Myth of the Tyranny of the Majority

[Francisco Ferrer]

There is no reason to accept either property rights violation or the legal power to violate property rights as a necessary fact of man's existence. In the 1850's slavery was an institution firmly established in American law and custom. A decade later it was was gone. It disappeared in large part as a result of people who refused to accept it as an "unfortunate reality."

I think that there are a few good reasons to accept the power of states to tax and violate property rights as a necessary fact of man's existence. While there are many states throughout history that did not allow slavery, there are no states that did not have the power to tax and violate property rights. Now, this alone does not prove my point, but it is evidence for it when you consider why no state in history did not have such power.

A state requires people to support it if it is to continue to exist. People will not support a state if they think they can form a new state that gives them more benefits than the old one. If a state did not have the power to tax, and instead relied on voluntary donations, it would not be able to reward its supporters better than a state that did have the power to tax and violate property rights.

Hence, if at any point in history, some head of state relinquished his power to tax, immediately his supporters would turn from him and replace (and probably kill) him with a head of state that would tax and violate the property rights of the weak.

Nations without slavery are entirely a modern phenomenon. Even within the British Isles slavery existed in the form of serfs attached to the land, and slavery was common throughout the empire until 1833.

As for nations without taxation, there is in fact precedent for that. See "Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case."

Do courts and police and armies require support of the people? Of course. So do shoe stores, but somehow shoe stores manage to survive and prosper without anyone be forced to support them.

Will some non-productive people shop around for the state that gives them the most benefits? Sure. We see that now in certain Western democracies. On the other hand, productive people will undoubtedly shop for a state that robs them the least. In this context, I have hope for the free nation movement. Will the moochers be stronger than the producers? In the long run, no, due to what's called a "brain drain."

The community itself. Mutual defense based on the premise that the initiation of force is evil would require a widespread respect for and cherishing of property rights. This would, of course, necessitate much prior educational-intellectual groundwork. (Ayn Rand repeatedly reminded us that the philosophical battle must precede the political battle.) But ultimately we might end up with something quite similar to what the Founding Fathers had in mind, not a standing army, but a well-armed citizenry.

A well-armed citizenry is not an army. They cannot devote all of their time to training, preparing, and, most importantly, organizing themselves for war.

An organized military force could easily overwhelm a well-armed citizenry by conquering them piecemeal. Unlike a unified and organized army, a well-armed citizenry faces a "Belling the Cat" problem when it comes to defending their allies. Each citizen can gain little from defending anybody who the army attacks, but faces enormous costs if he decides to help out, even if they win. Furthermore, they are all well aware of their conundrum, so any citizen that the army attacks usually cannot count on the support of other citizens, and simply surrenders. Thus, an army could conquer the citizens simply by threatening to do so.

Indeed, this "belling the cat" problem perfectly explains why popular revolutions against tyranny are so rare.

The example of Switzerland disproves your claim. Only about five percent of the military in that country are full-time professional soldiers.

This plan would work perfectly in any society where there are no altruists. However, in a diverse population it is not hard to imagine that there would be at least one self-sacrificing do-gooder who would propose the bill in order that his comrades gain a higher portion of the total amount of private wealth in the land, either through the payoff or the threat that backs up the bribe request.

I am glad that we can agree that the plan would work perfectly in a society without any "do-gooders". However, I think that there is a way for the producer to win even when there are "do-gooders". All he has to do is make a slight modification to his offer..

Suppose that the producer make the following offer, "If a parasite proposes a tax bill, then I will give everyone an equal share of the money that would be taxed if the bill were to pass, but only if the bill fails. However, if a do-gooder proposes a tax bill, then I will give one dollar more than what they can expect to gain from the bill to any parasite that votes against the bill".

Suppose that a parasite proposes a tax bill. Then, all the do-gooders vote against it, because everyone would get even more than they could with the tax bill. The producer also votes against it, breaking the tie, and failing the bill. He also gives everyone an equal share of the money.

Suppose that a do-gooder proposes a tax bill. Then, all the parasites vote against it, because the producer has promised them more than they could get if the wealth was distributed over a greater number of people. The producer also votes against it, breaking the tie, and failing the bill. He gives to each parasite that voted against it the money he promised them.

Thus, the parasites can get nothing if they propose the bill, and a lot if the do-gooders do. So they never propose the bill. The do-gooders get a more equal distribution of wealth, but only if a parasite proposes the bill. So they never propose the bill either.

Once again, a tax bill is never proposed, and the producer gets to keep everything he produces.

I think this example illustrates my original point quite well. No matter what the parasites do, because the producer starts the game with more resources and can make credible commitments about his use of those resources, he is always able to out-maneuver the parasites.

I do not know how on the surface one can distinguish between a parasite and a do-gooder. Nor do I wish to do away with the secret ballot only to find, too late, that the average parasite does not trust rich guys offering bribe money.

When that happens the corporation is no longer acting as a player in the free market but as a partner with and a part of the state.

By comparison consider this exchange:

X: Aren't you worried about the power that churches have?

Y: What power?

X: Well, churches could always take over the Congress and have a law passed to round up all the non-believers and make them convert or else be burned at the stake.

Y: I see what you mean. Churches are a real threat to freedom.

Economic organizations, such as corporations, are never acting solely as ordinary participants in markets. They are always, almost as if by a law of nature, "a partner with and a part of the state." This is true for very similar reasons to the ones I used above to explain why states necessarily interfere with markets.

