Eating Dirt etc

anthony · September 11, 2010

I have been rereading J.S. Mill's famous and influential discussion of induction in A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive . His succinct description of inductive reasoning is as good as any I have seen:
Induction, then, is that operation of the mind by which we infer that which we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, induction is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that which is true at certain times will be true in similar circumstances at all times. (Book III, Chapter II.)
Mill goes on to point out that induction presupposes causation:
We must first observe that there is a principle implied in the very statement of what induction is; an assumption with regard to the course of nature and the order of the universe; namely, that there are such things in nature as parallel cases; that what happens once will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, recur. This, I say, is an assumption involved in every case of induction.
...This universal fact, which is our warrant for all inferences from experience, has been described by different philosophers in different forms of language; that the course of nature is uniform; that the universe is governed by general laws; and the like. (Book III, Chapter III.)
This last passage indirectly illustrates why Hume's critique of causation was the linchpin of his rejection of inductive reasoning.
Mill also makes a point that I had overlooked in my posts on this topic, namely, that inductive inferences are not limited to future events:
We believe that fire will burn tomorrow because it burned today and yesterday; but we believe, on precisely the same grounds, that it burned before we were born, and that it burns this very day in Cochin-China. It is not from the past to the future, as past and future, that we infer, but from the known to the unknown; from facts observed to facts unobserved; from what we have perceived, or been directly conscious of, to what has not come within our experience. In this last predicament is the whole region of the future; but also the vastly greater portion of the present and of the past.
Ghs

Stimulating stuff. So J.S.Mill found a 'cognitive shortcut' to Primacy of Existence, accomplished solely through induction. Self-evident, and common sense, but aren't these two terms fundaments of induction?

As far as concept creation is concerned, I've learned a lot from watching my many dogs and cats over years. Any animal lover knows how much they thirst for 'knowledge' - okay, stimuli and percepts - and how they inductively integrate percepts.

You reach for your keys, and pooch is instantly at the door. Their rattle causes a response of 'such and such is going to happen'. Simple cause and effect. But those times that you are only moving the keys to another place, causes an instant's confusion in his eyes - until he integrates that "most times this happens, we are going out - but not always. OK. Got it now" :rolleyes:

As an animal behaviorist, Pavlov was a simpleton.

I raise this because I'm fascinated about where, how and why, induction developed. From the lower mammals there are clues of man's primitive capability of induction.

At its most primitive I think, induction was a tool against danger: the senses scan the surrounding environment, searching for colours,shapes,sounds,odours, movements that aren't normal, and don't fit; things that are there, and things that are not there - pattern seeking, generalization and perceptual integration, for minute to minute survival.

Blocks of those percepts combine to form concepts, and eventually higher concepts.

I don't know if I'm taking this too far, but it does seem as if inductive hypotheses are predominantly syntheticized, as opposed to deduction's analytic properties.(?)

Enough, before I get too carried away.

