Veatch points out that Aristotelian logic—and therefore humanistic knowledge—has all but been abandoned by contemporary science and philosophy, and he views this as a serious blunder. Considered by itself, modern logic is woefully inadequate, for it “simply does not allow for, or permit of, one’s saying or thinking what anything is.” By spurning the subject-predicate formulation of Aristotelian logic and dealing solely with the relationship among propositions and logical schemata, modern logic has rendered itself incapable of describing reality. It functions instead as a relating-logic, whose elements are “no more than devices or constructs of our own that enable us to get from one point to another in the cognitive process.”
To which I respond: It is not the job of logic to identify what things are. That is the job of "hard" science (such as physics and chemistry) which has been done superlatively well. Logic is the art or discipline of valid inference. It is a means of getting from premises to conclusions. Aristotle's logic (traditional term logic) has proven woefully inadequate for identifying what things are and how they operate. Which is why we have relied on mathematically based physics to do the job since the time of Newton. In the age of "what logic" technology floundered. Since the age of "hard" science technology has flourished. I would love to see how "what logic" can be used to design the GPS , for example. Categorical syllogisms are totally incapable of grounding mathematics and is incapable of dealing with dynamic systems. Which is why Aristotelean type logic has been discarded by "hard" science. Such logic is unequal to the tasks required.
Ba'al Chatzaf
Ba'al, et.al...excellent topic.
The reply of Ba'al to the question of veatch's criticism just points out how closely questions of logic are tied to questions of metaphysics, something of which Veatch was well aware. Pointing out that modal logic is closely tied to the understanding of the world in which to know what things are is to tell us what makes technological innovation is to point out the obvious. In the assumption that there are teleological motions present in nature lies the idea of logic as the attempt to discern the essential character that guides such teleological motion. In the glorification of technological innovation and mathematical flexibility, there is implicit the notion of nature as indifferently extended matter with random motion guided by external force. Let's just say this; I'm not convinced...and neither is Veatch (see his Aristotle, a contemporary appreciation)... that Aristotelean physics was ever 'refuted'; it seems rather that it was replaced by an acceptance the very rhetoric of mechanical success that we see present in Ba'al's reply, and to his greater glory, in Descartes' most interesting works, the Passions of the Soul and the Discourse. Aristotle has been refuted, that is, only once we accept a certain notion of what it means to "demonstrate" something- -and this is, of course, a matter of logic. An interesting book making this argument is Michael Davis' "Ancient Tragedy and Origins of Modern Science".
Of course, as Ba'al suggests, this can all be seen as a divergence of opinion on the nature of mathematical reality, as well; I recommend David Lachtermann's "The Ethics of Geometry" and Jakob Klein's "Greek Mathematics and the Origins of Modern Algebra" on these questions.
'Existential Import'...does such a 'concept' have such?
in 2 - Epistemology
Posted
Ba'al, et.al...excellent topic.
The reply of Ba'al to the question of veatch's criticism just points out how closely questions of logic are tied to questions of metaphysics, something of which Veatch was well aware. Pointing out that modal logic is closely tied to the understanding of the world in which to know what things are is to tell us what makes technological innovation is to point out the obvious. In the assumption that there are teleological motions present in nature lies the idea of logic as the attempt to discern the essential character that guides such teleological motion. In the glorification of technological innovation and mathematical flexibility, there is implicit the notion of nature as indifferently extended matter with random motion guided by external force. Let's just say this; I'm not convinced...and neither is Veatch (see his Aristotle, a contemporary appreciation)... that Aristotelean physics was ever 'refuted'; it seems rather that it was replaced by an acceptance the very rhetoric of mechanical success that we see present in Ba'al's reply, and to his greater glory, in Descartes' most interesting works, the Passions of the Soul and the Discourse. Aristotle has been refuted, that is, only once we accept a certain notion of what it means to "demonstrate" something- -and this is, of course, a matter of logic. An interesting book making this argument is Michael Davis' "Ancient Tragedy and Origins of Modern Science".
Of course, as Ba'al suggests, this can all be seen as a divergence of opinion on the nature of mathematical reality, as well; I recommend David Lachtermann's "The Ethics of Geometry" and Jakob Klein's "Greek Mathematics and the Origins of Modern Algebra" on these questions.
Norm Fischer