Concepts Vs Theories

[Daniel Barnes]

Karl Popper, from "Unended Quest" p 19-30.

In order to explain these matters as I see them at present, I will make use of a table of ideas which I first published in "On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance".

This table is in itself quite trivial: the logical analogy between the left and right sides is well established. Howeve , it can be used to bring home my exhortation, which may now be reformulated as follows.

In spite of the perfect logical analogy between the left and the right sides of this table, the left-hand side is philosophically unimportant, while the right-hand side is philosophically all-important.

This implies the view that meaning philosophies and language philosophies (so far as they are concerned with words) are on the wrong track. In matters of the intellect, the only things worth striving for are true theories, or theories which come near the truth - at any rate nearer than some other (competing) theory, for example an older one.

This, I suppose, most people will admit; but they will be inclined to argue as follows. Whether a theory is true, or new, or intellectually significant, depends on its meaning; and the meaning of a theory (provided it is grammatically unambiguously formulated) is a function of the meanings of the words in which the theory is formulated. (Here, as in mathematics, a "function" is intended to take into account the order of the arguments.)

This view of the meaning of a theory seems almost obvious; it is widely held, and often unconsciously taken for granted. Nevertheless there is hardly any truth in it. I would counter it with the following rough formulation.

The relationship between a theory (or a statement) and the words used in its formulation is in several ways analogous to that between written words and the letters used in writing them down.

Letters play a merely technical or pragmatic role in the formulation of words. In my opinion, words also play a merely technical or pragmatic role in the formulation of theories. Thus both letters and words are mere means to ends (different ends). And the only intellectually important ends are: the formulation of problems; the tentative proposing of theories to solve them; and the critical discussion of the competing theories....

(There follows a discussion on translations, that every translation is an interpretation, and the impossibility of a precise translation of a difficult text).

...In view of all this, the idea of a precise language, or of precision in language, seems to be altogether misconceived. If we were to enter "Precision" in the Table of Ideas (see above) it would stand on the left hand side (because the linguistic precision of a statement would indeed depend entirely on the precision of the words used); its analogue on the right hand side might be "Certainty". I did not enter these two ideas, however, because my table is so constructed that the ideas in the right hand side are all valuable; yet both precision and certainty are false ideals. They are impossible to attain, and therefore dangerously misleading if they are uncritically accepted as guides. The quest for precision is analogous to the quest for certainty, and both should be abandoned.

I do not suggest, of course, that an increase in the precision of, say, a prediction, or even a formulation, may not sometimes be highly desirable. What I do suggest is that it is always undesirable to make an effort to increase precision for its own sake- especially linguistic precision-since this usually leads to a loss of clarity, and to a waste of time and effort on preliminaries which often turn out to be useless, because they are bypassed by the real advance of the subject: one should never try to be more precise than the problem situation demands...

(There follows some discussion of the logical issues around the informative content of theories eg the infinity of unforeseeable non-trivial statements belonging to the content of any theory)

These, I think, are some of the more important results which, during a lifetime, emerged from my anti-essentialist exhortation...One further result is, quite simply, the realization that the quest for precision, in words or concepts or meanings, is a wild-goose chase. There simply is no such thing as a precise concept (say, in Frege's sense), though concepts like "price of this kettle" and "thirty pence" are usually precise enough for the problem context in which they are used. (But note the fact that "thirty pence" is, as a social and economic concept, highly variable: it had a different significance a few years ago from what it has today.)

Frege's opinion is different; for he writes:"A definition of a concept...must determine unambiguously of any object whether or not it falls under the concept...Using a metaphor, we may say: the concept must have a sharp boundary." But it is clear that for this kind of absolute precision to be demanded of a defined concept, it must first be demanded of the defining concepts, and ultimately of our undefined, or primitive terms. Yet this is impossible. For either our undefined or primitive terms have a traditional meaning (which is never very precise) or they are introduced by so-called "implicit definitions' - that is, the way they are used in the context of a theory. This last way of introducing them- if they have to be "introduced" - seems to be the best. But this makes the meaning of the concepts depend on that of the theory, and most theories can be interpreted in more than one way. As a result, implicitly defined concepts, and thus all concepts which are defined explicitly with their help, become not merely "vague" but systematically ambiguous. And the various systematically ambiguous interpretations (such as the points and straight lines of projective geometry) may be completely distinct.

