Illogical Leap: Why Harriman's account of induction is daft nonsense

[sjw]

Peikoff/Harriman are clear enough. They don't try to hide it. They positively wallow in it: A first-level gen is, for example, when a child pushes a ball and associates the pushing with the rolling. All other inductions are allegedly based on such "first-level" gens.

The immediate question that comes to mind, which by my recollection they fail to address (please pardon me for not having the book handy as of this writing), is how exactly this associational learning of children differs from that of dogs or chimpanzees. In any case, it is clear that it does not differ at all, and that should give one a hint that their account of induction is patent nonsense.

No account of induction should depend -- or even give the appearance of depending -- on an account of how children bridge the gap between lower animals and human beings as they develop. Adults don't need to know how a child, dog, or amoeba learns from its environment in order to know what they know. To hold otherwise is to hold the absurdity that if an adult had no experience with children and no memory of his own childhood, then he would be forever trapped in ignorance, that he would never be able to claim that he knew what he was talking about. Anyone with a sliver of self esteem will reject this nonsense outright.

So how would an adult approach the question of why a ball rolls? Would he merely observe the brute fact that when he pushed it, it rolled? Well certainly some adults "reason" in precisely this animalistic fashion. But if we are trying to get to the bottom of induction, do we focus on how the lowest of the low feign thinking, or should we rather be concerned with how intelligent people do it?

The answer of course depends on what audience you intend to appeal to. Since Harriman already addressed one type of audience, I'll attempt to address the other kind by describing how I would induce such a thing as "pushing a ball makes it roll". I make no assertion that this is some kind of act of genius. It is rather an ordinary act of using ordinary, everyday intelligence. I'm merely doing it to highlight precisely what constitutes adult-level induction on this issue.

Certainly, there are "first-level" items of knowledge here -- that their must be is an obvious implication of Aristotle's observation that there cannot be an infinite regress in explanations. At some point, we hit the bottom. But what is at the bottom is not, as Harriman would put it, child-animal level associations. Such associations are mere hints to an intelligent adult's mind that some causal explanation may be demanded by the apparent associations, they are not the "bottom", as Harriman wants you to think (One might wonder why Harriman/Peikoff, who have declared themselves intellectual Kings of Objectivism, might want to put you into a child-like mental condition).

A child associates, an adult isolates and integrates. An adult will ask what a ball being pushed and rolling has to do with the rest of what he knows. And what else does he know? That throwing a ball is in some respect like pushing, and it flying though the air is in some respect like rolling. After a bit of thinking, and adult, even one who did not know about Newtonian physics, might isolate in some terms the properties of momentum, force, gravity. He would observe that pushing a rectangular object does not make it roll easily because in order to roll it would need to transfer some forward momentum to lifting the object up at the corner. Through such inductive thinking the adult would recognize what precisely it is about roundness that makes the ball amenable to rolling on a flat surface. This would conclude a "first-level" induction, but only after thinking on it for some time.

Some form of Newton's first law -- that momentum is conserved -- would already be held by such an adult. He'd thrown objects, he'd run and tried to stop, he'd observed countless instances of a general tendency of an object to stay in motion unless resisted. He may not hold this concept in his mind in precise scientific form but he would have it. This concept would have been induced before and is merely applied to the prior induction regarding roundness.

We could also ask how the induction regarding momentum came about. It is easy to answer: think about how you would explain this to a child in an attempt to lift him out of his associational ignorance. You would pick widely varied examples to demonstrate that momentum tends to be conserved unless it is interfered with (the scientific form of this concept that Newton arrived at is not possible without advanced methods). You could demonstrate that whenever momentum is not conserved, that something was interfering (which might even lead you to the idea of friction). You don't grasp "momentum is conserved" (or its primitive equivalent) by mere association; you note that in your entire range of experience, it is conserved. What you do is sweeping abstraction and integration, not particular association.

(An astute, experienced adult would be able to recognize rotational momentum as well and incorporate it as a refinement of his induction of why a ball rolls.)

The point is, as an adult, you don't grasp "balls roll" by mere association, dig until you hit rock bottom (given your current context of knowledge), *which isn't very far*. These, then, are the true "first level" gens for an adult, not references to childhood associational memory.

