Goethe and Rand on Art

[Roger Bissell]

Many years ago, libertarian activist Terry Inman (d. 1994) suggested that Ayn Rand's views on art were similar to and possibly influenced by Goethe.

[....]

I won't delve into the evolution of Rand's thought here, but let's see if there are any low-hanging fruit -- meaning similarities that are easy to spot. I think there are. As evidence of similarity, I offer the following quote from Goethe:

[....]

"... the true connoisseur [of art] sees not only the realism of what is imitated but also the excellence in the selection of subject matter, the imaginativeness in composition, and the supra-natural spirit of this micro-world of art. He feels that he must rise to the level of the artist in order to enjoy the work, that he must focus his scattered energies on the work of art, that he must live with it, must see it again and again, and thus achieve a higher level of awareness." ("On Realism in Art" in Essays on Art and Literature, p78) [bold-underscore added by REB]

[....]

But despite these handicaps, Goethe came very close to Rand's formulations. Was she influenced by him? I don't know, but at least the case for a potential influence has been made.

I think it's clear that Rand was powerfully influenced by a long-standing tradition within aesthetics that viewed artworks as microcosms, as imaginary worlds-in-miniature--and specifically by Goethe among a number of others. (See my highlighting of the phrase "micro-world of art" in the above quote from Goethe.) There is ample evidence for this from her writings and the writings of her followers, and from the long historical record of writings on the philosophy of art.

I delve into this at some length in my essay "Art as Microcosm: The Real Meaning of the Objectivist Concept of Art." It was published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 2004) and is posted elsewhere on this website, as well as on my own website here: Art as Microcosm.

Specifically in regard to Kant and Goethe, I wrote:

Kant (1790, 528), echoing this philosophy [of certain Renaissance painters and poets], said: “The imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is a powerful agent for creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature” (emphasis added).

In his article on Baumgarten, a German Rationalist and the founder of aesthetics, Tonelli (1967, 256) says: “The [fine] artist is not an imitator of nature in the sense that he copies it . . . he imitates nature in the process of creating a world or a whole” (emphasis added). In Baumgarten’s (1742, 63) own words: "We observed a little while ago that the poet is like a maker or a creator. So the poem ought to be like a world. Hence by analogy whatever is evident to the philosopher concerning the real world, the same ought to be thought of a poem."

These writers are touching on a crucial idea for the philosophy of art: the concept of a microcosm. This is the notion, dating back to the ancient Greeks, that “the structure of the universe can be reflected on a smaller scale in some particular phenomenon” (Gilbert and Kuhn 1972, 6).

Baumgarten’s ([1735] 1954, 78) own term for this was “heterocosm,” a word not found in present-day dictionaries, but which means literally “another world,” and by which Halliwell (2002, 9) says Baumgarten meant “self-contained worlds produced by a human maker on analogy with the divine creator himself.”

Writing a half-century later, Goethe ([17 98] 1985–98), as cited by Halliwell (2002, 2–3), used the term “die kleine Kunstwelt” (literally: the little man-made world or world-in-miniature) to mean “the artistic microcosm,” and the term “eine kleine Welt für sich,” to mean a little “self-contained world.”[10]

Obviously, this is a fertile area for Randian scholarship, but don't look for the ortho's to explore it. (That would mean admitting that Rand's views on the fundamental nature of the "re-creation of reality" as a microcosm were not all that original!)

REB

P.S. -- On a related note, see my essay exploring the commonalities between Rand's aesthetics and the views of Albert Camus and Susanne Langer. It appeared in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 7, No. 1 (Fall 2005) and is posted at

Langer and Camus: Unexpected Post-Kantian Affinities with Rand's Aesthetics.

[Newberry]

J:

"...it's also a matter of Michael trying to craft a brand image of himself to an audience of Objectivists and potential customers. You have to remember that he's not here like the rest of us to just have interesting discussions with like-minded people, put to promote his art. Objectivists are a market to Michael, and crafting the image of a Cultural Warrior™ who fights against those whom Ayn Rand identified as aesthetic enemies of Objectivism would a pretty good sales pitch for Michael to use on Objectivists."