This should be sufficient to establish the fact that the "unambiguous" concepts, or concepts with "sharp boundary lines" do not exist. Thus we need not be surprised at a remark like that by Clifford A. Truesdell about the laws of thermodynamics:"Every physicist knows exactly what the first and second law mean, but...no two physicists agree about them."...

...However, the problem still remains: what should we do in order to make our meaning clearer, if greater clarity is needed? In the light of my exhortation the main answer to this question is: any move to increase clarity or precision must be ad hoc or "piecemeal". If because a lack of clarity a misunderstanding arises, do not try to lay new and more solid foundations on which to build a more precise "conceptual framework", but reformulation your formulations ad hoc, with a view to avoiding those misunderstandings which have arisen or which you can foresee...If greater precision is needed, it is needed because the problem to be solved demands it. Simply try you best to solve your problems and do not try in advance to make your concepts or formulations more precise in the fond hope that this will provide you with an arsenal for future use in tackling problems which have not yet arisen. They may never arise; the evolution of the theory may bypass all your efforts. The intellectual weapons which will be needed at a future date may be very different from those which anyone has in store. For example, it is almost certain that nobody trying to make the concept of simultaneity more precise would, before the discovery of Einstein's problem (the asymmetries in the electrodynamics of moving bodies), have hit on Einstein's "analysis"....

The ad hoc method of dealing with problems of clarity or precision as the need arises might be called "dialysis", in order to distinguish if from analysis: from the idea that language analysis as such may solve problems, or create an armory for future use. Dialysis cannot solve problems. It cannot do so any more than definition or explication or language analysis can: problems can only be solved with the help of new ideas. But our problems sometimes demand that we make new distinctions - ad hoc, for the purpose at hand.

...

Edited August 29, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[BaalChatzaf]

Do you seriously believe definitions will yield up useful facts about the physical world?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[kiaer.ts]

Do you seriously believe definitions will yield up useful facts about the physical world?

Ba'al Chatzaf

The physical world, as opposed to what, Bob?

I think it helps to know what "Duck!" means,

or "Abort, abort, abort, you are not cleared for landing."

[Daniel Barnes]

The physical world, as opposed to what, Bob?

As opposed to any number of things: a perfect circle, the set of all integers, or John Galt, for example.

Generally these are called abstractions. They exist, just not physically.

Edited August 29, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

Do you seriously believe definitions will yield up useful facts about the physical world?

No, and that's not what this chart suggests.

BTW I've added a long supplementary passage since posting.

[kiaer.ts]

The physical world, as opposed to what, Bob?

As opposed to any number of things: a perfect circle, the set of all integers, or John Galt, for example.

Generally these are called abstractions. They exist, just not physically.

Neither do they exist in some non-physical or supernatural world. They all exist in relation to the physical world. They are simply not bodies themselves, in the same way that a shadow is not a body. Is your metaphysics really so naive?

In any case, your explanation does not help Bob, who pretends that definitions are of no importance in the physical world.

[BaalChatzaf]

Do you seriously believe definitions will yield up useful facts about the physical world?

Ba'al Chatzaf

The physical world, as opposed to what, Bob?

I mean the world external to our internal illusions. The real world as opposed to the world our brains cook up. The world that would be left if every sentient being that is or was simply ceased to exist. The world that our senses report to our brains. That is the real physical world.

Definitions do not reveal a single fact to us about the real honest to goodness physical world. Observation and measurement does.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[tjohnson]

It seems both Korzybski and Popper were aware of the undefinability of ALL our terms. Korzybski didn't use the expression 'infinite regress' but simply noted that if you attempt to define every single term you will eventually define in circles.

We see that no statement made by man, whether savage or civilized, is free from

some kind of structural metaphysics involving s.r.[read assumptions] We see also that when we

explicitly start with undefined words, these undefined words have to be taken on

faith. They represent some kind of implicit creed, or metaphysics, or structural

assumptions. We meet here with a tremendously beneficial semantic effect of

modern methods, in that we deliberately state our undefined terms. We thus divulge

our creeds and metaphysics. In this way, we do not blind the reader or student. We

invite criticism, elaboration, verification, evaluation. , and so accelerate progress

and make it easier for others to work out issues. Compare the statement of Newton,

'Hypotheses non fingo' (I do not make hypotheses), in his Philosophiae Naturalis

Principia Mathematica, when he proceeded some very doubtful hypotheses; and such works as produced by Peano,

Whitehead, Russell, and others, in which not only all assumptions are stated

explicitly, but even the assumptions, given in single undefined terms, are listed. It is

not assumed here that even Peano, Whitehead, Russell, and the others have fulfilled

this program entirely. It is quite probable that not all of their assumptions are stated

explicitly. However, a very serious and revolutionary beginning has been made in

this direction.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Daniel,

Thanks for posting a pdf of the chart.

