David Harriman's Book


Robert Campbell

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I've yet to learn why "The Problem of Induction" is a problem.

Because there is no way you can be certain that a generalization you arrive at will be true for all cases. NO WAY.

Are you certain of this for all cases, Ellen?

<br><br><br><br>A simple example proves Ellen's point. The concept of "fluid heat" (aka caloric) was arrived at inductively. It was disproved by a simple experiment. Boring the barrels of canons produced an indefinite amount of heat that was associated with the motion of the drill. *There was no way to account for the amount of caloric to account for the heat. The source of the heat was the motion and the friction. One induction down the drain proves that induction is not generally valid. I thought this example was more interesting than the famous white crow and the fabulous black swan. Induction has led to theories that have held up and it has also led to theories that have failed. For example, Newtonian gravitation which we know is off since it does not account for the precession of the perihelion of Mercury (the same is true for other planets as well, Venus, and even the Moon, but this was discovered much later using better equipment).

Ba'al Chatzaf<br><br>*done by Count Rumford (Benjamin Thompson) at the end of the 18th century.  Subsequent experiments by Joule completely nailed the lid shut on the caloric theory of heat.  Caloric theory was not silly or absurd and it did have some experimental support but other difficulties made the theory untenable. <br>

Edited by BaalChatzaf
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But, Ba'al.

How many times was induction/abduction successful and valid? The exceptions you outlined sometimes proves the rule.

I don't understand why induction and deduction have been seen to be dichotomous. Surely, they 'work' best when they are both applied simultaneously;ie, when they interact... obviously with deduction having the final say.

Couldn't this be a false dichotomy?

(Btw, in the realm of philosophy, I'll take 90+% right, any day. :D )

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I've yet to learn why "The Problem of Induction" is a problem.

--Brant

Unlike George, I find Popper's views on induction exceedingly intelligent.

I think that what maybe confuses people of O'ist orientation is the term "valid." Sure, we can't exist without proceeding on assumptions that tomorrow will be, in significant respects, like today. But inductive reasoning can't ever provide necessarily true conclusions. Our inductive reasoning could turn out to be wrong. It's happened over and over and over in the history of science.

First, Popper rejects "inductivism" per se, not just in science.

Second, Popper doesn't believe that induction can yield even low levels of probability.

Third, Popper doesn't believe that science is capable of arriving at necessarily true conclusions, so that is not his beef with induction. Indeed, Popper doesn't believe that the conclusions of science can be "justified" at all; his rejection of "justificationism" is one of the most famous parts of his approach. The most we can say is that some "conjectures" -- guesses, in effect -- have withstood criticism better than others.

Thus, however intelligent you think Popper's views on induction are, your own views are much different than his. Popper's objections to induction are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, whereas yours are. By this I mean that the problems you express go back at least to Aristotle, who also maintained that induction, in and of itself, is incapable of yielding certainty. This is why Aristotle argued that only deductively certain conclusions are truly scientific. (Scientia originally signified certain knowledge in any field.) The rehabilitation of induction by Francis Bacon and others was an important feature of the Scientific Revolution. This was a revolt against the deductive method of scholasticism, which relied heavily on Aristotle.

Many defenders of induction have maintained that it is only capable of yielding degrees of probability, depending on the context. But if even this much is correct, then Popper is wrong.

Ghs

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I've yet to learn why "The Problem of Induction" is a problem.

--Brant

Because there is no way you can be certain that a generalization you arrive at will be true for all cases. NO WAY. And Harriman has not provided such a way. If there were such a way, who would need scientific investigation?

What is the matter with the certainty of uncertainty? I think it's a virtue of great value. "Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!" did not deny the existence and danger of mines in Mobile harbor, only that sometimes acting is a virtue in the face of even dangerous uncertainty. Living is tough; we keep bumping into things.

--Brant

Edited by Brant Gaede
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As much as I like Popper in many ways, his objections to inductive reasoning have never made much sense to me. (I reread some of his stuff just a few weeks ago. )

I thought you said a minute ago that they were "some of the silliest things he ever wrote." Now it seems you're saying you didn't quite get them, and wouldn't mind talking them over with someone just in case they might not be so silly. That seems a bit more reasonable.

I said that Popper's arguments don't make much sense to me. They don't make much sense because they are so silly, and I cannot understand how someone of his intelligence would defend them. My own opinion is that Popper was overly concerned with being a revolutionary thinker, and he sometimes went overboard.

