Thoughts on rights (children and human nature)


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I have been involved in a discussion of rights on RoR because an anti-concept—post birth abortion—started to be defended by a member. This means literally what it says: killing newborns and calling it abortion. Then the discussion became more general, but the subject of children's rights came up, things got a bit tense and, as usual, I could not keep my mouth shut on perceiving an absurd conclusion being drawn with grounds in a fundamental error (or better, an error in fundamentals). Here are some of the thoughts I posted.

Post 79 ("Post birth abortion, murder charge"):

Any concept of rights that extends them only to adult human beings is not a universal concept, but an arbitrary one. The reason is that such a concept violates the law of identity.

Human beings have a biological nature: birth, growth, maturity, aging and death. All this is part of the genus, as in "rational animal," where "rational" is the differentia and "animal" is the genus.

Ignoring the right to life of a newborn is the same as applying rights only to the differentia and not the genus. It ignores the identity of "human being" at the root.

Pure arbitrariness.

Such thinking comes from a rationalized premise and is a clear example of the stolen concept fallacy (establishing what rights a human being has, but ignoring what a human being is). It certainly is not in accordance with Objectivist epistemology.

Post 95 ("Post birth abortion, murder charge"):

"In fact, MSK's whole "argument", if we can call it that, is equally applicable to a fetus."

Actually it does not apply at all. . .

Rights apply only to human beings. A human being is a rational animal. An infant is included in this definition because he is both rational and an animal.

An infant has his rational (conceptual) faculty functioning in addition to his automatic animal processes. A fetus only has his automatic animal functions running. Rationally he is only a potential. That means, by definition, a fetus is not yet a full individual human being. The genus is there, but the differentia has not yet developed.

A newborn starts to form his first concepts from the very first moment he becomes aware with his very first cry. As a fetus, I suppose some differentiation and integration goes on at a percept level, but not conceptual identification.

This is actually what I believe Ayn Rand meant by the phrase tabula rasa at birth. At least, any other meaning is not substantiated by science.

. . . In Objectivism, in the definition of human being, rational is the differentia and animal is the genus. . . In the ITOE workshops, Rand even cautioned a student against leaving out the genus when calling man "rational."

When you deal with rights, it is very important not to leave out human beings or mischaracterize them. And for that, it is very, very important to understand just what a human being is.

. . .

Post 5 ("Individual Rights - What are they and who has them.")

I am thinking of writing an extended reply to this problem, identifying what rights a child has, but I have critical premise problems from the outset and I do not wish to provoke friction. So I will register where I have the problems, give my premises, and see what happens.

The basic premise problems are very nicely summed up by the following statement by Joe Rowlands from above:

From the previous thread, let me repeat that if the concept of rights is identified clearly among adults living in a harmony of interests, then the case of children (especially newborns) is a borderline case in the conceptual sense. For instance, if rationality is one of the key elements of rights, then a newborn only has the potential.

The first problem is that rights are not identified as stemming from an ethical base, but stemming instead from adults living in harmony of interests. This is similar but not identical. Ethics is a code to guide the actions of human beings for obtaining and/or keeping values. Rights, as give by Rand at least, is ethics applied to the social realm. Thus the concept of rights is essentially a code of values.

As simple induction, I do not find the social realm to be made up exclusively of adults, nor do I find that the definition of human being excludes the child stage, nor do I find that ethics (or volitional values) applies only to adults. So forming the concept of rights (and I mean that epistemologically) based on adults, even if that is only the primary focus and not a delimitation, is flawed at the outset. The concept of rights, just like the concept of ethics, pertains to human beings as a primary, not adult human beings. ("Human being" is the identification and "adult" is a measurement. See the identification/measurement discussion below.)

There is a concept of rights based on NIOF as a metaphysical given, but I do not see the NIOF principle as being more basic than the definition of what a human being is and what values are for human beings. On the contrary, the NIOF principle is derived from those premises. Thus if there is any conflict, the underlying principles take precedence. For instance, inverting NIOF with the law of identity (the definition of human being) leads to making a positive and negative rights dichotomy as if this were some kind of metaphysical principle, when in reality, it is merely a fancy way of saying social freedoms and social duties and mixing the word "rights" in the middle.

If rights is not a code to guide man's actions on a social level in obtaining and/or keeping values, then rights is not based on ethics. And if that is the case, we are stepping outside of reason. One cannot eliminate the concept of value from rights, nor can one eliminate the definition of human being.

The second problem I have is in identifying a newborn as not rational. Frankly, I consider this position as absurd at the root.

There are two intertwining cognitive methods that run in parallel during concept formation, but they are different. The first is identification (differentiation + integration). The second is measurement. The basis of concept formation is that something in reality is identified, but the measurements are omitted. This allows us to be able to measure all instances of what was identified.

A newborn is identified as a rational animal. So is an adult. This means that their rational faculties exist and can be measured. But when an infant's rational faculty is measured (in an ordinal or comparative basis in this case), it is not as developed as an adult's. Claiming that a newborn only has the potential for being rational is substituting the measurement for the identification. If the statement were "if an adult-level rationality is one of the key elements of rights, then a newborn only has the potential," this would be cognitively correct, albeit difficult to justify rights-wise. As it stands, the implication is that an infant has no rational faculty, merely a potential for one.

This kind of fuzziness in using terms (replacing identification with measurement) is what leads to the conclusion that the subject of rights is clearer for adults than for children. It is not.