Tony

anonrobt · September 11, 2010

I have been rereading J.S. Mill's famous and influential discussion of induction in A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive . His succinct description of inductive reasoning is as good as any I have seen:
Induction, then, is that operation of the mind by which we infer that which we know to be true in a particular case or cases, will be true in all cases which resemble the former in certain assignable respects. In other words, induction is the process by which we conclude that what is true of certain individuals of a class is true of the whole class, or that which is true at certain times will be true in similar circumstances at all times. (Book III, Chapter II.)
Mill goes on to point out that induction presupposes causation:
We must first observe that there is a principle implied in the very statement of what induction is; an assumption with regard to the course of nature and the order of the universe; namely, that there are such things in nature as parallel cases; that what happens once will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, recur. This, I say, is an assumption involved in every case of induction.
...This universal fact, which is our warrant for all inferences from experience, has been described by different philosophers in different forms of language; that the course of nature is uniform; that the universe is governed by general laws; and the like. (Book III, Chapter III.)
This last passage indirectly illustrates why Hume's critique of causation was the linchpin of his rejection of inductive reasoning.
Mill also makes a point that I had overlooked in my posts on this topic, namely, that inductive inferences are not limited to future events:
We believe that fire will burn tomorrow because it burned today and yesterday; but we believe, on precisely the same grounds, that it burned before we were born, and that it burns this very day in Cochin-China. It is not from the past to the future, as past and future, that we infer, but from the known to the unknown; from facts observed to facts unobserved; from what we have perceived, or been directly conscious of, to what has not come within our experience. In this last predicament is the whole region of the future; but also the vastly greater portion of the present and of the past.
Ghs
Stimulating stuff. So J.S.Mill found a 'cognitive shortcut' to Primacy of Existence, accomplished solely through induction. Self-evident, and common sense, but aren't these two terms fundaments of induction?
As far as concept creation is concerned, I've learned a lot from watching my many dogs and cats over years. Any animal lover knows how much they thirst for 'knowledge' - okay, stimuli and percepts - and how they inductively integrate percepts.
You reach for your keys, and pooch is instantly at the door. Their rattle causes a response of 'such and such is going to happen'. Simple cause and effect. But those times that you are only moving the keys to another place, causes an instant's confusion in his eyes - until he integrates that "most times this happens, we are going out - but not always. OK. Got it now"
As an animal behaviorist, Pavlov was a simpleton.
I raise this because I'm fascinated about where, how and why, induction developed. From the lower mammals there are clues of man's primitive capability of induction.
At its most primitive I think, induction was a tool against danger: the senses scan the surrounding environment, searching for colours,shapes,sounds,odours, movements that aren't normal, and don't fit; things that are there, and things that are not there - pattern seeking, generalization and perceptual integration, for minute to minute survival.
Blocks of those percepts combine to form concepts, and eventually higher concepts.
I don't know if I'm taking this too far, but it does seem as if inductive hypotheses are predominantly syntheticized, as opposed to deduction's analytic properties.(?)
Enough, before I get too carried away.
Tony

One thing that is so oft overlooked in most evolutionary discussions, or origin discussions, is that these advances happened NOT first with the adults, but with the child, the growing being with the most curiosity and openness to newness... add to this that the first use probably came along with first use of voluntary vocalization [again, first with the child] and that this in turn first arose from the aquatic ape's offshore water hunting, where a need was made of letting others see what was under water, and the developing corollary inductive responses...

kiaer.ts · September 11, 2010

The Aquatic Ape hypothesis is an entertaining one with grains of truth. But it is not taken seriously in any strong form by anthropologists. Human abilities like swimming and gesture (which predated speech) are the result of the early human evolution of delicate, coordinated, practiced movements. Apes are built for strength, not dexterity. Apes can't tie shoes or finger instruments or weave baskets. Merlin Donald discusses this in detail in his Origins of the Modern Mind:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Merlin_Donald

Origins of the Modern Mind proposes a three-stage development of human symbolic capacity through culture:

Mimetic culture: The watershed adaptation allowing humans to function as symbolic and cultural beings was a revolutionary improvement in motor control, the "mimetic skill" required to rehearse and refine the body's movements in a voluntary and systematic way, to remember those rehearsals, and to reproduce them on command. Following this development, Homo erectus assimilated and reconceptualized events to create various prelinguistic symbolic traditions such as rituals, dance, and craft.
Mythic cultures arose as a result of the acquisition of speech and the invention of symbols. Mimetic representation serves as a preadaptation to this development.
Technology-supported culture: Finally, the cognitive ecology dominated by ephemeral face-to-face communication has changed for most of us as a result of the external memory-store that reading and writing permit. Computer technology intensifies these changes by offering even more extensive capacities for external storage and retrieval of information.

Michael Stuart Kelly · September 11, 2010

Since evolution is being brought up, there is also a general idea that evolution moves a species toward improvement of the individual. But it only really moves a species toward the characteristics of individuals who have reproductive success.

On a human level, since anyone can successfully reproduce in today's world and there is a vast variety of traits, I don't expect much evolution of any particular one, especially as concerns the mind.