I do not know what you are talking about. My family has operated a successful corporation for over 40 years, and other than filing the necessary forms mandated under penalty of law, they have had nothing to do with the state.

Additionally, your example is a really bad one because it describes a very plausible scenario. Churches could have an enormous hold over secular governments. Indeed, for centuries in Europe, they did exactly that. Indeed, to a quite significant extent, they still do today.

The only reason they don't have a greater say is because the corporate elite have pushed them off to the margins.

If you fear either the church or the corporation (or men or rich people or whatever) having too much state power, then the solution is to put a collar on the state, not on the church or corporation.

[SoAMadDeathWish]

Nations without slavery are entirely a modern phenomenon. Even within the British Isles slavery existed in the form of serfs attached to the land, and slavery was common throughout the empire until 1833.

As for nations without taxation, there is in fact precedent for that. See "Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case."

Do courts and police and armies require support of the people? Of course. So do shoe stores, but somehow shoe stores manage to survive and prosper without anyone be forced to support them.

It is untrue that the Icelandic Free State did not have taxation. That's because, as a feudal society, people still owed tithes and military service to their lords.

I did not say that states cannot survive without taxation, but that they cannot survive without their supporters. However, in order to retain those supporters better than any competing group, a state needs to tax the general population in order to buy the loyalty of those supporters.

The only reason that shoe stores don't tax people is because they can't.

Will some non-productive people shop around for the state that gives them the most benefits? Sure. We see that now in certain Western democracies. On the other hand, productive people will undoubtedly shop for a state that robs them the least. In this context, I have hope for the free nation movement. Will the moochers be stronger than the producers? In the long run, no, due to what's called a "brain drain."

There are no inherently "productive" or "non-productive" people. A person is productive or unproductive to the extent that he chooses to be. A person could be a producer one day and a looter the next and then go back to being a producer the day after that. Anyone can produce with one hand and steal with the other. In fact, most people do.

What motivates a person to do one or the other depends on the opportunities available to him. If you took today's producers and put them in power, they would most certainly become tomorrow's looters. Meanwhile, the old looters would become liberty's new champions.

The example of Switzerland disproves your claim. Only about five percent of the military in that country are full-time professional soldiers.

What claim does it disprove and how? Only a very small percentage of the military are "full-time professional soldiers" in pretty much any country.

I do not know how on the surface one can distinguish between a parasite and a do-gooder. Nor do I wish to do away with the secret ballot only to find, too late, that the average parasite does not trust rich guys offering bribe money.

Even if you can't distinguish between the parasites and the do-gooders, it's still possible to create a deal whereby a producer would always get his way, just as I showed that it is possible even when the ballot is secret in my response to one of DeanGore's posts.

The parasites might not trust the rich guy, but they certainly do trust his money. Remember, we've already established that the rich guy will face severe negative consequences if he fails to hold up his end of the bargain.

I do not know what you are talking about. My family has operated a successful corporation for over 40 years, and other than filing the necessary forms mandated under penalty of law, they have had nothing to do with the state.

That's only because the smaller players are kept out of the loop by the largest and wealthiest corporations.

If you fear either the church or the corporation (or men or rich people or whatever) having too much state power, then the solution is to put a collar on the state, not on the church or corporation.

The original issue was not how to reign in corporate power. If you recall, it was whether or not they have power of their own that is independent of the state (and not state power).

How one might or might not limit that power necessarily concedes the point. So do you still disagree that corporations and churches have power of their own independently of the state?

[Brant Gaede]

Do you reign in power using reigns?

--Brant

[Francisco Ferrer]

Nations without slavery are entirely a modern phenomenon. Even within the British Isles slavery existed in the form of serfs attached to the land, and slavery was common throughout the empire until 1833.

As for nations without taxation, there is in fact precedent for that. See "Private Creation and Enforcement of Law: A Historical Case."

Do courts and police and armies require support of the people? Of course. So do shoe stores, but somehow shoe stores manage to survive and prosper without anyone be forced to support them.

It is untrue that the Icelandic Free State did not have taxation. That's because, as a feudal society, people still owed tithes and military service to their lords.

I did not say that states cannot survive without taxation, but that they cannot survive without their supporters. However, in order to retain those supporters better than any competing group, a state needs to tax the general population in order to buy the loyalty of those supporters.

The only reason that shoe stores don't tax people is because they can't.

Read the link I provided. "As in Norway (before Harald) there was nothing corresponding to a strictly feudal bond. The relationship between the Icelandic godi and his thingmen (thingmenn) was contractual, as in early feudal relationships, but it was not territorial; the godi had no claim to the thingman's land and the thingman was free to transfer his allegiance."

If states cannot survive without supporters, that is a good thing. "Whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it."

A system of wealth redistribution through taxation will work only as long as the majority of the population thinks the existing state is necessary to their well being. Once that myth crumbles, then the state collapses, just as it did during the American Revolution.

Even if dissidents form less than a majority, they can bring down the state. If a third of all people stopped paying their taxes, the revenues from the remaining payers would be insufficient to impose enforcement on the outlaws.

When statism reaches a critical point in America, people will pack it up or increasingly conduct their business offshore or in the underground economy. We can see signs of that already.

Will some non-productive people shop around for the state that gives them the most benefits? Sure. We see that now in certain Western democracies. On the other hand, productive people will undoubtedly shop for a state that robs them the least. In this context, I have hope for the free nation movement. Will the moochers be stronger than the producers? In the long run, no, due to what's called a "brain drain."