Interesting observation and take. The cultural warrior image, it is kind of cool, but it doesn't feel that way.

[Brant Gaede]

I meant "important" in a broad, general, objective way.

--Brant

[dan2100]

I think it's clear that Rand was powerfully influenced by a long-standing tradition within aesthetics that viewed artworks as microcosms, as imaginary worlds-in-miniature--and specifically by Goethe among a number of others. (See my highlighting of the phrase "micro-world of art" in the above quote from Goethe.) There is ample evidence for this from her writings and the writings of her followers, and from the long historical record of writings on the philosophy of art.

I delve into this at some length in my essay "Art as Microcosm: The Real Meaning of the Objectivist Concept of Art." It was published in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (Vol. 5, No. 2, Spring 2004) and is posted elsewhere on this website, as well as on my own website here: Art as Microcosm.

Specifically in regard to Kant and Goethe, I wrote:

Kant (1790, 528), echoing this philosophy [of certain Renaissance painters and poets], said: "The imagination (as a productive faculty of cognition) is a powerful agent for creating, as it were, a second nature out of the material supplied to it by actual nature" (emphasis added).

In his article on Baumgarten, a German Rationalist and the founder of aesthetics, Tonelli (1967, 256) says: "The [fine] artist is not an imitator of nature in the sense that he copies it . . . he imitates nature in the process of creating a world or a whole" (emphasis added). In Baumgarten's (1742, 63) own words: "We observed a little while ago that the poet is like a maker or a creator. So the poem ought to be like a world. Hence by analogy whatever is evident to the philosopher concerning the real world, the same ought to be thought of a poem."

These writers are touching on a crucial idea for the philosophy of art: the concept of a microcosm. This is the notion, dating back to the ancient Greeks, that "the structure of the universe can be reflected on a smaller scale in some particular phenomenon" (Gilbert and Kuhn 1972, 6).

Baumgarten's ([1735] 1954, 78) own term for this was "heterocosm," a word not found in present-day dictionaries, but which means literally "another world," and by which Halliwell (2002, 9) says Baumgarten meant "self-contained worlds produced by a human maker on analogy with the divine creator himself."

Writing a half-century later, Goethe ([17 98] 1985–98), as cited by Halliwell (2002, 2–3), used the term "die kleine Kunstwelt" (literally: the little man-made world or world-in-miniature) to mean "the artistic microcosm," and the term "eine kleine Welt für sich," to mean a little "self-contained world."[10]

Obviously, this is a fertile area for Randian scholarship, but don't look for the ortho's to explore it. (That would mean admitting that Rand's views on the fundamental nature of the "re-creation of reality" as a microcosm were not all that original!)

REB

P.S. -- On a related note, see my essay exploring the commonalities between Rand's aesthetics and the views of Albert Camus and Susanne Langer. It appeared in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies Vol. 7, No. 1 (Fall 2005) and is posted at

Langer and Camus: Unexpected Post-Kantian Affinities with Rand's Aesthetics.

Is there much evidence that Rand was aware of and influenced by this tradition and these thinkers? I mean evidence along the lines of her having read their works and taken notes or having been closely associated with, say, someone imbued with Kantian esthetics? I reckon some of the influence here could have been via circles she moved in back in the Soviet Union, but I wonder if there's anything more concrete than just my speculating.

[Newberry]

Dan:

Is there much evidence that Rand was aware of and influenced by this tradition and these thinkers? I mean evidence along the lines of her having read their works and taken notes or having been closely associated with, say, someone imbued with Kantian esthetics? I reckon some of the influence here could have been via circles she moved in back in the Soviet Union, but I wonder if there's anything more concrete than just my speculating.

