The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[Daniel Barnes]

No, of course I don't believe this. Not to put too fine a point on the matter, but it's bullshit. Moreover, it has no bearing on Popper's argument.

Well, now I confess I am confused. Popper uses this as a direct analogy with his argument.

He says trying to establish the meaning of all terms leads to the same result as proving the truth of all statements: an infinite regress.

Perhaps I will scan and post the chart he makes of this analogy.

I was going to ask you to define "prove" and "justify," but I didn't want to thrust you into the hellish vortex of an infinite regress.

That would depend if you were satisfied with my first definitions...!

Edited August 16, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

I was going to ask you to define "prove" and "justify," but I didn't want to thrust you into the hellish vortex of an infinite regress.

That would depend if you were satisfied with my first definitions...!

Suppose we disagreed (as we almost certainly would) about how to define "prove" and "justify." This would be a very important indicator that our disagreements run deeper than we originally thought, and it would serve as a laser that directs our energy to problems that are more fundamental.

Suppose that after some back and forth about the meanings of "prove" and "justify," we come to understand that different conceptions of these terms may lead to different outcomes on the infinite regress issue. Suppose, for example, that you were to proffer a technical definition of "justify," and that I, after thinking the matter over, conclude that you have defined "justify" in such a way that an infinite regress of justifications is the only possible outcome. So we mix it up over this allegation, and then move on to other things.

The focus on definitions in my example illustrates how definitions can isolate problems and serve as an indicator of which disagreements should take priority over other disagreements. Definitions have other benefits as well, such as alerting us to disagreements that are so fundamental that a change of mind would require a massive overhaul of one's worldview.

In most cases, the ultimate object of a philosophic argument is not to persuade your opponent to embrace your definitions. Definitions are a means to an end. They are a cognitive tool that helps us clarify our ideas and keep them in order, as we engage in what might develop into a long and complicated debate.

Nobody ever said that philosophy is pretty.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

The following passage by Thomas Hobbes (from Leviathan, 1651) is one of my favorite quotes about definitions:

[A] man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twigs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry (which is the only Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind) men begin at settling the significations of their words, which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge, to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to correct them , where they are negligently set down; or to make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of the errors....

Ghs

[merjet]

Actually, as Chapter 11 OSE and Chap 7 UQ try to make clear, he argues that "definitional analysis" is responsible for long running dysfunction in philosophical arguments.

That's the point of his comparison of the output of philosophy (and the social sciences) in the past 500 years or so and the output of natural science - which, he claims, is largely due to the degree from which natural science has departed from Aristotle's doctrine. He claims that's why most philosophy is still mired in Scholasticism while natural science races ahead in leaps and bounds.

And we continue to cling to this creed in spite of the unquestionable fact that philosophy, which for twenty centuries has worried about the meaning of its terms, is not only full of verbalism but also appallingly vague and ambiguous, while a science like physics which worries hardly at all about terms and their meaning, but about facts instead, has achieved great precision. This, surely, should be taken as indicating that, under Aristotelian influence, the importance of the meaning of terms has been grossly exaggerated. ...

The view that the precision of science and of scientific language depends upon the precision of its terms is certainly very plausible, but it is none the less, I believe, a mere prejudice. (OSE)

Popper here "missed the boat" while staring at it.

The success of physics has relied much on quantification, via numbers, formulas and measurement. These are the most precise meanings we have. Philosophy relies mostly on words, rarely quantification (excepting 'all', 'some', and 'none'). So it can't attain the kind of precision that numbers formulas and measurement allow. In philosophy key terms used often have very wide application and the different meanings people have for them can vary widely. In physics the opposite is true. The application may be wide in a spatial sense or cover a wide range of phenomena, but it doesn't pertain to nearly as many aspects of reality and experience as philosophy does. Physics has dealt with simpler things (at least before QM), whose behavior is easier to describe and far more uniform, than what philosophy often deals with. To illustrate compare the complexity and uniformity of the motions of classical physical objects to that of human behavior.

Edited August 16, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Daniel Barnes]

Suppose we disagreed (as we almost certainly would) about how to define "prove" and "justify." This would be a very important indicator that our disagreements run deeper than we originally thought, and it would serve as a laser that directs our energy to problems that are more fundamental.