So take your pick. You can take Harriman's account that says at the bedrock of your thinking is the same kind of association that monkeys do, or you can put integrated generalizations at the base.

Shayne

[Peter]

The problem is never how to get new, innovative thoughts into your mind, but how to get old ones out. Every mind is a building filled with archaic furniture. Clean out a corner of your mind and creativity will instantly fill it. -- Dee Hock

Shayne wrote:

No account of induction should depend -- or even give the appearance of depending -- on an account of how children bridge the gap between lower animals and human beings as they develop . . . So take your pick. You can take Harriman's account that says at the bedrock of your thinking is the same kind of association that monkeys do, or you can put integrated generalizations at the base.

End quote

I doubt that I am following your argument correctly, but I am watching my eleven month old granddaughter today and I was thinking about what you were saying: Objectivist Epistemology would be wrong to begin at the beginning?

Doctor Piaget and others have chronicled the steps of learning in children though not chimps or monkeys . A child should be at level X, by age Y. By observation, the pediatric scientist starts at the murky depths of the human big bang, the beginning of consciousness, and identifies all the steps leading to full rationality.

Objectivist Epistemology seeks that “natural” growth line by observing the child and then deconstructing adult consciousness, to begin the process of growth anew, as a system for adult use.

From the Ayn Rand Lexicon, automatizing reconstructs:

All learning involves a process of automatizing, i.e., of first acquiring knowledge by fully conscious, focused attention and observation, then of establishing mental connections which make that knowledge automatic (instantly available as a context), thus freeing man’s mind to pursue further, more complex knowledge.

End quote

Shayne, are not Axioms the same sort of system “beginning?” Abstracting is a process of seeking essentials.

From the Ayn Rand Lexicon:

Abstraction (process of)

The act of isolation involved [in concept-formation] is a process of abstraction: i.e., a selective mental focus that takes out or separates a certain aspect of reality from all others (e.g., isolates a certain attribute from the entities possessing it, or a certain action from the entities performing it, etc.).

End quote

From the tiny acorn, a mighty oak tree grows.

Doctor Leonard Peikoff stated in The Analytic-Synthetic Dichotomy:

The fact that certain characteristics are, at a given time, unknown to man, does not indicate that these characteristics are excluded from the entity—or from the concept. A is A; existents are what they are, independent of the state of human knowledge; and a concept means the existents which it integrates. Thus, a concept subsumes and includes all the characteristics of its referents, known and not-yet-known

End quote

We are not omniscient. A is still A, whether anyone is there in the forest when the tree falls )

From the Objectivist Epistemology:

Hierarchy of Knowledge

Concepts have a hierarchical structure, i.e., . . . the higher, more complex abstractions are derived from the simpler, basic ones (starting with the concepts of perceptually given concretes).

[There is a] long conceptual chain that starts from simple, ostensive definitions and rises to higher and still higher concepts, forming a hierarchical structure of knowledge so complex that no electronic computer could approach it. It is by means of such chains that man has to acquire and retain his knowledge of reality.

Starting from the base of conceptual development—from the concepts that identify perceptual concretes—the process of cognition moves in two interacting directions: toward more extensive and more intensive knowledge, toward wider integrations and more precise differentiations. Following the process and in accordance with cognitive evidence, earlier-formed concepts are integrated into wider ones or subdivided into narrower ones.

End quote

Objectivism is full of these, “begin at the beginning” themes.

From Objectivism, the Philosophy of Ayn Rand:

Validation

“Validation” in the broad sense includes any process of relating mental contents to the facts of reality. Direct perception, the method of validating axioms, is one such process. “Proof” designates another type of validation. Proof is the process of deriving a conclusion logically from antecedent knowledge.

End quote

So Objectivists will need to validate for themselves this integration of Induction into Objectivism.

I think I will buy the book, before I yack on.

The “Wall Doctor” is back spackling and painting the guest bathroom, and she has woken up my granddaughter. The paint smell is not too bad. They have improved on the drying time and the undercoat is part of the overcoat so it is a one step process.