There are no inherently "productive" or "non-productive" people. A person is productive or unproductive to the extent that he chooses to be. A person could be a producer one day and a looter the next and then go back to being a producer the day after that. Anyone can produce with one hand and steal with the other. In fact, most people do.

What motivates a person to do one or the other depends on the opportunities available to him. If you took today's producers and put them in power, they would most certainly become tomorrow's looters. Meanwhile, the old looters would become liberty's new champions.

That productivity or non-productivity is not an inherent characteristic of human beings is an enormously fascinating datum and is of absolutely no relevance to my point that people who are heavily looted by the state will be motivated to move to where they are less looted. That is why U.S. states with high taxes are driving residents and businesses to states with lower taxes.

The example of Switzerland disproves your claim. Only about five percent of the military in that country are full-time professional soldiers.

What claim does it disprove and how? Only a very small percentage of the military are "full-time professional soldiers" in pretty much any country.

In Post #149 you wrote, "A well-armed citizenry is not an army. They cannot devote all of their time to training, preparing, and, most importantly, organizing themselves for war." The example of Switzerland disproves this. Ninety-five percent of its soldiers do not daily wear uniforms, live on bases, and march back and forth on parade grounds. Contrary to your claim, here is a successful national defense in which the defenders do not "devote all of their time to training" but have full-time non-military jobs. They are citizens who live civilian lives but who also own guns and can be called up in an emergency to serve.

If you think this resembles the regular U.S. Army, then talk to an enlistee.

By the way, it would help the discussion greatly if you would keep what you have written previously in mind when you post something new.

I do not know how on the surface one can distinguish between a parasite and a do-gooder. Nor do I wish to do away with the secret ballot only to find, too late, that the average parasite does not trust rich guys offering bribe money.

Even if you can't distinguish between the parasites and the do-gooders, it's still possible to create a deal whereby a producer would always get his way, just as I showed that it is possible even when the ballot is secret in my response to one of DeanGore's posts.

The parasites might not trust the rich guy, but they certainly do trust his money. Remember, we've already established that the rich guy will face severe negative consequences if he fails to hold up his end of the bargain.

Your plan may work perfectly--or not. Envy plays a large role in the success of government wealth redistribution plans. Many people are as much motivated by seeing a wealthy man brought low as by increasing their own income. More importantly, what you haven't dealt with at all is the downside of removing the secret ballot. In unscrupulous hands information about how a person voted can be used to punish or even eliminate one's enemies.

I'm sure Barack Obama is a swell guy, but I don't want him or the IRS knowing how I voted in the last three elections.

I do not know what you are talking about. My family has operated a successful corporation for over 40 years, and other than filing the necessary forms mandated under penalty of law, they have had nothing to do with the state.

That's only because the smaller players are kept out of the loop by the largest and wealthiest corporations.

Oh, so if some corporations are kept out of the loop, then what sense does the following statement make?

Economic organizations, such as corporations, are never acting solely as ordinary participants in markets. They are always, almost as if by a law of nature, "a partner with and a part of the state."

Your italics.

Again, keep what you have written previously in mind when you post something new.

If you fear either the church or the corporation (or men or rich people or whatever) having too much state power, then the solution is to put a collar on the state, not on the church or corporation.

The original issue was not how to reign in corporate power. If you recall, it was whether or not they have power of their own that is independent of the state (and not state power).

In Post #85, I wrote, "If our goal is to protect individual rights, then the first step should be to de-fang and de-claw the institution that is the single greatest violator of personal and property rights, the state."

You responded, in #87: "That's easier said than done. The state and anybody who has an interest in maintaining the status quo, including most of the biggest corporations, (essentially, the most powerful people and organizations in the country) aren't just gonna sit back and let that happen."

So I'll continue to point out that if you are disturbed by the status quo of corporate power, then you should focus your attention on what aspect of the state makes it repellent when corporations (or churches or Masons or rich white guys) take control. It is the total state itself that is the problem, not what particular angels or devils control it.

How one might or might not limit that power necessarily concedes the point. So do you still disagree that corporations and churches have power of their own independently of the state?

Unlike some libertarians, I'm not opposed to authority per se, only to authority that is achieved through coercion. Every society benefits from leadership structures of some sort. Those hierarchies could be religious, fraternal or corporate. The key factor is that they rest ultimately on the consent of the individual members of society.

[dldelancey]

I think that there are a few good reasons to accept the power of states to tax and violate property rights as a necessary fact of man's existence. While there are many states throughout history that did not allow slavery, there are no states that did not have the power to tax and violate property rights. Now, this alone does not prove my point, but it is evidence for it when you consider why no state in history did not have such power.

Neither Texas nor Tennessee's constitutions allow an individual income tax, so yes there are states that do not have that power.

Edited to add: I'm aware the term "state" is used broadly, and not necessarily to refer specifically to geographic entities of the USA. I'm only pointing out that there are governments that operate without the power to levy income tax.

[tmj]

Naomi in #152 said

"A person could be a producer one day and a looter the next and then go back to being a producer the day after that. Anyone can produce with one hand and steal with the other. In fact, most people do."

If most people do, then a police state is what we(the minority) need.

[Brant Gaede]

It's just mixed economyism.