There are similarities with Romantic Manifest and Kant's Critique of Judgment...but it is only speculation about the influence, it is a question I would have liked to ask Rand. It is as if RM was in direct answer to the issues that Kant brought up. For example Kant writes in a general way about the sensory elements in art, then Rand addresses the issue with more detail, like her discussing sight and touch in sculpture and why that is significant. Another example is that Kant proposes that the sublime in art does violence to our imaginations: "Every affection of the STRENUOUS TYPE (such, that is, as excites the

consciousness of our power of overcoming every resistance [animus

strenuus]) is aesthetically sublime, e.g., anger, even desperation

(the rage of forlorn hope but not faint-hearted despair)."

Rand counters with the proposal that art can/should create the experience of "a moment of metaphysical joy--a moment of love for existence." Both of them discuss means, content, and ends in a non-poetic way. Here is link to a thread here A Few Kant Quotes.

Michael

[Jonathan]

Another example is that Kant proposes that the sublime in art does violence to our imaginations: "Every affection of the STRENUOUS TYPE (such, that is, as excites the

consciousness of our power of overcoming every resistance [animus

strenuus]) is aesthetically sublime, e.g., anger, even desperation

(the rage of forlorn hope but not faint-hearted despair)."

I don't see Kant as "proposing" anything, but as describing what he took to be the meaning of the Sublime as it had been discussed by thinkers such as Shaftsbury, Addison, Burke and others, going all the way back to Longinus.

Why do you choose to credit/blame Kant for the Sublime? Why not Addison or Shaftsbury? What do you think is so different about Kant that his ideas on the Sublime, rather than, say, Burke's, are the "foundation of postmodern art"?

Rand counters with the proposal that art can/should create the experience of "a moment of metaphysical joy--a moment of love for existence." Both of them discuss means, content, and ends in a non-poetic way. Here is link to a thread here A Few Kant Quotes.

Rand didn't "counter" Kant on the Sublime. She agreed (probably without knowing that she was agreeing with Kant) that violence, awe, spectacle, the dramatic and the strongly emotionally stimulating were aesthetically powerful. And Kant wasn't opposed to moments of metaphysical joy, or to art that allows us to experience it. In fact, I think that he and Rand would have agreed that a moment of metaphysical joy could be experienced through an artwork which stimulates a sense of the Sublime.

J

[Newberry]

J:

I don't see Kant as "proposing" anything, but as describing what he took to be the meaning of the Sublime as it had been discussed by thinkers such as Shaftsbury, Addison, Burke and others, going all the way back to Longinus.

Okay.

Why do you choose to credit/blame Kant for the Sublime?

I don't.

Why not Addison or Shaftsbury? What do you think is so different about Kant that his ideas on the Sublime, rather than, say, Burke's, are the "foundation of postmodern art"?

Quotes and context please.

Rand didn't "counter" Kant on the Sublime. She agreed (probably without knowing that she was agreeing with Kant) that violence, awe, spectacle, the dramatic and the strongly emotionally stimulating were aesthetically powerful. And Kant wasn't opposed to moments of metaphysical joy, or to art that allows us to experience it. In fact, I think that he and Rand would have agreed that a moment of metaphysical joy could be experienced through an artwork which stimulates a sense of the Sublime.

That is an interesting opinion. In Critique of Judgment I don't recall anything Kant wrote about love of existence, goodness, or resolution, in the context of the sublime. Can you quote passages in the context of sublime where Kant states what you "in fact" claim he does?

Edited April 6, 2010 by Newberry

[Jonathan]

Why do you choose to credit/blame Kant for the Sublime?

I don't.

What I meant by "credit/blame Kant for the Sublime" is that you claim that Kant's notion of the Sublime is the foundation of postmodern art. Why Kant and not Burke?

Why not Addison or Shaftsbury? What do you think is so different about Kant that his ideas on the Sublime, rather than, say, Burke's, are the "foundation of postmodern art"?

Quotes and context please.

I was asking you what you see as the difference between Kant and previous thinkers' concepts of the Sublime. Are you saying that you want me to tell you what other thinkers thought before answering?!?!