Suppose that after some back and forth about the meanings of "prove" and "justify," we come to understand that different conceptions of these terms may lead to different outcomes on the infinite regress issue. Suppose, for example, that you were to proffer a technical definition of "justify," and that I, after thinking the matter over, conclude that you have defined "justify" in such a way that an infinite regress of justifications is the only possible outcome. So we mix it up over this allegation, and then move on to other things.

I follow your argument, which is well put. In reply, let's say you do point out to me that I have defined "justify" in just such a technical way. My answer would be to say simply that that particular technical definition is appropriate to the problem I had at hand, which in this case was illustrating a well-known logical situation. I would certainly not see the need to "mix it up" over this, as the aforegoing seems no more a deep problem than using the right type of spanner on a particular nut. In fact that same logical mechanism, if I am to learn from it by analogy, teaches me that such a punchup is very likely to end in stalemate anyway. If you had some other problem in mind that didn't require a standard technical usage of "justify", I would probably simply agree to your version - for if I was to dogmatically cling to my technical version regardless of the problem at hand, then it would be the equivalent of shutting my eyes to what you are trying to say. And if on the other hand I was to doggedly only accept the non-technical version, I risk shutting my eyes to what the workings of the logical mechanism might teach me.

So arguing over the meanings of words still seems not only unimportant, but about as useful as insisting that one should properly use only screwdrivers on nuts, not spanners.

The focus on definitions in my example illustrates how definitions can isolate problems and serve as an indicator of which disagreements should take priority over other disagreements. Definitions have other benefits as well, such as alerting us to disagreements that are so fundamental that a change of mind would require a massive overhaul of one's worldview.

I agree that definitions might alert us to fundamental differences in our opponents worldview. However, to my mind a good debate is ideally a mutual effort primarily to get closer to the truth, despite opposing worldviews. (Bad debates can be kinda fun sometimes too...)

Your example of the two fellows from opposite ends of the political spectrum is useful in that regard, in that here we have a particularly difficult problem of trying to understand each - one already filled with potential frustrations (such as contrary facts perversely reinforcing pre-existing views etc). AFAICS the emphasis of the importance of definitions does nothing to make overcoming these frustrations any easier, and is likely to make it worse, with both fellows, having doggedly denied the other's meanings and asserted their own, simply wandering off muttering about the other's faulty "conceptual schemes" or suchlike.

In most cases, the ultimate object of a philosophic argument is not to persuade your opponent to embrace your definitions. Definitions are a means to an end. They are a cognitive tool that helps us clarify our ideas and keep them in order, as we engage in what might develop into a long and complicated debate.

There is no doubt that debates can be long and complicated. However, if this approach of Popper's might lessen at least some of those complications, then it should be seriously considered.

Nobody ever said that philosophy is pretty.

Amen to that.

Edited August 16, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Xray]

Ellen,

In Peikoff's OPAR, p. 171, there's a whole chapter about "certainty as contextual".

Not a chapter, a section of Chapter 5, as I said in the post you're quoting.

Ellen

Ellen,

Okay, a section then. I also overlooked the last words in your #641 post where you had mentioned the section in OPAR where LP speaks about certainty being contextual, sorry about that.

OPAR, p. 172: LP on certainty being contextual: "on the basis of the available evidence, i. e. within the context of the factors so far discovered, the following is the proper conclusion to draw". (LP)

I can't imagine any Objectivist having problems with this explanation by LP, even it should turn out that the phrase "Certainty as Contextual" did not come from Rand herself but was coined by her disciple.

What is the purpose of the concepts of "contextually absolute" and "contextual certainty" in Objectivism? What role do they play in the minds of Objectivists?

I haven't seen much talk by Objectivists about "contextually absolute," which Rand used pertaining to definitions.

Ellen,

I'm a stickler for concrete examples: Could you (or anyone else here here who believes to have understood exactly what Rand means by "contextually absolute" definitions), please provide an example of a definition and demonstrate the "contextual absoluteness" in it? TIA.

The role "contextual certainty" seems to me to play for Objectivists is to let them think that they have a grasp which they don't have on physics and the history of physics.

Again, the approach I would take here is to ask those Objectivists to demonstrate "induction" with an example from the O'ist philosophy. The simpler and the more concrete the example, the better. Simple, concrete examples work excellently both for demonstration and for testing purposes.

George wrote:

Rand also uses "contextually" in regard to essential characteristics: "Essential characteristics are determined contextually (p. 102)."

Could you (or anyone else here who believes to have understood exactly what Rand means here) please demonstrate "essential characteristics being determined contextually"? with a concrete example?

