fact of mendacity being the linchpin in determining whether or not a right was violated). His example requires only the milk purchase on the part of the buyer. In other words, for me the actions of the "rights violating" party should be sufficient to determine whether a rights violation occurred, while for Bill (via his definition, not his milk example) the actions/expectations/beliefs of the "rights violated" party must also be known. Let's use another example to stress this: Bill calls the Psychic Friends Hotline and gets information about his future which he acts on to his detriment; did the Psychic Friend (and what kind of friend charges you $8.99/minute, anyway?) violate his rights? Bill seems committed to saying that IF the psychic friend KNEW he didn't really have psychic powers, Bill's rights WERE violated, but if the psychic friend truly thought he DOES have psychic powers, Bill's rights weren't violated.

Furthermore, in neither case were Bill's rights violated if Bill knew that Psychic Friends is a joke, not a real way to tell the future. Is that the correct answer? Should right violations be primarily a function of belief, or need we focus right violations on, as George suggested, property titles that don't transfer as they were intended to, rather than subjective expectations of the participants, which may vary widely in the same exchange based on naive expectations, etc.?

 

Many years ago, at a Libertarian Scholar's Conference where George presented his seminal paper on Justice Entrepreneurship, I began thinking that for the title-transfer theory to work, there should be a highly developed grid. If title-transfer is so important, we should know WHEN and under WHAT CONDITIONS titles transfer. For example, when there is an inter-temporal exchange (A gives title X to B now; B gives title Y to A in one year), do the titles transfer now or in one year? (If B refuses to give A title to Y in one year, has B been illegitimately holding X for one year or one day?) I never got around to generating this grid, and now think that much of what I had in mind is already enmeshed in the extensive legal findings of the common law. These conditions and approaches strike me as more objective and appropriate than Bill and Ellen's approach, which continues to concern me as being overly expansive in the denotation of rights violation. Keep in mind that the more expansive our notion of rights and what violates them, the less likely rights are compossible, and the greater the power we cede to authorities entitled to detect, prosecute, and punish right violations.

Sincerely, Ross L.

 

From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Minority Report on Determinism Date: Sun, 30 Dec 2001 21:16:22 EST

I just came from the theater, having seen the magnificent "Fellowship of the Rings", with it's important theme of the ability of power to corrupt, but what really struck my attention was a preview of a Tom Cruise movie out this summer (2002), entitled "Minority Report". Directed by Steven Spielberg, I suspect it may have developed from a short story or novel with which I am unfamiliar, but the plot, as I gleaned it from the preview, is as follows: The government has mastered the ability to predict future events. The police employ this ability to arrest people for crimes before they have actually committed them. The police are never wrong about this. (Tom Cruise plays a police officer who efficiently arrests such "felons" before they've done any

harm. Then Cruises' fellow officer notes Cruise himself is next on the list for arrest...)

 

Well, this got me thinking about our spirited discussions of determinism. I understand that--even though we are determined to perform an action, per the Gang of Four (Bill, Roger, Jeff, and Gayle), it is still appropriate for society to punish such people because the punishment itself is one of the factors that will be used by us in the future in deterministically making future decisions. Punishment is therefore justified on prudential rather than moral grounds. It is not for retribution and only incidentally for restitution. Determinists almost by definition do not accept a desert theory of punishment. It is primarily educational. It's not that A *deserves*

punishment, but merely that A needs feedback on what might happen if he were to do again what he has already done, so as to limit the likelihood of his doing it.