If so, okay, here's some basic info:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sublime_(philosophy)

And, as I wrote in this post, Burke thought that the ideas of pain, which he believed were the source of the Sublime, were more powerful than those of pleasure.

In this post, I copied text (from a site that Matus had linked to) and emphasized phrases (in bold) which represent similarities that various previous thinkers had to Kant in their concepts of the Sublime.

Rand didn't "counter" Kant on the Sublime. She agreed (probably without knowing that she was agreeing with Kant) that violence, awe, spectacle, the dramatic and the strongly emotionally stimulating were aesthetically powerful. And Kant wasn't opposed to moments of metaphysical joy, or to art that allows us to experience it. In fact, I think that he and Rand would have agreed that a moment of metaphysical joy could be experienced through an artwork which stimulates a sense of the Sublime.

That is an interesting opinion. In Critique of Judgment I don't recall anything Kant wrote about love of existence, goodness, or resolution, in the context of the sublime. Can you quote passages in the context of sublime where Kant states what you "in fact" claim he does?

As I quoted Kant here:

"Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including the might of nature which challenges our strength, is then, though improperly, called sublime, and it is only under presupposition of this idea within us, and in relation to it, that we are capable of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that Being Which inspires deep respect in us, not by the mere display of its might in nature, but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating that might without fear,

and of regarding our estate as exalted above it

." [bold added]

I don't have the Critique of Judgment in front of me, but I think Kant includes several comments about the Sublime allowing us to measure ourselves against immense powers and to feel our "capacity for resistance" and our ability to adhere to our "highest principles" regardless of the immensity of the powers we're facing. I think that the following, from here, is an example of that:

"For what is it that, even to the savage, is the object of the greatest admiration? It is a man who is undaunted, who knows no fear, and who, therefore, does not give way to danger, but sets manfully to work with full deliberation. Even where civilization has reached a high pitch, there remains this special reverence for the soldier; only that there is then further required of him that he should also exhibit all the virtues of peace — gentleness, sympathy, and even becoming thought for his own person; and for the reason that in this we recognize that his mind is above the threats of danger. And so, comparing the statesman and the general, men may argue as they please as to the pre-eminent respect which is due to either above the other; but the verdict of the aesthetic judgement is for the latter."

In the above, Kant is expressing reverence for the undaunted hero, and linking it to his notion of the Sublime.

J

Edited April 6, 2010 by Jonathan

[Newberry]

J:

I was asking you what you see as the difference between Kant and previous thinkers' concepts of the Sublime. Are you saying that you want me to tell you what other thinkers thought before answering?!?!

Lol. Of course.

http://en.wikipedia....me_(philosophy)

And, as I wrote in this post, Burke thought that the ideas of pain, which he believed were the source of the Sublime, were more powerful than those of pleasure.

In this post, I copied text (from a site that Matus had linked to) and emphasized phrases (in bold) which represent similarities that various previous thinkers had to Kant in their concepts of the Sublime.

Those are all interesting. I have had a vague knowledge of some of the 19th Century British Aestheticians, but I don't know their works other than a few quotes. Perhaps as I learn more about them I will revise my opinion of Kant. But Kant was very thorough in his system about the means, ends, and variations of his concepts of the sublime--it isn't just about the violent subject matter.

As I quoted Kant here:

"Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including the might of nature which challenges our strength, is then, though improperly, called sublime, and it is only under presupposition of this idea within us, and in relation to it, that we are capable of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that Being Which inspires deep respect in us, not by the mere display of its might in nature, but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted above it." [bold added]

I don't have the Critique of Judgment in front of me, but I think Kant includes several comments about the Sublime allowing us to measure ourselves against immense powers and to feel our "capacity for resistance" and our ability to adhere to our "highest principles" regardless of the immensity of the powers we're facing. I think that the following, from here, is an example of that:

"For what is it that, even to the savage, is the object of the greatest admiration? It is a man who is undaunted, who knows no fear, and who, therefore, does not give way to danger, but sets manfully to work with full deliberation. Even where civilization has reached a high pitch, there remains this special reverence for the soldier; only that there is then further required of him that he should also exhibit all the virtues of peace — gentleness, sympathy, and even becoming thought for his own person; and for the reason that in this we recognize that his mind is above the threats of danger. And so, comparing the statesman and the general, men may argue as they please as to the pre-eminent respect which is due to either above the other; but the verdict of the aesthetic judgement is for the latter."