A very clear and rational code to guide man's values on the social level (rights)—one that pertains to human beings as they exist (man qua man, to use the jargon)—is easy to establish if one defines one's terms and adheres to cognitive consistency in the concepts being used.

I even have other issues, like including children as "borderline" (distant from the core concept) and putting them in the same category as the mentally deficient, the ill, etc. This implies that these other states are either part of the fundamental definition of human beings, or the infant stage is not fundamental. This is an example of apples and oranges. To be clear, being mentally ill is not essential to being human. It is not universal to all cases. It is an exceptional and defective state. Being an infant is fundamental to being human. All adults were once infants.

I could go on with some other cases of premise trouble, but this is enough for now.

I don't know how any agreement on the issue of rights for children can be arrived at with such conflicts in the underlying premises. So I will merely state some of my own premises and leave it at that (unless these premises can be agreed upon or I become convinced otherwise):

1. The definition of a human being is "rational animal." A fetus is not, since despite being an animal, it does not yet have a functioning conceptual faculty. A lower animal is not because it does not have a conceptual faculty at all. An infant is a rational animal (a complete human being) because his conceptual faculty is functioning, meaning that an infant is rational from birth.

2. The infant stage of human life is a fundamental part of arriving at the adult stage, meaning it is impossible to eliminate it. Thus it is an essential part of the concept of what an adult human being is. Any attempt to discuss the values/conditions of an adult, but contradict or blank-out the fact that he was once an infant and that the values/conditions of that stage must be included in order to even arrive at adult-level values/conditions, is an example of the stolen concept fallacy. (Granted that this could apply to fetuses also, but we are discussing volitional and conceptual values and a fetus does not have volition or conception.)

3. Rights are moral principles to guide the actions of rational animals (human beings) on a social level to obtain and/or keep values. The concept of rights applies only to human beings and it deals only with volitional values. The end-in-itself as the ultimate value is the individual human being, and this applies ethically and rights-wise to infants from birth by definition ("rational animal").

4. As a corollary, legal protections for non-humans (like restrictions against excessive cruelty to animals, or measures of care for mentally impaired people) are not rights. Their source stems from another premise—the valuing of genus-related entities without the differentia. These values are not ends in themselves, but are secondary. They derive from the wishes of adult ends-in-themselves (adult human beings) who establish such restrictions and conditions on each other to preserve these secondary values. Infants are not included in this corollary since they have the differentia (they are rational), thus they have rights as ends-in-themselves, not just genus-related legal protections. (Whether there should be such legal protections and why is another issue. I am merely stating an identification for now.)

5. As morals become more complex and varied during the growth and development of an infant, so do rights. This is due to a more complex and varied cognitive development over time and the fact that the interaction between the infant with other people will become more complex and varied. Codes of conduct and codes of values become more advanced to the extent that they can in cognitive terms. Note that this is a measurement issue (complexity of code), not an identification issue (need for code).

6. NIOF derives from ethics. It is not a principle that replaces ethics. The concept of positive and negative rights is derived from NIOF, thus it is a secondary identification, not a primary one. The implication is that when NIOF conflicts with fundamental human values (especially reason), the values take precedence. This applies to rights by simple logical extension.

It is not my purpose here to make a strawman out of Rowlands (or even the misguided poster who started the discussion). I am only interested in the ideas that are presented. I only mentioned the arguments because they prompted my thinking. People reading this should realize that these excerpts were culled from a discussion that is far from over.

However, I believe that the issue of human nature is not fleshed out like it should be in Objectivism. This leads some Objectivists to imagine that a human being is an adult in his prime and everything else is an exception. Also, the issue of emotions is often treated with disdain or at least grossly oversimplified. This leads to some pretty strange conclusions, like the one that prompted the initial discussion. Killing a newborn is called murder, not abortion. This is a universal concept. Only a person who had an incomplete or flawed view of human nature could make a mistake of that magnitude.

So even though this thread is being posted in "Politics," it is also about human nature. I hate to say it, but we have to clean up our act on this if we want the ideas and the good to spread.

Michael

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MSK:

~ In the 1st place, I disagree that 'POLITICS' is the place for this; indeed, if anything belongs under your 'ETHICS' sub-forum, this subject is one.

~ In the 2nd: I read the RoR thread you allude to, and was tempted, but of mixed minds, to even respond to such a questioner (Rowland's arguments aside.) I may yet, only because so many have been 'baited' into discussion. Guess what my main point will be?

~ You consider the kid as merely 'misguided'; I consider him knowledgeable enough to know when he's baiting-for-the-sake-of-it. He knows enough how to use O'ist terminology, says he cares not what "O-ism" has to say about anything, and talks about 'rights' being recognized in a child in terms of when they're 'productive'...or (cripes!) 'cute.' He knows what O'ism is about, yet 'asks' why should an infant killer be 'punished. Give me a break on expecting him to be given any benefit-of-doubt about trolling.

~ He's arguing the personal right of being (and staying as) a Narcissist, fer Pete's sakes; not synonomous with a Rational Egoist learner.

LLAP

J:D

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John,

When discussing matters of human nature, since Rand did not designate this as a subdivision of philosophy, there are crossovers. I agree that there are ethical concerns. But since the issue is individual rights of children, I chose the Politics section.

