Concepts Vs Theories


Daniel Barnes

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This is obviously wrong. The referents of a higher level concept are the referents of the lower level concepts that are combined into the higher one. One of the higher level concepts Rand discussed in ITOE is furniture. The referents of "furniture" are the referents of tables, chairs, beds, etc." Pointing to the concrete instances works fine.

You cannot define 'furniture' by pointing at tables, chairs, beds, etc. In fact, 'ostensive definition' is a contradiction of terms, since it is not a definition at all, it is a physical act! It may be useful for a someone learning the names of things in a new language but that about it.

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This is obviously wrong. The referents of a higher level concept are the referents of the lower level concepts that are combined into the higher one. One of the higher level concepts Rand discussed in ITOE is furniture. The referents of "furniture" are the referents of tables, chairs, beds, etc." Pointing to the concrete instances works fine.

You cannot define 'furniture' by pointing at tables, chairs, beds, etc.

I didn't try to define "furniture" by pointing. I said "furniture" had referents one can point to.

In fact, 'ostensive definition' is a contradiction of terms, since it is not a definition at all, it is a physical act! It may be useful for a someone learning the names of things in a new language but that about it.

I think it is odd -- not a contradiction -- but the use of 'ostensive definition' is fairly common.

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This is obviously wrong. The referents of a higher level concept are the referents of the lower level concepts that are combined into the higher one. One of the higher level concepts Rand discussed in ITOE is furniture. The referents of "furniture" are the referents of tables, chairs, beds, etc." Pointing to the concrete instances works fine.

You cannot define 'furniture' by pointing at tables, chairs, beds, etc.

I didn't try to define "furniture" by pointing. I said "furniture" had referents one can point to.

In fact, 'ostensive definition' is a contradiction of terms, since it is not a definition at all, it is a physical act! It may be useful for a someone learning the names of things in a new language but that about it.

I think it is odd -- not a contradiction -- but the use of 'ostensive definition' is fairly common.

You can't point to "a furniture", there is no such thing. 'Furniture' refers to a generalization, abstraction, class, etc. that exists only in our brain.

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You can't point to "a furniture", there is no such thing. 'Furniture' refers to a generalization, abstraction, class, etc. that exists only in our brain.

Nonsense. You can point to a piece of furniture, such as a sofa. Suppose Joe says, "Let's move the furniture out of the bedroom so we can paint there next." The furniture Joe refers to is merely in his brain?

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You can't point to "a furniture", there is no such thing. 'Furniture' refers to a generalization, abstraction, class, etc. that exists only in our brain.

Nonsense. You can point to a piece of furniture, such as a sofa. Suppose Joe says, "Let's move the furniture out of the bedroom so we can paint there next." The furniture Joe refers to is merely in his brain?

Lets avoid confusion. I enclose the word with single quotes when I refer to the abstraction and not the object. The movers pick up and move furniture, not 'furniture'.

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And another thing, even 'chair' refers to a generalization, abstraction, class, etc. of all the individual things we call 'chairs'.

That's only part of it. In "the chair I am sitting in", "chair" does not refer to an abstraction. It refers to a particular.

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This is obviously wrong. The referents of a higher level concept are the referents of the lower level concepts that are combined into the higher one. One of the higher level concepts Rand discussed in ITOE is furniture. The referents of "furniture" are the referents of tables, chairs, beds, etc." Pointing to the concrete instances works fine.

You cannot define 'furniture' by pointing at tables, chairs, beds, etc.

I didn't try to define "furniture" by pointing. I said "furniture" had referents one can point to.

In fact, 'ostensive definition' is a contradiction of terms, since it is not a definition at all, it is a physical act! It may be useful for a someone learning the names of things in a new language but that about it.

I think it is odd -- not a contradiction -- but the use of 'ostensive definition' is fairly common.

You can't point to "a furniture", there is no such thing. 'Furniture' refers to a generalization, abstraction, class, etc. that exists only in our brain.

Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

Thanks, but that is a description of the Objectivist position (and an inaccurate one - it is realist, but not naive realist - see Kelley's Evidence of the Senses).

Can you actually present the Objectivist argument in a few sentences? You say " 'Furniture' refers to a generalization, abstraction, class, etc. that exists only in our brain." In your own words, what do Objectivists hold is the relation between abstractions, the mind, and external reality?