 

Now George, I, and other defenders of volition find the Minority Report scenario fantastic, in the literal sense of the word. Before the crime is committed, in our view, it is not possible to say that X *will* commit the crime, no matter what the statistical likelihood might be due to his past experiences, motivations, etc. This is because we believe X can freely choose to ignore what his past experience, reason, motivations, habits, etc. tell him to do. X is able to choose otherwise, or so we believe. Not so the Gang of Four. So presumably the Gang of Four, if they truly believed the government computer was infallible (or perhaps merely no more fallible than courts of law at determining guilt or innocence), would have no qualms about arresting, trying, and convicting people *in advance of* the crimes we know, because people are determined, they will commit in future. This would have the same prudential benefit they see in punishment now. They don't now see punishment as in any way making a moral claim, because they agree the person could not have chosen otherwise. So the lack of moral justification for punishment before the crime need not dissuade them.

 

I'm assuming, nonetheless, they would not sanction this clearly unlibertarian proposal, even on the premise the computer is accurate. If I am right, I'm very interested in hearing why... Ross L.

 

From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Mike Hardy's Theory of Inexplicable Actions

Date: Sun, 30 Dec 2001 21:40:53 EST Mike Hardy, in a response that has generated more heat than light, offered the following theory (and perhaps part of the problem is that it's not clear to me what this is a theory of: volition, action...):

 

 > "...how about this theory: We either do things because of logical reasons, or fail to exert the effort to act on those reasons. Thus, it is when we "inexplicably" act, that we are acting on reasons, and it is when we *don't* act, but merely get pushed by influences outside ourselves, that we have no reasons."

 

As Mike subsequently clarified, by "inexplicably" act he doesn't mean unexplainably act (a natural interpretation but not consistent with the claim that inexplicable acts are those based on reasons). Instead he means act in a way that cannot be further reduced causally. But isn't that assuming the issue at hand, Mike. Determinists claim there are no such actions. Volitionists disagree.

 

Furthermore, it is not clear if your theory allows third-parties to ever explain/understand whether any individual event constitutes an "action" on someone else's part. You see me sit on a dock watching someone drown. Is that me "not acting," but merely get pushed by influences outside myself? Or is it me positively choosing not to save the drowning man (perhaps due to fear, perhaps due to my knowledge it is a politician), thus making my sitting still and not moving an action, "inexplicable" or otherwise.

 

Just to give you some feedback, Mike, but I believe, though am not completely sure, you are supporting a volitionist position. The fact I myself support that position but am not completely sure about you, and the fact that I, like Jeff Olson, found your initial post confusing, should indicate there is something more going on than mere desire to distort your position on the part of any determinist. Best, Ross L.

 

From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Hear the One About Dennis May Trapped in a Chinese Room...? Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2001 00:17:41 EST

 

I strongly support Jeff Olson's challenge to Dennis (All the World's Puzzles Solved by Third Grade) May. Let Dennis simply state Searle's Chinese Room, what Searle is trying to achieve with it, and where it goes wrong, in Dennis' view.

 

I for one am quite confident Dennis doesn't understand basic distinctions between semantics and syntax, and therefore misses Searle's point. But Dennis can show me and Jeff Olson wrong. If he's unwilling (read: unable) to do so, perhaps he should instead try to tone down the truly insulting and presumptuous rhetoric. Ross L.

 

From: DXIMGR To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Response to Dwyer RE: Minority Report on Determinism Date: Mon, 31 Dec 2001 01:57:24 EST

 

Bill Dwyer, in response to my question regarding a plot line in the forthcoming movie, Minority Report (starring Tom Cruise) says: >Secondly, as for arresting a criminal before the fact, we do that already when we discover a crime in the planning stages.  If, for example, we uncover a plot to blow up a building, we arrest the planners before they can execute the plan.  We assume that, left to their own devices, they will in fact commit the crime they are planning to commit. We don't assume that, because they have free will, they can always change their minds, and that they must, therefore, be allowed to carry out the plot before being arrested.

 

This is an excellent example, sadly, of a tendency I've noticed in Bill of not grappling with the issue.