In the above, Kant is expressing reverence for the undaunted hero, and linking it to his notion of the Sublime.

I can see how this seems positive. Like his positive view of the general being sublime, but then Kant thought that war was good as men could get soft pursuing trite commercial interests.

War itself, provided it is

conducted with order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians,

has something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on

in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more

numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are

able to meet with fortitude. On the other hand, a prolonged peace

favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a

debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to

degrade the character of the nation.

The Critique of Judgement by Immanuel Kant, translated by James Creed Meredith

He probably is not talking about a general defending his country from an aggressor but hailing a conquering hero.

It is an interesting thought to rise above disasters and find sublimity in contemplating them. I find many postmodern artists have critical views of humanity, like Paul McCarthy. Or a postmodern artist, I don't remember his name, but he had an exhibition at the Barbara Gladstone Gallery, and it was an installation of internet photos of decomposing bodies, and mutilated mannequins conveying the horrors of war.

My personal opinion is that an artist doesn't rise above horrors by recreating them.

[Jonathan]

Those are all interesting. I have had a vague knowledge of some of the 19th Century British Aestheticians, but I don't know their works other than a few quotes. Perhaps as I learn more about them I will revise my opinion of Kant. But Kant was very thorough in his system about the means, ends, and variations of his concepts of the sublime--it isn't just about the violent subject matter.

Could you explain the essence of your complaint against Kant? What specifically is it about his concept of the Sublime that upsets you and leads you to conclude that it (as opposed to others' concepts of the Sublime) is the foundation of postmodern art, but not the foundation of Romanticism, and not the foundation of Rand's aesthetics? If your gripe is not just about the violent subject matter of the Sublime, or Kant's acceptance of previous thinkers' notions of the aesthetic effectiveness of the "delightful horror" of the Sublime, what exactly is the nature of your disagreement with Kant?

Isn't Kant himself an example of the Sublime to you? Isn't the horror of the myth of the pervasiveness of his evil and influence something which allows you to delight in the satisfaction of your power to resist?

I can see how this seems positive. Like his positive view of the general being sublime, but then Kant thought that war was good as men could get soft pursuing trite commercial interests.

Quote

War itself, provided it is

conducted with order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians,

has something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on

in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more

numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are

able to meet with fortitude. On the other hand, a prolonged peace

favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a

debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to

degrade the character of the nation.

Kant did not think that "war was good," but that it was aesthetically powerful. He called war an "evil," along with the Furies and diseases. His comments on the Sublimity of war are about aesthetic judgments, not moral ones.

It is true, at least from what I've seen, that challenges in peoples lives, including unchosen ones such as war, disease or economic hardship, can stimulate strength of character, and also that comfort and abundance can degrade it. To recognize that people tend to rise to face challenges and that they can become complacent without them is not grounds to conclude that anyone thinks that war, disease and economic hardship are good, but that facing challenges is good.

He probably is not talking about a general defending his country from an aggressor but hailing a conquering hero.

You're guessing that he was bloodthirsty and desirous of conquering other peoples based on the fact that while focusing on an aesthetic view of war he didn't explicitly identify his detailed moral opposition to initiators of war?

My personal opinion is that an artist doesn't rise above horrors by recreating them.

Rand recreated horrors in her art. Do Rand's novels disgust you?

J

[Newberry]

J:

Isn't Kant himself an example of the Sublime to you? Isn't the horror of the myth of the pervasiveness of his evil and influence something which allows you to delight in the satisfaction of your power to resist?

lol.

Kant did not think that "war was good," but that it was aesthetically powerful.

As in Twin Towers?