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Daniel to me:

If you keep insisting that Objectivism and Critical Rationalism are in such close agreement I really am going to have practise my harmonies on "Kumbaya"!

I don't anticipate there being a choral group to sing with for at least another decade or more, since Peikoff and Harriman fucked up. Plus < groan >, Harry Binswanger has expressed the opinion that Peikoff's theory solves the problem of induction. Looks to me as if apparent war will continue for some while.

Ellen

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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

But a pain is not an entity. Pains are the way by which we register damage or potential to our bodies. They are a type of proprioception, the sensation of a of an internal state. We can become aware of a wound, for example, by seeing it, feeling the wetness of the blood, by sensing the pain, or even smelling it if it becomes infected. Pain is not an entity. It is a sensation, like seeing red or smelling gasoline.

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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

But a pain is not an entity. Pains are the way by which we register damage or potential to our bodies. They are a type of proprioception, the sensation of a of an internal state. We can become aware of a wound, for example, by seeing it, feeling the wetness of the blood, by sensing the pain, or even smelling it if it becomes infected. Pain is not an entity. It is a sensation, like seeing red or smelling gasoline.

Pain is a bundle of neuron firings. That is entity enough for my reckoning.

The most solid objects you can think of is the jumping about of atoms.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

But a pain is not an entity. Pains are the way by which we register damage or potential to our bodies. They are a type of proprioception, the sensation of a of an internal state. We can become aware of a wound, for example, by seeing it, feeling the wetness of the blood, by sensing the pain, or even smelling it if it becomes infected. Pain is not an entity. It is a sensation, like seeing red or smelling gasoline.

Pain is a bundle of neuron firings. That is entity enough for my reckoning.

The most solid objects you can think of is the jumping about of atoms.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Maybe you could clarify that? As it stands, your first sentence (Pain is a bundle of neuron firings.) is elliptical to the point of equivocation, and on a plain reading, is simply false. Your second sentence (That is entity enough for my reckoning.) has a "that" whose reference is fatally ambiguous. And your third sentence (The most solid objects you can think of is the jumping about of atoms.) isn't even grammatical English.

And please don't drop context. Your prior claim (A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.) was that we directly know pain. Do you you really now mean to say that we directly know a bundle of neuron firings?

Also, let me know if you contest or did not understand the points I made myself. You did not respond to them.

Edited by Ted Keer
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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

But a pain is not an entity. Pains are the way by which we register damage or potential to our bodies. They are a type of proprioception, the sensation of a of an internal state. We can become aware of a wound, for example, by seeing it, feeling the wetness of the blood, by sensing the pain, or even smelling it if it becomes infected. Pain is not an entity. It is a sensation, like seeing red or smelling gasoline.

Pain is a bundle of neuron firings. That is entity enough for my reckoning.

The most solid objects you can think of is the jumping about of atoms.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Maybe you could clarify that? As it stands, your first sentence (Pain is a bundle of neuron firings.) is elliptical to the point of equivocation, and on a plain reading, is simply false. Your second sentence (That is entity enough for my reckoning.) has a "that" whose reference is fatally ambiguous. And your third sentence (The most solid objects you can think of is the jumping about of atoms.) isn't even grammatical English.

And please don't drop context. Your prior claim (A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.) was that we directly know pain. Do you you really now mean to say that we directly know a bundle of neuron firings?

Also, let me know if you contest or did not understand the points I made myself. You did not respond to them.

A pain you can feel is as much an entity as a brick in your hand. Clear enough?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited by BaalChatzaf
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A pain you can feel is as much an entity as a brick in your hand. Clear enough?

Clear as mud. Is pleasure an entity, too?

Specific pleasures. Yes. Such pleasures can be localized in space-time and are the effects of specific causes. Pleasure and pain are in our heads. That is a volume less than that of a basket ball.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Pain is very particular, yes, but it is not what I was talking about. All I am saying is that we cannot know objects (outside our skin) directly, we can only know abstractions of them.

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A pain you can feel is as much an entity as a brick in your hand. Clear enough?

Clear as mud. Is pleasure an entity, too?

Specific pleasures. Yes. Such pleasures can be localized in space-time and are the effects of specific causes. Pleasure and pain are in our heads. That is a volume less than that of a basket ball.

Ba'al Chatzaf

So what? X being locatable in space-time does not make X an entity. Motion is not an entity.