Edited August 16, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

All "contextual" talk is bogus save relevant to the sacred texts. All knowledge has various contexts out of multiple perspectives including the perspectives of the perceivers. The metaphysical context is the basic reference. That an ignorant idiot has his own contextual absolutes is enough reason to retreat from this debate, and I do.

--Brant

[Robert Campbell]

As I noted before, it is pretty obvious that Peikoff's discussion would have had a green light from Rand. It is quite possible, even probable, that Rand was the source of this approach.

George,

I hope a recording of "Objectivism's Theory of Knowledge" still exists somewhere. There are questions about the development of Objectivism that probably can't be answered without detailed evidence of what Leonard Peikoff was teaching in the mid-1960s.

Peikoff obviously had the green light from Rand on all of this.

It doesn't follow that Rand was the source for the doctrine of contextual certainty. Without a documented expression of it in Rand's own words, it's safer to assume that she wasn't.

Rand never got very far with her project of writing a treatise on Objectivism. She finished Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology... and after that? Post-1968, her intellectual milieu had shrunk and would shrink further, and she was gradually declining intellectually.

Robert Campbell

[George H. Smith]

Suppose we disagreed (as we almost certainly would) about how to define "prove" and "justify." This would be a very important indicator that our disagreements run deeper than we originally thought, and it would serve as a laser that directs our energy to problems that are more fundamental.

Suppose that after some back and forth about the meanings of "prove" and "justify," we come to understand that different conceptions of these terms may lead to different outcomes on the infinite regress issue. Suppose, for example, that you were to proffer a technical definition of "justify," and that I, after thinking the matter over, conclude that you have defined "justify" in such a way that an infinite regress of justifications is the only possible outcome. So we mix it up over this allegation, and then move on to other things.

I follow your argument, which is well put. In reply, let's say you do point out to me that I have defined "justify" in just such a technical way. My answer would be to say simply that that particular technical definition is appropriate to the problem I had at hand, which in this case was illustrating a well-known logical situation. I would certainly not see the need to "mix it up" over this, as the aforegoing seems no more a deep problem than using the right type of spanner on a particular nut. In fact that same logical mechanism, if I am to learn from it by analogy, teaches me that such a punchup is very likely to end in stalemate anyway. If you had some other problem in mind that didn't require a standard technical usage of "justify", I would probably simply agree to your version - for if I was to dogmatically cling to my technical version regardless of the problem at hand, then it would be the equivalent of shutting my eyes to what you are trying to say. And if on the other hand I was to doggedly only accept the non-technical version, I risk shutting my eyes to what the workings of the logical mechanism might teach me.

So arguing over the meanings of words still seems not only unimportant, but about as useful as insisting that one should properly use only screwdrivers on nuts, not spanners.

I don't recall that I advocated arguing over the meanings of words. Rather, I suggested using definitions to identify where our fundamental disagreements lie. We can then focus on and argue about substantive points, should we judge the flame to be worth the candle.

The focus on definitions in my example illustrates how definitions can isolate problems and serve as an indicator of which disagreements should take priority over other disagreements. Definitions have other benefits as well, such as alerting us to disagreements that are so fundamental that a change of mind would require a massive overhaul of one's worldview.

I agree that definitions might alert us to fundamental differences in our opponents worldview. However, to my mind a good debate is ideally a mutual effort primarily to get closer to the truth, despite opposing worldviews. (Bad debates can be kinda fun sometimes too...)

The ideal goal of an argument is to reach a mutual understanding of some sort and on some level. Definitions (or discussions about the meanings of key terms) are very useful -- indeed, virtually indispensable -- in achieving this goal. Agreement requires common ground, and definitions function as guides in our quest for that common ground.

It always helps an argument if we know precisely where we disagree and where we share common ground that can serve as a foundation for the resolution of our differences. The focus on definitions and word meaning is a preliminary step in the process of resolution. It is normally not the substance of an argument.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

One of the best and most extensive cases for achieving clarity of meaning in our discussions and arguments was presented by John Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, specifically, the chapters titled "Of the Imperfections of Words," "Of the Abuse of Words" and "Of the Remedies of the Foregoing Imperfections and Abuses of Words." The following brief excerpt is but a sample:

This inconvenience, in an ill use of words, men suffer in their own private meditations: but much more manifest are the disorders which follow from it, in conversation, discourse, and arguings with others. For language being the great conduit, whereby men convey their discoveries, reasonings, and knowledge, from one to another, he that makes an ill usage of it, though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge, which are in things themselves, yet he does, as much as in him lies, break or stop the pipes whereby it is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind. He that uses words without any clear and steady meaning, what does he but lead himself and others into errors? And he that designedly does it, ought to be looked on as an enemy to truth and knowledge. And yet who can wonder that all the sciences and parts of knowledge have been so overcharged with obscure and equivocal terms, and insignificant and doubtful expressions, capable to make the most attentive or quick-sighted very little, or not at all, the more knowing or orthodox; since subtlety, in those who make profession to teach or defend truth, hath passed so much for a virtue: a virtue, indeed, which, consisting for the most part in nothing but the fallacious and illusory use of obscure or deceitful terms, is only fit to make men more conceited in their ignorance, and more obstinate in their errors.

Let us look into the books of controversy of any kind, there we shall see that the effect of obscure, unsteady, or equivocal terms is nothing but noise and wrangling about sounds, without convincing or bettering a man's understanding. For if the idea be not agreed upon, betwixt the speaker and hearer, for which the words stand, the argument is not about things, but names....

In other words, we should be clear about the meanings of the words we use in order to prevent our arguments from degenerating into pointless quibbles about words.

Ghs

[Xray]

A metaphor that I sometimes use to illustrate Rand's theory is as follows: If a file folder is a concept, and if the contents of the folder are the units subsumed by a concept (i.e., its meaning), then a definition would be a descriptive label that we attach to the folder in order to keep it distinct from other folders -- a cognitive device that we use to organize our concepts. If, for example, we were dealing with a large collection of personal information, we might have folders labeled "Smith, Adam," "Smith, Barry," "Smith, George," and so forth -- where the last name is the genus, and the first names are differentia. (I realize that there are some problems with this metaphor, but it is adequate to illustrate the point.)

The metaphor works just fine. A file folder is for classifying stuff, and Rand's definition of concept is about forming classes and subclasses. It's that simple actually. Genus and differentia have merely been put in new clothes by Rand and are now called "concept" and "unit'.

Look at her basic definitions:

ITOE, p. 10 “Every word we use (with the exception of proper names is a symbol that denotes a concept, i. e. that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of a certain kind.“

[A 'concept' that stands for an unlimited number of concretes of of a certain kind is actually a CLASS.

Rand even goes as far as saying that every word we use denotes a concept standing for an unlimited number of of concretes of a certain kind, and imo this does not work with abstract terms. Or can you name some 'unlimited concretes' the concept denoted by the word "hesitation" stands for?]

ITOE, p. 13: “A concept is mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristics(s), with their particular measurements omitted.”

Again, what she means is CLASS.

Two or more entities - which then become 'units' in her classification system - possessing the same characterstics are subsumed under e.g. the concept "table". The word table denotes the concept, the class that stands for an unlimited number of concretes, (i. e. of units), belonging to the class.

She also leaves not doubt as to what she regards as “units”:

ITOE, p. 6: "A unit is an existent regarded as a separate member of a group of two or more similar members. Two stones are two units; so are two square feet of ground, if regarded as distinct parts of a continuous stretch of ground."

Again, what’s new about that, Ghs?

Classes in general can be formed on whatever resemblances one regards as suitable. Imagine a society in which being homosexual or not plays no role whatsoever - that society might not feel the need to coin a word at all for labeling people with this sexual orientation. Just as we, in our society, have no concept, no societal classification denoted by the term ‘caste’ because this concept plays no role in our society (as opposed to the society in India).

If Rand had used "class" instead of concept, a lot of the confusion would have been eliminated. For the word "concept" is by no means limited to a single term as Rand used it. It can refer to a whole body of ideas, like in outlining a concept for a business plan, or a concept for a pedagogic intervention in school.

I would like to discuss the following ITOE passage in detail:

The nominalists of modern philosophy, particularly the logical positivists and linguistic analysts, claim that the alternative of true and false is not applicable to definitions, only to “factual” propositions. Since words they claim, represent arbitrary (human) social conventions, and concepts have no objective referents in reality, a definition can be neither be true nor false. The assault on reason has never reached a deeper level or a lower depth than this.”

Rand is just plain wrong in alleging that linguistic analysts claim that concepts have no objective referents.

Every student in linguistics learns as basic the trias: signifier/signified and referent (the actual object). At least that's what I learned in my 1974 class; ITOE was published a few years before, so I ask myself what "modern linguists" Rand had in mind? As almost always, she gives no source. Had she ever heard of Ferdinand de Saussure, the "father of modern linguistics"?