I would therefore like to engage an intelligent Popperian on this subject. If you know where I can find one, please let me know.

I recommend my good friend Rafe Champion, who posts over at Matt Dioguardi's most excellent CriticalRationalism blog. If there's a relevant thread, perhaps you could drop in with any questions you might have.

Alternately I recommend the Critical Rationalism Yahoo group, which Matt also moderates. Though I haven't posted over there for a long time, Ken Hopf is a particularly good commenter and I see he's posting a bit right now, so you could fire a few queries his way. Incidentally, he's a former Objectivist, so he knows that side of the street too.

I guess my sarcasm escaped you, so I will fill in the blank: If you know where I can find an intelligent Popperian, please let me know, because I can't find any on OL.

Or am I wrong? Can you actually speak for yourself and summarize your Popperian rejection of induction? Or may we expect nothing more than additional sarcastic quips indicating how naive anyone who defends induction must be?

Ghs

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But, Ba'al.

How many times was induction/abduction successful and valid? The exceptions you outlined sometimes proves the rule.

I don't understand why induction and deduction have been seen to be dichotomous. Surely, they 'work' best when they are both applied simultaneously;ie, when they interact... obviously with deduction having the final say.

Couldn't this be a false dichotomy?

(Btw, in the realm of philosophy, I'll take 90+% right, any day. :D )

The following passage by Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel (An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, Routledge, 1934, p. 278) gives a fairly typical account of the complementary nature of induction and deduction, one frequently found in books on logic.

In general, not all the premises required logically in an inductive argument are known to be true. For we do not know that the examined instances in which a general proposition is verified are representative or fair samples of the entire class to which they belong. The specific problem of induction is to determine to what extent the samples are fair. Consequently, while induction and deduction are not opposed as forms of inference, nevertheless deduction is not concerned with the truth or falsity of its premises, while the characteristic nature of induction is to be concerned with just that. Induction may therefore be viewed as the method by means of which the material truth of the premises is established. The proper contrast is not between deductive and inductive inference, but between inferences that are necessary and inferences that are probable.

I would maintain that some conclusions reached via induction are certain, even if not deductively so, but this difference with Cohen and Nagel stems from differing conceptions of certainty. Specifically, I disagree with their comment that immediately follows the passage quoted above: "For the evidence for universal propositions which deal with matters of fact can never be more than probable." Nevertheless, I agree with the substance of their remarks, and if instead of claiming certainty an inductivist wishes to claim only a high degree of probability, I can easily live with that.

Ghs

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Reply to post #23.

Barnes, please tell us why you eat isn't completely irrational. I can guess the real answer already -- not that you would say it -- a stolen concept.

I eat because i'm hungry Merlin, not because I've done it x times before!

"I don't always drink beer, but when I do I prefer Dos Equis. Stay thirsty, my friend."

--Brant

the most interesting man in the world (but only one bottle left)

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My opinion for years, without knowledge of Peikoff's or anyone else's, has been that concept formation is induction, pure and simple.

Rand already stated that concept formation was essentially a process of induction. ITOE, p. 36: "The process of observing facts of reality and of integrating them into concepts is, in essence, a process of induction."

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I eat because i'm hungry Merlin, not because I've done it x times before!

That did not answer my question. Please tell us why your eating isn't completely irrational. Why do you believe that eating will get rid of the hunger?

Because it is an extremely well tested theory!...;-)

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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I've yet to learn why "The Problem of Induction" is a problem.

--Brant

Because there is no way you can be certain that a generalization you arrive at will be true for all cases. NO WAY. And Harriman has not provided such a way. If there were such a way, who would need scientific investigation?

What is the matter with the certainty of uncertainty? I think it's a virtue of great value. "Damn the torpedoes! Full speed ahead!" did not deny the existence and danger of mines in Mobile harbor, only that sometimes acting is a virtue in the face of even dangerous uncertainty. Living is tough; we keep bumping into things.

--Brant

There is wisdom here. Do anything significantly creative and you'll be surrounded by uncertainty. The difference in outcomes is how one proceeds. One can take hints from signs that point in a certain direction, be diligent in looking for contradictions, etc., doing one's best to follow reason and reality. Sometimes a rock solid argument takes you forward. Sometimes all you have are signs that consistently point in a certain direction with nothing pointing away from it, and you can't just sit there doing nothing, you have to move forward. Moving forward reveals the sign as genuine or as a mirage, how often it's genuine depends on how diligent and honest you are.

