The so-called 'ESSENTIALS' of Objectivism

[John Dailey]

Mike:

~ I keep using the word 'essentials' because, as I spelled out in my original post, so many use it already, but my concern is: they never spell out what such supposedly are...by their lights. I also pointed out that the term 'fundamentals' is synonomously...and as ambiguously...used.

~ Re your 2 questions:

"1. Who decides?" [Clearly, each of them do]. " (And why do they decide?)" [Well, if they'd spelled out their 'whats', I'd ask the 'why'; I dunno 'why', 'cause I dunno the 'whats'. This has been my whole point!]

"2. What standard do they use?" [Good question! See my previous comment.]

LLAP

J:D

Edited December 26, 2006 by John Dailey

[John Dailey]

Mike:

~ You add "I see your own questions pushing off into more or less opinion." Really? My questions were calls for clarifying the use of very bandied about terminology. What 'opinion' is there in my questions, beyond what I clarified about non-clarification by others?

~ You then parenthesize your opinion with the examples of "('I think it's Galt's speech;' 'I think it includes Rand's later writings;' etc.)---Huh? No; I don't 'think' such (innuending that I'm not sure if I've decided such or not). I clarified *my* essentials in terms of "I say that..." and "I regard...", just as you have re Kelley's interpretations of Rand's general writings. I think we both made ourselves un-opinionatedly clear.

~ And, that's a good start at clarifying what all of us mean by essentials, right?

LLAP

J:D

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I think we both made ourselves un-opinionatedly clear.

~ And, that's a good start at clarifying what all of us mean by essentials, right?

John,

Correct. And I appreciate the friendliness. I just saw that my own post comes off as brusque and that was not my intention.

I am thinking of doing the following when I get a little time, because of the magic word, "integration." Objectivism is an integrated system fundamentals-wise, yet it is not complete (or open) on the secondary level on up. These parts depend on interpretation and application to concrete cases.

I am thinking of making an outline of Kelley's excerpt above and referencing where he gets the ideas from in Rand's writings--including statements in her own words. This should clear up the following problem (among some others): You mentioned "Kelley's interpretations" of Rand. This is not accurate. Kelley used the same concepts that Rand did--he did not "interpret" them--but he used other words to express them. His language does not rely on Objectivist jargon, whereas Rand's works are jargon-heavy. That's what gives Kelley's writings the appearance of being an "interpretation," when it is a rewording of some concepts at the most.

In your quest for essentials, don't forget the "integrated system" part. That is why the "standing on one foot" speech is not enough. Expressed that starkly, the concepts are not integrated with each other enough to make a system.

Also, Galt's speech dealt with many secondary issues that are not fundamental. Kelley has an excellent outline of the speech here.

Michael

[studiodekadent]

I would like to add a point.

There is no such thing as an intrinsic essential. The process of abstraction is based on measuring a group of concretes according to their similarities and differences to and from eachother. Hence, that which constitutes the 'eachother' will influence what the essentials (the unique factors) turn out to be.

Kelley's description of the essentials of Objectivism is within the context of comparing Objectivism to other philosophies. The ARIans consider the essential of Objectivism to be, at least from what I have seen, "the philosophy of Ayn Rand," i.e. that which she said. In the case of the ARIans, this seems related to their intellectual tribalism: their devotion to people rather than principles (Ayn Rand, rather than Ayn Rand's ideas), and also seems related to their religionistic attitude: "Christianity is the philosophy of Jesus, that is why it is totally different from the philosophy of Buddha!" (Blank out the fact that all religions are philosophically identical, essentially speaking). Im sure the analogy is understandable.

[Judith]

Yes, I remember that aesthetics weren't included in the "one foot" episode. Someone brought that up elsewhere. I did say, "pretty much" to qualify my statement.

Sorry if I came across as curt.

No, you didn't -- and if I did in my response, I didn't mean to!

I did say that it might be optional. Nonetheless, I did include it because the overwhelming majority of Objectivists I've encountered do tend to have aesthetic tastes that tend toward romanticism and realism.