Not every concept has to have an 'objective' referent, but to claim that linguistic analysis says concepts have no objective referents in reality is false.

What modern linguistic analysis does say is that the audiovisual representation (the signifier) is an arbitary choice in that is says nothing about any essence of something. The only exception are a few onomatopoetic words imitating sounds such as 'cuckadoodledoo'.

"The nominalists of modern philosophy, particularly the logical positivists and linguistic analysts, claim that the alternative of true and false is not applicable to definitions, only to “factual” propositions." (Rand)

What do you think, George? Are "true" and "false" only applicable to propositions?

Edited August 16, 2010 by Xray

[Ellen Stuttle]

Here, as best I can display it, is a chart from Unended Quest which I think makes graphically clear -- one picture is worth umpteen words -- where the differences lie between Popper's and Rand's epistemologies.

The chart is supposed to be so that the column on the right lines up with the column on the left, but I couldn't find any formatting command which would achieve the desired result.

If anyone reading the thread has the graphics know-how to do the chart in better formatting, your help would be much appreciated.

--

IDEAS

that is

DESIGNATIONS or

STATEMENTS or

TERMS or

PROPOSITIONS or

CONCEPTS

THEORIES

may be formulated in

WORDS

ASSERTIONS

which may be

MEANINGFUL

TRUE

and their

MEANING

TRUTH

may be reduced, by way of

DEFINITIONS

DERIVATIONS

to that of

UNDEFINED CONCEPTS

PRIMITIVE PROPOSITIONS

______________________________________________________

the attempt to establish (rather than reduce) by those means their

MEANING

TRUTH

leads to an infinite regress

[sjw]

Or can you name some 'unlimited concretes' the concept denoted by the word "hesitation" stands for?

I hesitate getting into this silly debate. There's a concrete. I hesitate spelling it out in any more detail for someone who is likely purposefully being obtuse. There's another.

[merjet]

If anyone reading the thread has the graphics know-how to do the chart in better formatting, your help would be much appreciated.

I don't have the graphics know-how, but I can see the chart as it appears in the book by doing the following. Go here. Then search for "designations or terms". Click on the one hit. Page 19, which shows the chart, should appear.

[Dragonfly]

Your argument is not a reductio ad absurdum argument. Instead it unjustifiably poses an absurdity as the only possible alternative to what you're arguing against. You take as your criterion for certainty an indefensible idea (which moreover is a stolen concept in Randian language)

Oh no, not again that nonsense about stolen concepts...

I do not take that absurdity as a criterion for certainty, I show that the assumption of certainty leads to that absurdity and that therefore the assumption is wrong, that is exactly what a reductio ad absurdum means.

-- the idea of knowing everything all at once with no means or method of knowledge -- and then claim that because knowledge requires a means and method, certain knowledge isn't possible. You might as well set up immortality as your standard for whether life is possible and then say that since humans aren't immortal, they can't live.

Your analogy is false. A correct analogy would be that if I could show that life implies immortality, I then could argue that humans cannot live. In contrast with my example however, life does not imply immortality, so in this case the argument doesn't hold.

Moreover, the idea of a "final" tally at the "end of times" (what is the date?) is no less absurd than the notion of omniscience.

[Daniel Barnes]

The ideal goal of an argument is to reach a mutual understanding of some sort and on some level. Definitions (or discussions about the meanings of key terms) are very useful -- indeed, virtually indispensable -- in achieving this goal. Agreement requires common ground, and definitions function as guides in our quest for that common ground.

It always helps an argument if we know precisely where we disagree and where we share common ground that can serve as a foundation for the resolution of our differences. The focus on definitions and word meaning is a preliminary step in the process of resolution. It is normally not the substance of an argument.

Well, we definitely agree on the ends, but obviously not so much on the means.

I apologise that for the next week or so my posting will be sporadic as I have a bit more to say on the issue, which may include repeating some of the things I've said to Locke fans before (not that there is anything wrong with being Locke fan; quite the reverse). I also have a thought experiment in mind, perhaps expanding a little more on our hypothetical debaters and their two types of freedom.

