Kacy's doctrine of the arbitrary propostion

[KacyRay]

For situations like these, I find it useful to draw principles using clear examples, and then use those principles to sort out the not-so-clear examples.

The fundamental difference between a proposed fact-statement and a statement of opinion is that, when it comes down to it, the former provides information about the *object* being discussed, whereas the latter provides information about the *subject* who is discussing the object.

For the sake of discussion, I propose that:

1) You are a human being = A statement about the metaphysical nature of reality

2) Red is the most beautiful color = A statement of opinion.

In example one, the sentence uttered tells the listener something about the object I'm discussing (you), and nothing about the subject discussing it (me).

In example two, the sentence uttered tells the listener nothing about the object I'm discussing (red), and something about the subject discussing it (me).

That's generally a good tack to take, but the specific example that you chose will not work with certain Objectivists. They would see the second proposition as false only because it identifies the wrong color as being the most beautiful. Their argument would be that it is an objective fact of reality, and not a mere "statement of opinion," that blue-green, rather than red, is the most beautiful color.

J

If you're kidding... good one.

If not, then it's a sad day for Objectivism.

[Brant Gaede]

For situations like these, I find it useful to draw principles using clear examples, and then use those principles to sort out the not-so-clear examples.

The fundamental difference between a proposed fact-statement and a statement of opinion is that, when it comes down to it, the former provides information about the *object* being discussed, whereas the latter provides information about the *subject* who is discussing the object.

For the sake of discussion, I propose that:

1) You are a human being = A statement about the metaphysical nature of reality

2) Red is the most beautiful color = A statement of opinion.

In example one, the sentence uttered tells the listener something about the object I'm discussing (you), and nothing about the subject discussing it (me).

In example two, the sentence uttered tells the listener nothing about the object I'm discussing (red), and something about the subject discussing it (me).

That's generally a good tack to take, but the specific example that you chose will not work with certain Objectivists. They would see the second proposition as false only because it identifies the wrong color as being the most beautiful. Their argument would be that it is an objective fact of reality, and not a mere "statement of opinion," that blue-green, rather than red, is the most beautiful color.

J

This has to be a reductio ad absurdum both for your argument and its ad hominem, but it really has nothing to do with Kacy's post making it gratuitous. You can chip esthetics off Objectivism but you can't use your animadversion upon the philosophy as a wedge into it simply because there is no such thing as Objectivist esthetics only some Objectivists' views on some esthetics. The problem is lack of hierarchical integration you get with the metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and politics. There's no place to stick in esthetics, psychology, chemistry, english lit., accounting, etc. You can say reality plus reason then science. You can also say reality and reason then esthetics, but those consequent views have to be defended in the context of reality and reason, not Objectivism. While Rand and her Objectivism may have started from her esthetics that Objectivism died with/ended with her. It does not continue with intellectual zombies calling themselves "Objectivists" no matter how much Internet space they occupy.

But again, what's this to do with Kacy's post? He could have pulled a hundred other examples for illustration out of his hat, none to do with any esthetic considerations.

--Brant

[Jonathan]

But again, what's this to do with Kacy's post? He could have pulled a hundred other examples for illustration out of his hat, none to do with any esthetic considerations.

I disagree. Kacy is talking about issues of taste and sentiment, and how they are phrased, so they are necessarily about aesthetics. Any example chosen to illustrate his point will be an aesthetic example.

As for your claim that there's no place to stick aesthetics into Objectivism, I think that a rephrasing of Kacy's second proposition would satisfy Objectivism by making it a proper/true identification of a fact of reality rather than a subjective opinion disguised in the language of objectivity: Instead of saying "Red is the most beautiful color," an Objectivist should say, "Red is the most beautiful color to me," or, "Red is my favorite color." In doing so, he would be honestly and accurately phrasing the statement to be an objective reporting of his subjective tastes, rather than a mistaken or misworded statement about the status of red. (Kacy is right that his second proposition is not about the object, but about the person discussing it. Therefore the Objectivist solution would be to stop pretending to talk about the object, and to alter one's use of language to accurately refer to the fact that one is talking about oneself.)

J

[BaalChatzaf]

But again, what's this to do with Kacy's post? He could have pulled a hundred other examples for illustration out of his hat, none to do with any esthetic considerations.

I disagree. Kacy is talking about issues of taste and sentiment, and how they are phrased, so they are necessarily about aesthetics. Any example chosen to illustrate his point will be an aesthetic example.

