Peikoff's defense of the "validity of the senses"

[Arkadi]

Dear all-- I'm puzzled by his argument here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vhJN_mKG_KY&feature=youtu.be 

It seems to me that he caricatures his opponents' thesis. They deny only that perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived. And his argument not only does not refute but, actually, indirectly confirms precisely this.

Did I miss something?

Thanks.

p.s. BTW, pace Peikoff, Kant did not claim that the senses are "invalid". On the contrary, he claimed that the phenomenal world is "empirically real".

[merjet]

2 hours ago, Arkadi said:

It seems to me that he caricatures his opponents' thesis. They deny only that perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived. And his argument not only does not refute but, actually, indirectly confirms precisely this.

Did I miss something?

I didn't hear Peikoff say anything like opponents "deny that perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived." Perhaps you misinterpret something rather than miss something.

[Arkadi]

merjet-

I did not say that Peikoff says that his opponents "deny that perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived." This is my (not his) interpretation of his opponents' position.

Do you believe this interpretation of mine is wrong? If so, would you be so kind as to state what their position is in your view? 

Thanks.

[merjet]

Arkadi,

Your response shows you didn't comprehend what I wrote.  

Yes, I believe your interpretation of Peikoff is wrong. However, whether or not perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived is a relevant question about Peikoff's example.

I don't know what you mean by "their position" if different than what Peikoff said. 

[Arkadi]

"However, whether or not perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived is a relevant question about Peikoff's example."

So, what is your answer to this "relevant question"?

"I don't know what you mean by "their position" if different than what Peikoff said." --"Their" refers to Peikoff's opponents (Kant et al.). If their position would be, in Peikoff's view, the same as Peikoff's own position, why would he be refuting them? In my view their position is that sensible properties do NOT belong to the entity perceived.  But Peikoff, as I understand him, asserts that they deny the validity of the claim that the entity perceived exists at all. This is blatantly false, given Kant's assertion of the existence of the "thing-in-itself."

"I believe your interpretation of Peikoff is wrong"--It would be nice if you could explain what are your grounds for saying this.

[merjet]

In your first post you said Peikoff "caricatures his opponents' thesis." I disagree. He clearly states the issue. "They say, if two different consciousnesses perceive the same object in different forms, doesn't this lead to a contradiction?" Peikoff says no.

Contrarily you have tried to make the issue "whether or not perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived." That is why I said your interpretation of Peikoff is wrong.

Quote

"However, whether or not perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived is a relevant question about Peikoff's example." So, what is your answer to this "relevant question"?

You answer first.

[Arkadi]

"They say, if two different consciousnesses perceive the same object in different forms, doesn't this lead to a contradiction?"--What "they" mean is that "it leads to a contradiction" if one assumes that the perceived forms belong to the object itself. This assumption is held by naïve realists but not by Kant. What Peikoff cites thus is a classical argument (reductio ad absurdum) against naïve realism. As I understand Peikoff, he asserts that this argument does not work against objectivism, because objectivism does not share the indicated assumption. But Peikoff claims to be refuting, by the same stroke, Kant as well. And this latter claim is, in my view, ungrounded.

"You answer first."-- My answer is: no, a claim that perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived is not, generally, valid.

[merjet]

9 minutes ago, Arkadi said:

My answer is: no, a claim that perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived is not, generally, valid.

My answer is yes and no.   intrinsic/extrinsic   primary/secondary  

[Arkadi]

If so, your "answer" violates the principle of excluded middle. An entity either has a given property or it does not.

[merjet]

17 hours ago, Arkadi said:

If so, your "answer" violates the principle of excluded middle. An entity either has a given property or it does not.

Your first sentence is wrong.

[Arkadi]

I prefer to be wrong rather than opinionated (i.e., holding views with no arguments to support them).

[KorbenDallas]

9 hours ago, Arkadi said:

no, a claim that perceived sensible properties belong to the entity perceived is not, generally, valid.

If this claim "is not, generally, valid", then what is?

[Arkadi]

KorbenDallas--There are quite a few claims that are valid. You want me to list them all? Or what is your question?