The other way to deal with uncertainty is to copy what others have done in similar circumstances, or to quickly latch on to some idea from your subconscious. Which is a good recipe for subverting creativity and ending up with a mess.

That said, there is no uncertainty about certain things, such as individual rights. I am certain that no one will ever create a valid argument for usurping my (properly understood) individual rights. They are not "contextual" or "contextually absolute"; they are absolute truth, just as my life itself is not "contextual", it simply is.

Shayne

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I eat because i'm hungry Merlin, not because I've done it x times before!

That did not answer my question. Please tell us why your eating isn't completely irrational. Why do you believe that eating will get rid of the hunger?

Because it is an extremely well tested theory!...;-)

And why do you assume that foods you commonly eat won't poison you? Have you "tested" each and every one of those foods?

The belief that eating will satisfy hunger has been verified via inductive reasoning. You don't eat, you get hungry. You don't eat again, you get hungry again. And so forth. From these particular cases, we reasonably infer that we will always get hungry if we don't eat. We thereby establish a causal relationship between satisfying our hunger and eating.

Only a true-believing Popperian -- and an especially dense one at that -- would insist that we form a hypothesis about the relationship between eating and hunger and then, having failed to falsify this "conjecture," accept it provisionally as relatively better than other hypotheses.

Ghs

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I guess my sarcasm escaped you, so I will fill in the blank: If you know where I can find an intelligent Popperian, please let me know, because I can't find any on OL.

It didn't escape me at all, but I guess the humour in my reply escaped you. Never mind.

Or am I wrong? Can you actually speak for yourself and summarize your Popperian rejection of induction? Or may we expect nothing more than additional sarcastic quips indicating how naive anyone who defends induction must be?

I've just given a thumbnail overview of the problem a few posts up. As you've already outlined Popper's position to Ellen a few posts up it's obvious you're familiar with it, so I'm not sure exactly what you want me to explain? I did note this remark of yours to Ellen:

Popper's objections to induction are not of the run-of-the-mill variety, whereas yours are.

Popper's objections to induction are the same as Hume's. He says he merely took Hume's objection more seriously than Hume did (although he disagrees with Hume's theory of knowledge). It seems pretty reasonable to consider Hume's objections "run of the mill" by now.

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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Only a true-believing Popperian -- and an especially dense one at that -- would insist that we form a hypothesis about the relationship between eating and hunger and then, having failed to falsify this "conjecture," accept it provisionally as relatively better than other hypotheses.

Yes, this is what Popperians say, and not even just especially dense ones...;-) Can you point out what is illogical about it? I'm happy to point out what is illogical about the claim that, say, because I've eaten breakfast x times in the past, I will always eat breakfast in the future, because that is indeed what an inductive belief amounts to. Are you trying to claim, based on your prior observations, that people eating breakfast is some kind of universal law? It hardly can be: I skipped it just the other day.Or perhaps you are trying to argue that because you've observed people eating when they are hungry, that it follows that there is a universal law that people always eat when they are hungry? Well this would be obviously false too: see here, here, and here. Or are you arguing that the probability of my eating breakfast tomorrow, or not developing anorexia, is somehow higher due to the number of times I've eaten breakfast or food in general in the past? If so, please show us your workings ie because I have eaten breakfast x times in the past, the probability is x that I will eat breakfast tomorrow. If not, what exactly are you trying to claim?

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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The problem as you will know ad tedium was made famous by Hume, even though pre-dates him and he never called it such. We may summarise it as the problem of obtaining universal laws from particular instances - in effect, obtaining knowledge of future occurrences (for universal laws are predictive) from observations of past ones.

Who has ever claimed that we can arrive at universal laws solely through observing and adding up particular instances? Name one philosopher.

We might call "induction" the belief that this process is reasonable, and even possible. After all, it seems to track with our everyday experience: we see the sun rise every morning and have done all our lives, it seems unthinkable that it will not do so tomorrow. In fact, the more often we've observed something occur in a certain fashion, the more confident we feel that it will occur in this fashion in the future. Once we've seen something happen often enough, why, we just know that it will happen the same way again.

Do you expect anyone to take this account seriously?