As for your claim that there's no place to stick aesthetics into Objectivism, I think that a rephrasing of Kacy's second proposition would satisfy Objectivism by making it a proper/true identification of a fact of reality rather than a subjective opinion disguised in the language of objectivity: Instead of saying "Red is the most beautiful color," an Objectivist should say, "Red is the most beautiful color to me," or, "Red is my favorite color." In doing so, he would be honestly and accurately phrasing the statement to be an objective reporting of his subjective tastes, rather than a mistaken or misworded statement about the status of red. (Kacy is right that his second proposition is not about the object, but about the person discussing it. Therefore the Objectivist solution would be to stop pretending to talk about the object, and to alter one's use of language to accurately refer to the fact that one is talking about oneself.)

J

Everyone ought to know by now that the opinion of an Objectivist is a Fact of Reality.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[KacyRay]

I disagree. Kacy is talking about issues of taste and sentiment, and how they are phrased, so they are necessarily about aesthetics. Any example chosen to illustrate his point will be an aesthetic example.

"It's hot in here"

"That's far away"

"This is hard work"

"This crossword puzzle is difficult"

"The test question was easy"

"Trigonometry is incomprehensible"

"Piekoff is an idiot"

All statements of opinion. All of them provide information on the individual making the statement rather than the object being discussed. None of them involve aesthetics.

I suppose you could argue the aesthetic value of trigonometry and crossword puzzles, but the statements above describe evaluations of their technical complexity, not about their pleasure-value, so even if you made a case that those pursuits are enjoyable, the statements above don't address that aspect so they still qualify as counter-examples.

[Brant Gaede]

That's not my quote.

--Brant

[KacyRay]

Yes... you are correct. The quote is from Jonathan. My apologies... that was a technical error, not a deliberate mis-citation.

I will attempt to fix it.

[Brant Gaede]

Not necessary. Readers can figure it out for themselves. I only need the abject apology and a few virgins to sacrifice in the volcano (after I de-virginize them).

--Brant
fulminating evil--I didn't know getting old could be so much fun! (Never let a virgin go to waste.)

[Xray]

For the sake of discussion, I propose that:

1) You are a human being = A statement about the metaphysical nature of reality

What is the difference between 'nature of reality' and 'metaphysical nature of reality'?

[BaalChatzaf]

For the sake of discussion, I propose that:

1) You are a human being = A statement about the metaphysical nature of reality

What is the difference between 'nature of reality' and 'metaphysical nature of reality'?

None. The phrase "the facts of reality" is also redundant. The facts are what is what in reality.

[Serapis Bey]

Yeah, I heard.

Like Jonathan said, your approach seems a good tack to take. But I see problems:

For the sake of discussion, I propose that:

1) You are a human being = A statement about the metaphysical nature of reality

2) Red is the most beautiful color = A statement of opinion.

In example one, the sentence uttered tells the listener something about the object I'm discussing (you), and nothing about the subject discussing it (me).

In example two, the sentence uttered tells the listener nothing about the object I'm discussing (red), and something about the subject discussing it (me).

Example two tells nothing about the object you are discussing if you have already assumed that "beautiful" is a property of the subject and not the object. Do you think beauty does not exist in nature? Is this where Rea$on leads us?

I understand this example is complicated by the fact that art and aesthetics are a tricky thing. So how about this:

"Honesty is good"

Peel the onion layer on that one for me.

To reel it back to your original question, when you say "Rush is good", that really tells me nothing about Rush per se. Rather, it only tells me something about you (the fact that you value Rush).

[Rick] Naw...Naw!! Rush is GOOD, goddammit!!![/Rick]

[Jonathan]

"It's hot in here"

"That's far away"

"This is hard work"

"This crossword puzzle is difficult"

"The test question was easy"

"Trigonometry is incomprehensible"

"Piekoff is an idiot"

All statements of opinion. All of them provide information on the individual making the statement rather than the object being discussed.

That's not true. They're statements of fact, minus an explicitly identified standard of value or comparison. The standard is merely implied.

The concept "hot," for example, always refers to a temperature relative to another. Would you therefore say that the concept of heat is always a subjective opinion?

All of your propositions above are objectively measurable against implied (but unstated) standards. We can measure how hot or distant something is compared to specified temperature or distance, we can test people's levels of knowledge of certain subjects and compare them to their success at solving crossword puzzles, or at out-debating and out-thinking "Piekoff" (and at spelling his name correctly ;-)).

We cannot do the same with matters of taste and sentiment. There are no identifiable, objective, repeatable standards by which to measure beauty or color preferences.