--Brant

what "most people do" is defined into and out of a truthful statement by expanding and contracting sundry definitions so it's incumbent to define your terms to rationally support your proposition instead of just stating it as an empirically derived truth (this is more important when you say "most" instead of "many")

[SoAMadDeathWish]

Read the link I provided. "As in Norway (before Harald) there was nothing corresponding to a strictly feudal bond. The relationship between the Icelandic godi and his thingmen (thingmenn) was contractual, as in early feudal relationships, but it was not territorial; the godi had no claim to the thingman's land and the thingman was free to transfer his allegiance."

Not everyone was a "thingmenn". In fact, many people were slaves. Every feudal society had "free-men" who lived in towns, but they also had serfs who owed tithes to their lords. Additionally, even the thingmenn had to pay a tithe by the 1100's.

If states cannot survive without supporters, that is a good thing. "Whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it."

A system of wealth redistribution through taxation will work only as long as the majority of the population thinks the existing state is necessary to their well being. Once that myth crumbles, then the state collapses, just as it did during the American Revolution.

Even if dissidents form less than a majority, they can bring down the state. If a third of all people stopped paying their taxes, the revenues from the remaining payers would be insufficient to impose enforcement on the outlaws.

When statism reaches a critical point in America, people will pack it up or increasingly conduct their business offshore or in the underground economy. We can see signs of that already.

A state will continue to exist so long as the people who hold the "keys to the kingdom" think no alternative state could do better, regardless of what the majority of the people think or want. That's the whole point of having power, you can do things even if everybody else doesn't want you to.

No state collapsed during the American Revolution. Rather, the revolutionaries figured out that they could do better for themselves by becoming independent of Great Britain and forming their own state. Thus, rather than them having to pay taxes to the king and getting nothing for it (the king did not need their support to stay in power so they always got the short end of the stick in British politics), they would now levy their own taxes on the population and give that money to themselves. In fact, this is pretty much what the Whiskey Rebellion was about. As for people choosing not to pay their taxes, one can see what would happen even in the earliest days of the republic from this example. Today, with the advent of deficit spending, even if people didn't pay their taxes, the government would still have enough funding to suppress any internal rebellion.

That productivity or non-productivity is not an inherent characteristic of human beings is an enormously fascinating datum and is of absolutely no relevance to my point that people who are heavily looted by the state will be motivated to move to where they are less looted. That is why U.S. states with high taxes are driving residents and businesses to states with lower taxes.

So? That doesn't contradict my claim that there are no states that don't tax. Just because some states tax less than others, doesn't mean that there will be any states that don't tax at all.

In Post #149 you wrote, "A well-armed citizenry is not an army. They cannot devote all of their time to training, preparing, and, most importantly, organizing themselves for war." The example of Switzerland disproves this. Ninety-five percent of its soldiers do not daily wear uniforms, live on bases, and march back and forth on parade grounds. Contrary to your claim, here is a successful national defense in which the defenders do not "devote all of their time to training" but have full-time non-military jobs. They are citizens who live civilian lives but who also own guns and can be called up in an emergency to serve.

If you think this resembles the regular U.S. Army, then talk to an enlistee.

By the way, it would help the discussion greatly if you would keep what you have written previously in mind when you post something new.

Consider carefully what I said. I said that "a well-armed citizenry... cannot devote all of their time to preparing for war". By contrast, then, that implies that an army can but nowhere did I say that they necessarily will.

An army might or might not call upon all of its resources to prepare for war, but a citizenry couldn't even if it wanted to, unless it became an army first. They have to spend a great deal of their time just doing their civilian jobs.

Your plan may work perfectly--or not. Envy plays a large role in the success of government wealth redistribution plans. Many people are as much motivated by seeing a wealthy man brought low as by increasing their own income. More importantly, what you haven't dealt with at all is the downside of removing the secret ballot. In unscrupulous hands information about how a person voted can be used to punish or even eliminate one's enemies.

I'm sure Barack Obama is a swell guy, but I don't want him or the IRS knowing how I voted in the last three elections.

I can come up with a winning strategy for the producer even if everyone wants to see him burn and where the ballot is secret, if you like. The producer can overcome any obstacle you put in his way by being just a bit more clever than you give him credit for.

Oh, so if some corporations are kept out of the loop, then what sense does the following statement make?

Economic organizations, such as corporations, are never acting solely as ordinary participants in markets. They are always, almost as if by a law of nature, "a partner with and a part of the state."

Your italics.

Again, keep what you have written previously in mind when you post something new.

*ahem*... Ok, I may have overstated that a bit.

What I meant to say is that the largest and wealthiest corporations are pretty much always in cahoots with the state. And if they weren't, then the others would be.

In Post #85, I wrote, "If our goal is to protect individual rights, then the first step should be to de-fang and de-claw the institution that is the single greatest violator of personal and property rights, the state."

You responded, in #87: "That's easier said than done. The state and anybody who has an interest in maintaining the status quo, including most of the biggest corporations, (essentially, the most powerful people and organizations in the country) aren't just gonna sit back and let that happen."

So I'll continue to point out that if you are disturbed by the status quo of corporate power, then you should focus your attention on what aspect of the state makes it repellent when corporations (or churches or Masons or rich white guys) take control. It is the total state itself that is the problem, not what particular angels or devils control it.

It's not that I'm "disturbed" by corporate power. It's that corporate power is one of those unfortunate realities that isn't going away any time soon and that we can't just ignore. So if you want to, as you say, "de-fang and de-claw" the state, you do have to accept that this is a nearly hopeless endeavor due to the enormous power that corporations wield and their vested interests in the state.