M:

My personal opinion is that an artist doesn't rise above horrors by recreating them.

J: Rand recreated horrors in her art. Do Rand's novels disgust you?

Good point. Novelists write stories in which all kinds of things happen, including struggles and challenges. But they convey an overall theme or view of humanity, for good or bad. So my intended meaning stays the same.

Jonathan, it might be helpful for you and others to know that I share criticisms and opinions about aesthetics because I am happy with the choices I have made as an artist, it's interconnected. But no one has to agree or like the path I take or the opinions I have. There is a point in all humanities in which persuasion is the last word, and if that doesn't work, there isn't much anyone can do about it.

Edited April 7, 2010 by Newberry

[Newberry]

dublicate

Edited April 7, 2010 by Newberry

[Jonathan]

Kant did not think that "war was good," but that it was aesthetically powerful.

As in Twin Towers?

Could a person experience the Sublime in the events of 9/11 while being vehemently morally opposed to the attacks? Absolutely. I think a person could also experience a sense of the Sublime in Howard Roark's similar destruction of the Cortland project, while being morally opposed to the idea of people doing the same thing in reality. One could also experience the Sublime while viewing a tornado. It wouldn't mean that he thinks tornadoes are good. The object of fear is not what is Sublime, but the experience induced by the object.

Jonathan, it might be helpful for you and others to know that I share criticisms and opinions about aesthetics because I am happy with the choices I have made as an artist, it's interconnected. But no one has to agree or like the path I take or the opinions I have. There is a point in all humanities in which persuasion is the last word, and if that doesn't work, there isn't much anyone can do about it.

Well, I've been asking you to present a persuasive argument to support your assertions.

Anyway, thanks for the responses. I think this discussion has been one of the most productive we've had.

Cheers,

J

[Jonathan]

FWIW, I don't think that a person could experience the Sublime in the events of 9/11 if he supported the attacks. If the attacks didn't make him feel horror or incomprehension and then the capacity to resist, it wouldn't be a case of the Sublime, just as someone who hoped that a tornado would destroy a neighboring town wouldn't be experiencing the Sublime.

J

[Newberry]

J:

Could a person experience the Sublime in the events of 9/11 while being vehemently morally opposed to the attacks? Absolutely.

Your comment is an excellent example of the Kant's meaning of the Sublime. Below is the dictionary meaning.

–adjective

1.

elevated or lofty in thought, language, etc.: Paradise Lost is sublime poetry.

2.

impressing the mind with a sense of grandeur or power; inspiring awe, veneration, etc.: Switzerland has sublime scenery.

3.

supreme or outstanding: a sublime dinner.

4.

complete; absolute; utter: sublime stupidity.

5.

Archaic.

a.

of lofty bearing.

b.

haughty.

6.

Archaic. raised high; high up.

–noun

7.

the sublime,

a.

the realm of things that are sublime: the sublime in art.

b.

the quality of sublimity.

c.

the greatest or supreme degree.

–verb (used with object)

8.

to make higher, nobler, or purer.

Kant is simply redefining the sublime to mean its antithesis. Shock and destruction replaces elevation and the furthest reaches of human creativity. And it seems horribly contradictory to simultaneously think destruction is emblem of human greatness, yet morally reprehensible. That path is too weird for me.

Any speculation on Kant and Rand having a meeting of the minds or agreement in a fundamental way aesthetically would have to resolve this insurmountable difference.

This also may be significant factor why I rarely agree with you in anything but mundane issues.

I think a person could also experience a sense of the Sublime in Howard Roark's similar destruction of the Cortland project, while being morally opposed to the idea of people doing the same thing in reality. One could also experience the Sublime while viewing a tornado. It wouldn't mean that he thinks tornadoes are good. The object of fear is not what is Sublime, but the experience induced by the object.

Again that is a good example. But my take is two-fold: the sublime in the Fountainhead is that Roark's buildings were true to his intent. The blowing up of Cortland was an act of justice at the bastardization of his vision.

Well, I've been asking you to present a persuasive argument to support your assertions.