I do offer briefly though that in my experience that preliminary step is often as far as it really ever goes - it gets bogged down. Further, I have seen plenty of debates grind to an eventual halt along the lines of "you simply haven't grasped the proper concept of freedom/democracy/selfishness/altruism - this is evident by your choice of definition" -type breakdowns (not just in Objectivism, obviously). Thus arguing becomes presumed a waste of time. I have been told many times that the gap between my "conceptual" scheme and that of my interlocutor is too vast to be crossed, making debate impossible. As I recall, I even had one lifelong Objectivist, who I didn't regard as an Randroid, tell me that he thought this was probably due to an accidental conceptual misintegration of some description that I had committed somewhere deep in my childhood.

All this I regard as a terminally unhelpful attitude: not just to me, but to the movement's own chances of success (I see this despairing withdrawal from a yawning, presumed impassable gap in key members of the official Objectivist elite, though there does appear to be a slight thaw on at the moment.)

Anyway I will discuss further in a few days.

Edited August 16, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

If anyone reading the thread has the graphics know-how to do the chart in better formatting, your help would be much appreciated.

I will scan and post a jpeg when I get a moment.

[Ellen Stuttle]

I do not take that absurdity [omniscience] as a criterion for certainty, I show that the assumption of certainty leads to that absurdity and that therefore the assumption is wrong, that is exactly what a reductio ad absurdum means.

I'm not recalling your attempting to show that. Could you point me to a post where you've argued as you describe? What I've understood you to be claiming is that since we aren't omniscient we can't achieve certainty about anything we believe. Possibly I've misunderstood your view.

Ellen

[George H. Smith]

The ideal goal of an argument is to reach a mutual understanding of some sort and on some level. Definitions (or discussions about the meanings of key terms) are very useful -- indeed, virtually indispensable -- in achieving this goal. Agreement requires common ground, and definitions function as guides in our quest for that common ground.

It always helps an argument if we know precisely where we disagree and where we share common ground that can serve as a foundation for the resolution of our differences. The focus on definitions and word meaning is a preliminary step in the process of resolution. It is normally not the substance of an argument.

Well, we definitely agree on the ends, but obviously not so much on the means.

I apologise that for the next week or so my posting will be sporadic as I have a bit more to say on the issue, which may include repeating some of the things I've said to Locke fans before (not that there is anything wrong with being Locke fan; quite the reverse). I also have a thought experiment in mind, perhaps expanding a little more on our hypothetical debaters and their two types of freedom.

I do offer briefly though that in my experience that preliminary step is often as far as it really ever goes - it gets bogged down. Further, I have seen plenty of debates grind to an eventual halt along the lines of "you simply haven't grasped the proper concept of freedom/democracy/selfishness/altruism - this is evident by your choice of definition" -type breakdowns (not just in Objectivism, obviously). Thus arguing becomes presumed a waste of time. I have been told many times that the gap between my "conceptual" scheme and that of my interlocutor is too vast to be crossed, making debate impossible. As I recall, I even had one lifelong Objectivist, who I didn't regard as an Randroid, tell me that he thought this was probably due to an accidental conceptual misintegration of some description that I had committed somewhere deep in my childhood.

All this I regard as a terminally unhelpful attitude: not just to me, but to the movement's own chances of success (I see this despairing withdrawal from a yawning, presumed impassable gap in key members of the official Objectivist elite, though there does appear to be a slight thaw on at the moment.)

Anyway I will discuss further in a few days.

There are many reasons why arguments fail. The fact a person may get unreasonably bogged down on definitions simply tells that he does not know how to argue well. This doesn't mean that definitions cannot be immensely helpful. Some people misuse deductive syllogisms, but that doesn't constitute a case against deductive reasoning. Some people do not know how to evaluate the relative credibility of conflicting claims, but this doesn't mean that no one else should try.

Definitions are important tools of clarification; they aid our own reasoning and our communications with others. It totally baffles me how you, Popper, or anyone else can seriously claim that a concern for clarity will inevitably lead to confusion.

Suppose I am about to argue about anarchism with a governmentalist. I'm not familiar with his views, so I begin by saying, "Perhaps you should explain what you mean by 'government,' so we can be sure that we are talking about the same thing."

Will the Popperian seriously maintain that disaster will follow in the wake of my request? Will he seriously contend that neither of us should explain what we mean by the key terms we will be using? I say I am an anarchist, and my opponent asks me what I mean by this label. Am I to reply, "No, no, I can't possibly tell you! That would be a huge mistake! If I answer your question, we will be thrown into an infinite regress of definitions, and confusion will follow. It is therefore far better that we never attempt to clarify what we mean, especially with definitions. They are like potato chips: you cannot eat just one. If either of us offers so much as one definition, we will end up with an infinite number of potato chips on our hands, and we can't have that. So feel free to say anything else you like, but do not, at the peril of your sanity, ever attempt to explain what you mean or ask me to explain what I mean."