I fully agree with your assessment of the misguided young man in philosophical terms, except I go deeper than narcissism. I find the whole issue of how human beings are defined both by him and by Rowlands to be seriously lacking. To be clear, they don't have a view of human nature. There is "me" and "others" and everyone has "interests" (which means urges, appetites, whims, goals, whatever) and that's about as far as it goes. Well, that says nothing about human beings. All living creatures have "interests." That doesn't mean they have rights.

Rowlands is on some kind of trip to prove that all ethics and rights derive from self-interest, but without defining "interest" or "self." My discussion with him was fruitful because it highlighted to me just how lacking in a self his view of philosophy holds. There are others who hold this view (or make the same mistake) and I think it is important to bring it out into the open. This can be an intellectual booby-trap for those who come in good will.

I seriously believe these people have awareness of themselves only on a perceptual level. They have no conceptual image of themselves as individual human beings. They stop at the word "individual." When confronted with "rational animal" as a definition, they kinda get the rational part (differentia) but completely blank out the animal part (genus). They even get testy when discussing the animal part. They have no notion of where their so-called interests come from and they literally don't know what they are in conceptual terms. I wrote this in continuing the discussion on RoR:

Post 10 ("Individual Rights - What are they and who has them.")

It is true that such a person will be unable to distinguish between a cat and a newborn infant on the normative level (and most likely on the cognitive level, too). He didn't integrate the concept of what he is.

This is literally an anti-conceptual self.

I am reminded of Rand's essay, "The Missing Link" (The Ayn Rand Letter, Vol. II, No. 16, May 7, 1973) , which deals with the anti-conceptual mentality.

Michael

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The topic interests me enormously, because the challenge of defining the rights of children was given to me by Dr. Gerald MacCallum, former chairman of the Dept of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin. He called it the crucial, most important political question because it controls whatever else may be deduced about civil society and just government. I crunched the problem for 30 years. The result was The Freeman's Constitution. Children and adults have equal legal standing.

I'd like to call attention to something else as well, namely the distinction between private action and public justice. Ethics concerns the nature, powers, ambitions and dilemmas of an individual ("What shall I do?") Law addresses impartial adjudication of disputes, custodial care of those who are unable to or are forbidden to manage their own affairs, use of the combined powers of a whole community, etc. 'Right' may be an ethical term metaphysically or emotively, but ethical values have no proper place in constitutional law. It doesn't matter what an adult happens to believe is right or wrong or the voice of God or common sense, when it comes to due process. Children have an equal constitutional right to due process.

W.

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Wolf,

Here is the link to your work:

The Freeman's Constitution

It is not too long. I want to digest it properly and get back to you. There is one phrase that you wrote in your post that I think needs clarification.

... ethical values have no proper place in constitutional law.

I am in full agree with this once the constitution has been ratified (presupposing it is based on rational premises). But ethical values do have a strong impact in formulating a constitution. Do we agree on this?

Michael

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My perspective on this is simple: Children have the capability to be rational volitionally. Therefore they have individual rights. I was certainly rational as a child and if I can be, anyone else can.

Im a little 'headstrong' on this subject for emotional/psychological reasons. Apologies if I appear too gruff about it.

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Andrew (studiodekadent),

Of course children have individual rights. Children are limited in exercising them because they are limited at surviving and production. This means childrens' rights increase as they grow, but the fundamental one of right to life is there at birth.

This entire thing started because on another forum (RoR), a poster started a thread by defending a young lady in a news article who threw her newborn out in the freezing cold in the garbage to die. The poster tried to justify the action of the mother (even calling it "post birth abortion" instead of murder) from the standpoint of negative rights and the fact that punishment of her would not achieve anything. In his view, the child's life was worthless and not an end in itself. Pushed about this being not representative of Objectivism, he claimed disinterest in Objectivism. The site owner (Rowlands) supported him in his quest for truth or some such silliness while, of course, disagreeing on the justification of murder.

There is so much wrong with this, all of it from all angles, one wonders what it is even doing on an Objectivist forum. I brought some of the more important ideas over here to discuss them because the owner of that forum and I do not get along. We have serious disagreements about what the nature of a human being is. He has the power of moderation over there and I have been moderated for quite a while. I usually have to endure a barrage of insults, evasions, dismissals, etc., from him whenever he disagrees with me.

Ever since I have been moderated there, all of my posts passed except a last one I submitted yesterday (and it still may pass, I can only wait and see). I am giving below the text of what I submitted just in case it will not go through. If this were simply a personal matter, I wouldn't bother. But I find the implications very disturbing. A knuckleheaded proposal that it is moral to murder a newborn is given serious consideration on an Objectivist forum. And there are widely diverging views on the nature of man, yet there is oodles of preaching about how man should live a moral life and what those morals (and consequently, rights) should be. Something is seriously wrong somewhere. Here is what I was answering (post by Joe Rowlands):

MSK, you're speaking gibberish again. It's revolting to witness you trying to make sense. What a perversion of reason! For instance, definitions are not arguments. You need definitions to keep your ideas clear and communicate them well. But when you state your conclusion as part of the definition, you're playing word games. And that's all you've done.

I shouldn't have to point out that these same stupid semantic games are how anti-abortion activists try to justify their own views. We shouldn't kill human beings! What's the definition of a human being? That's not an argument. That's an attempt at equivocation.

But instead of recognizing that my criticism is about trying to "define" reality by arbitrary assertion, you jump to the idiotic view that I'm against definitions. Every time you speak, you inform the world that you're not worth listening to.