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It's not important what it's called, ie. an object, entity, unit, etc. What's important is separating what is inside our skin and what is outside. :) There is "something" out there but the thing we know and call 'chair' is in here. Now obviously the 2 are related, and this relation is similarity of structure.

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It's not important what it's called, ie. an object, entity, unit, etc. What's important is separating what is inside our skin and what is outside. :) There is "something" out there but the thing we know and call 'chair' is in here. Now obviously the 2 are related, and this relation is similarity of structure.

Is similarity inside your skin or outside it? :)

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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

But a pain is not an entity. Pains are the way by which we register damage or potential to our bodies. They are a type of proprioception, the sensation of a of an internal state. We can become aware of a wound, for example, by seeing it, feeling the wetness of the blood, by sensing the pain, or even smelling it if it becomes infected. Pain is not an entity. It is a sensation, like seeing red or smelling gasoline.

Pain is a bundle of neuron firings. That is entity enough for my reckoning.

The most solid objects you can think of is the jumping about of atoms.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Maybe you could clarify that? As it stands, your first sentence (Pain is a bundle of neuron firings.) is elliptical to the point of equivocation, and on a plain reading, is simply false. Your second sentence (That is entity enough for my reckoning.) has a "that" whose reference is fatally ambiguous. And your third sentence (The most solid objects you can think of is the jumping about of atoms.) isn't even grammatical English.

And please don't drop context. Your prior claim (A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.) was that we directly know pain. Do you you really now mean to say that we directly know a bundle of neuron firings?

Also, let me know if you contest or did not understand the points I made myself. You did not respond to them.

A pain you can feel is as much an entity as a brick in your hand. Clear enough?

Ba'al Chatzaf

Yes, you don't even know what the meaning of the word entity is.

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Yes, you've been saying the same thing for three years. I am curious if you have actually learned anything here. I don't want to know if you agree with the Objectivist position. What I want to know is, can you present the Objectivist position in response to your claim?

the Objectivist position, in this regard, is what is often referred to as "naive realism". It asserts that we can know objects directly whereas science tells us that we can only know abstractions directly.

A pain is very particular, not abstract and is known directly.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Pain is very particular, yes, but it is not what I was talking about. All I am saying is that we cannot know objects (outside our skin) directly, we can only know abstractions of them.

Once again, you have not presented the actual Objectivist position, Thomas. If you are able, would you please do so?

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A pain you can feel is as much an entity as a brick in your hand. Clear enough?

Clear as mud. Is pleasure an entity, too?

Specific pleasures. Yes. Such pleasures can be localized in space-time and are the effects of specific causes. Pleasure and pain are in our heads. That is a volume less than that of a basket ball.

Ba'al Chatzaf

So what? X being locatable in space-time does not make X an entity. Motion is not an entity.

"Pleasure and pain are in our heads"? This is an equivocation. Merlin's objections are spot on. Only primary ousia (entities and substances) have locations per se. Attributes and relations, which exist in regard to entities, can sometimes be referred to the location of the entity in a sense, but this is not exact speech, and in many cases it leads to absurdity. Where, for example, is the falsehood of Clinton's lie that he "did not have sex with that woman"? Where is the age of the Universe? Where is the fatherhood of GHW Bush for GW Bush? Yes, physical entities have locations. Do their locations have locations? Only entities have locations per se.

To say that my pain is in my head is false in one sense - no, it is in my stubbed toe - and metaphysically naive in another. It's based on the representationalist fallacy that posits what is in effect a homunculus in my brain experienceing my experiences like a little man sitting in a movei theater. In reality, the pain I experience of a stubbed toe exists in various ways in relation to my toe, the nerves in my leg, my spinal chord, and the rest of my consciousness, which itself exists in relation to my entire environment. Take away any one of those things and you cease to have this concrete pain which I feel in my toe. If the pain of my stubbed to is in my head - an abstract metaphor based on such notions as a sock being in a drawer- then how could a lotion on my foot or an injection in my spine matter? And if the pain of my stubbed toe is in my head, then why is it not a migraine or a sinus headache?

Statements like this are a form sloppy speech based on a confused synthesis of materialism and epistemological representationalism. They are as silly as saying Just as with evolution or relativistic physics, a rigorous and coherent discussion of this matter requires a knowledge of the proper epistemological and metaphysical concepts.

Edited by Ted Keer
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