Peter Taylor

[sjw]

Pete, there's of course nothing wrong with field of child development, nor with being fascinated and studying how they mature. The point is that if you can't know what *you* are doing without consulting someone else, *anyone else*, whether a child or an adult, then you are not an independent thinker, you are someone who must look to some authority to sort out this or that issue for you. This kind of requirement is a prima facie non-starter for an epistemology that is part of a philosophy which actually values the virtue of independence.

No theory of epistemology that asks the reader to consult anything other than the reader's own mind and experiences with reality has any business being part of a philosophy that honors independence as a virtue.

Shayne

[Brant Gaede]

Pete, there's of course nothing wrong with field of child development, nor with being fascinated and studying how they mature. The point is that if you can't know what *you* are doing without consulting someone else, *anyone else*, whether a child or an adult, then you are not an independent thinker, you are someone who must look to some authority to sort out this or that issue for you. This kind of requirement is a prima facie non-starter for an epistemology that is part of a philosophy which actually values the virtue of independence.

No theory of epistemology that asks the reader to consult anything other than the reader's own mind and experiences with reality has any business being part of a philosophy that honors independence as a virtue.

Shayne

By this formulation there is simply no such thing as "an independent thinker." Do you realize how much you are mixing determinism into this?

--Brant

[sjw]

By this formulation there is simply no such thing as "an independent thinker." Do you realize how much you are mixing determinism into this?

--Brant

I don't see what you're talking about. Perhaps you could point out the problem you think you see and I can either revise or clarify.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

No account of induction should depend -- or even give the appearance of depending -- on an account of how children bridge the gap between lower animals and human beings as they develop. Adults don't need to know how a child, dog, or amoeba learns from its environment in order to know what they know. To hold otherwise is to hold the absurdity that if an adult had no experience with children and no memory of his own childhood, then he would be forever trapped in ignorance, that he would never be able to claim that he knew what he was talking about. Anyone with a sliver of self esteem will reject this nonsense outright.

The only nonsense involved here is your characterization of Harriman's argument. You need to read the book again.

Ghs

[sjw]

The only nonsense involved here is your characterization of Harriman's argument. You need to read the book again.

Ghs

My characterization is not of the whole book, it is of part of the first chapter where he introduces first-level generalization and says that "pushing a ball makes it roll" is one. Are you saying that he didn't actually claim that was a first-level generalization?

Shayne

[Brant Gaede]

By this formulation there is simply no such thing as "an independent thinker." Do you realize how much you are mixing determinism into this?

--Brant

I don't see what you're talking about. Perhaps you could point out the problem you think you see and I can either revise or clarify.

Shayne

Sure. If you are exposed to the ideas and opinions of others they will determine your own views, not independent thinking, now impossible.

--Brant

[sjw]

Sure. If you are exposed to the ideas and opinions of others they will determine your own views, not independent thinking, now impossible.

--Brant

I still can't see the connection between what I said and what you're saying it means. (In any case, I certainly don't mean that.)

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

The only nonsense involved here is your characterization of Harriman's argument. You need to read the book again.

Ghs

My characterization is not of the whole book, it is of part of the first chapter where he introduces first-level generalization and says that "pushing a ball makes it roll" is one. Are you saying that he didn't actually claim that was a first-level generalization?

Shayne

Okay, then you need to read the first chapter again.

For HarriPei, the significance of generalizations, both lower and higher, is that they are essentially "statements of causal connection." "In reality, there is nothing to unite two existents (such as pushing and, or force and acceleration) universally, i.e, there is nothing to make any generalization true, except some form of causal relationship between the two." Hence, "Any validation of generalizations...must answer the question: How -- by what means -- does man learn causal connections" (p. 21).

This is the reason that HarriPei discusses how we learn to make rudimentary causal generalizations. But, contrary to your characterization, this does not mean that "if an adult had no experience with children and no memory of his own childhood, then he would be forever trapped in ignorance." Harriman (p. 13) quotes Peikoff as follows:

Since there are options in the details of a learning process, one need not always retrace the steps one initially happened to take. What one must retrace is the essential logical structure. [My italics.]

A person with no memory of his childhood or experience with children could still retrace the essential logical structure of his causal generalizations. The point here is that our higher-level generalizations should not contradict our justified lower-level generalizations. This is simply a call for logical consistency in our knowledge claims.