It's been my experience that the overwhelming majority of Objectivists say that they love "romantic realism," but their tastes are actually something I'd call romantic fantasy (and quite often romantic children's fantasy). Blunt, exaggerated heroism (exaggerated to the point of fantasy) seems to be their vision of what "romanticism" means, and that, along with a preference for ethical messages which are compatible with Objectivism, is much more important to them in art than any serious aesthetic considerations (such as depth, the presentation of complex, adult dilemmas, quality of artistry, etc.). To them, the romance part of Rand's formulation trumps the realism part, and ethical judgements trump aesthetic ones. To get to the point, I suspect that, to many Objectivists, art is often little more than propaganda which to rally behind or oppose because they believe that "romantic realism" is the standing-on-one-foot essense of Rand's aesthetics -- they falsely believe that Rand proved that romantic realism is the best art, and, therefore, they have reduced themselves to judging art ethically as opposed to aesthetically.

(*wince*) Yeah, I've seen that among people trying to prove, either to themselves or to others, their Objectivist credentials, and I've seen it in badly written Objectivist knock-off literature and art.

But I've also seen first-hand genuine responses from many Objectivists that tend toward Romantic Realism. My own tastes in art and music were set long before I'd ever heard of Rand. Call me a philistine and a barbarian if you will, but most music written before 1875 bores me to death; I love the late Romantics and the 20th-Century composers like Rachmaninoff, Vaughan Williams, Prokofieff, Stravinsky, Mahler, etc.

Judith

[Ellen Stuttle]

[Jonathan wrote:] It's been my experience that the overwhelming majority of Objectivists say that they love "romantic realism," but their tastes are actually something I'd call romantic fantasy (and quite often romantic children's fantasy). Blunt, exaggerated heroism (exaggerated to the point of fantasy) seems to be their vision of what "romanticism" means, and that, along with a preference for ethical messages which are compatible with Objectivism, is much more important to them in art than any serious aesthetic considerations (such as depth, the presentation of complex, adult dilemmas, quality of artistry, etc.). To them, the romance part of Rand's formulation trumps the realism part, and ethical judgements trump aesthetic ones. To get to the point, I suspect that, to many Objectivists, art is often little more than propaganda which to rally behind or oppose because they believe that "romantic realism" is the standing-on-one-foot essense of Rand's aesthetics -- they falsely believe that Rand proved that romantic realism is the best art, and, therefore, they have reduced themselves to judging art ethically as opposed to aesthetically.

Jonathan, again, I love the way you express these things. Quite so, IMO. Also, I don't think the description "romantic realism" properly applies to any form of art except novelistic. Torres and Kamhi discussed that; maybe someone has the references.

Re Judith's comment:

Call me a philistine and a barbarian if you will, but most music written before 1875 bores me to death; I love the late Romantics and the 20th-Century composers like Rachmaninoff, Vaughan Williams, Prokofieff, Stravinsky, Mahler, etc.

If perchance you believe that this list indicates that your and Rand's musical tastes are similar, it does not. Rachmaninoff, very ok, granted. Vaughan Williams, I'm not sure about. I don't recall ever asking how she reacted to Vaughan Williams or if she'd even heard any of his music. I expect she would have liked at least some of it, if she heard it. Prokofiev, Stravinsky, Mahler, "etc.," however, you far diverge from Rand in regard to. All malevolent; one could expect raised eyebrows upon mentioning enjoying any of those, most especially Mahler, who tended to be scorned. And Shostokovich (sp?), gasp (you didn't mention him, and maybe you don't like him, but he is 20th-century): I recall an extended argument one night trying to convince an Objectivist friend of mine that Shostokovich so much as qualified as music. This was the prevailing type of reponse I got on that subject. (I consider him one of the very great composers; Mahler also; Prokofiev and Stravinsky not quite as great but up there.)

Ellen

___

Edited December 28, 2006 by Ellen Stuttle

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael,

I would like to persuade you and David that one of his propositions that you quoted is incorrect. “The law of causality, which says that a thing must act in accordance with its nature, is the basis of all inductive reasoning.” The law of causality is a genre of the principle that a thing must act in accordance with its nature, but that principle is broader than the law of causality.

Stephen, I wish I had time at the moment carefully to think about what you wrote and to reply. I think I agree with what you said, but I'd have to think about it with some care. I believe I'd add that "a thing must act in accordance with its nature" is the basis beyond "identity" of all DEDUCTIVE reasoning. I'll give you a quick for instance (one which happened this very evening). I walk into the kitchen and see the pretzel jug at a certain angle, an angle at which I know it wasn't earlier and at which I know I did not place it. I deduce, not induce, that Larry has moved the pretzel jug (and hypothesize that he opened it to get a pretzel/pretzels). The basis of the deduction is that the pretzel jug cannot move without having been moved by an external source -- and that the only possible external source was guess who.

