By definition...

[Hazard]

Hello again everyone! It's been a while.

I've noticed that I tend to use different definitions than other people when arguing philosophy or theoretical topics. For example, I often drop by OL every few months with a topic on Free Will (as its something that bothers me often) however, earlier today, I realized that my definition of free will may be crippling my argument / the "successfulness" of the discussion.

For example, today I realized how my definition probably differs from that of others: I can do many things, but don't. Most would say this means I have free will because I can. There is no mental block. I am free to do these actions. And I suppose that makes sense. Whereas in my own mind, I defined free will as what someone will do in the future, not what they are able to do.

I do not mean to spark another debate of free will here, I am simply amused how one's definition of a word can corrupt a successful debate. Any thoughts?

Sincerely,

Hazard

[Selene]

Jordan:

Of course. I am a stickler for defining terms. As a debate teacher, or, rhetoric teacher, defining terms was the first step in framing a debate proposition.

Many times it is the definition that refines the argument into productive paths.

For example, on another thread, Ellen, Stephen and Tony discussed Ayn's definition of selfishness. Her definition is formative of her philosophy and I always start a discussion, or, argument with anyone about Ayn's ideas with an agreement with her definition.

"In her introduction to ‘The Virtue of Selfishness’, Ayn Rand re-defined ‘selfishness’. In popular usage, and most dictionary definitions, the word ‘selfish’ denotes a person exclusively concerned with his/her own interests at the expense of others, or at best, with complete disregard for others. The image it brings to mind is of “a mindless brute who tramples over piles of corpses to achieve his own end”, or some other hedonistic monster. For most people, in order to condemn anyone, it is enough to say that they are ‘selfish.’ Ayn Rand freed ‘selfishness’ from this kind of a moral evaluation and from any judgment on how one treats others. She defined it, simply, as “concern with one’s own interests.”

In the lexicon, "rational selfishness—which means: the values required for man’s survival qua man—which means: the values required for human survival..."

The following blog attempts to debate this issue.

http://aynrandindia.blogspot.com/2009/11/debate-on-definition-of-selfishness.html

Glad you realized it on your own.

A...

[jts]

Another example of the importance of a definition is any discussion about capitalism. Without a definition of capitalism, any discussion about capitalism will be unproductive.

The conventional definition of capitalism, "private ownership of the means of production", is no good. According to that, slavery is capitalism. Slavery is private ownership of the means of production (slaves).

The correct definition of capitalism is:

Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights,

from Ayn Rand Lexicon.

Capitalism is about rights.

[dldelancey]

I'm a business analyst, and clarity of terminology is paramount to my professional success. Getting people to understand the need for agreement on terminology is the easy part. Getting them to agree on the actual terminology is often a challenge. Someone who continues to insist on using their own personal glossary after an agreement has been reached is the bane of my existence, and whenever possible, I cordially invite that person to leave my teams and meeting rooms.

[BaalChatzaf]

definitions are conventions. There is no "right" or "wrong". Any more than the rules of chess are right or wrong. The only requirement is that a set of definitions be consistent or non-contradictory.

Definitions are conveniences for reducing verbal clutter. The only essential parts of a thought system are the undefined terms and the underlying postulates. Definitions could be, in principle, eliminated or ignored.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Selene]

definitions are conventions. There is no "right" or "wrong". Any more than the rules of chess are right or wrong. The only requirement is that a set of definitions be consistent or non-contradictory.

Definitions are conveniences for reducing verbal clutter. The only essential parts of a thought system are the undefined terms and the underlying postulates. Definitions could be, in principle, eliminated or ignored.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Bob:

Your statement has merit. However, in terms of human communication, there must be an agreement on the definition of terms. Otherwise, we cannot communicate, nor, can we conduct argumentation.

A...

[BaalChatzaf]

definitions are conventions. There is no "right" or "wrong". Any more than the rules of chess are right or wrong. The only requirement is that a set of definitions be consistent or non-contradictory.

Definitions are conveniences for reducing verbal clutter. The only essential parts of a thought system are the undefined terms and the underlying postulates. Definitions could be, in principle, eliminated or ignored.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Bob:

Your statement has merit. However, in terms of human communication, there must be an agreement on the definition of terms. Otherwise, we cannot communicate, nor, can we conduct argumentation.

A...