[SoAMadDeathWish]

I think that there are a few good reasons to accept the power of states to tax and violate property rights as a necessary fact of man's existence. While there are many states throughout history that did not allow slavery, there are no states that did not have the power to tax and violate property rights. Now, this alone does not prove my point, but it is evidence for it when you consider why no state in history did not have such power.

Neither Texas nor Tennessee's constitutions allow an individual income tax, so yes there are states that do not have that power.

Edited to add: I'm aware the term "state" is used broadly, and not necessarily to refer specifically to geographic entities of the USA. I'm only pointing out that there are governments that operate without the power to levy income tax.

But I did not say that there are no states that don't have an income tax. I said that there are no states that don't have taxes, period. For example, the Roman Empire did not levy an income tax, and only collected a 3% tax on assets. This might sound good, but if those assets only generated a 5% return, then a 3% tax on them would effectively be an oppressive 60% tax on income.

[Francisco Ferrer]

Read the link I provided. "As in Norway (before Harald) there was nothing corresponding to a strictly feudal bond. The relationship between the Icelandic godi and his thingmen (thingmenn) was contractual, as in early feudal relationships, but it was not territorial; the godi had no claim to the thingman's land and the thingman was free to transfer his allegiance."

Not everyone was a "thingmenn". In fact, many people were slaves. Every feudal society had "free-men" who lived in towns, but they also had serfs who owed tithes to their lords. Additionally, even the thingmenn had to pay a tithe by the 1100's.

First of all, as evil as slavery is, it did not figure prominently in Icelandic society. In Viking Age Iceland, Jesse Byock points out that slavery was simply not economical in the higher latitudes: "In Iceland with its mixed economy of coastal hunting, gathering and fishing, and inland livestock farming, the efficient use of slave labor was not possible."

More importantly, the existence of slavery in Iceland is completely irrelevant to the point I made in Post #15l: the non-coercive creation and enforcement of law in that country. The Icelandic people were able to develop and live under a legal system that did not require forcible financing. Slavery had nothing to do with that system.

If states cannot survive without supporters, that is a good thing. "Whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it."

A system of wealth redistribution through taxation will work only as long as the majority of the population thinks the existing state is necessary to their well being. Once that myth crumbles, then the state collapses, just as it did during the American Revolution.

Even if dissidents form less than a majority, they can bring down the state. If a third of all people stopped paying their taxes, the revenues from the remaining payers would be insufficient to impose enforcement on the outlaws.

When statism reaches a critical point in America, people will pack it up or increasingly conduct their business offshore or in the underground economy. We can see signs of that already.

A state will continue to exist so long as the people who hold the "keys to the kingdom" think no alternative state could do better, regardless of what the majority of the people think or want. That's the whole point of having power, you can do things even if everybody else doesn't want you to.

If majorities did not matter, the Communist Party would still be in power in Poland, Hungary and East Germany.

No state collapsed during the American Revolution. Rather, the revolutionaries figured out that they could do better for themselves by becoming independent of Great Britain and forming their own state. Thus, rather than them having to pay taxes to the king and getting nothing for it (the king did not need their support to stay in power so they always got the short end of the stick in British politics), they would now levy their own taxes on the population and give that money to themselves. In fact, this is pretty much what the Whiskey Rebellion was about. As for people choosing not to pay their taxes, one can see what would happen even in the earliest days of the republic from this example. Today, with the advent of deficit spending, even if people didn't pay their taxes, the government would still have enough funding to suppress any internal rebellion.

I agree and on that basis call for abolishing all U.S. taxes and financing our less than frugal federal government entirely from credit.

That productivity or non-productivity is not an inherent characteristic of human beings is an enormously fascinating datum and is of absolutely no relevance to my point that people who are heavily looted by the state will be motivated to move to where they are less looted. That is why U.S. states with high taxes are driving residents and businesses to states with lower taxes.

So? That doesn't contradict my claim that there are no states that don't tax. Just because some states tax less than others, doesn't mean that there will be any states that don't tax at all.

Try to keep up with the thread, or else don't comment. In response to your suggestion that people will seek the state that gives the most loot, I wrote Post #151, "Will some non-productive people shop around for the state that gives them the most benefits? Sure. We see that now in certain Western democracies. On the other hand, productive people will undoubtedly shop for a state that robs them the least. In this context, I have hope for the free nation movement. Will the moochers be stronger than the producers? In the long run, no, due to what's called a 'brain drain.'"

Your non sequitur was, "There are no inherently 'productive' or 'non-productive' people. A person is productive or unproductive to the extent that he chooses to be. A person could be a producer one day and a looter the next and then go back to being a producer the day after that. Anyone can produce with one hand and steal with the other. In fact, most people do."

I then pointed out that your observation about inherent productivity is of no relevance to my point that productive people will move to where they are less looted. It is fruitless for a state to attract thousands of new parasites if the productive people there flee the tax burden in large numbers. I never made the claim that there has to be a no tax state for overtaxed people to escape to.

Quote

In Post #149 you wrote, "A well-armed citizenry is not an army. They cannot devote all of their time to training, preparing, and, most importantly, organizing themselves for war." The example of Switzerland disproves this. Ninety-five percent of its soldiers do not daily wear uniforms, live on bases, and march back and forth on parade grounds. Contrary to your claim, here is a successful national defense in which the defenders do not "devote all of their time to training" but have full-time non-military jobs. They are citizens who live civilian lives but who also own guns and can be called up in an emergency to serve.