And re Galt's Speech, which John Dailey proposes as essential. MSK pointed to David Kelley's analysis of that speech. If Galt's Speech were to be taken as the "essential" statement of Objectivism, this would commit the Objectivist to long stretches of psychologizing opinionating on AR's part. Also to key points simply pronounced with no explaining, most importantly, her view of volition.

Ellen

___

[Judith]

Re Judith's comment:

Call me a philistine and a barbarian if you will, but most music written before 1875 bores me to death; I love the late Romantics and the 20th-Century composers like Rachmaninoff, Vaughan Williams, Prokofieff, Stravinsky, Mahler, etc.

If perchance you believe that this list indicates that your and Rand's musical tastes are similar, it does not. Rachmaninoff, very ok, granted. Vaughan Williams, I'm not sure about. I don't recall ever asking how she reacted to Vaughan Williams or if she'd even heard any of his music. I expect she would have liked at least some of it, if she heard it. Prokofiev, Stravinsky, Mahler, "etc.," however, you far diverge from Rand in regard to. All malevolent; one could expect raised eyebrows upon mentioning enjoying any of those, most especially Mahler, who tended to be scorned. And Shostokovich (sp?), gasp (you didn't mention him, and maybe you don't like him, but he is 20th-century): I recall an extended argument one night trying to convince an Objectivist friend of mine that Shostokovich so much as qualified as music. This was the prevailing type of reponse I got on that subject. (I consider him one of the very great composers; Mahler also; Prokofiev and Stravinsky not quite as great but up there.)

(*laugh*) Oh, I've no illusions on that point. In fact, I've sometimes thought that she probably had Stravinsky or Prokofieff in mind when she wrote that scene near the beginning of "Atlas Shrugged" when Dagny is walking home from work looking vainly for entertainment and sees the book in the window "The Vulture is Molting" and hears screeching sounds of a modern symphony. (In my more optimistic moments, I hope that Rand was thinking of one of the atonalists like Schoenberg or Webern.)

I was talking about my own tastes there, not Rand's or even necessarily Romanticism. While Rachmaninoff and Vaughan Williams arguably have one foot each in Romanticism and 20th Century, Prokofieff and Stravinsky are both pure 20th Century. Composers like Hanson are similarly one foot each, IMHO. I don't like Shostakovich. I can see why she might have considered Mahler malevolent, but he wrote some of the most ecstatic moment in music I've ever heard, and had I had an opportunity to discuss him with her, I'd have given her an argument on him. She may not have cared for Vaughan Williams once she learned of his interest in folk melodies and nationalism in music even if she did like what she heard, sad to say. And I certainly don't share her liking for light marches.

Judith

[Guyau]

Ellen, you remarked: "I think I agree with what you said, but I'd have to think about it with some care. I believe I'd add that 'a thing must act in accordance with its nature' is the basis beyond 'identity' of all DEDUCTIVE reasoning. I'll give you a quick for instance (one which happened this very evening). I walk into the kitchen and see the pretzel jug at a certain angle, an angle at which I know it wasn't earlier and at which I know I did not place it. I deduce, not induce, that Larry has moved the pretzel jug (and hypothesize that he opened it to get a pretzel/pretzels). The basis of the deduction is that the pretzel jug cannot move without having been moved by an external source -- and that the only possible external source was guess who."

I think you are correct to take "a thing acts in accordance with its nature" as a basis in some deductions, although I think it participates as a premise not as a logical axiom or rule of deductive inference. Let me think about it in application to one of Rand's simple examples.

It is the nature of leaves that they cannot freeze and burn at the same spot on the leaf at the same time.

This is a leaf burning.

This is a leaf not everywhere freezing.

The first premise is a case of the general principle that a thing acts in accordance with its nature. The second premise and the conclusion may rely on the principle implicitly for their meaning. But the principle that a thing acts in accordance with its nature does not seem to be a principle of the deductive inference itself. The general logical form of this deduction is

Not both A and B

B

Not A

This inference form relies on the fact that there are diverse things and that they are all subject to identity, but that is a more general form of the principle that existence is identity than that covered by the principle that every thing acts in accordance with its nature. This general form of the logical deduction allows the same inference where the topics are the identities of entities considered of themselves or considered with some attribute, not only entities considered with some action. I'll use the examples Rand used.