Michae

kiaer.ts · September 11, 2010

Since evolution is being brought up, there is also a general idea that evolution moves a species toward improvement of the individual. But it only really moves a species toward the characteristics of individuals who have reproductive success.
On a human level, since anyone can successfully reproduce in today's world and there is a vast variety of traits, I don't expect much evolution of any particular one, especially as concerns the mind.
Michae

Not according to actual science.

http://www.scientifi...human-evolution
Homo sapiens sapiens has spread across the globe and increased vastly in numbers over the past 50,000 years or so—from an estimated five million in 9000 B.C. to roughly 6.5 billion today. More people means more opportunity for mutations to creep into the basic human genome and new research confirms that in the past 10,000 years a host of changes to everything from digestion to bones has been taking place.
"We found very many human genes undergoing selection," says anthropologist Gregory Cochran of the University of Utah, a member of the team that analyzed the 3.9 million DNA sequences* showing the most variation. "Most are very recent, so much so that the rate of human evolution over the past few thousand years is far greater than it has been over the past few million years."
"We believe that this can be explained by an increase in the strength of selection as people became agriculturalists—a major ecological change—and a vast increase in the number of favorable mutations as agriculture led to increased population size," he adds.
Roughly 10,000 years ago, humanity made the transition from living off the land to actively raising crops and domesticated animals. Because this concentrated populations, diseases such as malaria, smallpox and tuberculosis, among others, became more virulent. At the same time, the new agriculturally based diet offered its own challenges—including iron deficiency from lack of meat, cavities and, ultimately, shorter stature due to poor nutrition, says anthropologist John Hawks of the University of Wisconsin–Madison, another team member.
"Their bodies and teeth shrank. Their brains shrank, too," he adds. "But they started to get new alleles [alternative gene forms] that helped them digest the food more efficiently. New protective alleles allowed a fraction of people to survive the dread illnesses better."
By looking for wide swaths of genetic material that vary little from individual to individual within these sections of great variation, the researchers identified regions that both originated recently and conferred some kind of advantage (because they became common rapidly). For example, the gene known as LCT gave adults the ability to digest milk and G6PD offered some protection against the malaria caused by Plasmodium falciparum parasite.
"Ten thousand years ago, no one on planet Earth had blue eyes," Hawks notes, because that gene—OCA2—had not yet developed. "We are different from people who lived only 400 generations ago in ways that are very obvious; that you can see with your eyes."
Comparing the amount of genetic differentiation between humans and our closest relatives, chimpanzees, suggests that the pace of change has accelerated to 10 to 100 times the average long-term rate, the researchers write in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA.

http://www.rationals...oxp2-t1784.html
Wang & Su, 2004 wrote:
Microcephalin
gene is one of the major players in regulating human brain development. It was reported that truncated mutations in this gene can cause primary microcephaly in humans with a brain size comparable with that of early hominids. We studied the molecular evolution of
microcephalin
by sequencing the coding region of microcephalin gene in humans and 12 representative non-human primate species covering great apes, lesser apes, Old World monkeys and New World monkeys.
Our results showed that
microcephalin
is highly polymorphic in human populations.
We observed 22 substitutions in the coding region of
microcephalin
gene in human populations, with 15 of them causing amino acid changes.
The neutrality tests and phylogenetic analysis indicated that the rich sequence variations of
microcephalin
in humans are likely caused by the combination of recent population expansion and Darwinian positive selection
. The synonymous/non-synonymous analyses in primates
revealed positive selection on
microcephalin
during the origin of the last common ancestor of humans and great apes
, which coincides with the drastic brain enlargement from lesser apes to great apes. The codon-based neutrality test
also indicated the signal of positive selection on five individual amino acid sites of
microcephalin
, which may contribute to brain enlargement during primate evolution and human origin
.
 So, ASPM and microcephalin apparently act as a genetic tag team in human brain development, and mutations in either are associated with microcephaly-class conditions. Interesting. But now, as promised, on to FOXP2. This is a gene that is implicated in several interesting developments, namely bird song, bat echolocation, and human speech and language. Here's the abstract: 
Enard
et al
,2002 wrote:Language is a uniquely human trait likely to have been a prerequisite for the development of human culture. The ability to develop articulate speech relies on capabilities, such as fine control of the larynx and mouth
1
, that are absent in chimpanzees and other great apes. FOXP2 is the first gene relevant to the human ability to develop language
2
. A point mutation in FOXP2 co-segregates with a disorder in a family in which half of the members have severe articulation difficulties accompanied by linguistic and grammatical impairment
3
. This gene is disrupted by translocation in an unrelated individual who has a similar disorder. Thus, two functional copies of FOXP2 seem to be required for acquisition of normal spoken language. We sequenced the complementary DNAs that encode the FOXP2 protein in the chimpanzee, gorilla, orang-utan, rhesus macaque and mouse, and compared them with the human cDNA.
We also investigated intraspecific variation of the human FOXP2 gene.
Here we show that human FOXP2 contains changes in aminoacid coding and a pattern of nucleotide polymorphism, which strongly suggest that this gene has been the target of selection during recent human evolution
.