 

It is not enough, Bill, to say that even today, and even assuming volition police arrest people in the planning stages of a crime. That is not the theoretically interesting aspect of the problem, which I again invite you to deal with:

 

You are a perfectly respectable citizen. You have never committed a crime in your life. You are not currently planning one. But you agree you are determined and without volition in the sense you cannot choose actions other than those your reason, deliberation, background, etc., lead you to choose. it's a causal law, after all.

 

The government has a fancy computer. It predicts ("calculates" may be a better word) you *will* commit a crime in 5 years. You have no reason to doubt the computer in this regard. It has shown itself trustworthy in other similar uses.

 

OK, Bill...is it your claim that it is appropriate for the government to punish you for the crime you have not yet even conceived of, but which you don't doubt, given your understanding of determinism and the validity of the government's computer algorithm? (and, BTW, this has nothing to do with our arguments on government; it could be a private defense agency's computer)  Ross L.

PS: When I studied philosophy in college, I was taught that it is philosophically appropriate, and also a big time-saver, if you try to respond to the strongest interpretation of the argument presented to you. This avoids your opponent having to ask you the same questions about a slight variation on his argument created solely to eliminate nonessential objections raised about weaker interpretations of what is essentially the same argument

 

From: DXIMGR To: <atlantis Subject: ATL: Nothing resembling common sense...

Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 21:52:07 EST

 

Roger Bissell, in an effort to shore up the points previously made by Bill Dwyer, offers his perspective as nothing more than common sense. It is not common, and makes little sense.

 

Roger opines that what George, I, Victor, and others see as a contradiction is not a contradiction because Aristotle's Law of Non-Contradiction states that a thing can not both be and not be AT THE SAME TIME AND IN THE SAME RESPECT. Actions that seem to us to contradict the determinists' claim merely represent two actions close in time where the directing and determining decision has changed. Roger offers a banal food tray example to make his point.

 

Roger has been so enthralled by what he sees as Bill's crystalline clear prose that he has not read the other posts with sufficient care. Specifically, he ignores the point I have made several times that it is insufficient to offer a theory that can be jury-rigged to "explain" seeming problems with the theory. It must also be the case that such explanations seem credible. To assess credibility, Roger, it is best not to take the simple examples one makes up to rhetorically defend the theory. It is better to assess the more difficult examples one's opponents have already offered to defeat the theory. I would have thought, since you went through such pains to explain how you came to determinism by way of logically analyzing matters in the face of a natural desire to accept volition, this would be obvious.

 

We all understand how one can put food on a plate that, 30 minutes later, one no longer has an interest in consuming. If this were the only sort of conflict determinism had to explain away, your job would be done. It is not. I won't bore the group with further explications of rather detailed counterexamples I have already given. Suffice to say, you have to CREDIBLY explain how, for example, someone who lectures on self-defense, carries a concealed weapon, freely explains to people his well-thought out intention to shoot anyone trying to rob him should it be safe to do so, sincerely believes this intention himself, and who--on finding himself being robbed, finding a safe time during which the thief is looking away, intending to shoot NOW (saying to himself, "NOW, NOW; SHOOT!")--could nonetheless not shoot. Is it CREDIBLE to say, "Oh, he simply changed his mind." WHEN? IMMEDIATELY after saying to himself, "SHOOT NOW!"? If you ask him, he'll deny ever DECIDING to change his mind! He'll tell you he simply had a failure of nerve. That he couldn't "bring himself" to do it. And that will be a retrospective analysis on his part. AT THE TIME, he sees himself as having decided to shoot but, frustratingly to himself, not shooting.

 

Do you believe, Roger, that the scenario I just developed (didn't take too long but perhaps you'll agree it a tad more challenging than the buffet example you labor over in your last post) is completely unintelligible? Do you think it fully explained by quoting Aristotle's take on the Law of Non-Contradiction? The reason we poor volitionists have not yet seen the light is you determinists, in your goal to hew devotedly to (what you see as) the logic and facts, have developed a NON-CREDIBLE theory. GRANTED, you have a model that can take any input and spew out a deterministic "explanation". The problem is such explanations are NOT BELIEVABLE.