A leaf cannot be a stone at the same time.

This is a stone.

This is not a leaf.

A leaf cannot be all red and all green at the same time.

This leaf is all green.

This leaf is not red.

So in your inference about the pretzel jug being moved, I think the principle that a thing acts in accordance with its nature enters the deduction as in the case of the leaf not both freezing and burning. That is, the principle that a thing acts in accordance with its nature is exemplified in the first premise and in the background of the meaning of the second premise and the conclusion. But the truth conveyed to the conclusion from the premises is conveyed by a deductive inference that relies on more elementary facts concerning identity.

Pretzel jugs resting cannot change orientation and not be acted upon by an external torque.

This pretzel jug has changed orientation.

This pretzel jug has been acted upon by an external torque.

Stephen

Edited December 28, 2006 by Stephen Boydstun

[Ellen Stuttle]

I can see why she might have considered Mahler malevolent, but he wrote some of the most ecstatic moment in music I've ever heard, and had I had an opportunity to discuss him with her, I'd have given her an argument on him.

Lots of luck. Allan Blumenthal gave her "an argument on him" -- gently -- for years and got nowhere. I wonder what might have happened if someone had given her an argument vociferously. I expect that that person would soon have been excised from her presence. This reverts to a hypothetical you raised at one point along the lines of, What if someone had put his or her foot down and truly talked back? Almost the only cases I've heard of of people doing that on any subject were ones involving older, established intellectuals -- the two who come to mind are Isabel Patterson and Ludwig von Mises. Plus there was the incident Barbara reports wherein -- after a long session over some remarks Barbara had made regarding an early story of Ayn's, in the context of the fiction-writing seminar -- Barbara had at length in the wee hours said, "Ayn stop it!" and Ayn stopped it -- for awhile. I've never heard of anyone from within the Objectivist world talking back persistently from a stance of certainty -- except maybe Joan Blumenthal on painting. I don't know how heated Joan's various arguments with Ayn about painting became.

And I certainly don't share her liking for light marches.

Her "tiddlywinks" stuff. Some of that stuff I find physical torture; it jangles my nervous system. I can't stand it. When I start internally hearing it -- as I do start to do as soon as it's mentioned -- I then have to counteract by deliberately tracking some other composition to drive the "tiddlywinks" sound away. And if I hear that stuff played externally, my hands fly to my ears to cover them and my teeth start clenching. This isn't to say that it isn't good music of its type. But I personally can't take the type.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

Stephen, thanks for your analysis in post #34. I'm printing that out to save and ponder, along with the earlier post.

I think your qualification of my overstatement is right. I'd written, "I believe I'd add that 'a thing must act in accordance with its nature' is the basis beyond 'identity' of all DEDUCTIVE reasoning."

You replied:

I think you are correct to take "a thing acts in accordance with its nature" as a basis in SOME [emphasis added] deductions, although I think it participates as a premise not as a logical axiom or rule of deductive inference.

I also think you're right that "it participates as a premise not as a logical axiom or rule of deductive inference."

Likewise re your examples and your application to the pretzel jug scenario:

So in your inference about the pretzel jug being moved, I think the principle that a thing acts in accordance with its nature enters the deduction as in the case of the leaf not both freezing and burning. That is, the principle that a thing acts in accordance with its nature is exemplified in the first premise and in the background of the meaning of the second premise and the conclusion. But the truth conveyed to the conclusion from the premises is conveyed by a deductive inference that relies on more elementary facts concerning identity.

Pretzel jugs resting cannot change orientation and not be acted upon by an external torque.

This pretzel jug has changed orientation.

This pretzel jug has been acted upon by an external torque.

Ellen

___

[Jonathan]

Ellen wrote,

Jonathan, again, I love the way you express these things. Quite so, IMO.

Thank you, Ellen. :-)

Also, I don't think the description "romantic realism" properly applies to any form of art except novelistic. Torres and Kamhi discussed that; maybe someone has the references.