wikipedia
Evolution
A derived form of MCPH1 called haplogroup D appeared about 37,000 years ago (anytime between 14,000 and 60,000 years ago) and has spread to become the more common form throughout the world except Sub-Saharan Africa. The timing of its emergence may have closely preceded the Upper Paleolithic, when people started colonising Europe, although the margin of error is substantial^[8] and there is evidence that the transition to the Upper Paleolithic occurred in Africa before spreading to Europe.^[9] Doubts concerning origins aside, modern distributions of chromosomes bearing the ancestral forms of MCPH1 and MCPH5 coincide with the incidence of tonal languages, although the nature of this relationship can only be guessed at.^[10]

http://www.sciencema...t/309/5741/1717
Microcephalin, a Gene Regulating Brain Size, Continues to Evolve Adaptively in Humans
Patrick D. Evans,¹^,2 Sandra L. Gilbert,¹ Nitzan Mekel-Bobrov,¹^,2 Eric J. Vallender,¹^,2 Jeffrey R. Anderson,¹Leila M. Vaez-Azizi,¹ Sarah A. Tishkoff,⁴ Richard R. Hudson,³ Bruce T. Lahn¹^*
The gene Microcephalin (MCPH1) regulates brain size and hasevolved under strong positive selection in the human evolutionarylineage. We show that one genetic variant of Microcephalin inmodern humans, which arose $sim.gif$ 37,000 years ago, increased in frequencytoo rapidly to be compatible with neutral drift. This indicatesthat it has spread under strong positive selection, althoughthe exact nature of the selection is unknown. The finding thatan important brain gene has continued to evolve adaptively inanatomically modern humans suggests the ongoing evolutionary^{plasticity of the human brain. It also makes}^{Microcephalin}^anattractive candidate locus for studying the genetics of humanvariation in brain-related phenotypes.

Michael Stuart Kelly · September 11, 2010

Ted,

So how does all that contradict what I said? It doesn't.

You really need to learn to read my posts more carefully, but that's your choice.

I suggest you try to correctly identify what I say first, then disagree. Rather than your present method of disagreeing first, then trying to fit stuff together. It will be a lot less tedious, both for me and for the reader. But once again, that's your choice.

Here's a plain-language video from the Khan Academy that will help you understand evolution (and help you understand what I said, since you obviously didn't). See if you disagree with that by half-thinking, also.

Introduction to Evolution and Natural Selection

Michael

kiaer.ts · September 12, 2010

As for reading you carefully, it is indeed difficult, Michael, to be sure what you are talking about. But in this case I believe you are saying that human evolution is pretty much in stasis, especially so far as it effects the mind.

Both that human evolution in general is in stasis and that the brain in regards to language and general intelligence is not evolving are in contradiction to current evidence.

If you are serious that you do not see how the papers I cited contradict your claim that human evolution, I can bold the appropriate sentences and define the necessary technical words in layman's terms for you.

Do I understand you correctly that your ideas of the stasis of human evolution come from watching Mr. Khan's cartoon? If you want my opinion of his expertise, I will spend some time listening to him for you.

Michael Stuart Kelly · September 12, 2010

Ted,

That's not a cartoon.

But don't worry about it.

It's not worth it.

Michael

kiaer.ts · September 12, 2010

I am interested in knowing if you were just recommending Khan in general, or if that is where you got the specific idea of evolutionary status from.