Look at it this way: If you set the standard of distance by saying that anything beyond 100 meters is far, I can know whether any specific distance is near or far.

We can't do the same with beauty and colors if you attempt to set the standard by identifying red as the most beautiful color. Similarity or dissimilarity to red doesn't necessarily make a color more beautiful or more ugly. You might identify a hue that complements red as the second-best color. There's no possible way to establish an objective standard which reflects your tastes and sentiments.

J

[KacyRay]

What is the difference between 'nature of reality' and 'metaphysical nature of reality'?

This question seems to miss the point. The point is that a proposition is a statement about the metaphysical nature of reality as opposed to a statement about the speaker. (Metaphysical meaning - existence as a whole, to include concepts, consciousness etc... and that which underlies the reality of which we are aware.)

Example two tells nothing about the object you are discussing if you have already assumed that "beautiful" is a property of the subject and not the object. Do you think beauty does not exist in nature? Is this where Rea$on leads us?

I understand this example is complicated by the fact that art and aesthetics are a tricky thing. So how about this:

"Honesty is good"

Peel the onion layer on that one for me.

1) You need not make that assumption about the object being discussed, because it is irrelevant. To wit: If someone says "Red is the most beautiful color".... whether red is a color that pleases anyone else to a greater degree than any other color is irrelevant to the fact that the speaker finds it to be the most pleasing color.

In other words, the speaker finds it to be the most pleasing color around. Everyone else in the world may find red to be abhorrent, but that does not change the fact that the speaker finds it to be the most pleasing (or beautiful) color.

Remember, "beauty" describes the relationship between an existent and an observer. When the last conscious being dies, beauty ceases to exist. It is not a property of the object being observed, no matter what Roissey says.

No, beauty does not exist in nature. We find things to be beautiful. It's a response inside of us, not a property of the object. I assure you, your average spider does not recognize any difference in attractiveness between Halle Berry and Margaret Thatcher. But they sure do get turned on by other spiders.

2) "Honesty is good" is an example of the dangers of using colloquial language during discussion of intellectual issues. To peel the onion back on that...

- The statement "Honesty is good" is a colloquial way of saying either "Honesty is virtuous", "Honesty is practical", or "Honesty is advantageous (to either the honest person or those who might exploit the honest person). To really be able to unpack your question, I'd have to know exactly which of these you meant. For the sake of discussion, I'll assume you meant the first. "Honesty is virtuous".

- Now, I assume you're asking whether this statement is a statement of fact or opinion. In other words, you're asking me to offer a justified approach to determining whether this statement offers information on the person uttering the statement or on the object being discussed (honesty).

- For the sake of brevity, I will begin by stating that I do believe in objective morals. This means that reality provides information on what actions are more likely to work to your advantage, and which actions are more likely to work to your disadvantage - regardless of how we feel about those actions. (In this context, "working to your advantage" means having life-extending, life-enhancing, or otherwise pro-mans-life results).

- The statement "Honesty is good", therefore, is making a definitive proposition about the metaphysical nature of honesty. It is stating that honesty is virtuous - i.e. it yields the best results (highest chances of working to your advantage). Therefore it is a proposition, not a statement of opinion.

Of course, the example was vague and I had to interpret it in order to unpack it. If we were sitting in a room together, I'd have asked several questions before undertaking that analysis, so if you would be so kind as to grant me the assumptions in my interpretation of your statement that I had to make in order to unpack it, that would help avoiding any unnecessary rabbit-holes. I had to assume the statement was a colloquial way of saying "Honesty is an objectively virtuous principle". If you meant it otherwise, I'd have to know exactly how you meant it, but my analysis method would be exactly the same.

The point is in the methodology, not in the specific example.

"It's hot in here"

"That's far away"

"This is hard work"

"This crossword puzzle is difficult"

"The test question was easy"

"Trigonometry is incomprehensible"

"Piekoff is an idiot"

All statements of opinion. All of them provide information on the individual making the statement rather than the object being discussed.

That's not true. They're statements of fact, minus an explicitly identified standard of value or comparison. The standard is merely implied.

The concept "hot," for example, always refers to a temperature relative to another. Would you therefore say that the concept of heat is always a subjective opinion?

All of your propositions above are objectively measurable against implied (but unstated) standards. We can measure how hot or distant something is compared to specified temperature or distance, we can test people's levels of knowledge of certain subjects and compare them to their success at solving crossword puzzles, or at out-debating and out-thinking "Piekoff" (and at spelling his name correctly ;-)).