[KorbenDallas]

Nope, no need to list them, you've answered my question.  Was curious if you had a single, personally held belief about the validity of the senses.  (Mine is Objectivism's.)

Rand once told Peikoff that the essence of Kant's philosophy is "consciousness negates identity." *see next post.  I found an article that is related to this thread: http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/objectivity/walsh1/

This is a quotation from Rand:

Quote

The “phenomenal” world, said Kant [this is not a direct quotation from Kant], is not real: reality, as perceived by man’s mind, is a distortion. The distorting mechanism is man’s conceptual faculty: man’s basic concepts (such as time, space, existence) are not derived from experience or reality, but come from an automatic system of filters in his consciousness (labeled “categories” and “forms of perception”) which impose their own design on his perception of the external world and make him incapable of perceiving it in any manner other than the one in which he does perceive it. This proves, said Kant [this is not a direct quotation], that man’s concepts are only a delusion, but a collective delusion which no one has the power to escape. Thus reason and science are “limited,” said Kant [this, again, is not a direct quotation from Kant]; they are valid only so long as they deal with this world, with a permanent, pre-determined collective delusion . . . but they are impotent to deal with the fundamental metaphysical issues of existence, which belong to the “noumenal” world . . . [which] is unknowable; [but] it is the world of “real” reality, “superior” truth and “things in themselves” or “things as they are”—which means things as they are not perceived by man.

 

[KorbenDallas]

*(from prev post)
Rand said the essence of Kant's philosophy was "identity negates consciousness"--here she is using the Objectivist axioms of what identity and consciousness is.  I see why she did this, she considered Kant's philosophy to be what she called an "anti-concept" as unto Objectivism.  And on the face of it, it would seem kind of silly to say that human's don't have consciousness, when they do have consciousness, so why make the assertion.  Rand describes the human consciousness as a volitional consciousness while Kant describes it as duty-based consciousness, so Rand was not saying that Kant was negating a human consciousness completely, rather he was negating the volitional consciousness--and this volitional consciousness is specific and necessary to man's nature, that its job is to know reality through sense-perception, and that he is perceiving a knowable universe (existence) that "possesses" identity.

Now, to say, "the essence of Kant's philosophy is: consciousness negates identity," as I previously did, but misquoted Rand, is still okay to say if one is being clear on terminology, and saying this from Kant's perspective.  In the phrase "consciousness negates identity", consciousness would be mental activity and identity would be Oist existence exists, that things have their own identity (as material cause and attributes).  Bearing this in mind, the Rand quote from the previous post still holds:

Quote

The “phenomenal” world, said Kant [this is not a direct quotation from Kant], is not real: reality, as perceived by man’s mind, is a distortion. The distorting mechanism is man’s conceptual faculty: man’s basic concepts (such as time, space, existence) are not derived from experience or reality, but come from an automatic system of filters in his consciousness (labeled “categories” and “forms of perception”) which impose their own design on his perception of the external world and make him incapable of perceiving it in any manner other than the one in which he does perceive it. This proves, said Kant [this is not a direct quotation], that man’s concepts are only a delusion, but a collective delusion which no one has the power to escape. Thus reason and science are “limited,” said Kant [this, again, is not a direct quotation from Kant]; they are valid only so long as they deal with this world, with a permanent, pre-determined collective delusion . . . but they are impotent to deal with the fundamental metaphysical issues of existence, which belong to the “noumenal” world . . . [which] is unknowable; [but] it is the world of “real” reality, “superior” truth and “things in themselves” or “things as they are”—which means things as they are not perceived by man.

..and "consciousness negates identity" is the one I use as the essence to Kant's philosophy.