I feel as if I have been transported to LaLa Land.

Ghs

[Ellen Stuttle]

I would like to discuss the following ITOE passage in detail:

The nominalists of modern philosophy, particularly the logical positivists and linguistic analysts, claim that the alternative of true and false is not applicable to definitions, only to “factual” propositions. Since words they claim, represent arbitrary (human) social conventions, and concepts have no objective referents in reality, a definition can be neither be true nor false. The assault on reason has never reached a deeper level or a lower depth than this.”

Rand is just plain wrong in alleging that linguistic analysts claim that concepts have no objective referents.

Every student in linguistics learns as basic the trias: signifier/signified and referent (the actual object). At least that's what I learned in my 1974 class; ITOE was published a few years before, so I ask myself what "modern linguists" Rand had in mind? As almost always, she gives no source. Had she ever heard of Ferdinand de Saussure, the "father of modern linguistics"?

She's talking about philosophic schools, not about linguistics.

See for an Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy discussion:

Analytic Philosophy

Related:

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Vienna Circle

The "logical positivism" link isn't working to access an article on the topic. Pertinent entries can be found on this search screen.

Ellen

[George H. Smith]

Your argument is not a reductio ad absurdum argument. Instead it unjustifiably poses an absurdity as the only possible alternative to what you're arguing against. You take as your criterion for certainty an indefensible idea (which moreover is a stolen concept in Randian language)

Oh no, not again that nonsense about stolen concepts...

I do not take that absurdity as a criterion for certainty, I show that the assumption of certainty leads to that absurdity and that therefore the assumption is wrong, that is exactly what a reductio ad absurdum means.

Are you certain that your argument against certainty is valid? Or do you have some doubts? If the latter, then what are some of those doubts?

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

I feel as if I have been transported to LaLa Land.

I repeat: if you regard Popper's viewpoint as so incredibly, insanely ridiculous, please say. I have better things to do, and clearly so do you.

Given that this totally La-La Land idea is, by his own admission, probably the man's single longest and most firmly held view, starting from his mid teens and defended to the end of his life, he must have been quite a looney tune.

Also given that you have read most of Popper, and appreciated it, I must say I am surprised that you don't seem to have come across it.

[George H. Smith]

I feel as if I have been transported to LaLa Land.

I repeat: if you regard Popper's viewpoint as so incredibly, insanely ridiculous, please say. I have better things to do, and clearly so do you.

Given that this totally La-La Land idea is, by his own admission, probably the man's single longest and most firmly held view, starting from his mid teens and defended to the end of his life, he must have been quite a looney tune.

Also given that you have read most of Popper, and appreciated it, I must say I am surprised that you don't seem to have come across it.

I stated at the outset of this exchange that I consider the chapter in question to be one of the worst things that Popper ever wrote. Since then I have been explaining why I believe this. Did you think I was joking when I expressed such a low regard for the chapter? Well, I wasn't. It is Popper's version of why he wouldn't vote for a woman president.

Ghs

[Ellen Stuttle]

The following passage by Thomas Hobbes (from Leviathan, 1651) is one of my favorite quotes about definitions:

[A] man that seeketh precise truth, had need to remember what every name he uses stands for; and to place it accordingly; or else he will find himself entangled in words, as a bird in lime-twigs; the more he struggles, the more belimed. And therefore in Geometry (which is the only Science that it hath pleased God hitherto to bestow on mankind) men begin at settling the significations of their words, which settling of significations, they call Definitions; and place them in the beginning of their reckoning.

By this it appears how necessary it is for any man that aspires to true knowledge, to examine the definitions of former authors; and either to correct them , where they are negligently set down; or to make them himself. For the errors of definitions multiply themselves, according as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, which at last they see, but cannot avoid, without reckoning anew from the beginning, in which lies the foundation of the errors....

Ghs

Yeah, well. Bingo!

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

Excerpting from Merlin's post #679:

The view that the precision of science and of scientific language depends upon the precision of its terms is certainly very plausible, but it is none the less, I believe, a mere prejudice. (OSE)

Popper here "missed the boat" while staring at it.

Agreed.

Ellen