We cannot do the same with matters of taste and sentiment. There are no identifiable, objective, repeatable standards by which to measure beauty or color preferences.

Look at it this way: If you set the standard of distance by saying that anything beyond 100 meters is far, I can know whether any specific distance is near or far.

We can't do the same with beauty and colors if you attempt to set the standard by identifying red as the most beautiful color. Similarity or dissimilarity to red doesn't necessarily make a color more beautiful or more ugly. You might identify a hue that complements red as the second-best color. There's no possible way to establish an objective standard which reflects your tastes and sentiments.

J

Hold on now... I never said they weren't factual statements. I said that they were not propositions. In other words, they provide no information on the object being discussed.

"It's hot in here", at best, factually informs the listener that the speaker finds the local ambient temperature to be uncomfortably high. This is ostensibly true - in fact, my wife and I go around and around about the temperature on a routine basis. I've known her to complain that "it's too hot" during 60 degree weather, and the very next week tell me "it's too cold" when it was 75 degrees in the house. Her assessment isn't even internally consistent - how then can you claim that the statement "it's hot" says anything at all about the temperature? It's a meaningless statement, apart from the fact that it tells you how the speaker feels.

I can tell you that what we feel as "cold" would probably strike your average penguin as very curious. (Remember, the statement is "It's cold in here", not "It's colder in here than in locations with a higher temperature")

"All of your propositions above are objectively measurable against implied (but unstated) standards."

Without going through every single example, I'll demonstrate your error on this one:

"The test question was easy"

Can your justify the idea that any of the following test questions are objectively more difficult than the others:

a - What is 30+50?

b - What is 40+40?

c - What is the capital of Cyprus?

d - What is the capital of Alabama?

It almost goes without saying, but I will point out that any test question is easy to those who knows the answer. Conversely, any test question is difficult to those who do not know the answer.

It is clear that the ease or difficulty of the test question lies entirely within the psychology of the person being tested. A 5 year old child living in Cyprus can probably answer c but would find d rather difficult. Your average Alabama resident would probably find it quite surprising that there is a country named Cyprus. Neither could probably answer questions a or b.

Therefore the statement "This test question is easy" clearly provides information about the person making the statement, and none about the test question (the object being discussed). It tells you (factually, even!) that the person speaking either knew the answer or knew how to figure it out without much difficulty. It says absolutely nothing about the question itself. It is a statement of opinion, not a proposition (It provides information about the speaker, not about the metaphysical nature of the test question).

"Look at it this way: If you set the standard of distance by saying that anything beyond 100 meters is far, I can know whether any specific distance is near or far."

You're inserting aspects into my formulation that change the nature of the propositions. If you start assigning arbitrary definitions to words, then you have changed the nature of those words. Therefore, you change the way in which those words are being used. Therefore, you change the nature of the statement being made. (For example, to agree that 100 meters is "far" is to arbitrarily redefine it).

You're right, if we all agree to define the term far as "anything more distant than 100 meters", then yes, you are correct. But you've changed the entire equation by doing this, therefore my formulation doesn't apply. So you're right, but you're not arguing my formulation, you're arguing against a straw man of your own creation.

I assure you, the statement "The ball is far away" tells you nothing about the distance of the ball from the speaker. It tells you no information about the distance of the ball at all, other than the fact that the speaker finds it to be very distant.

Again, I don't have time to break down every example, but breaking down one example should suffice to demonstrate that the same epistemological methodology applies to all the examples I've provided.

[BaalChatzaf]

^ ^ ^

Are you the assuming that the Speaker is somehow apart from Reality? We are all imbedded in one and the same Cosmos. We are not separate from Reality at all.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Xray]

"It's hot in here"

"That's far away"

"This is hard work"

"This crossword puzzle is difficult"

"The test question was easy"

"Trigonometry is incomprehensible"

"Piekoff is an idiot"

All statements of opinion. All of them provide information on the individual making the statement rather than the object being discussed.

That's not true. They're statements of fact, minus an explicitly identified standard of value or comparison. The standard is merely implied.

They are statements which are presented as fact.

But they differ from statements like e. g. "Vienna is the capital of Australia", which can objectively be falsified.

[Xray]

What is the difference between 'nature of reality' and 'metaphysical nature of reality'?

This question seems to miss the point. The point is that a proposition is a statement about the metaphysical nature of reality as opposed to a statement about the speaker. (Metaphysical meaning - existence as a whole, to include concepts, consciousness etc... and that which underlies the reality of which we are aware.)

But why doesn't the term "reality" suffice for "existence as a whole"?