That is what makes definitions a -convention-. Arbitrary protocols agreed to by some group of players. That puts definitions into the same category as game rules.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Peter]

I am fond of this letter from Ghs. Peter

From: "George H. Smith" smikro@earthlink.net

Reply-To: "George H. Smith" <smikro@earthlink.net>

To: <objectivism@wetheliving.com>

Subject: OWL: Re: Mind as emergent [was: Objectivism's concept of free will]

Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2004 14:44:30 -0500

Neil Goodell (4/11) wrote:

"I'm not sure I agree with Mike Rael's (4/9) characterization of mind: [Rael] 'The way I see it, once the physical constituents of a mind have been created, the mind can control the starting of its own processes to some degree. What happens when I raise my hand up? Physical things are going on, but the determiner is my mind.' [Goodell] In my reading of it he seems to trying to keep the advantages of a dualist perspective of the mind-body question but without calling it that.

The term "dualism" covers a broad range of views in philosophy. It is often associated with Cartesianism, according to which the mind is a "substance" that can exist independently of matter. In less extreme versions, dualists are those who repudiate reductionism, according to which the mind (i.e., consciousness) is nothing but "matter in motion." Dualists in this latter sense don't necessarily deny that consciousness depends on matter for its existence. They contend, however, that consciousness (a state of awareness) is not something physical per se, however much it may be causally dependent on physical phenomena.

I am a "dualist" only in this latter sense, and I suspect the same is true of Mike Rael. Indeed, the kind of emergence theory that Neil goes on to defend is a common foundation for this variety of dualism.

Ayn Rand, in maintaining that consciousness is epistemologically axiomatic, that a state of awareness cannot be explained by something more fundamental, was also defending this sort of mitigated "dualism." But I doubt if she would have cared for this label, given its customary association with the Cartesian theory of mind, which of course she did not agree with.

Neil wrote:

"George Smith makes a distinction between "hard" determinism and "soft" determinism (4/11), between biology and psychology if you will, concluding, "Even though I disagree with physical determinism, there are powerful arguments in its favor, and it is a position deserving of respect. I'm afraid I cannot say the same about "soft" determinism."

"As I've said previously, I'm a complete and committed determinist, but I don't agree with any of these views. My position is that mind is an emergent property of the brain. What this means in philosophic terms is that the nature of the causality that operates at the level of the brain is separate and distinct from that which operates at the level of the mind. (This is similar to a levels of analysis argument.)"

I agree with emergence theory, as here summarized. This is one reason I reject physical determinism, and it also plays a role in my not-so-thinly disguised contempt for "soft determinism." The mind, as an emergent phenomenon, needs to be studied on its own terms, and we can access it directly only through introspection. We should not assume that causation in the world of consciousness is analogous to causation as we observe it in physical phenomena. We should not assume, for example, that "motives" operate like physical particles that, upon striking other mental "things," such as choices, "cause" them to move.

The mind is not a world of mental billiard balls moving to and fro, engaging in endless collisions which "cause" us to choose this or that. Of course, the soft determinist will repudiate this characterization of his position as unfairly crude and inaccurate. But it doesn't take much scratching beneath the language of the soft determinist to see that this is exactly how he analyzes mental phenomena. He adopts what is essentially a mechanistic, linear view of mental causation, in which a mental event (say, a value) somehow "causes" another mental event (say, a preference), which in turn "causes" us to make a choice to put the eight ball in a given pocket.

One needn't defend that view that choices and other mental events are "uncaused" in order to defend volitionism. Certainly Rand didn't take this view, and neither do I. I subscribe (as did Rand) to an "agency theory" of causation, according to which a rational agent -- and not merely antecedent *events,* whether mental *or* physical -- can properly be said to be the "cause" of his own mental acts. This is essentially an Aristotelian perspective, one that has been defended not only by modern Thomists but also by other contemporary philosophers, such as Richard Taylor. It had a number of able defenders in earlier centuries as well, such as the eighteenth-century philosophers Richard Price and Thomas Reid. This position was also defended by Nathaniel Branden in "The Objectivist Newsletter" and, later, in *The Psychology of Self-Esteem.*

Neil wrote:

"And I do not believe my position is inconsistent with Objectivism. (More on this below.)"

Emergence theory does not conflict with Objectivism, but any form of determinism most certainly does.

[snip]

"Rand says over and over again that the premises a person holds in their mind is what determines their character. As she writes in Galt's Speech, "...that your character, your actions, your desires, your emotions are the products of the premises held by your mind—that as man must produce the physical values he needs to sustain his life, so he must acquire the values of character that make his life worth sustaining—that as man is a being of self-made wealth, so he is a being of self-made soul—that to live requires a sense of self-value, but man, who has no automatic values, has no automatic sense of self-esteem and must earn it by shaping his soul in the image of his moral ideal..."

This passage does not entail or suggest determinism. On the contrary, Rand's claim that man "is a being of self-made soul" is an expression of free-will.