Likewise.

Anyway, thanks for the responses. I think this discussion has been one of the most productive we've had.

Ditto.

[dan2100]

J:

Could a person experience the Sublime in the events of 9/11 while being vehemently morally opposed to the attacks? Absolutely.

Your comment is an excellent example of the Kant's meaning of the Sublime. Below is the dictionary meaning.

–adjective

1.

elevated or lofty in thought, language, etc.: Paradise Lost is sublime poetry.

2.

impressing the mind with a sense of grandeur or power; inspiring awe, veneration, etc.: Switzerland has sublime scenery.

3.

supreme or outstanding: a sublime dinner.

4.

complete; absolute; utter: sublime stupidity.

5.

Archaic.

a.

of lofty bearing.

b.

haughty.

6.

Archaic. raised high; high up.

–noun

7.

the sublime,

a.

the realm of things that are sublime: the sublime in art.

b.

the quality of sublimity.

c.

the greatest or supreme degree.

–verb (used with object)

8.

to make higher, nobler, or purer.

Kant is simply redefining the sublime to mean its antithesis. Shock and destruction replaces elevation and the furthest reaches of human creativity. And it seems horribly contradictory to simultaneously think destruction is emblem of human greatness, yet morally reprehensible. That path is too weird for me.

Is Kant redefining it? Don't his ideas here sort of ramify those of Longinus (and Burke) and also fit with definitions 2 and 7a above? Perhaps I misunderstand this issue, but it doesn't seem like he's redefining -- more like he's refining. That, of course, doesn't mean one has to accept his refinements of the concept.

Edited April 8, 2010 by Dan Ust

[Jonathan]

Is Kant redefining it? Don't his ideas here sort of ramify those of Longinus (and Burke) and also fit with definitions 2 and 7a above? Perhaps I misunderstand this issue, but it doesn't seem like he's redefining -- more like he's refining. That, of course, doesn't mean one has to accept his refinements of the concept.

Right, Kant wasn't redefining the Sublime. It is Michael who is redefining it, at least in the philosophical context. Apparently Michael expects that Kant should have ignored the established philosophical definition in favor of a future layman's dictionary definition (but it's okay that thinkers from Longinus to Burke weren't as prescient as Kant is expected to have been, and that they opted for the established philosophical definition).

J

[Newberry]

Thanks guys for the discussion, I enjoyed it.

Cheers,

Michael

[Guyau]

I see that both of the essays of Goethe mentioned by Dan have been translated here.

The essay of Goethe’s "Simple Imitation of Nature, Manner, Style” was written in 1789. By that time, Goethe had tried to learn some of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. Goethe was something of a Spinozian realist at this stage, and Kant’s idealism did not go down well. Kant did not publish Critique of Judgment until 1790, so Goethe could not have been influenced by it in this earlier essay. Goethe did get hold of Critique of Judgment as soon as it was published and enthusiastically read it and reread it. This 1790 work of Kant’s was more to his liking, although Goethe would take from it what he saw as semi-correct (for esthetics and for biology) and fix them to his own liking.

I do not know how uncommon were the ideas of Goethe in this essay or the second, and I do not know if these ideas would have been particularly helpful to Rand in comparison to other ideas advanced in the history of esthetics. That is to say, I know little about the history of esthetics. So far.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

A close comparison of the esthetic theories of Kant and of Rand is good work not yet performed by anyone. By such a study, I do not mean any conjectures about influence of Kant on Rand. I mean only the basic task of comparing their esthetic theories comprehensively within their respective philosophies.

I would myself probably make it a comparison of three philosophers, where the third is Hermann Cohen. See Andrea Poma’s The Critical Philosophy of Hermann Cohen (pp. 131–47) concerning Cohen’s esthetic theory.

Edited August 14, 2010 by Stephen Boydstun

[Guyau]

In this thread, a number of posts concern history of aesthetics. I post here some remarks on that history from my first philosophy professor, Francis Kovach, from his Philosophy of Beauty (2012 [1974]). This post will serve for a reference link in future compositions.