[BaalChatzaf]

What is the difference between 'nature of reality' and 'metaphysical nature of reality'?

This question seems to miss the point. The point is that a proposition is a statement about the metaphysical nature of reality as opposed to a statement about the speaker. (Metaphysical meaning - existence as a whole, to include concepts, consciousness etc... and that which underlies the reality of which we are aware.)

But why doesn't the term "reality" suffice for "existence as a whole"?

For humans there is no "reality as a whole". There is only the reality we have access to.

[KacyRay]

They are statements which are presented as fact.

But they differ from statements like e. g. "Vienna is the capital of Australia", which can objectively be falsified.

XRay - I've already explained that. The difference between a proposition and a statement of opinion has nothing to do with whether the statements are true or not. The distinction is not based on that.

As I've pointed out - A proposition makes a statement about the object it names.

A statement of opinion offer information on the person stating the opinion.

- Green is a mixture of blue and yellow = proposition

- Green is a bad color to paint your car = opinion

Do you see the difference? I am not sure I can make it any more clear than I already have...

Hold on now... I never said they weren't factual statements. I said that they were not propositions. In other words, they provide no information on the object being discussed.

[BaalChatzaf]

They are statements which are presented as fact.

But they differ from statements like e. g. "Vienna is the capital of Australia", which can objectively be falsified.

A proposition is a declarative, meaningful sentence which is either true or false.

"Vienna is the capital of Australia" is a proposition. It happens to be false.

[KacyRay]

A proposition is a declarative, meaningful sentence which is either true or false.

"Vienna is the capital of Australia" is a proposition. It happens to be false.

See, I would dispute that definition.

In order to qualify as a proposition, it must make a statement about something. It offers information on the nature of reality of an object.

If the information provided corresponds to reality, the proposition is true. If it does not, it is false.

If the information provided cannot be verified, falsified, or examined... it cannot be deemed either of those. Thus, it is arbitrary.

[Xray]

A proposition is a declarative, meaningful sentence which is either true or false.

"Vienna is the capital of Australia" is a proposition. It happens to be false.

See, I would dispute that definition.

In order to qualify as a proposition, it must make a statement about something. It offers information on the nature of reality of an object.

If the information provided corresponds to reality, the proposition is true. If it does not, it is false.

KacyRay,

But your above post does not dispute what Ba'al wrote about propositions: that they can be true or false. You actually agree with him on that.

[KacyRay]

KacyRay,

But your above post does not dispute what Ba'al wrote about propositions: that they can be true or false. You actually agree with him on that.

XRay, did you read the OP? You seem to be surprised that I'm agreeing with something I've already made clear. Here, let me provide you the relevant text.

My contention is that:

- Any proposition about the nature of reality will fit into one of two broad categories: Those which have truth value and those which don't.

- Those which do may have a truth value of true or false. (Whether or not that value is as-of-yet determined is irrelevant, so long as it is determinable).

- Those which do not are arbitrary, and the only proper way to handle such statements is to reject them out-of-hand.

Disclaimer: I'd like to pre-emptively confess that my entire formulation on arbitrary assertions is merely an attempt to inject seeds of liberal progressive ideology into the hearts of America in order to feminize the overall population and create a culture of victimhood where men are enslaved and the Jews take over.

Just wanted to make that clear before Serapis Bey comes in and cracks the code. The jig is up!

[Brant Gaede]

KacyRay,

But your above post does not dispute what Ba'al wrote about propositions: that they can be true or false. You actually agree with him on that.

XRay, did you read the OP? You seem to be surprised that I'm agreeing with something I've already made clear. Here, let me provide you the relevant text.

>My contention is that:

- Any proposition about the nature of reality will fit into one of two broad categories: Those which have truth value and those which don't.

- Those which do may have a truth value of true or false. (Whether or not that value is as-of-yet determined is irrelevant, so long as it is determinable).

- Those which do not are arbitrary, and the only proper way to handle such statements is to reject them out-of-hand.

Disclaimer: I'd like to pre-emptively confess that my entire formulation on arbitrary assertions is merely an attempt to inject seeds of liberal progressive ideology into the hearts of America in order to feminize the overall population and create a culture of victimhood where men are enslaved and the Jews take over.

Jewish mothers take over?

--Brant

[KacyRay]

Yep. Under every stone there's a liberal Boogeyman. And a Jew.

[Xray]

Under every stone there's a liberal Boogeyman. And a Jew.

Arbitrary assertions, by your own definition.

... and the only proper way to handle such statements is to reject them out-of-hand.