I should note that I have some problems with HarriPei's presentation; for example, I don't think first-level generalizations are "self-evident" and therefore "admit and require no proof." If this were the case, then no first-level generalization could possibly be wrong, whereas some can be. Contrary to HarriPei (p. 19), "the perceptual" is not necessarily "the self-evident." But this is a topic for different discussion.

Ghs

[sjw]

Okay, then you need to read the first chapter again.

OK, I'll re-read it.

For HarriPei, the significance of generalizations, both lower and higher, is that they are essentially "statements of causal connection." "In reality, there is nothing to unite two existents (such as pushing and, or force and acceleration) universally, i.e, there is nothing to make any generalization true, except some form of causal relationship between the two." Hence, "Any validation of generalizations...must answer the question: How -- by what means -- does man learn causal connections" (p. 21).

This is the reason that HarriPei discusses how we learn to make rudimentary causal generalizations. But, contrary to your characterization, this does not mean that "if an adult had no experience with children and no memory of his own childhood, then he would be forever trapped in ignorance." Harriman (p. 13) quotes Peikoff as follows:

What HarriPei call "statements of causal connection" are in fact mere associations. They suggest causal connection, but they do not in any manner affirm it, and it is certainly not (as you observe as well) self-evident. They claim to "see" a connection where in fact there is nothing to *see* at all, as Hume makes quite clear. And they place this as the bedrock of induction, but merely adding more and more associations up does not make an induction. So I see HarriPei as the other side of Hume's coin -- he claims not to see something, and they merely reverse his claim and say they do. It's like elementary school "Yes you are!" "No I'm not!" They haven't actually added anything other than empty assertions.

And as I pointed out in the other thread, they haven't actually even attempted to validate induction at all, they just take it for granted, which of course must be their position, because according to them one "just sees" the causal connection when they push a ball and it rolls, just like a religionist "just knows" that God is talking to him.

Since there are options in the details of a learning process, one need not always retrace the steps one initially happened to take. What one must retrace is the essential logical structure. [My italics.]

A broken clock is right twice a day...

Shayne

Edited October 20, 2010 by sjw

[George H. Smith]

What HarriPei call "statements of causal connection" are in fact mere associations. They suggest causal connection, but they do not in any manner affirm it, and it is certainly not (as you observe as well) self-evident. They claim to "see" a connection where in fact there is nothing to *see* at all, as Hume makes quite clear.

You need to get past all this Humean nonsense. It is an epistemological train wreck.

I play "fetch" with my dog at least once each day. I throw a tennis ball so he can retrieve it. So are you telling me, in all seriousness, that when I exert force by moving my arm to throw the ball, and the ball subsequently goes across the room, that my belief in a causal relationship between my action and the ball's reaction is a mere association on my part? That I have no rational basis to believe that I caused the ball to behave as it does?

God save us from people who have just discovered David Hume.

Ghs

[sjw]

I play "fetch" with my dog at least once each day. I throw a tennis ball so he can retrieve it. So are you telling me, in all seriousness, when when I exert force by moving my arm to throw the ball, and the ball subsequently goes across the room, that my belief in a causal relationship between my action and the ball's reaction is a mere association on my part?

No, I don't say that.

God save us from people who try to read minds.

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

I play "fetch" with my dog at least once each day. I throw a tennis ball so he can retrieve it. So are you telling me, in all seriousness, when when I exert force by moving my arm to throw the ball, and the ball subsequently goes across the room, that my belief in a causal relationship between my action and the ball's reaction is a mere association on my part?

No, I don't say that.

God save us from people who try to read minds.

Shayne

You cited Hume, and I have read Hume -- many times. If you didn't mean to invoke his argument about mistaking mere associations for causal relationships, then why did you mention it?

[sjw]

You cited Hume, and I have read Hume -- many times. If you didn't mean to invoke his argument about mistaking mere associations for causal relationships, then why did you mention it?

Because I think Hume's argument highlights the need for or value in a validation of induction, and I think that all HarriPei did was jump up and down and say "I know you are but what am I?"

Shayne

[George H. Smith]

You cited Hume, and I have read Hume -- many times. If you didn't mean to invoke his argument about mistaking mere associations for causal relationships, then why did you mention it?