Here is the answer I submitted:

I don't see any reason to continue either. With each post you make, I see the logical fallacy you commit clearer and clearer and all you are doing now is substituting insults for rational discourse while sidestepping the fallacy (stolen concept).

I will not speculate why you feel revulsion, but it is not for any "perversion of reason" by me, since there is none. Contrary to what you claim, my arguments and definitions are not word games at all. They have solid grounds in both reality and logic and there are no contradictions. That's the real test for logic, not insults. If you find a contradiction, prove it. I am listening, breathlessly awaiting your wisdom to correct myself.

You rant about me trying to substitute definitions for arguments (which is false and too silly to refute, but it is weird—I don't know how you expect someone to define terms without defining terms). And you falsely claim that I argue that you are against definitions. I don't know where you got that idea and I don't know whether you are against definitions or not.

I do know that you have not presented any clear idea about what you think human nature actually is.

Nothing. Zilch. Well, you do say that a human being has "interests." But that is not saying much about human beings because all living creatures have "interests."

I won't hold my breath for any clarification either. To be blunt, I don't think you have a clear idea about human nature.

I will be flabbergasted and delighted if this guy answers my challenges (I am interested, seriously, in asking how he relates human nature to self-interest and rights, since I have been unable to detect this), but I don't see it happening in my lifetime. On a personal level, I don't care all that much about resolving this, but I do find these limitations disturbing in an environment devoted to teaching Objectivism.

On a tangential issue, I keep hearing about positive rights and negative rights as if this concept were integral to Objectivism. I looked up these phrases on the Objectivism Research CDROM and Ayn Rand never used them, at least not in what is published there (which is almost all of her published works).

She has declared openly that she believed in government protection of minors when their parents mistreated them or did not feed them or care for them, even claiming that minors are entitled to be cared for until they grow up (see the Q&A book). Whether she would call such protection and entitlements "rights" or not is unclear, but if "rights" is what she did mean, this would create—for children—positive rights (entitlements to something produced by others) in addition to negative rights (being left alone to act) and many Objectivists apparently would then turn psychotic and jump off bridges and stuff. So they twist logic all around in order to keep this positive/negative rights dichotomy thing going where "positive rights" is the social equivalent of evil and "negative rights" the social equivalent of good.

A couple of attempts at more serious issues have grown from this abominable start of justifying murder. One attempt is to prove that infants can be entitled to care from the standpoint of negative rights. This is only worth examining by the stouthearted because the logical pretzel just keeps growing and growing.

Another attempt, one that I find exceptional (albeit very incomplete) is by Steve Wolfer in a recent essay called What gives rise to the need for rights?. I do not agree with everything, but his introduction in building the initial concept is one of the more refreshing ones I have read on rights and his justification for upholding rights from a trader principle is very convincing.

... you can not claim protection from a moral right that you won’t observe for others. A moral right doesn’t reside inside of you or them but as a moral relationship between you and them – violate it for another and it you no longer have it for yourself.

I do not believe this trader principle is the only reason to uphold rights, but it is certainly among the fundamental reasons.

I will have more on this later. To end this post, as more food for thought, here are a couple of Objectivist articles specifically dealing with rights, but with some differing views:

Getting Rights Right by Robert Bidinotto

Getting Rights Right – A Reply to Robert Bidinotto by Nicholas Dykes

Michael

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Hi Michael,

This will be my first post on your site. It is nice to have already shown up here in your quote and your kind words. Thank you.

My post that you refer to on RoR is very rough and incomplete. I'd say that the entire post is intended to be an argument that rights are moral and objective and not intrinsic. The section labeled "self interest and rights" is a side argument (the Trader principle) - not where I'd go as the primary argument.

Edited by Steve Wolfer
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[E]thical values do have a strong impact in formulating a constitution. Do we agree on this?

Historically, no. The Federal Convention of 1787 discarded ethics, especially the obvious wrong of slavery. Delegates voted their sectional and class interests, practically deaf to reasoned arguments. At the end of a contentious two-month debate, a majority of delegates accepted Ben Franklin's last ditch appeal: If we don't adopt this draft, all hope of saving the United States is sunk. New York's delegates refused to sign, saying they had no authority to surrender state sovereignty. No one liked the draft constitution. It had no guarantee of common law civil rights. Madison and Hamilton argued in The Federalist newspaper series that the draft constitution should be ratified because a) foreign powers like France and Britain would split the colonies into rival regional blocs that might lead to civil war; b) "wicked and improper objects" like fiat paper money and pork barrel largesse would be checked by a national legislature; and c) all state powers and common law rights were outside the purview of the proposed Federal government, whose duties were few and limited to those specifically enumerated in the draft constitution. As you can see, there was no ethical dimension at all. It was 100% pragmatic politics, hoping to pull the 13 States out of bankruptcy in the aftermath of the War of Independence, to resolve the dispute over Crown Lands claimed by multiple states, to pay off state militias and create a Navy, etc. The so-called "commerce clause" gave the U.S. Congress exclusive and unlimited authority to regulate interstate trade because States were taxing each other's produce moving across state borders. New Jersey was compared to a cask tapped at both ends by Pennsylvania and New York.

Sorry to be so prolix. It's important to put the U.S. Constitution in perspective. It did not abolish slavery. The sole source of Union revenue was imposts and duties on foreign trade, which caused the Civil War. To pay for it, Lincoln issued paper greenbacks and Congress voted for conscription, confiscation, and income taxes. If there was any ethical dimension in U.S. political history, I fail to perceive any.