In this work, Prof. Kovach formulates definitions known as essential definitions for esthetics and for beauty. Such definitions explain the nature of the thing defined. Kovach examines the history of esthetics behind the etymology of the name esthetics. He then turns to composing his essential definition of esthetics. As prelude he lays out the formidable challenges to sustaining such a definition posed against the great variety of treatments of esthetics in the history of the discipline. It is in this prelude that I come to these extracts that should join historical remarks in this thread.

In ancient and medieval esthetics, beauty is the central aesthetic value and a generic notion in reference to which all other aesthetic notions were being defined. Longinus, for instance, defines the sublime as being really identical with the beautiful; St. Augustine understands the gracious, the specious, and the suitable (decus, species, aptum) in terms of or in their relation to beauty; Alexander of Hales explains the suitable (aptum) in its similarity to the beautiful; Albert the Great does so with some half a dozen aesthetic notions; and Thomas Aquinas, with at least ten such notions.

In modern times, however, the situation begins to change step by step. The first step in this gradual and lengthy process consists in this, that the beautiful and the sublime are being mentioned and analyzed together, and beauty loses thereby its central significance. Edmund Burke’s explicitly stated reason for treating these two notions separately is what he considers their radical difference, even opposition, in contrast to their similarity or genus-species relations in the minds of premodern thinkers. Half a century later, Dugald Stewart expresses a very similar opinion on this issue. And neither of them stands isolated in this view. Before Burke, for instance, J. Addison already speaks of the sublime (“the great”) and the beautiful together with the novel (“the uncommon”); and after him Alexander Gerard, Hugh Blair, Thomas Reid, A. Alison, and I. Kant (to mention only a few) all treat both the sublime and the beautiful.

The next step is taken by Lord Kames (1761), who differentiates between the grandeur and the sublime, and by Thomas Reid, who does the same for different reasons (1785). Thereby, there is now a trichotomy in place of a dichotomy of aesthetic values, viz., that of the sublime and the beautiful. As the next phase in this development, the picturesque, that is merely the species of the beautiful to the mind of William Gilpin, is being added to the old pair of the beautiful and the sublime in the philosophy of Sir Uvedale Price, whereby the aesthetic trichotomy becomes explicit. This view was represented later on by several other aestheticians, like Dugald Stewart and John G. Macvicar, whereas it underwent partial changes, e.g., in the thought of George Ramsey who replaced the picturesque with the ludicrous.

But Lord Kames, together with M. Mendelssohn (1761), becomes the source of an even more radical innovation, that of aesthetic pluralism. For Mendelssohn discusses five values: the beautiful, the sublime, the naïve, the dignified, and the gracious; and Lord Kames, in addition to the triad of beauty, grandeur, and sublimity, such notions also as risibility, congruity, propriety, dignity, and grace. . . .

A further development may seem to be small; yet, it is great in its consequences. While ancient and medieval philosophy throughout and even modern thought for a long time considered ugliness the lack or privation of beauty, under the impact of German idealism, and especially dialectics, some aestheticians began to soften this privative opposition between beauty and ugliness. In 1797, F. Schlegel . . . . In 1853, J. K. F. Rosenkranz publishes the first Aesthetics of the Ugly . . . . Finally, sixteen years later, M. Schasler goes so far as to claim that the ugly enters into all beauty, a view shared later by Eduard von Hartmann. Thereby, ugliness took its place among the aesthetic values, be it considered by contemporary aestheticians as a negative aesthetic value, as by Harold N. Lee, or even a positive value, as by George Santayana, or “aesthetically excellent,” as by B. Bosanquet. With this last phase, the modern development in the treatment of beauty is completed in such a way that the present treatment is the exact opposite of the premodern treatment: beauty is not only dethroned but even made co-equal with its own privation. (18–21)

[Jonathan]

Thanks for posting the excerpts, Stephen. They confirm my understanding of the history of the Sublime as I've discussed it here on OL and other O-sites.

J