Because I think Hume's argument highlights the need for or value in a validation of induction, and I think that all HarriPei did was jump up and down and say "I know you are but what am I?"

Shayne

Earlier today, didn't you express agreement with Harriman (and contra Hume) that inductive reasoning does not require justification? Or did I miss something? See here.

Ghs

[sjw]

I love Hume. Hume stared into the abyss. And the abyss stared right back into him. And he was afraid. But he had courage. HarriPei have emotional angst over the whole thing. They won't even talk about staring into the abyss. Like frightened children, they close their eyes and cover their ears: "There is no abyss! blah blah blah I can't hear you! Hume is of the devil! The devil I say! Don't listen!"

Hahahaha. I'm not saying "brain in a vat" questions are legitimate. But it is legitimate to entertain them. It is legitimate to explore and understand just what is wrong with them. They can also be entertaining (e.g., see "The Matrix").

Shayne

[sjw]

You cited Hume, and I have read Hume -- many times. If you didn't mean to invoke his argument about mistaking mere associations for causal relationships, then why did you mention it?

Because I think Hume's argument highlights the need for or value in a validation of induction, and I think that all HarriPei did was jump up and down and say "I know you are but what am I?"

Shayne

Earlier today, didn't you express agreement with Harriman (and contra Hume) that inductive reasoning does not require justification? Or did I miss something? See here.

Ghs

Which is why I said need *or* value. My position is that it's not needed in order to proceed with science or your life etc., in that sense I agree with HarriPei. But it is valuable to answer exactly why induction is valid, just as Peikoff validated reason in OPAR. And I think that's what they advertised as having done. That was my expectation. And then they completely sidestepped it.

When someone says "problem of induction," the only problem I see is that no one has validated it yet, at least as far as I know (but you're far more widely read so you may know otherwise).

Shayne

[Selene]

George:

You have to "Humer" Shayne.

Adam

[George H. Smith]

I love Hume. Hume stared into the abyss. And the abyss stared right back into him. And he was afraid. But he had courage. HarriPei have emotional angst over the whole thing. They won't even talk about staring into the abyss. Like frightened children, they close their eyes and cover their ears: "There is no abyss! blah blah blah I can't hear you! Hume is of the devil! The devil I say! Don't listen!"

Hahahaha. I'm not saying "brain in a vat" questions are legitimate. But it is legitimate to entertain them. It is legitimate to explore and understand just what is wrong with them. They can also be entertaining (e.g., see "The Matrix").

Shayne

Hume didn't "stare into the abyss." He created an epistemological abyss and then wisely ignored it -- and I mean completely ignored it -- when pursuing his work in moral, political, and social theory, economics, and history -- none of which would have been possible if Hume had taken his own epistemological theories seriously.

In his own day, Hume was better known as a historian than as a philosopher -- his multi-volume History of England was a best-seller -- and his contributions to social and economic theory surpass by light years anything he did in epistemology. His critiques of religious belief have lasting value as well. See my discussion and defense of Hume's celebrated argument against miracles in Why Atheism? (pp. 204-210).

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

George:

You have to "Humer" Shayne.

Adam

Maybe Shayne has a Brain Humer.

Your turn.

Ghs

[Selene]

George:

You have to "Humer" Shayne.

Adam

Maybe Shayne has a Brain Humer.

Your turn.

Ghs

That would be so sad because sometimes he is humeresque in his answers.

Now we get to the stretching pun point.

Adam

[sjw]

Hume didn't "stare into the abyss." He created an epistemological abyss and then wisely ignored it -- and I mean completely ignored it -- when pursuing his work in moral, political, and social theory, economics, and history -- none of which would have been possible if Hume had taken his own epistemological theories seriously.

Just what is the "abyss" George?

It is brazenly obvious from his epistemological theory that he never had any intention of taking it "seriously" in the sense you wish to assert here.

I thought you said you've read Hume numerous times? So it seems like you never understood what he was saying.

Shayne

[sjw]

George:

You have to "Humer" Shayne.

Adam

Maybe Shayne has a Brain Humer.

Your turn.

Ghs

Buffoons.

[Selene]

George:

You have to "Humer" Shayne.

Adam

Maybe Shayne has a Brain Humer.

Your turn.

Ghs

Buffoons.

Any other requests?