Now we come to the possibility of an Objectivist political order based on individual rights (not political power conferred by voting or pragmatic payola). At this stage I would prefer to disqualify myself because I have no new ideas except those presented in previous work, especially the core concept of defacto anarchy. Government should be extremely small, consisting of a legal profession and a separate, privately-held public company for national defense. The only ethical principle needed is the virtue of rationality IMO.

W.

see also

'Defects in The Freeman's Constitution' http://www.geocities.com/dv05131970/freemans_const.pdf

'The Rule of Law' http://www.geocities.com/dv05131970/rule_of_law.html

'Architecture of Liberal Democracy' http://www.geocities.com/dv05131970/arch_of_lib_dem.pdf

Edited by Wolf DeVoon
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Wow, it's a good thing that Gores is only disagreeing with Objectivism about killing unwanted babies, and merely declaring publicly that he's "not particularly interested in what Objectivism is or is not." Just think if instead he disagreed with Joe Rowlands about something much, much more important, like his personal opinions about works of art!

J

Edited by Jonathan
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Jonathan,

There is more truth to your complaint than meets the eye. I am very interested in Rowland's approach to Objectivism because I have seen it in other places. I have always felt a huge gulf between what I see as reality and what people who think like Rowlands do. For the record, I consider Rowlands to be very intelligent. I am too. Among intelligent rational people there should not be a gulf as wide as there is between us. I think I have uncovered the underlying principles, so here are a few comments.

I want to emphasize that my intention is not to roast anybody. I am interested in looking at the reasons as to why certain things happen in the Objectivist world and this case is a very good one for analysis since the principles are clearly observable. It is especially interesting to look into why many highly intelligent and talented people on RoR were delegated to a "Dissent" forum, moderated or banned when a person who openly declared indifference to Objectivism while advocating the murder of newborns as a moral ideal is not only tolerated, but continues to be an insider. As icing to that cake, this person is not even that knowledgeable about Objectivism although he knows some of the basics.

We have to remember that the stated purpose of the RoR site is to teach Objectivism to the world. So I think it is entirely legitimate to question the roots of this double standard if we are interested in the Objectivist culture.

1. Intolerance for opposing views. This is more ARI-oriented than independent-oriented, but the particular view of Objectivism I am analyzing usually displays a high degree of intolerance. This is openly perceivable with the way posters have been restricted on RoR based on their views, so it cannot be denied. But it can be seen in other places as well. It usually pops up as an insult right off the bat. One characteristic I have noticed, though, is that it is manifest in a rather arbitrary manner. Sometimes people with opposing views are tolerated and sometimes they are not. In the case at hand (the poster defending murder of newborns), it is completely contradictory to the stated policy since he also declared he was uninterested in the Objectivist view. Those who have declared this openly are restricted and the explicit RoR policy is for them to be restricted. In light of the fact that intelligent people are involved, there has to be some method to the madness.

On reflection, I have detected an underlying standard: intellectual competence. Those who are highly competent in arguing opposing views to Objectivism are not tolerated and those who are obviously unlearned or simply opinionated are. I see the advantages clearly, too. They are easy to teach if they are open to learning , and they are easy to refute if not. The competent people need more attention and effort.

2. Tribalism. This also is more ARI-oriented than independent-oriented, but I detect it. I only speculate about RoR here, but I imagine that if a person openly supported the murder of a defenseless and innocent person as a moral ideal, this would have resulted in some restrictive measure except if he were an insider or intellectually lacking. And that is where I perceive the tribalism.

Interestingly, I don't have any problem with an open declaration of tolerance based on friendship and I do not consider that as tribalism per se. We all cut our friends a lot of slack and this is because of a whole set of values that the friend represents, not just the objectionable act he performed. If one says, "He is my friend and he is wrong, but I stand by him anyway," I don't see this as tribalism except in extreme cases. It is a declaration of fraternal love and the standard of value it is out in the open. Even Rand said that love is exception-making.

Where I perceived the tribalism is in the defense of the poster in the manner given here:

... I think his position is tentative and mistaken. Most of the arguments made against him were vague and unconvincing.

. . .

... at this point, he seems to be genuinely trying to find reasons. Since the ones offered were insufficient, he may work under the premise that it isn't a valid belief.

. . .

I once heard a question that went something like: "Is it better to be right for the wrong reasons, or wrong for the right reasons?". In other words, is it better to arrive at a false conclusion through a rational approach that you made a mistake in applying, or be right through the product of an irrational approach. I think the first will at least have the opportunity to correct his views. The latter will apply his faulty methodology throughout the rest of his life.

In other words, it is OK to propose murder as an ideal under Objectivism because other people have not explained why this is an abomination correctly. This poster is being held up as applying a correct method of thinking but making a mistake in doing it. What he is proposing (moral correctness for murdering a newborn) is not seen as the evil proposition it is.

This is hiding the best (the love of a friend) with the worst (a gross rationalization). The only discernible reason I can detect for this is tribalism. Being loyal to an intellectual leader (and especially not questioning his intellectual premises) is far more important than the actual ideas under discussion. And this leads to to following observation.

3. Deducting the philosophy from an incorrect premise. I have detected a common root that actually explains some of this behavior. This is where my real interest lies. Objectivists are always bickering among each other and making all kinds of derogatory statements about the characters of each other. I think it is a miracle that Objectivist ideas have spread as far as they have with this as the public example of how Objectivists act. But on to the rationalization.