 

I hope this clarifies matters. Ross L.

 

From: Ellen Stuttle  To: atlantis Subject: ATL: REFERENCE SOURCE: Key Searle Quote

Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 22:39:46 -0500

[Those interested in the volition/determinism debate, please save this post.  I think that it pretty well captures the core of Searle's views on "the gap."  It also provides succinct statements which can be used to formulate the essential differences between hard determinists, soft determinists, soft volitionists, and hard free-willists.  (I'll highlight the key sentences in my next post.)  All italics are in the original.] ES

___

 

From:  *rationality in Action*, John R. Searle, 2001, Massachusetts Institute of Technology pp. 64-67

 

The simplest proof of what I am describing as the special causal and volitional elements of the gap is in the following thought experiment, based on the research of Wilder Penfield. (2)  He found that by stimulating the motor cortex of his patients with a microelectrode he could cause bodily movements.  When asked, the patients invariably said, "I did not do that, you did it" (p. 76).  So the patient's experience, for example, of having his arm raised by Penfield's stimulation of the brain is quite different from his experience of voluntarily raising his arm.  What is the difference? Well, to answer that, let us imagine the Penfield cases on a grand scale. Imagine that all of my bodily movements over a certain period of time are caused by a brain scientist sending electromagnetic rays into my motor cortex. Now clearly the experience would be totally different from normal conscious voluntary action.  In this case, as in perception, I *observe* what is happening to me.  In the normal case, I *make it happen*.  There are two features of the normal case.  First, I cause the bodily movement by trying to raise my arm.  The trying is sufficient to cause the arm to move; but second, the reasons for the action are not sufficient causes to force the trying.

 

If we put this under the magnifying glass we find that the action consists of the two components I described in chapter 2, the intention-in-action (the trying), which, when conscious, is a conscious experience of acting, and the bodily movement.  The intention-in-action is causally sufficient for the bodily movement.  So, if I raise my arm the intention-in-action causes the arm to go up.  But in a normal case of voluntary action, the intention- in-action does not itself have psychologically causally sufficient antecedent conditions, and when I say the whole action lacks sufficient conditions it is because the intention-in-action lacks them.  That is a manifestation of the gap of human freedom.  In the normal case, the experience of acting will cause the initiation of movement by sufficient conditions, but that experience itself (the experience of trying, what William James called the feeling of "effort") does not have sufficient pychological causal conditions in the free and voluntary cases.

 

In the first chapter I briefly mention a second argument:  I believe the most dramatic manifestation of the gap in real life comes out in the fact that when one has several reasons for performing an action, or for choosing an action, one may act on only one of them; one may select which reason one acts on.  For example, suppose I have several reasons for voting for a particular political candidate.  All the same, I may not vote for the candidate for all of those reasons.  I may vote for the candidate for one reason and not for any of the others.  In such a case, I may know without observation that I voted for the candidate for one particular reason and not for any of the others, even though I know that I also had those other reasons for voting for him.  Now, this is an amazing fact and we ought to ponder it.  There are several reasons operating on me, but only one of these is actually effective and *I select which one will be effective*.

 

That is, as far as my awareness of my own actions is concerned, my various beliefs and desires don't *cause* me to behave in a particular way.  Rather, I select which desire I act on.  I decide, in short, which of the many causes will be effective.  This suggests a fascinating hypothesis that will also come up in later chapters.  If we think of the reasons I act on as the reasons that are *effective*, then it emerges that where free rational action is concerned, *all effective reasons are made effective by the agent*, insofar as he chooses which ones he will act on.

 

When I say that we "select" which reasons to act on, or that we "make" reasons effective, I do not mean that there are any separate acts of selecting and making going on.  If there were, we could quickly construct vicious-infinite-regress arguments about making the makings and selecting the selectings. (3)  I just mean that when you freely act on a reason you have thereby, in that act, selected that reason and made it effective.