I think that that "someone" is you:

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...558_8.shtml#178

J

P.S. I think I might start calling "romantic realism" "volition-expressing realism," and the Objectivist notion of "naturalism" "lack-of-volition-expressing realism." I think it might make things much more clear, and less likely that people would confuse the terms with historical movements sharing the same names but not necessarily the same meanings. It would be pretty obvious right away when listening to music or looking at architecture and non-narrative paintings that "volition-expressing realism" vs "lack-of-volition-expressing realism" might not be an appropriate method of analyzing the art in question. In regard to paintings which include narrative, it would be more clear that ~some~ images could be analyzed according to Rand's system, but not very reliably.

[Judith]

I can see why she might have considered Mahler malevolent, but he wrote some of the most ecstatic moment in music I've ever heard, and had I had an opportunity to discuss him with her, I'd have given her an argument on him.

Lots of luck. Allan Blumenthal gave her "an argument on him" -- gently -- for years and got nowhere. I wonder what might have happened if someone had given her an argument vociferously. I expect that that person would soon have been excised from her presence. This reverts to a hypothetical you raised at one point along the lines of, What if someone had put his or her foot down and truly talked back? Almost the only cases I've heard of of people doing that on any subject were ones involving older, established intellectuals -- the two who come to mind are Isabel Patterson and Ludwig von Mises. Plus there was the incident Barbara reports wherein -- after a long session over some remarks Barbara had made regarding an early story of Ayn's, in the context of the fiction-writing seminar -- Barbara had at length in the wee hours said, "Ayn stop it!" and Ayn stopped it -- for awhile. I've never heard of anyone from within the Objectivist world talking back persistently from a stance of certainty -- except maybe Joan Blumenthal on painting. I don't know how heated Joan's various arguments with Ayn about painting became.

I wasn't thinking of a nasty argument -- more of a confident, cheerful argument -- but yes, definitely along the lines of my hypothetical; confident, cheerful, and definitely not about to be squashed by a self-made despot. But it's not the kind of thing I'd persist in with anyone; if they don't agree with my musical tastes, well then, to each his/her own. One discussion will do.

Devers Branden's encounter with her seemed to be along these lines, and it appeared to be successful. Devers actually bullied her successfully, from what I've read of the account (and I'm not saying I approve of that part of it); Ayn didn't know how to handle it.

Judith

Edited December 28, 2006 by Judith

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen wrote,

Also, I don't think the description "romantic realism" properly applies to any form of art except novelistic. [i should have said "narrative" rather than "novelistic," since it could be a literary form other than a novel, for instance a narrative poem or a film script.] Torres and Kamhi discussed that; maybe someone has the references.

I think that that "someone" is you:

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...558_8.shtml#178

That was last year about this time during the somewhat bizarre esthetics discussion which developed. And Newberry capped the whole thing by doing that "Three Crybabies" painting -- which Ciro later purchased for his new restaurant. I chuckle every now and then at having been implicated in the inspiration for that visual pun. And I like the painting, so even though it involved a slam at you and me and Rich, I'm glad to have been of service to the muse.

P.S. I think I might start calling "romantic realism" "volition-expressing realism," and the Objectivist notion of "naturalism" "lack-of-volition-expressing realism." I think it might make things much more clear, and less likely that people would confuse the terms with historical movements sharing the same names but not necessarily the same meanings. It would be pretty obvious right away when listening to music or looking at architecture and non-narrative paintings that "volition-expressing realism" vs "lack-of-volition-expressing realism" might not be an appropriate method of analyzing the art in question. In regard to paintings which include narrative, it would be more clear that ~some~ images could be analyzed according to Rand's system, but not very reliably.

I applaud the ploy.

Ellen

___

[Jonathan]

That was last year about this time during the somewhat bizarre esthetics discussion which developed. And Newberry capped the whole thing by doing that "Three Crybabies" painting -- which Ciro later purchased for his new restaurant. I chuckle every now and then at having been implicated in the inspiration for that visual pun. And I like the painting, so even though it involved a slam at you and me and Rich, I'm glad to have been of service to the muse.

I liked Newberry's drawing and the implied slam so much, as well as his also having been inspired by his affection for Hong Z. and George C., that I came pretty close to buying it.

I was happy that Jon Letendre identified Rich, and not you or me, as the unstable onion about to fall off the bowl's edge. :-)

J

Edited December 29, 2006 by Jonathan

[Chris Grieb]

When the Sense of Life was being put together Michael Paxton listened to some of the tiddly wink music and he found it awful.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

On tiddly wink music (the bad beer barrel marches), try having to play the trombone part of the stuff.

Uhg.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

On tiddly wink music (the bad beer barrel marches), try having to play the trombone part of the stuff.