I have detected in Rowlands's approach (and that of several others) that he is deducting all of his main principles from altruism and selfishness. Altruism is set up as a metaphysical standard of evil and selfishness is considered as a metaphysical standard of good, regardless of context or entity. They are metaphysical givens and the philosophy is deduced from there. Lip service is given to reality and so forth, but altruism and selfishness are considered as the basic standard of reason and rational thinking. They are fundamental axioms to this kind of thinker on the same level that existence, identity and consciousness are.

Notice this in a quote from the same post as above:

Since this topic has come up before, I'm aware that many of the "arguments" made in favor of the babies life are unconvincing and come off as emotionally driven and an appeal to altruism. It's not surprising at all that someone will come off thinking there is no actual reason for these beliefs.

Just to make it clear that I am not speaking of Rowlands alone, he even acknowledges this by stating (in that post) that the misguided poster"

... is far from the first person on this forum to be lead to that conclusion.

Now if you point to the reality of the human being, mention that infancy is part of man's inherent nature, mention the "rational animal" definition as given by Rand, and so forth as your basis of reality, this is dismissed. I have constantly scratched my head and wondered how a person can look at what is in front of him and blank it out, then use words like "rational" and "reason," claiming that he is employing them while all others are not. The following quote (from the same post) is very typical of this kind of thinking and it is all over discussions with Rowlands and many like-thinking Objectivists in many places.

But from my perspective the irrational people are those who stand by the status quo without being able to give a real reason for believing any of it. For them, it just feels right and they don't feel the need to follow reason wherever it leads them. These people, even if they're right on this one issue, are right for the wrong reasons. And more importantly, they're immune to rational debate.

This makes no sense if you use induction to see that man goes through an infant stage in order to acquire adult values. You wonder how a person can ignore this observation as part of the reason for building a moral concept and simply claim that people are not "able to give a real reason."

But if you use altruism/selfishness as a floating concept, cut off from everything else in reality, as the standard of reason like a fundamental axiom, it makes perfect sense. This kind of mentality will not consider connecting selfishness to an actual self (with a specific nature) as a valid means of reasoning because selfishness is the metaphysical fact, not the self. Rational thought is seen as a value, but only if this new axiom is the premise. Thus he will call anyone who does not accept his intrinsic selfish/altruistic premise as "irrational."

I have seen several posters try to say, "Look at reality. See this: XXXXXXX. It exists and that is not as you say." (You can see this basic message in several places on the threads in question.) This often provokes an enormous amount of conflict and hostility from the person being challenged, with the original person being accused of feeling instead of thinking, being "immune to rational debate," having muddled reasoning, and so forth.

And this, Jonathan, explains exactly why a person proposing murder as the good is seen by them as merely mistaken while a person with a different view of art is seen as needing intellectual restrictions. The one proposing murder is not looking at the reality of the human being first, but instead he sees altruism first. That makes him rational (to them). You look into the soul of man, see what is in there and report it as you see it as honestly and competently as you are able to. Yet you do not blank out fundamentals that cannot be aligned with altruism/selfishness, so that is why they consider you as irrational.

In other words, their premise is a stolen concept. They propose values for man, but their view of man lops off much of his nature.

I have been seeking the answer to this issue for a long time. With this episode, I have finally detected where the error is and what the premises are (especially the stolen concept—or more precisely, stolen axiom), so I imagine that my interest in the ones insisting on this error will start to wane. I might write an article about this before I let it go. As this is a widespread error, it is important to present the principles in an organized manner. But I will probably not cite specific people other than Rand and maybe one or another core Objectivist thinker. The problem is much bigger and more fundamental than the persons involved in this episode.

Michael

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Wolf:

~ I see the moral basis of children's rights automatically implying a moral obligation to the creator of any conscious child, since such is creating a dependent.

MSK:

~ Re 'negative' and 'positive' rights, I agree that most discussion of such is unnecessary pretzeling of simple basic ideas, meaning that too many will get too little info from any of it. If such serves the arguer usefully, fine, but they shouldn't count on others not familiar with such as being dunces if still disagreeing. Further, I believe Rand did refer to what others call 'negative' rights, but, didn't label them as such; she merely referred to the idea in terms 'of a negative kind' or some such, re the implication of obligations by others toward the 'rights' of one.

~ I also have a prob with 'The Trader Principle' being relevent to recognizing 'rights' of anyone; more circumlocution for anyone familiar with Rand's arguments about 'rights.'

LLAP

J:D

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Who has the "right" to violate a child's right to life?

Brant,

That is the zillion dollar question that I asked that brought on all the bickering. And having that right is exactly what was being preached. Now I understand that this is the wrong question to start with for people who boil metaphysics and epistemology down to altruism versus selfishness. They literally don't understand it and think you are trying to undermine their philosophy (which bears a similarity to Rand's Objectivism in many points, but has some fundamental differences).