Requoting part of the text including a paragraph you skipped without indicating that you'd skipped.

Karl Popper, from "Unended Quest" p 19-30.

In spite of the perfect logical analogy between the left and the right sides of this table, the left-hand side is philosophically unimportant, while the right-hand side is philosophically all-important.

This implies the view that meaning philosophies and language philosophies (so far as they are concerned with words) are on the wrong track. In matters of the intellect, the only things worth striving for are true theories, or theories which come near the truth - at any rate nearer than some other (competing) theory, for example an older one.

This, I suppose, most people will admit; but they will be inclined to argue as follows. Whether a theory is true, or new, or intellectually significant, depends on its meaning; and the meaning of a theory (provided it is grammatically unambiguously formulated) is a function of the meanings of the words in which the theory is formulated. (Here, as in mathematics, a "function" is intended to take into account the order of the arguments.)

This view of the meaning of a theory seems almost obvious; it is widely held, and often unconsciously taken for granted. Nevertheless there is hardly any truth in it. I would counter it with the following rough formulation.

The relationship between a theory (or a statement) and the words used in its formulation is in several ways analogous to that between written words and the letters used in writing them down.

[Inserting a paragraph which Daniel left out, and adding my emphasis:]

Obviously the letters have no "meaning" in the sense in which the words have "meaning"; although we must know the letters (that is, their "meaning" in some other sense) if we are to recognize the words, and so discern their meaning. Approximately the same may be said about words and statements or theories.

Letters play a merely technical or pragmatic role in the formulation of words. In my opinion, words also play a merely technical or pragmatic role in the formulation of theories. Thus both letters and words are mere means to ends (different ends). And the only intellectually important ends are: the formulation of problems; the tentative proposing of theories to solve them; and the critical discussion of the competing theories....

1) I don't know if your leaving out the paragraph I've re-included was deliberate or inadvertent.

I think it's an important paragraph, since in it Popper acknowledges that we aren't going to understand what's being proposed by a theory if we don't know what's being meant by the words in which the theory is couched. The issue isn't the meaning OF words but what's meant BY the words.

2) The only parts of the passage quoted which I see Objectivism as possibly disputing are Popper's statements "In matters of the intellect, the only things worth striving for are true theories, or theories which come near the truth" and "[T]he only intellectually important ends are: the formulation of problems; the tentative proposing of theories to solve them; and the critical discussion of the competing theories." Since I don't know what he means by "matters of the intellect" and "intellectually important ends," I can't assess either my or Objectivism's degree of agreement with those statements.

3) Objectivism isn't a member of the categories "meaning philosophies and language philosophies," though I think that you think it is.

4) As I've pointed out before, Popper uses "concepts" as roughly equivalent to "designations" and "terms." Objectivism doesn't.

5) Rand says that the hierarchy of *concepts* is reduced to ostensive concepts. Thus the infinite-regress problem doesn't pertain in her theory of concepts.

Ellen

Edited August 29, 2010 by Ellen Stuttle

[kiaer.ts]

Do you seriously believe definitions will yield up useful facts about the physical world?

Ba'al Chatzaf

The physical world, as opposed to what, Bob?

I mean the world external to our internal illusions. The real world as opposed to the world our brains cook up. The world that would be left if every sentient being that is or was simply ceased to exist. The world that our senses report to our brains. That is the real physical world.

Definitions do not reveal a single fact to us about the real honest to goodness physical world. Observation and measurement does.

My brain produces ideas, not "worlds."

I won't contradict you if you wish to insist that yours produces illusions.

But I still have to wonder what organ, if not your brain, gives you contact with the real world? Your colon?

As for definitions, they define. Who ever claimed that a dictionary is a telescope? Definitions help us keep our ideas in order. Is that not something you care about?