Edited September 12, 2010 by Ted Keer

Daniel Barnes · September 13, 2010

The issue here is whether inductive reasoning is ever rationally warranted. Hume said never, absolutely never, not even in regard to the empirical generalizations that we make in everyday life. So let's clear this up: Do you agree with Hume?

Yes, obviously.

More specifically, do you agree with Hume that we have no rational basis whatsoever for assuming that future events will even resemble past events?

Yes, obviously.

Ignore the rest of this post, if you like, but please address this issue. And don't hide behind Popper's skirts. Explain your own position.

This is getting boring. I agree with Popper on this, and he agrees with Hume. Why don't you stop hiding behind JS Mill's skirts, who in turn is hiding behind the skirts of a false assumption? Do you think if you keep intoning how famous and influential Mill's piece is that will somehow make his conclusions true? The passage you cite is useful, however, as an excellent example of precisely where he goes wrong:

JS Mill: We must first observe that there is a principle implied in the very statement of what induction is; an assumption with regard to the course of nature and the order of the universe; namely, that there are such things in nature as parallel cases; that what happens once will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, recur. This, I say, is an assumption involved in every case of induction.
...This universal fact, which is our warrant for all inferences from experience, has been described by different philosophers in different forms of language; that the course of nature is uniform; that the universe is governed by general laws; and the like. (Book III, Chapter III.)

In this passage Mill is actually conflating two separate assumptions:

A1.The universe is governed by general laws.

A2. Inferences from experience (ie inductive inferences) are warranted.

Now, what is the difference between these two assumptions? Well, the second one is, via logical analysis, demonstrably false.

The first one, however, is not.

So this is where Mill at least is going wrong. I fear your case may be more complicated...;-)

Oh, and are you going to acknowledge that your "infinite regress" argument was incorrect?

Edited September 13, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

Brant Gaede · September 13, 2010

Any kind of reasoning can be rationally warranted qua reason. You may or may not get somewhere, just like this conversation. If you are being stymied by induction throw in some deduction and vice versa. Are you guys trying to get somewhere? Keep arguing form over real substance and you won't. The scientists aren't sitting around waiting for the end of your debate so they can get to work using the correct methodology.

--Brant

Daniel Barnes · September 13, 2010

Any kind of reasoning can be rationally warranted qua reason. You may or may not get somewhere, just like this conversation. If you are being stymied by induction throw in some deduction and vice versa. Are you guys trying to get somewhere? Keep arguing form over real substance and you won't. The scientists aren't sitting around waiting for the end of your debate so they can get to work using the correct methodology.
--Brant

This conversation is getting somewhere Brant, albeit somewhat tediously. At least it is in my view. If you disagree, don't play.

For a start, you now know that a very commonly held assumption is actually false. But you can continue to hold it by all means - that's a personal decision, not a logical one.

Edited September 13, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

George H. Smith · September 13, 2010

The issue here is whether inductive reasoning is ever rationally warranted. Hume said never, absolutely never, not even in regard to the empirical generalizations that we make in everyday life. So let's clear this up: Do you agree with Hume?
Yes, obviously.
More specifically, do you agree with Hume that we have no rational basis whatsoever for assuming that future events will even resemble past events?
Yes, obviously.
Ignore the rest of this post, if you like, but please address this issue. And don't hide behind Popper's skirts. Explain your own position.
This is getting boring. I agree with Popper on this, and he agrees with Hume.

I knew I was asking the improbable when I asked you to explain your views. If you agree with Hume's fundamental views on causation and identity, then you should also believe that no scientific method, including Popper's falsificationism, has any rational basis.

Why don't you stop hiding behind JS Mill's skirts, who in turn is hiding behind the skirts of a false assumption? Do you think if you keep intoning how famous and influential Mill's piece is that will somehow make his conclusions true?

Huh? I don't agree with Mill on a number of significant issues. I briefly quoted him on a few specific issues as a point of interest, as I have sometimes quoted other philosophers, such as Joseph. And I never quoted Mill in lieu of defending my own position, as you have done repeatedly with Popper. You treat Popper as Randroids treat Rand. You think that citing him is enough, without defending your own views in your own words.