If you think this resembles the regular U.S. Army, then talk to an enlistee.

By the way, it would help the discussion greatly if you would keep what you have written previously in mind when you post something new.

Consider carefully what I said. I said that "a well-armed citizenry... cannot devote all of their time to preparing for war". By contrast, then, that implies that an army can but nowhere did I say that they necessarily will.

An army might or might not call upon all of its resources to prepare for war, but a citizenry couldn't even if it wanted to, unless it became an army first. They have to spend a great deal of their time just doing their civilian jobs.

I suppose your point is that Switzerland's national defense does not work. Yet you have several hundred years of historical fact contradicting you.

Your plan may work perfectly--or not. Envy plays a large role in the success of government wealth redistribution plans. Many people are as much motivated by seeing a wealthy man brought low as by increasing their own income. More importantly, what you haven't dealt with at all is the downside of removing the secret ballot. In unscrupulous hands information about how a person voted can be used to punish or even eliminate one's enemies.

I'm sure Barack Obama is a swell guy, but I don't want him or the IRS knowing how I voted in the last three elections.

I can come up with a winning strategy for the producer even if everyone wants to see him burn and where the ballot is secret, if you like. The producer can overcome any obstacle you put in his way by being just a bit more clever than you give him credit for.

Then go to it. The ballot is secret, and a more plausible strategy would be one that starts with present realities.

Oh, so if some corporations are kept out of the loop, then what sense does the following statement make?

Economic organizations, such as corporations, are never acting solely as ordinary participants in markets. They are always, almost as if by a law of nature, "a partner with and a part of the state."

Your italics.

Again, keep what you have written previously in mind when you post something new.

*ahem*... Ok, I may have overstated that a bit.

What I meant to say is that the largest and wealthiest corporations are pretty much always in cahoots with the state. And if they weren't, then the others would be.

Then the solution is, as I have said, to de-fang and de-claw the state so that it is not a weapon of special interests.

Quote

In Post #85, I wrote, "If our goal is to protect individual rights, then the first step should be to de-fang and de-claw the institution that is the single greatest violator of personal and property rights, the state."

You responded, in #87: "That's easier said than done. The state and anybody who has an interest in maintaining the status quo, including most of the biggest corporations, (essentially, the most powerful people and organizations in the country) aren't just gonna sit back and let that happen."

So I'll continue to point out that if you are disturbed by the status quo of corporate power, then you should focus your attention on what aspect of the state makes it repellent when corporations (or churches or Masons or rich white guys) take control. It is the total state itself that is the problem, not what particular angels or devils control it.

It's not that I'm "disturbed" by corporate power. It's that corporate power is one of those unfortunate realities that isn't going away any time soon and that we can't just ignore. So if you want to, as you say, "de-fang and de-claw" the state, you do have to accept that this is a nearly hopeless endeavor due to the enormous power that corporations wield and their vested interests in the state.

Let me see if I have this right. Corporate (political) power is an unfortunate reality that isn't going away any time soon.

How do you know this? Where is the expiration date written on corporate power's label? What crystal ball are you looking into?

People in Eastern Europe in the late 1970's had no inkling that the Berlin Wall would come down within ten years. Not even the CIA predicted it.

Yet you write with apparent certainty that there can be no fundamental change in crony capitalism in the foreseeable future. How would you know?

[Selene]

Francisco:

If the Icelandic period interests you, I would reccommend.

Njáls saga ( listen (help·info)) (also Njála ( listen (help·info)), Brennu-Njáls saga ( listen (help·info)) or "The Story of Burnt Njal") is one of the sagas of Icelanders. The most prominent characters are the friends Njáll Þorgeirsson,^[1] a lawyer and a sage, and Gunnar Hámundarson, a formidable warrior. In the course of a feud, Gunnarr is exiled and must leave Iceland but as he rides away from his home he is struck by the beauty of the land and resolves to stay; this quickly leads to his death. Some years later, Njál is burned alive in his home as a part of a cycle of killing and vengeance.

The saga deals with the process of blood feuds in the Icelandic Commonwealth, showing how the requirements of honor could lead to minor slights spiralling into destructive and prolonged bloodshed. Insults where a character's manhood is called into question are especially prominent and may reflect an author critical of an overly restrictive ideal of masculinity. Another characteristic of the narrative is the presence of omens and prophetic dreams. It is disputed whether this reflects a fatalistic outlook on the part of the author.

The saga dates to the late 13th century while the events described take place between 960 and 1020. The work is anonymous, although there has been extensive speculation on the author's identity. The major events described in the saga are probably historical but the material was shaped by the author, drawing on oral tradition, according to his artistic needs. Njáls saga is the longest and most highly developed of the sagas of Icelanders. It is often considered the peak of the saga tradition.^[2]

We studied this in Constitutionalism and Common Law to trace certain traditions that operated as law based on oral tradition.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nj%C3%A1ls_saga

A...

[Francisco Ferrer]

Thank you. Yes, one of this days I would like to spend a serious amount of time with The Complete Sagas of Icelanders.

[BaalChatzaf]

Of course in an anarchistic system there is no Constitution.

But there is is custom.