Some time ago on another list, I wrote a post in which I discussed the possibility that, according to Rand, our only truly free choice is the choice to think (or focus) or not, after which everything else is necessarily determined. Although I concede that there are some passages by Rand that give this impression, I don't think this is what she believed; and I would further maintain that this interpretation is inconsistent with her overall approach, including many of her remarks about ethical theory and moral responsibility. I think the passages in question were probably instances of rhetorical exaggeration, made for the purpose of emphasis. This sort of thing is fairly common in Rand's writings.

Neil wrote:

"I don't know whether George Smith would characterize this as "soft" determinism, but it is certainly determinism of a non-biological kind, "your character, your actions, your desires, your emotions are the products of the premises held by your mind." If this were *not* the case, it would mean that the relationship between premises and character was arbitrary, which would have the effect of eviscerating the entirety of Objectivism's concept of virtue."

Rand did not defend any kind of determinism, whether "hard" or soft." In calling our character, actions, desires, and emotions the "products" of premises held by our minds, there is good reason to believe she was drawing logical, rather than strictly causal, connections. In any case, one needn't be a determinist to maintain that how and what we think will greatly influence what kind of characters we have and how we will act. This complex issue has nothing to do with determinism one way or the other.

Neil wrote:

In other words, if determinism is denied, there can be no morality. If specific causes do not lead to specific effects (i.e., indeterminism) then effects are arbitrary and a person cannot be held responsible for them."

If this were true, then we could hold a rock or a tree or a snail morally responsible for its behavior -- for in all such cases specific causes lead to specific effects.

In order for there to be moral responsibility, there must first be a moral agent, i.e., a rational being who can make autonomous decisions and choices that are not causally necessitated by antecedent events that he is powerless to change or control. If the actions of a mass murderer were causally necessitated by a chain of antecedent events, which reach back (presumably) to infinity, long before he (or any life form) existed, then he is no more "responsible" for his behavior than a snail. Both behave not as they choose, but as they *must.* For what, in a deterministic scheme, could we hold a mass murderer responsible *for*? For being born? For possessing undesirable genes? For not making better choices that were metaphysically impossible for him to make? For not possessing an omnipotent power to alter past events over which neither he nor anyone else has any control?

When we pass a negative moral judgment, part of what we mean is that a person *should* not have made the choice he did under those circumstances. He *ought* to have chosen differently in that precise situation. If, however, his "choice" (and I use the word advisedly in this context) was causally necessitated by antecedent events that he was powerless to change, then to pass moral judgments on humans makes no more sense than to pass moral judgments on clouds for causing a flood.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

The correct definition of capitalism is:

Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights,

from Ayn Rand Lexicon.

Capitalism is about rights.

When the companies used to send out goons to bust up attempts to unionize are you saying the system was not capitalistic?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Selene]

Bob:

What is your point?

Additionally, how is your "argument" relevant to a current reality?

Apparently, you wish to refer to the past and believe that it impacts the now.

Yes, there was a time when Pinkerton "goons" waded into worker mobs with the intent of suppressing them. Ok. Now the "goons," apparently, have flipped the script and they can wade into the factories and disrupt production.

I fail to see the relevancy of your observations.

A,,,

[jts]

The correct definition of capitalism is:

Capitalism is a social system based on the recognition of individual rights,

from Ayn Rand Lexicon.

Capitalism is about rights.

When the companies used to send out goons to bust up attempts to unionize are you saying the system was not capitalistic?

Ba'al Chatzaf

If the goons were violating rights, then their action probably would be a crime.

[BaalChatzaf]

Bob:

What is your point?

Additionally, how is your "argument" relevant to a current reality?

Apparently, you wish to refer to the past and believe that it impacts the now.

Yes, there was a time when Pinkerton "goons" waded into worker mobs with the intent of suppressing them. Ok. Now the "goons," apparently, have flipped the script and they can wade into the factories and disrupt production.

I fail to see the relevancy of your observations.

A,,,

The system was capitalistic and rights were not always respected.

This is a counter example to the previous idealized definition of capitalism.

Clear?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Selene]

Bob:

What is your point?

Additionally, how is your "argument" relevant to a current reality?

Apparently, you wish to refer to the past and believe that it impacts the now.

Yes, there was a time when Pinkerton "goons" waded into worker mobs with the intent of suppressing them. Ok. Now the "goons," apparently, have flipped the script and they can wade into the factories and disrupt production.

I fail to see the relevancy of your observations.

A,,,

The system was capitalistic and rights were not always respected.

This is a counter example to the previous idealized definition of capitalism.

Clear?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Bob:

Definitionally, if the system was "capitalistic" and it did not "respect" rights, it would not be capitalistic.

The system was capitalistic and rights were not always respected.

Therefore, it does not, logically follow from the definition, correct?

A...

[Hazard]

Wow, Thanks for all the responses! Very interesting