The passage you cite is useful, however, as an excellent example of precisely where he goes wrong:
JS Mill: We must first observe that there is a principle implied in the very statement of what induction is; an assumption with regard to the course of nature and the order of the universe; namely, that there are such things in nature as parallel cases; that what happens once will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, recur. This, I say, is an assumption involved in every case of induction.
...This universal fact, which is our warrant for all inferences from experience, has been described by different philosophers in different forms of language; that the course of nature is uniform; that the universe is governed by general laws; and the like. (Book III, Chapter III.)
In this passage Mill is actually conflating two separate assumptions:
A1.The universe is governed by general laws.
A2. Inferences from experience (ie inductive inferences) are warranted.
Now, what is the difference between these two assumptions? Well, the second one is, via logical analysis, demonstrably false.
The first one, however, is not.

If the second statement is "demonstrably false," then how about demonstrating it? I'm afraid we will need more than your word for this claim.

So this is where Mill at least is going wrong. I fear your case may be more complicated...;-)

At least I argue for my positions....

Oh, and are you going to acknowledge that your "infinite regress" argument was incorrect?

I'm not sure which "argument" you are referring to. I recall mentioning that Popper was wrong in attributing his infinite regress argument to Hume, and I was correct about this. I also recall ending a post with something like, "Now, that's an infinite regress." That was an offhand polemical tag, not an argument. So did I miss something? Did I mention another infinite regress argument? I can't recall any.

It is ironic, however, that you keep demanding that I defend some incidental argument when you won't even give us any first hand arguments to support your fundamental views about induction. All you say is that you agree with Popper, who agreed with Hume. La-de-da.

The problem here is that Popper misunderstood Hume on a number of points. So what you should have said is that you agree with Popper's misinterpretations of Hume. You have obviously never read Hume for yourself. If Popper tells you what he said, as Rand tells us what Kant said, that is sufficient for any true believer.

Should you ever wish to explain, in your own words, why you think inductive reasoning is demonstrably false, I will be all ears. I will also be pleasantly surprised.

Ghs

kiaer.ts · September 13, 2010

This conversation is getting somewhere Brant, albeit somewhat tediously.

Oh, no, don't start blaming me.

George H. Smith · September 13, 2010

Any kind of reasoning can be rationally warranted qua reason. You may or may not get somewhere, just like this conversation. If you are being stymied by induction throw in some deduction and vice versa. Are you guys trying to get somewhere? Keep arguing form over real substance and you won't. The scientists aren't sitting around waiting for the end of your debate so they can get to work using the correct methodology.
--Brant
This conversation is getting somewhere Brant, albeit somewhat tediously. At least it is in my view. If you disagree, don't play.
For a start, you now know that a very commonly held assumption is actually false. But you can continue to hold it by all means - that's a personal decision, not a logical one.

Daniel invokes the words "logic" and "logical" like theists invoke the word "God." And, from I've seen so far, Daniel doesn't know any more about logic than theists know about God.

Ghs

merjet · September 13, 2010

Daniel invokes the words "logic" and "logical" like theists invoke the word "God." And, from I've seen so far, Daniel doesn't know any more about logic than theists know about God.

The same can be said for "rational", for example:

So it turned out this perfectly natural and seemingly indispensable assumption had no rational justification whatsoever. (link)

Michael Stuart Kelly · September 13, 2010

Me to George at the beginning of last month:

But if you want the discussion to get more interesting, ask Daniel about Popper. You will find that he is hell-bent on slaying Rand, but it's over far more than nothing. He wants to tear down one god to make sure the place of another is not threatened.
The fact that most people who like Rand don't think in terms like that (i.e., thinker-gods) doesn't seem to matter. I speak from years of discussing things with Daniel. He is one of the most religious people I know.

Daniel's response:

Michael, you sure write some dumb-ass stuff.

Now, a bazillion posts later (some quite technical) between George and Daniel:

... I never quoted Mill in lieu of defending my own position, as you have done repeatedly with Popper. You treat Popper as Randroids treat Rand. You think that citing him is enough, without defending your own views in your own words.