In any human society there is custom.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[dldelancey]

Thank you. Yes, one of this days I would like to spend a serious amount of time with The Complete Sagas of Icelanders.

You might also try Burial Rites by Hannah Kent. It's a fictionalized account of the last days of the last person to be executed in Iceland. There's a great deal of historical accuracy to the extent that details are available, and it's a beautifully written depiction of Icelandic culture in the early 1800s.

[anthony]

"A person is productive or unproductive *to the extent he chooses to be*". [Francisco]

This is surprising. FF, have you come over to free will?

[Selene]

This is surprising. FF, have you come over to free will?

Why is will even incarcerated is what I want to know?

Did he have his Miranda rights read to him?

[SoAMadDeathWish]

First of all, as evil as slavery is, it did not figure prominently in Icelandic society. In Viking Age Iceland, Jesse Byock points out that slavery was simply not economical in the higher latitudes: "In Iceland with its mixed economy of coastal hunting, gathering and fishing, and inland livestock farming, the efficient use of slave labor was not possible."

More importantly, the existence of slavery in Iceland is completely irrelevant to the point I made in Post #15l: the non-coercive creation and enforcement of law in that country. The Icelandic people were able to develop and live under a legal system that did not require forcible financing. Slavery had nothing to do with that system.

The existence of slavery proves that not everyone was a thingmenn, which is the actual claim I was defending. More importantly, I also said that even the thingmenn had to pay a tax by the 1100's which supports my argument rather than yours.

My argument is that states will tax the populace for political reasons (which I've explained before). Just because the state might be funded through entirely non-coercive means does not mean that it will be. States are not the same thing as shoe stores. The Iceland example supports my theory perfectly because, although a proto-state could be funded through entirely voluntary means, once the ball of statism starts rolling, it doesn't stop. We see this same scenario played out in the emergence of the first civilizations. Before the first city-states emerged in Mesopotamia, society was organized into chiefdoms and lineages that did not have the power to tax (as far as anyone knows anyway). When the first states were organized, however, pretty much immediately afterward, taxes and social stratification showed up as well.

If majorities did not matter, the Communist Party would still be in power in Poland, Hungary and East Germany.

Can you go into more detail here? I don't see how that works.

Try to keep up with the thread, or else don't comment. In response to your suggestion that people will seek the state that gives the most loot, I wrote Post #151, "Will some non-productive people shop around for the state that gives them the most benefits? Sure. We see that now in certain Western democracies. On the other hand, productive people will undoubtedly shop for a state that robs them the least. In this context, I have hope for the free nation movement. Will the moochers be stronger than the producers? In the long run, no, due to what's called a 'brain drain.'"

Your non sequitur was, "There are no inherently 'productive' or 'non-productive' people. A person is productive or unproductive to the extent that he chooses to be. A person could be a producer one day and a looter the next and then go back to being a producer the day after that. Anyone can produce with one hand and steal with the other. In fact, most people do."

I then pointed out that your observation about inherent productivity is of no relevance to my point that productive people will move to where they are less looted. It is fruitless for a state to attract thousands of new parasites if the productive people there flee the tax burden in large numbers. I never made the claim that there has to be a no tax state for overtaxed people to escape to.

Perhaps I should have been more clear.

I did indeed say that there are no inherently "productive" or "parasitic" people. This means that any talk of what "productive" people might do is meaningless. For some purposes, we might make an assumption that this or that person is always productive or some other person is always parasitic. But in this case, such an assumption would be an over-simplification, because people choose to be productive and/or parasitic depending on their circumstances (which, in the real world, are highly variable).

So, for example, let's say that A and B are two owners of two companies in a country with a high tax burden. Suppose that A has good lobbyists and friends in the government, and derives many benefits from the state, whereas B does not and must mainly rely on his own productivity. Additionally, B has the opportunity to move his business to one of two countries. One with a lower tax rate, where he can't influence the government, and another with the same lower tax rate but where he can influence the government. B will obviously choose the latter, and, therefore, that country, rather than attracting a "producer", just gets another "parasite". So we see that, just because B was productive under one set of circumstances, does not mean that he will remain that way under another set.

I suppose your point is that Switzerland's national defense does not work. Yet you have several hundred years of historical fact contradicting you.

Why would I say that?

Then go to it. The ballot is secret, and a more plausible strategy would be one that starts with present realities.

Alright. Let's say that everyone except A is envious and derive just as much utility from having A lose $1 as they do from gaining an additional $1. What this means is that, all else being equal, they like having more money rather than less, but they also like it more when A has 1 of his dollars taken away. Their payoff, Vp, from a tax bill with tax rate r is then given by:

Vp = (r(1 - l) * 1,000,000) / N + 500,000 - (1 - r)(1 - l)1,000,000,

where N is the number of people in the society and l is A's leisure choice as defined in the OP.

Things might seem hopeless for A here, because if the tax rate is set to 100%, all the envious parasites will receive a payoff of $500,000 and A will have no money with which to bribe them. And A can never produce more than $500,000 so it seems like he will never be able to get out of this jam. But we have to dig a bit deeper.

It turns out that the envious parasites can get a payoff higher than $500,000 while A retains some of his money with a tax rate that is less than 100%. It seems impossible, but it's actually quite interesting how it all works out.