 

A third, more indirect way to argue for the existence of the gap is to note that rationality is only possible where irrationality is possible. But the possibility of each requires freedom.  So in order to behave rationally I can do so only if I am free to make any of a number of possible choices and have open the possibility of behaving irrationally. Paradoxically, the alleged ideal of a perfectly rational machine, the computer, is not an example of rationality at all, because a computer is outside the scope of rationality altogether.  A computer is neither rational nor irrational, because its behavior is entirely determined by its program and the structure of its hardware.  The only sense in which a computer can be said to be rational is observer-relative.

 

(2) *The Mystery of the Mind*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975, pp. 76-77.

 

(3) Gilbert Ryle is known for these types of regress arguments against traditional action theory.  See his *The Concept of Mind*, New York: Harper and Row, 1949.

 

From: Ellen Stuttle To: atlantis Subject: ATL: Key Distinction Among Contending Views

Date: Wed, 16 Jan 2002 23:35:52 -0500 Quotes are from:  *rationality in Action*, John R. Searle, 2001, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pp. 64-65.

 

"There are two features of the normal case [in voluntary action]. First, I cause the bodily movement by trying to raise my arm. The    trying is sufficient to cause the arm to move; but second, the reasons for the action are not sufficient causes to force the trying."

 

Alright, here's an easy way to keep in mind the difference between hard determinism and all the other views:

 

Hard determinism says that the trying has nothing to do with the real causal sequence, that it's but an experiential after-effect of the real causal sequence.

 

All the other views at least agree that the trying really is causally necessary in the sequence.

 

 "If we put this under the magnifying glass we find that the action consists of the two components I described in chapter 2, the intention-in-action (the trying), which, when conscious, is a conscious experience of acting, and the bodily movement.  The  intention-in-action is causally sufficient for the bodily movement.  So, if I raise my arm the intention-in-action causes the arm to go up. But in a normal case of voluntary action, the intention-in-action *does not* [my emphasis] itself have psychologically causally sufficient antecedent conditions, and when I say the whole action lacks sufficient conditions it is because the intention-in-action lacks them.  That is a manifestation of the gap of human freedom.  In the normal case, the experience of acting will cause the initiation of movement by sufficient conditions, but that experience itself (the experience of trying, what William James called the feeling of "effort") does not have sufficient pychological causal conditions in the free and voluntary cases."

 

 

Here's the central point on which the soft determinist differs from the hard free-willist:

 

The soft determinist says, contra Searle, that the intention-in-action DOES have psychologically causally sufficient antecedent conditions. Ellen S.

 

From: DXIMGR Dear list members,

 

Bill Dwyer wrote, responding to (what I see as devastating critiques by) George Smith:

 

[George] > When I am confronted with alternatives over which I can exercise control, I can choose to think (or not) about those alternatives, deliberate (or not) for a certain period of time,  and focus (or not) on selective features of those alternatives. [Bill]

 

Yes, you have that ability, but you don't exercise it arbitrarily. It seems that, in Bill's world view the concept of arbitrary choice is a contradiction in terms. Choice, by definition in his view, is never arbitrary. What is not arbitrary has some precedent cause. Therefore, all actions, which by their nature precede from choices, are determined. Determinism rules the day.

 

Ironically, for Dennis May, there is no such thing as choice, since what appears to us as choice is a result of our neural networks, which are deterministic. Again, determinism rules the day.

 

It seems unfair. If we have choice, determinism wins. If we don't have choice, determinism wins. Free will wins only on the condition of utter arbitrariness. Does this really account for our common notions of choice?