Michael

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(Rowlands)

Since this topic has come up before, I'm aware that many of the "arguments" made in favor of the babies life are unconvincing and come off as emotionally driven and an appeal to altruism.

from previous writing:

...an individual man is bound by consequence to his moral purpose and values. This, as flimsy as it seems, is the basis of most progress. An egoist rightly ponders outcomes. Kill and eat a few babies -- your pursuit of happiness will be irrevocably expended, lost in fatal perversion and villainy. Victims are not my first concern. I worry about the mental health of ungovernable freemen, unless the function of morality is understood. ... To the clever predator, who does as he pleases without fear of coffee-sipping, donut-munching lawyers and cops, I suggest a review of moral purpose. Thy will be done. If you kill babies and torture morons, you will live the rest of your days in an irreversible interior hell of your own making, a black madness in perpetual fear of discovery, which will happen sooner or later. There are very few serial killers at large, except cattle ranchers and hog producers and flag-waving, stupified, weary, ultimately doomed armies of occupation. There is no ethical free ride.

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This whole discussion is an illustration that there is no such thing as "objective rights". You can't derive a comprehensive and satisfactory system of rights based on a single principle, all such theories are in fact rationalizations. The story of the mother killing her child is a good example. Most people will react with indignation to that story. That is not caused by adherence to some abstract scheme of rights, it's a gut reaction, which is ultimately based on a combination of our genetic heritage and our early education. Now the Objectivists who agree that this killing is wrong do have a problem: this "moral imperative" cannot be derived from the theory. I predict that a lot of electrons will travel the Internet with regard to this question, but to no avail, there is no solution. People like that Rowlands person are tying themselves into pretzels trying to rationalize the desired outcome, but I'll guarantee that we'll never see a solution. Now I don't say that an ethical system is useless, far from it, but we must accept that such a system cannot be built without arbitrary assumptions that are necessary to match our system to our gut feelings. Those assumptions are arbitrary in the sense that they can't be derived from first principles, but that doesn't mean that they are completely random. Such fields as evolutionary psychology and game theory may give us insight why we have in general such gut feelings (there will always be people whose genetic constitution makes them different in that regard, for example by being unable to feel empathy) and why those assumptions may be a good idea. So by all means, let us try to find together a more or less comprehensive and consistent system, but forget the quasi-scientific rationalizations from first principles. We should really take human nature into account, but not pretend that we can make logical deductions from it. Pretension killed the philosophy.

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Dragonfly,

I cannot come to your conclusion, but I do admit that the view of human nature that is being used for the first principles is woefully incomplete. In fact, no definition of human nature is even present in the first principles for the view under discussion. This only comes in later, and even then, it is not complete. Once I cracked the primacy of altruism/selfishness thing with that line of thought, I felt like a weight had been lifted. I now understand why they think that way. It didn't make any sense before.

I am delving into this much more deeply. I am digesting right now, but I like Wolf's call to look at, er... essentially real estate as a part of this mix, including historical context. Part of our nature is to occupy land for producing values, so I don't see any problem in including it.

I generally have found libertarians to be history heavy, but Objectivists to be history deficient.

I have something inside me brewing on this.

Michael

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This whole discussion is an illustration that there is no such thing as "objective rights". You can't derive a comprehensive and satisfactory system of rights based on a single principle, all such theories are in fact rationalizations. The story of the mother killing her child is a good example. Most people will react with indignation to that story. That is not caused by adherence to some abstract scheme of rights, it's a gut reaction, which is ultimately based on a combination of our genetic heritage and our early education. Now the Objectivists who agree that this killing is wrong do have a problem: this "moral imperative" cannot be derived from the theory. I predict that a lot of electrons will travel the Internet with regard to this question, but to no avail, there is no solution. People like that Rowlands person are tying themselves into pretzels trying to rationalize the desired outcome, but I'll guarantee that we'll never see a solution. Now I don't say that an ethical system is useless, far from it, but we must accept that such a system cannot be built without arbitrary assumptions that are necessary to match our system to our gut feelings. Those assumptions are arbitrary in the sense that they can't be derived from first principles, but that doesn't mean that they are completely random. Such fields as evolutionary psychology and game theory may give us insight why we have in general such gut feelings (there will always be people whose genetic constitution makes them different in that regard, for example by being unable to feel empathy) and why those assumptions may be a good idea. So by all means, let us try to find together a more or less comprehensive and consistent system, but forget the quasi-scientific rationalizations from first principles. We should really take human nature into account, but not pretend that we can make logical deductions from it. Pretension killed the philosophy.

If you can't get an "ought" from an "is" we can't get a "should" either. So we shouldn't take human nature into account. So much for morality, for we can't say people ought to have a morality. But of course we can. The only real question is what morality. Human nature is an "is." If we can't make logical deductions from it we can't make logical deductions from anything. I think at the least you have spread your position too broad and thin. Could you tighten up your formulation? "Pretension killed the philosophy"? I think you are killing all philosophy. Why ought we be logical? Why ought we have a different morality than the one we absorbed by osmosis? Etc.

--Brant

Edited by Brant Gaede
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Well, the chickens have certainly come home to roost.

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If you can't get an "ought" from an "is" we can't get a "should" either. So we shouldn't take human nature into account.

To say we "ought" to do something is one thing, to say we can prove what we ought to do is quite another thing. In contrast to others don't pretend that I can derive from first principles what I think is desirable, other people may have a different opinion. I only think that my idea is more practical.

Human nature is an "is." If we can't make logical deductions from it we can't make logical deductions from anything

That is a non sequitur. The fact that I can't deduce an ethics system from "what human nature is" does not imply that I can't deduce a mathematical theorem from a set of axioms. To deduce an ethics system you always have to make subjective choices. Show me any so-called derivation and I'll show you the subjective choices that are made in that derivation.

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Well, the chickens have certainly come home to roost.