If we maximize the payoff function of the envious parasites, we get that the payoff maximizing tax rate is given by

r = (2 + 2N - Sqrt(N^2 + 3N + 2)) / (N + 1). (note that this rate approaches but is never equal to 100% regardless of how high N is)

Let's go back to the original example with just A, B, and C. Here, there are only 3 people, so N = 3. Here, the tax rate that B and C would like the most is 88.2%, according to the above equation. We can get A's leisure choice for that tax rate which turns out to be l = 1/(2 - r) = 1/(2 - 0.882) = 0.894. Plugging l, r, and N into the envious parasites' payoff function we see that their payoff with a tax rate of 88.2% is:

Vp (0.882) = (0.882(1-0.894)*1,000,000)/3 + 500,000 - (1-0.882)(1-0.894)*1,000,000 = $518,576.

You might ask, where is all this extra money coming from? There is no extra money. This function is merely a payoff function. When A loses $1 to taxes, the envious parasite interprets this as an increase in utility form gaining $1/N but also as an increase in utility of A losing $1 to taxes, i.e. he gains $1/N + $1.

Now we need to look at how much money each person would actually hold if the bill were to pass. Using the equations from the OP, A would have only $43,499.70, while each parasite would have $31,038.50.

Now, all A has to do is make the following offer, "If anyone proposes a tax bill, and the bill succeeds, then I will give an additional dollar to the one who didn't propose it." Since each of the envious parasites would like to be the one to get the additional dollar, neither of them wants to be the one to propose the bill. Therefore, the bill is never proposed, and A never has to pay anyone anything.

Then the solution is, as I have said, to de-fang and de-claw the state so that it is not a weapon of special interests.

Let me see if I have this right. Corporate (political) power is an unfortunate reality that isn't going away any time soon.

How do you know this? Where is the expiration date written on corporate power's label? What crystal ball are you looking into?

People in Eastern Europe in the late 1970's had no inkling that the Berlin Wall would come down within ten years. Not even the CIA predicted it.

Yet you write with apparent certainty that there can be no fundamental change in crony capitalism in the foreseeable future. How would you know?

It's not that there are no feasible alternatives to crony capitalism (though, none of them are any better). It's that laissez-faire isn't one of them.

[Selene]

It's not that there are no feasible alternatives to crony capitalism (though, none of them are any better). It's that laissez-faire isn't one of them.

Wrong.

[Brant Gaede]

It's not just wrong it's stupid and insulting. If you come to this kind of board with something like that it's incumbant on you to back up your statement.

--Brant

since she doesn't explain why she's right we get not to explain why she's wrong, and since she went first we are right so far by default

[tmj]

Naomi said in #167

"So, for example, let's say that A and B are two owners of two companies in a country with a high tax burden. Suppose that A has good lobbyists and friends in the government, and derives many benefits from the state, whereas B does not and must mainly rely on his own productivity. Additionally, B has the opportunity to move his business to one of two countries. One with a lower tax rate, where he can't influence the government, and another with the same lower tax rate but where he can influence the government. B will obviously choose the latter, and, therefore, that country, rather than attracting a "producer", just gets another "parasite". So we see that, just because B was productive under one set of circumstances, does not mean that he will remain that way under another set."

Why would be B do what you claim is obvious ?

[SoAMadDeathWish]

Naomi said in #167

"So, for example, let's say that A and B are two owners of two companies in a country with a high tax burden. Suppose that A has good lobbyists and friends in the government, and derives many benefits from the state, whereas B does not and must mainly rely on his own productivity. Additionally, B has the opportunity to move his business to one of two countries. One with a lower tax rate, where he can't influence the government, and another with the same lower tax rate but where he can influence the government. B will obviously choose the latter, and, therefore, that country, rather than attracting a "producer", just gets another "parasite". So we see that, just because B was productive under one set of circumstances, does not mean that he will remain that way under another set."

Why would be B do what you claim is obvious ?

He can choose between a lower tax rate and that same tax rate but with the added opportunity to get benefits from the state. The second option is the better one.

[tmj]

Naomi said in #167

"So, for example, let's say that A and B are two owners of two companies in a country with a high tax burden. Suppose that A has good lobbyists and friends in the government, and derives many benefits from the state, whereas B does not and must mainly rely on his own productivity. Additionally, B has the opportunity to move his business to one of two countries. One with a lower tax rate, where he can't influence the government, and another with the same lower tax rate but where he can influence the government. B will obviously choose the latter, and, therefore, that country, rather than attracting a "producer", just gets another "parasite". So we see that, just because B was productive under one set of circumstances, does not mean that he will remain that way under another set."

Why would be B do what you claim is obvious ?

He can choose between a lower tax rate and that same tax rate but with the added opportunity to get benefits from the state. The second option is the better one.

So both choices are fascist in nature but he can only be guaranteed favorable treatment in one state as opposed to the other, or is the choice between one fascist state and one at least less fascist( if such a distinction could be made) or even that one state enjoys at least economic freedom for sake of the example?

[SoAMadDeathWish]

So both choices are fascist in nature but he can only be guaranteed favorable treatment in one state as opposed to the other, or is the choice between one fascist state and one at least less fascist( if such a distinction could be made) or even that one state enjoys at least economic freedom for sake of the example?

The choice is between a crony capitalist state with favorable treatment and a crony capitalist state without.

[Brant Gaede]

The first is crony capitalism; the second is fascism--or even worse.

--Brant

false alternatives

OL as the Augean Stables

[tmj]

The only obvious answer is that A will pick the option with the lower tax and the guaranteed state sponsored parasitism.