Uhg.

Michael

That would be sufficient incentive to suicide. B)

Uhg, indeed.

Ellen

___

[Ellen Stuttle]

I liked Newberry's drawing and the implied slam so much, as well as his also having been inspired by his affection for Hong Z. and George C., that I came pretty close to buying it.

I hope not for the sake of tearing it up. Just kidding. It is a lovely drawing, and I was fascinated by seeing artistic transformation of experience in process. Also, something you might have forgotten: I'd earlier in the list described the Joan Mitchell Blumenthal "Pink Foil" watercolor we have in our living room. That has a drape of tapestry coming down from the left side, a center arrangement of three pears, one on a pewter-looking plate and one to each side, plus a sprig of evergreen. The arrangement has a similarity, with different elements, and the drape from the other side, to his drawing. I've wondered if the description triggered something, maybe without his even knowing it had.

I was happy that Jon Letendre identified Rich, and not you or me, as the unstable onion about to fall off the bowl's edge. :-)

J

I was entertained that Jon Letendre was getting so wrapped up in the discussion. He said that usually he'd have been ignoring a discussion about art. Maybe it was the nudes in the Capulettis. ;-)

E-

___

Edited December 29, 2006 by Ellen Stuttle

[Chris Grieb]

Michael; Your comment makes me glad I don't play an instrument.

[John Dailey]

~ If we can get back to the, er, 'essentialness' of this thread...

~ A few have criticized *my* committment to *my* definition of the 'essentials' of O'ism (being Galt's speech), and only 1 of such (out of all the tangential subjects introduced) attempted a...refinement: MSK, re preferring Kelly's pronouncements. --- I have no prob with the latter, so far (other than I suspect an innuendo as a 'replacement' rather than an 'adjunct'), but...can no one, yet, specifically 'replace' my criterion...with a BETTER ONE?

~ To be sure, Ms. Stuttle criticised Galt's speech re several points (implying inherent probs with accepting Rand's philosophy, as presented therein.) I'm not interested in debating specifics of the speech per se (though I'm willing elsewhere.) Such is not relevent to what I started this thread about. If you disagree that that speech is NON-'essential', ok; then...what do *you* see as THE essential, established, unequivocal, tenets of O'ism...and, in such case...why?

LLAP

J:D

[John Dailey]

Addendum:

~ For those ostensibly interested in "O-ism"...for whatever reasons...this simple question about one's views on what the 'essentials' of it are, really shouldn't be that difficult to spell out; especially for those who've read this thread and responded already (excepting MSK ).

~ C'mon peoples; show some thoughts.

LLAP

J:D

[Guyau]

John,

The essentials of the essentials of the essentials of the essentials gets one to the standing-on-one-foot essentials of a theory. So for relativity, special and general, one gets the standing-on-one-foot essentials: frame-invariance of the form of physical laws, frame-invariance of a finite upper limit of velocity, and the equivalence of gravitational and inertial mass. For the standing-on-one-foot essentials of the philosophy of Epicurus, one gets: don't worry, pursue modest pleasure.

But for a statement of the essentials of these theories back at the first level, before the distillations of the distillations of the distillations suitable for the standing-on-one-foot characterization, one should turn to books such as Wolfgang Rindler's Essential Relativity or Eugene O'Connor's The Essential Epicurus. At this level, in my judgment, the essentials of Rand's philosophy Objectivism are what is included in Leonard Peikoff's book Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand. Rand approved the lecture series (1976) from which this book was composed as the straight statement of her philosophy. I heard that lecture series in 1977. I took 53 pages of notes during the lectures. Peikoff remained true to the lectures in his book. He couldn't include everything from the lectures, but he did very well at selecting what was essential to present in a book-length basic statement of Rand's philosophy.

Rand rightly did not say that Peikoff's lecture series (and the anticipated book to be based on them) was the only possible correct systematic presentation of her philosophy. Other books can be written on The Essential Objectivism, and their authors can argue from Rand's own philosophic writings that theirs is a correct statement of her philosophy and a correct identification of what is essential to her philosophy and what is not.

Stephen

Edited August 12, 2007 by Stephen Boydstun

[John Dailey]

Stephen:

~ Thanx for responding, but, I really wasn't asking about 'how' to 'essentialize' essentials of the essentials of 'X', to the point of trying to summarize a Cliff's Notes of it in a single sentence, nm in Rand's famous way.