 

Ignoring Dennis for the moment (I'm at my 3 satiric attacks per week against any individual poster), let's ask Bill if it is CONCEIVABLE to him that arbitrary choices can be made:

 

1) My wife wants to go out to eat, and I agree. She offers two suggestions, both of which I like. I tell her I'll prefer whichever she chooses. Now her choice may be deterministic to *her*, but surely from my vantage point it is not deterministic to me. Yet, I speak truly when I say I'll prefer whichever she chooses. She chooses Wellington's, a delightful upscale restaurant here in Green Bay. I prefer it. However, had she chosen Black & Tan, a delightful upscale restaurant here in Green Bay, I would have preferred that. Can he seriously say my preferences determined my choice when, per hypothesis, someone else's choice determined my preferences?

 

2) What if I said, "Flip a coin; heads it's Wellingtons, tails it's Black & Tan"? Assuming a fair coin and a fair toss, it's unpredictable and in a strict sense random what my preference and choice will be.  Would Bill say it is nonetheless determined?

 

3) What if I decided to devote my life to proving Bill Dwyer wrong (which, contrary to what some list-members think, is not actually the case)? I therefore began to act in a completely arbitrary fashion. I would shine my shoes with mud, use my belt for a tie and vice-versa, put cream in my coffee when I really like it black, etc. While it is true that I have a reason for my OVERALL course of action ("to prove Bill Dwyer wrong") it is NOT true that I have that reason for performing each of my actions. My reason for performing each individual action is "to act in an arbitrary way," but that does not "explain" my action, for had I chosen to use sugar rather than cream, it would have equally been explainable with the same rationale. The only way to explain my SPECIFIC choices related to my GENERAL program of acting arbitrarily is to say I simply CHOOSE them without reasons. Bill seems committed to claiming NO ONE can EVER act arbitrarily. Since Objectivists spend so much time attacking people for acting arbitrarily and without commitment to reason, this seem strange.

 

4) I'm in Las Vegas at the roulette table. I put my money on red. No reason. I'm quite aware that there is an equal chance it will come up black. I want to play and have to choose either red or black, so I choose one. They are equally far from me. I subjectively "like" both colors equally. The words "red" and "black" are equally mellifluent to my ears. I just choose one. Is Bill REALLY willing to say what I've just described is INCONCEIVABLE to him.

5) I'm an amnesiac, unaware of what my prior short-term thoughts were. Such people have been described in the neurology literature, with brain lesions such that you can have a perfectly normal conversation with them, but 10 minutes later they don't remember ever having met or conversed with you. They live in a "perpetual now". Obviously, we don't want to grant much to such examples in developing our view of epistemology, any more than we want to use lifeboat situations to develop ethics. But if we grant such people are still human and conscious (and they are talking with us), surely it's reasonable to ask if they, at least, have free will, or whether they, like everyone else in Bill's view, succumb to soft determinism. They make a choice to do something, A, when they could have done B. They get distracted for a few minutes (doing neither A nor B) and remember nothing of their prior deliberations. For them, nothing has changed, except they no longer remember their prior deliberations. They deliberate again (I say "again", for in reality that is the case, though subjectively it would be more accurate to say they deliberate anew for what to them is the first time). Now they choose B, when they could (again) have chosen A.

 

Isn't that what Bill considers a counterexample to determinism? Is Bill to say that free will exists for those suffering brain lesions, but for healthy people, soft determinism must be true? What kind of choice is that?  :-) Ross

 

[anthony]

A little plum by Nathaniel Branden:

"Not self, but the absence of self, is closer to being the root of all evil. Self-alienation impoverishes our capacity for empathy, and in dehumanizing ourselves we inevitably dehumanize others.

In failing to develop an independent and strong ego, to evolve to moral sovereignty, we become capable of unspeakable atrocities, since we do not experience ourselves as responsible for our actions".

[Honoring the Self] 

Insightfully, NB lays out that one's ego-foundation is the prerequisite for empathy. Contrary to most people, who've been taught to believe that empathy is the signifier of one's selflessness. The atrocities are the consequence of "absence of self", not the absence of public empathy.

[anthony]

That self-less form of empathy NB writes about, as opposed to the emotion as self-full. 