 

[Arkadi]

KorbenDallas--   "Was curious if you had a single, personally held belief about the validity of the senses" -- My personally held belief about the validity of the senses is precisely the one presented by Peikoff as that of Objectivism in the lecture a link to an excerpt from which I posed in this thread (the whole lecture is found here: https://campus.aynrand.org/campus-courses/history-of-philosophy/objectivism-on-the-validity-of-the-senses?s=0 ). However, Peikoff (and Rand, as you citation confirms) is totally wrong in claiming that Kant's view on the validity of the sense is any different from Objectivism's as presented by Peikoff. In particular, this statement is false: "The “phenomenal” world, said Kant [this is not a direct quotation from Kant], is not real, reality, as perceived by man’s mind, is a distortion." The phenomenal world for Kant is "empirically real," i.e., in the Objectivism's language, "objective."

 

[Arkadi]

p.s. In other words, I agree with Peikoff's and Rand's view on the validity of the senses but disagree with their interpretation of Kant's view on this issue. It thus makes no sense to respond to me unless you have (or are willing to acquire) some first-hand knowledge of Kant's view.

[Brant Gaede]

9 hours ago, Arkadi said:

KorbenDallas--   "Was curious if you had a single, personally held belief about the validity of the senses" -- My personally held belief about the validity of the senses is precisely the one presented by Peikoff as that of Objectivism in the lecture a link to an excerpt from which I posed in this thread (the whole lecture is found here: https://campus.aynrand.org/campus-courses/history-of-philosophy/objectivism-on-the-validity-of-the-senses?s=0 ). However, Peikoff (and Rand, as you citation confirms) is totally wrong in claiming that Kant's view on the validity of the sense is any different from Objectivism's as presented by Peikoff. In particular, this statement is false: "The “phenomenal” world, said Kant [this is not a direct quotation from Kant], is not real, reality, as perceived by man’s mind, is a distortion." The phenomenal world for Kant is "empirically real," i.e., in the Objectivism's language, "objective."

 

So, it's a distortion of senses by the mind? Did Kant say the senses and mind were working off the wrong material? Nope(?)--the material is "objective." (Did he say how he knew?) The next question is what to do about it? A scientist uses instrumentation. Scientist from 90 years ago: "Would you believe it if you saw it with your own eyes"? "No! First I would test it with many instruments!" The metaphysics and epistemology of Objectivism--insofar as valid--are the same as for science (reality and reason), which is taken as valid. But what has Objectivism done--via Rand--that has informed and bettered scientific methodology? The flow would seem to be in the opposite direction. I can't think, but am easily wrong, of any modern philosophical contribution to science aside from Popper. (I'm ignorant of the deep history of science except for a smattering.)

--Brant

[KorbenDallas]

5 hours ago, Arkadi said:

unless you have (or are willing to acquire) some first-hand knowledge of Kant's view.

Have it, have read Kant.

 

5 hours ago, Arkadi said:

It thus makes no sense to respond to me

Wasn't planning on it.  Something of note: you quoted one sentence in the paragraph above, I quoted the whole paragraph, context difference.

[Brant Gaede]

Was Kant a gas bag?

[KorbenDallas]

Who are you speaking to?

[Arkadi]

KorbenDallas--"Something of note: you quoted one sentence in the paragraph above, I quoted the whole paragraph, context difference."-- The paragraph you quoted begins with a blatantly false statement (which I cited), showing that it's author was ignorant of the subject she was talking about (i.e., Kant's view of perception). Why would one bother to read the rest? If you cited it to demonstrate the author's ignorance, that would be another matter. But you did not say so; I, therefore, assumed that you were agreeing with it.

[Brant Gaede]

3 hours ago, KorbenDallas said:

Who are you speaking to?

Not who--what. "What" being what generally passes for philosophy but focused on Kant.

[KorbenDallas]

9 minutes ago, Arkadi said:

KorbenDallas--"Something of note: you quoted one sentence in the paragraph above, I quoted the whole paragraph, context difference."-- The paragraph you quoted begins with a blatantly false statement (which I cited), showing that it's author was ignorant of the subject she was talking about (i.e., Kant's view of perception). Why would one bother to read the rest? If you cited it to demonstrate the author's ignorance, that would be another matter. But you did not say so; I, therefore, assumed that you were agreeing with it.

[KorbenDallas]

22 minutes ago, Brant Gaede said:

Not who--what. "What" being what generally passes for philosophy but focused on Kant.

Honestly, I have no idea what you're talking about.