~ A-l-l I've been asking for, GIVEN EVERYONE'S CHRONIC TALK ABOUT 'ESSENTIALS/FUNDAMENTALS', is for such, who chronically talk about 'the essentials of O-ism' to s-p-e-l-l out (and NOT say "see book 'X' as THE adjunct to what Rand said") what they're referring to, since clearly, QUITE CLEARLY, not all who use these terms 'essential/fundamental' really mean the same thing as others.

~ The prob I'm talking about, as I've spelled out, is the way EVERYONE uses the term 'fairness": EVERYONE agrees about its worth; no one agrees about what it consists of.

LLAP

J:D

Edited August 14, 2007 by John Dailey

[studiodekadent]

~ A-l-l I've been asking for, GIVEN EVERYONE'S CHRONIC TALK ABOUT 'ESSENTIALS/FUNDAMENTALS', is for such, who chronically talk about 'the essentials of O-ism' to s-p-e-l-l out (and NOT say "see book 'X' as THE adjunct to what Rand said") what they're referring to, since clearly, QUITE CLEARLY, not all who use these terms 'essential/fundamental' really mean the same thing as others.

Well the problem with actually defining the essentials of Objectivism is that the task of identifying the essentials is very, very difficult!

First, we have to take every philosophy, then list their tenets, then take the ones that are unique to Ayn Rand. First off, Rand herself may not have said any one point that was FULLY unique (i.e. no one has ever advocated it before)(except possibly her Metaethics... I know no philosopher that advanced a metaethical theory similar to hers, except possibly Aristotle, but the implications of Aristotle's epistemology (which would include intrinsic functions and deny premoral choice) seem to point away from Rand), so it will be a set of points that Rand advocated as an integrated set. This set of points must be absolutely unique to Objectivism but must only include that which is needed to make it unique (i.e. nothing else, no more and no less).

I am not in a position to define this list, however I think some of the points Rand made that are very rare in the history of philosophy and hence a good place to start would be (in no order):

-Metaphysical Objectivism (eliminating Platonists, mystics and other fruit loops)

-Atheism (eliminating a lot)

-Direct realism in perception (kills off all Kantians and Kant-Derivatives)

-Rejecting both realism and nominalism in the problem of universals (which basically eliminates almost all epistemologists except Locke and Abelard... it eliminates all Platonists, moderate realists including Aristotle and Aquinas, and all nominalists)

-Explicit rejection of (Comtean) altruism (kills off a lot of ethicists)

-Rand's metaethical argument (kills off basically everyone except herself)

-Endorsement of natural rights that exist prior to the State (excludes basically everyone except Locke and possibly Kant (Kant himself was a political individualist, regardless of the statism of his intellectual progeny))

-Classical Liberal (aka. Libertarian) politics

Note, this is a starting point rather than an intended catechism. Basically this is two points in Metaethics, Epistemology, Ethics and Politics. However you can also include points regarding Meta-anthropology (Human Nature), although whether these are necessary to differentiate Objectivism from everything else is another debate (as I said, one can argue that Rand's metaethics are unique... those alone would differentiate an Objectivist argument from any other philosophical perspective).

As for meta-anthropology, I would say the most vital point there is

-cognitive free will (control over ones beliefs and level of rationality)

This implies free will in the broader sense. I have had a number of debates on the subject where my interlocutor conceded that if I prove cognitive free will, I prove all free will.

So, if I may advance, these nine points would form at least a good starting point:

-Metaphysical Objectivism (eliminating Platonists, mystics and other fruit loops)

-Atheism (eliminating a lot)

-Direct realism in perception (kills off all Kantians and Kant-Derivatives)

-Rejecting both realism and nominalism in the problem of universals (which basically eliminates almost all epistemologists except Locke and Abelard... it eliminates all Platonists, moderate realists including Aristotle and Aquinas, and all nominalists)

-cognitive free will (control over ones beliefs and level of rationality)(eliminates all determinists)

-Explicit rejection of (Comtean) altruism (kills off a lot of ethicists)

-Rand's metaethical argument (kills off basically everyone except herself)

-Endorsement of natural rights that exist prior to the State (excludes basically everyone except Locke and possibly Kant (Kant himself was a political individualist, regardless of the statism of his intellectual progeny))

-Classical Liberal (aka. Libertarian) politics