What he would think of the world gone mad with prostrating itself to and virtue-signaling (empath-signaling) to outrage, hatred and intimidation, is evident.

"Not self but the absence of self, is closer to being the root of all evil."

An emotion which wasn't self-conceived, (by way of one's value choices) - dehumanizes oneself and dehumanizes others. Ultimately, leading to cultural/etc.etc. self-sacrifice.

That's the situation in the West right now. "Unspeakable atrocities"- to the human spirit.  Easy-peasy, any bunch can take over societies and civilization while it's wallowing in universal empathic guilt, mea culpas and appeasement. Apologizing for your existence? that IS evil.

Not with a bang, but a whimper.

[william.scherk]

On 6/16/2020 at 11:01 PM, william.scherk said:

As always on an emotion-related thread, a plug for the excellent work of author and neuroscientist Antonio Damasio. I've used an example from his work to illustrate how decision-making and reason itself is deformed or gravely impaired by specific lesions to the brain that remove emotion.

What a remarkable attribute of human beings, that we can imagine ourselves in the feeling body of another human. 

Michael Shermer of Skeptic has a podcast with Damasio just published:

Show notes exerpt:

Quote

Dr. Antonio Damasio is a University Professor, David Dornsife Professor of Neuroscience, Psychology, and Philosophy, and director of the Brain and Creativity Institute at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles. He is the author of Self Comes to Mind, The Strange Order of Things, Descartes’ Error, Looking for Spinoza, and The Feeling of What Happens.

Shermer and Damasio discuss:

• Feeling & Knowing as a meditative reverie reflecting on making minds conscious,
• homeostasis as a primary purpose of life,
• the second law of thermodynamics is the first law of life,
• sensing, minding, feeling, being, knowing, and consciousness,
• What is mind, and is it the same as brain?
• What does it mean to experience something?
• spatially mapped patterns that represent objects and actions,
• What is memory?
• What is the self?
• intelligence as the ability to resolve successfully the problems posed by the struggle for life,
• multiple intelligences,
• the purpose of emotions,
• brains and bodies,
• the purpose of a nervous system,
• Are plants conscience? Other animals?
• What is consciousness “for”?
• consciousness as a rheostat instead of a light switch,
• free will and determinism,
• interchangeable substrates of consciousness,
• AI: can a computer ever be conscious or sentient?
• mind-uploading a copy of a connectome, and
• Where does consciousness go during sleep and anaesthesia? Death?

You can download an MP3 at the Skeptic link:

The Michael Shermer Show

WWW.SKEPTIC.COM

---

The Michael Shermer Show (formerly Science Salon) is a series of long-form conversations between Dr. Michael Shermer and leading scientists, philosophers, historians, scholars, writers...

 

[william.scherk]

On 6/16/2020 at 11:01 PM, william.scherk said:

On that same tack -- empathy can be stimulated for good and for ill. As a parent teaches a child about the general non-aggression pact in human societies, stimulating a capacity for empathy is one tool. When we advise about the No Biting rule, and later on basic justice, on family fairness, we can effectively use a capacity for empathy to deepen the lesson.  Later still, as we help teens grapple with moral issues we instruct on more explicit evils, on abuses and crimes, even on terrible fates, the wounds, hatreds, joys, fears and triumphs 'out there.' Evoking another's feelings in one's own mind is also a kind of day-to-day practical psychology ... 

Here is an intriguing story about robotics and emotion, from Science Daily: Introducing Nikola, the emotional android kid

Quote

Researchers from the RIKEN Guardian Robot Project in Japan have made an android child named Nikola that successfully conveys six basic emotions. The new study, published in Frontiers in Psychology, tested how well people could identify six facial expressions -- happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust -- which were generated by moving "muscles" in Nikola's face. This is the first time that the quality of android-expressed emotion has been tested and verified for these six emotions.

[...]