Daniel invokes the words "logic" and "logical" like theists invoke the word "God." And, from I've seen so far, Daniel doesn't know any more about logic than theists know about God.

Heh.

Michael

Brant Gaede · September 13, 2010

Any kind of reasoning can be rationally warranted qua reason. You may or may not get somewhere, just like this conversation. If you are being stymied by induction throw in some deduction and vice versa. Are you guys trying to get somewhere? Keep arguing form over real substance and you won't. The scientists aren't sitting around waiting for the end of your debate so they can get to work using the correct methodology.
--Brant
This conversation is getting somewhere Brant, albeit somewhat tediously. At least it is in my view. If you disagree, don't play.
For a start, you now know that a very commonly held assumption is actually false. But you can continue to hold it by all means - that's a personal decision, not a logical one.

What is reason with your position and what is it without? And are you claiming a significant defect in the scientific method as commonly used? You talk about the illogic of inductive reasoning but can it be used by you for anything? If a man has two legs, one inductive and the other deductive, and we cut off one won't the poor bastard fall down?

--Brant

it's a gestalt thing

George H. Smith · September 13, 2010

Any kind of reasoning can be rationally warranted qua reason. You may or may not get somewhere, just like this conversation. If you are being stymied by induction throw in some deduction and vice versa. Are you guys trying to get somewhere? Keep arguing form over real substance and you won't. The scientists aren't sitting around waiting for the end of your debate so they can get to work using the correct methodology.
--Brant
This conversation is getting somewhere Brant, albeit somewhat tediously. At least it is in my view. If you disagree, don't play.
For a start, you now know that a very commonly held assumption is actually false. But you can continue to hold it by all means - that's a personal decision, not a logical one.
What is reason with your position and what is it without? And are you claiming a significant defect in the scientific method as commonly used? You talk about the illogic of inductive reasoning but can it be used by you for anything? If a man has two legs, one inductive and the other deductive, and we cut off one won't the poor bastard fall down?
--Brant
it's a gestalt thing

I cannot speak for Daniel, obviously, but I can briefly explain Popper's views on this subject. And I think we can safely assume that Daniel follows in lockstep.

When Popper speaks of "conjectures," he means it. For Popper, a hypothesis based on induction is a mere conjecture, one with no more probability that a conjecture pulled out of thin air with no inductive or observational credibility. He claims that all such conjectural hypotheses have a probability of zero.

Popper often refers to the old distinction between the method of discovery and the logic of verification -- except Popper speaks of corroboration instead of verification (or justification), since he doesn't believe that any hypothesis can be verified (or justified). Induction, which has no cognitive status whatsoever, might suggest a conjecture, which would then be subjected to falsification tests. But a scientist could with equal justification concoct a hypothesis from thin air and test that as well. Thus repeated observations and the inductive generalizations based on those observations might serve as a method of discovery ,but they can never serve as a method of corroboration. Induction is not part of the "logic" of science.

This is an untenable position for several reasons. One of the most serious pertains to the Humean grounds on which the rejection of induction is based. Popper flits all around this issue, claiming to reject Hume's sensationalist epistemology while accepting his criticism of induction. The problem here is that Hume's argument against induction would make no sense at all without its epistemological foundation, and Popper never satisfactorily explains how he can accept Hume's critique of induction while repudiating its foundation.

Hume's epistemological views -- specifically, his positions on causation and identity -- wreak havoc on all scientific methods and endeavors, including Popper's beloved falsificationism. As I pointed out some time ago on another thread, scientific instruments and their readings could not be accepted as reliable, since we would have no rational basis to assume that future readings will correspond to past readings. And without presupposing causation, we would have no reason to think that scientific instruments measure anything. There would be no way to link an effect (a reading) with a cause (the phenomenon being measured). The readings would be totally random.

In addition, should a given hypothesis be falsified by an experiment or prediction on one occasion, we would have no good reason to assume that the same hypothesis would be falsified by the same experiment or prediction in the future.