Hume, being a particularly rigorous fellow and disinclined to take anything for granted, especially the obvious, looked at this seemingly undeniable process and said "Hey...wait just a second. What exactly is the justification for this seemingly undeniable belief?" There's no logically valid way of getting from 1, or 1,000, or 1,000,000 observations to anything like a universal law, for any such generalisation must always outstrip the evidence for it. Further, if we try justify induction a different way, 'inductively' - by saying that hey, induction has worked in the past, so it must work in the future, right? - this too is a fallacy, because it's simply another appeal to experience to justify the first appeal to experience. Hume pointed out that this question could be renewed each time this justification was offered, so effectively led to an infinite regress. So no such luck there either. Even appeals to probability - that, ok, if not certain, then perhaps a conclusion justified by prior observations would be more probable - are, sadly, fatally destroyed in the same stroke.

Hume was anything but "rigorous" in this area. His rejection of induction, which depended upon his rejections of causation and identity (i.e., the persistence of the same existent through time), was based on his extremely crude epistemology, according to which ideas are the faint impressions of sensations. Hume has no theory of abstraction. Can we point to sensations that correspond to our ideas of causation and identity? No, said Hume, so we have no rational warrant to believe in them, and by implication no rational warrant to believe in induction. (As Herbert Spencer pointed out, there is also no sensation that corresponds to our idea of "habit," but that didn't stop Hume from attributing causation to a psychological habit. Nor did Hume's rejection of causation prevent him from arguing that our observations of regular occurrences cause us to form certain psychological expectations.)

So it turned out this perfectly natural and seemingly indispensable assumption had no rational justification whatsoever.

What bunk this is. As the Scottish philosopher (and Hume's contemporary) Thomas Reid pointed out, we have seen many cases of night following day, but we don't assume that day is the cause of night. We do not, as Hume contended, assume that causation is operative merely because of temporal succession and spatial contiguity. (This is important because, as noted previously, Hume's rejection of induction is based on his dismissal of causal necessity.)

Ghs

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Only a true-believing Popperian -- and an especially dense one at that -- would insist that we form a hypothesis about the relationship between eating and hunger and then, having failed to falsify this "conjecture," accept it provisionally as relatively better than other hypotheses.

Yes, this is what Popperians say, and not even just especially dense ones...;-) Can you point out what is illogical about it?

It's simply not true.

Suppose you ask a person why he believes that eating will satisfy his hunger. He will give a response very similar to the one I gave. But then you, being a true Popperian, correct him:

"No, no, that's not why you believe this at all. You see, at some point in your life -- perhaps when you were a baby -- you got hungry and were curious what would satisfy it. You then formed a hypothesis; you conjectured that, well, maybe eating something will end my hunger. Then you decided to test your hypothesis, i.e., to falsify it, by eating some food. That didn't falsify your hypothesis, so you stayed with that conjecture, and, like any rational person, you are still attempting to falsify it. But you haven't so far, so when someone asks if you are certain that eating will satisfy your hunger, you should say: No, of course not; I could never be certain of such a thing. All I say is that I have not yet been able to falsify my hypothesis."

What balderdash this is. To the extent that is has any plausibility whatsoever, this is only because it is surreptitiously riding piggy back on inductive reasoning. In some ways it is nothing more than a tortuous restatement of inductive reasoning.

I'm happy to point out what is illogical about the claim that, say, because I've eaten breakfast x times in the past, I will always eat breakfast in the future, because that is indeed what an inductive belief amounts to. Are you trying to claim, based on your prior observations, that people eating breakfast is some kind of universal law? It hardly can be: I skipped it just the other day.Or perhaps you are trying to argue that because you've observed people eating when they are hungry, that it follows that there is a universal law that people always eat when they are hungry?

Who would ever argue that because I have eaten breakfast x times in the past, this means that I will always eat breakfast in the future? This is not inductive reasoning, not even crappy inductive reasoning. This would be inductive reasoning if I concluded that my nature necessitates that I eat breakfast every day. And I would never maintain this, because it is obviously wrong. (Another alternative pertains to human habits. If we know that a person has formed regular habits, we might reasonably conclude that he will probably do similar things in the future.)

Nor did I say anything about people always eating when they are hungry. My point is that people know that that eating will satisfy their hunger because of inductive reasoning. Hence: If a person wants to satisfy his hunger, then he will know to eat something, and he will know this because of his past experiences, not because he was (and is) attempting to falsify a hypothesis.