The reconciliation is so easy: Dragonfly's "should" is a conditional. Sure, you can get a conditional "should" ("ought") from an is. IF you want X, then you should do Y. What you can't get is a deduction that says that you should want X. And in fact, Rand herself said this in her essay "Causality Versus Duty." I do wish that those who don't understand the point about shoulds not being derivable by deductive logic from statements of fact would re-read that essay. Her discussion of there being no unchosen obligations contradicts her earlier brief statement on is/ought in "The Objectivist Ethics" (unless one goes to lengths twisting her meaning of "determines" in that earlier statement into something implausible in the context).

Ellen

PS: Dragonfly and I cross-posted.

___

Edited by Ellen Stuttle
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Well, the chickens have certainly come home to roost.

The reconciliation is so easy: Dragonfly's "should" is a conditional. Sure, you can get a conditional "should" ("ought") from an is. IF you want X, then you should do Y. What you can't get is a deduction that says that you should want X. And in fact, Rand herself said this in her essay "Causality Versus Duty." I do wish that those who don't understand the point about shoulds not being derivable by deductive logic from statements of fact would re-read that essay. Her discussion of there being no unchosen obligations contradicts her earlier brief statement on is/ought in "The Objectivist Ethics" (unless one goes to lengths twisting her meaning of "determines" in that earlier statement into something implausible in the context).

Ellen

PS: Dragonfly and I cross-posted.

___

Well, I'll reread that essay when I have time. I don't think philosophy is about proving anything, but only demonstrating what seem to be best conclusions from available data. I couldn't understand why I suddenly seemed to be on different tracks with Dragonfly. "Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification" means different, additional data might equal a different identification later on. The trick of logic is to use it and to avoid logical fallacies. This is reason. I think we know enough to justify a theory of natural human rights even if that theory is hard to apply in all circumstances. The anarchists are Utopian; they want perfection in human societies. I don't see how we can avoid having some government or how that government can avoid violating some rights. I suggest that the idea of perfection--in knowledge, human beings, human societies is basically nuts.

--Brant

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Well, I'll reread that essay ["Causality Versus Duty'] when I have time. I don't think philosophy is about proving anything, but only demonstrating what seem to be best conclusions from available data. I couldn't understand why I suddenly seemed to be on different tracks with Dragonfly. "Logic is the art of non-contradictory identification" means different, additional data might equal a different identification later on. The trick of logic is to use it and to avoid logical fallacies. This is reason. I think we know enough to justify a theory of natural human rights even if that theory is hard to apply in all circumstances. The anarchists are Utopian; they want perfection in human societies. I don't see how we can avoid having some government or how that government can avoid violating some rights. I suggest that the idea of perfection--in knowledge, human beings, human societies is basically nuts.

--Brant

Brant,

Not for the first time, I don't understand what you mean by your reply in relationship to the subject under dispute. Hume claimed, though not in terms of modern logic procedures, that one can't deduce an "ought" statement from an "is" statement. Rand appears in one paragraph * of "The Objectivist Ethics" to say, yes, you can. The paragraph is fuzzy as to interpretation because of her use of "determines," which might mean merely something like "sets the parameters of." But if that's all she meant, then why did she say "In answer to those philosophers [....]"? Ignorance of the context she was speaking to? Or what?

You keep bringing up the issue of "rights," but I think you're not understanding what the basic philosophic dispute is about. I have no quarrel with you -- and I'm sure that neither does Dragonfly -- that a society in which the principle of "rights" is accepted as the base line for legal procedures is a society wherein benefits that a lot of people would want would have a better chance of occurring. I have no quarrel that the flourishing of rational minds has a much better chance in a society where "rights" as Rand understood those are the law of the land. But this is not a deductive argument. It requires the introduction of factual speculations, conditionals, and preferences. Kenghis Khan wouldn't have liked your preferred society. SHOULD he have? Why, on the basis of deductive logic? Can you demonstrate, in the same way you can demonstrate that if all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, Socrates is mortal, he SHOULD have adopted your moral code?

Ellen

* Sorry; it's late and I don't have the paragraph immediately to hand. Probably someone else does and can reference it; or I'll post it again tomorrow -- it's been posted several times.

___

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I said above that I'd re-quote the paragraph giving rise to these is/ought disputes.

Here again, in all its non sequitur glories, is what she wrote:

[pg. 7-8, The Virtue of Selfishness ,

The New American Library hardcover,

1961 given as the copyright date of the

article]

In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, [sic, re the comma] determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between "is" and "ought."

There just is no way you can twist that into a logically sound argument which counteracts the non-derivability of an "ought" from an "is."

Ellen

___

Edited by Ellen Stuttle
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~ Well, after reading all this, I'm a bit confused as to where, if there be any 'where', an ought has any place for anything worth calling a rational justification for use (beyond momentary/random preferences/desires/wishes). --- Apparently...no 'where.' Is THAT the final 'argument'?

~ If so, then one 'ought' to NOT accept Rand's argument about the relation 'twixt 'is' and 'ought'. That one 'is' a rational being is irrelevent to what one 'ought' to do in staying such. But, that's assuming the acceptance of the 'logic' supporting the...argument...against her argument.

~ Unfortunately, I don't see the induction or deduction coherently applied to the argument against her 'argument'. --- Without either or both, the 'argument' lacks a bit.

~ Maybe one 'ought' to...desire...to re-think the 'arguments' against her 'argumented relation of the two?'

LLAP

J:D

Edited by John Dailey
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