Scientists rely a good deal on the repetition of experiments. And these repetitions would have no cognitive value without presupposing the "uniformity of nature." To repeat experiments, claiming that results are more reliable when the findings of one scientist are confirmed by other scientists, is to engage in inductive reasoning -- the very thing that Hume and Popper repudiate. If inductive generalizations can never be justified, we would have no rational warrant to assume that future experiments will yield the same results as past experiments.

Ghs

Brant Gaede · September 13, 2010

In addition, should a given hypothesis be falsified by an experiment or prediction on one occasion, we would have no good reason to assume that the same hypothesis would be falsified by the same experiment or prediction in the future.
Scientists rely a good deal on the repetition of experiments. And these repetitions would have no cognitive value without presupposing the "uniformity of nature." To repeat experiments, claiming that results are more reliable when the findings of one scientist are confirmed by other scientists, is to engage in inductive reasoning -- the very thing that Hume and Popper repudiate. If inductive generalizations can never be justified, we would have no rational warrant to assume that future experiments will yield the same results as past experiments.

Well, no matter how many repetitions of experiments it only takes one experiment that is repeatable and repeated that contradicts a theory to invalidate it, so you cannot escape the tentativeness of this type of knowledge. Induction cannot give you absolute knowledge, nothing can, and absolutism is core Objectivism, culturally if not intellectually. There is nothing a standard Objectivist likes to do more than go around saying "Absolutely!"--end of discussion. This relief from thinking must be a profound default to over-taxed neurons needing rest. To me it's a declaration that "I'm saved! Praise the Lord [Ayn Rand]!"

--Brant

Edited September 13, 2010 by Brant Gaede

George H. Smith · September 13, 2010

In addition, should a given hypothesis be falsified by an experiment or prediction on one occasion, we would have no good reason to assume that the same hypothesis would be falsified by the same experiment or prediction in the future.
Scientists rely a good deal on the repetition of experiments. And these repetitions would have no cognitive value without presupposing the "uniformity of nature." To repeat experiments, claiming that results are more reliable when the findings of one scientist are confirmed by other scientists, is to engage in inductive reasoning -- the very thing that Hume and Popper repudiate. If inductive generalizations can never be justified, we would have no rational warrant to assume that future experiments will yield the same results as past experiments.
Well, no matter how many repetitions of experiments it only takes one experiment that is repeatable and repeated that contradicts a theory to invalidate it, so you cannot escape the tentativeness of this type of knowledge. Induction cannot give you absolute knowledge, nothing can, and absolutism is core Objectivism, culturally if not intellectually. There is nothing a standard Objectivist likes to do more than go around saying "Absolutely!"--end of discussion. This relief from thinking must be a profound default to over-taxed neurons needing rest. To me it's a declaration that "I'm saved! Praise the Lord [Ayn Rand]!"
--Brant

Things are not this simple. Even Popper recognized that a single experiment -- a so-called "crucial experiment" -- that contradicts a theory does not necessarily disprove that theory. This is so because ad hoc explanations can always be given that explain away the contradiction as an apparent contradiction only.

Moreover, as many philosophers of science have pointed out, a well-established theory will not usually be rejected on the basis of one experiment until and unless there exists a better theory to replace it. The anomaly may raise doubts and thereby motivate scientists to develop a better theory, but until that is done the established theory will tend to prevail. Some changes might involve the "paradigm shifts" that Thomas Kuhn regarded as emblematic of scientific revolutions.

Ghs

Daniel Barnes · September 14, 2010

If a man has two legs, one inductive and the other deductive, and we cut off one won't the poor bastard fall down?

The problem is that one leg kicks the other out from under him.

Daniel Barnes · September 14, 2010

Daniel invokes the words "logic" and "logical" like theists invoke the word "God." And, from I've seen so far, Daniel doesn't know any more about logic than theists know about God.

LOL! That's more like the way you invoke "causality" and "identity".

Edited September 14, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

Daniel Barnes · September 14, 2010

That was an offhand polemical tag, not an argument. So did I miss something? Did I mention another infinite regress argument? I can't recall any.

Try the very first post on this thread.

Edited September 14, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

Michael Stuart Kelly · September 14, 2010

I reminded about the old joke from the Wild West days of a person being as busy as a one-legged man in an ass-kicking contest.

Michael

Eating Dirt etc

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