You are very confused about this matter. Your notion of induction is one that only a young child might accept -- and even then not a very bright child.

Ghs

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The problem as you will know ad tedium was made famous by Hume, even though pre-dates him and he never called it such. We may summarise it as the problem of obtaining universal laws from particular instances - in effect, obtaining knowledge of future occurrences (for universal laws are predictive) from observations of past ones.

Who has ever claimed that we can arrive at universal laws solely through observing and adding up particular instances? Name one philosopher.

I don't think anyone ever claimed that one arrives there alone. Deductive logic has always been part of the picture to a greater or lesser extent. The problem is observation's compatibility with deduction - how does it fit together? If observation is the way we establish the truth of our premises, by what means is that truth justified? It wasn't always clear just how fallacious the idea of enumerative observations establishing ever increasing certainty - moving from the observation that you have seen X white swans to "All swans are white" - really was. (As I recall JS Mill offered a variety of different types of induction, but ultimately admitted they all boiled down to the enumerative method). Popper primarily clarified how observations, such as scientific experiments, might be made to be more compatible - by falsifying, rather than attempting verification by sheer weight of numbers. (That's why his book is called "The Logic of Scientific Discovery", emphasis mine). A short overview of this complex tale can be found here.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_scientific_method

Edited by Daniel Barnes
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George,

A rhetorical thing is becoming clear in all this, one that I had noticed before, but never honed in on as clearly as now.

I have seen many arguments similar to Daniel's. They all do the following:

They take two events or items that form a pattern, but are not causally related. (Day following night or observing white swans.)

They pretend that pattern and causal connection are one and the same because we observe both and make an idea (or "integration" or whatever you want to call the mental note) about them.

Then they try to find an exception to the non-causal pattern they mentioned.

Once they do, they crow that this proves induction does not exist, or induction does not give us reliable information about reality, or whatever.

In their arguments, they do not distinguish between induction as a form of noticing patterns and induction as a form of arriving at causal relationships.

That's a humongous gap and equivocation. I believe, from the few things I have read from and about Popper, this was his gap, too.

btw - I find the "deduction trumping induction" (Popper & Co.) as opposed to "induction trumping deduction" (Peikoff, Harriman & Co.) dichotomy absolutely silly. It reminds me of the Rand Love/Hate dichotomy. You need both induction and deduction to validate knowledge. Eliminate one and there's no real way to use the other.

Anyway, back to the war of top fighting bottom while both try to claim the title of form.

Michael

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Suppose you ask a person why he believes that eating will satisfy his hunger. He will give a response very similar to the one I gave. But then you, being a true Popperian, correct him:

"No, no, that's not why you believe this at all. You see, at some point in your life -- perhaps when you were a baby -- you got hungry and were curious what would satisfy it. You then formed a hypothesis; you conjectured that, well, maybe eating something will end my hunger. Then you decided to test your hypothesis, i.e., to falsify it, by eating some food. That didn't falsify your hypothesis, so you stayed with that conjecture, and, like any rational person, you are still attempting to falsify it. But you haven't so far, so when someone asks if you are certain that eating will satisfy your hunger, you should say: No, of course not; I could never be certain of such a thing. All I say is that I have not yet been able to falsify my hypothesis."

What balderdash this is.

Well I agree, but then you wrote it. Actually, in terms of say a biological process like eating, Popper argues that our bodies are programmed with expectations; a baby does not need to first receive hypothetico-deductive instruction before looking for their mother's breast. But Popper argues these in-built expectations have no more rational weight than any other expectation - the mother's breast may turn out to actually be the solidified sap of a tree, suitably shaped. The baby's in-built expectations may be mistaken - they are therefore a form of hypothesis, or guess.

To the extent that is has any plausibility whatsoever, this is only because it is surreptitiously riding piggy back on inductive reasoning. In some ways it is nothing more than a tortuous restatement of inductive reasoning.

I am not one to argue over terms as you know, let alone mere "torturous restatements" of them. I leave that to professionals..;-) So you can indeed call the process whereby we first put forward imaginative hypotheses, then attempt to falsify them by observation and argument rather than verify them through enumeration, "induction" if you like. In that case, I will happily accept that I, just like yourself, am a rock-ribbed, true-believing inductivist. Kumbaya, baby!

An excellent result, as I'm sure Ellen will agree. And even better, poor Robert's thread won't get derailed either...

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