The fact that definitions are not observations no more makes definitions useless than the fact that transistors are not observations makes transistors useless. Each thing serves its own purpose.

Next you'll object that you have no use for underpants since they are not are not pocketknives.

[Daniel Barnes]

1) I don't know if your leaving out the paragraph I've re-included was deliberate or inadvertent.

Inadvertent. Thanks for picking that up. I will correct.

I think it's an important paragraph, since in it Popper acknowledges that we aren't going to understand what's being proposed by a theory if we don't know what's being meant by the words in which the theory is couched. The issue isn't the meaning OF words but what's meant BY the words.

I don't see how he could really say otherwise?

2) The only parts of the passage quoted which I see Objectivism as possibly disputing are Popper's statements "In matters of the intellect, the only things worth striving for are true theories, or theories which come near the truth" and "[T]he only intellectually important ends are: the formulation of problems; the tentative proposing of theories to solve them; and the critical discussion of the competing theories." Since I don't know what he means by "matters of the intellect" and "intellectually important ends," I can't assess either my or Objectivism's degree of agreement with those statements.

??

What is so mysterious about prosaic, broad phrases like "matters of the intellect" that could lead an intelligent person such as yourself to say that you "don't know what he means by" them?!

3) Objectivism isn't a member of the categories "meaning philosophies and language philosophies," though I think that you think it is.

Hey, I really don't think Rand meant to be a "scientific skeptic" either. But (at the very least) she is. Likewise, wittingly or no, she shares the verbalist approach of those she despises.

You may disagree of course.

4) As I've pointed out before, Popper uses "concepts" as roughly equivalent to "designations" and "terms." Objectivism doesn't.

(Edit after I misread:) Concepts are closer to ideas in Objectivism, yes.

But the final step in the formation of a concept is the application of a word.

So that's where the rubber hits the road in Objectivism, and where the emphasis falls in discussing concepts, leading down the left hand side of the chart.

5) Rand says that the hierarchy of *concepts* is reduced to ostensive concepts. Thus the infinite-regress problem doesn't pertain in her theory of concepts.

There's all sorts of problems with this line of argument. First, the referents of higher level concepts are always other concepts - they are "abstracted from abstractions", purportedly over manifold levels. How's ostensiveness going to work here, short of Vulcan mind-melding? Second, as I've said many times before: if, below all these layers of abstraction, you're going to make ostensiveness - ie simply pointing - as the ultimate source of your appeal to the "truth" of your definition this seems to lead not to a problem of "truth" but to a problem of falsity. Effectively an ostensive definition seems to be no different from a mere assertion, and an untestable one at that.

Edited August 30, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[kiaer.ts]

5) Rand says that the hierarchy of *concepts* is reduced to ostensive concepts. Thus the infinite-regress problem doesn't pertain in her theory of concepts.

There's all sorts of problems with this line of argument. First, the referents of higher level concepts are always other concepts - they are "abstracted from abstractions", purportedly over manifold levels. How's ostensiveness going to work here, short of Vulcan mind-melding? Second, as I've said many times before: if, below all these layers of abstraction, you're going to make ostensiveness - ie simply pointing - as the ultimate source of your appeal to the "truth" of your definition this seems to lead not to a problem of "truth" but to a problem of falsity. Effectively an ostensive definition seems to be no different from a mere assertion, and an untestable one at that.

Just because it might be difficult, in the case of a specific person, to trace the history of his actually having formed a higher level abstraction from a lower level abstraction, it isn't in itself a problem for the theory, any more than the difficulty of tracking specific atomic particles diffusing through the air in a room might be a problem for the theory of the gas laws.

The fact that children do indeed form certain types of concepts in a set developmental series, such as concepts for entities before concepts for colors, and concepts for distance before concepts for time, along with our own introspection, is quite sufficient. This should be obvious to anyone who can remember his own learning experience in kindergarten, elementary, and secondary schooling. The entire sequence of a rational course of pedagogy screams out the truth of her theory.

Edited August 30, 2010 by Ted Keer

[Daniel Barnes]

The entire sequence of a rational course of pedagogy screams out the truth of her theory.

If you're going to make comparisons with testable physical theories, such as the laws regarding gases, then perhaps you might suggest some ways we could test the truth of Rand's theory of concept-formation? What might some experiments look like?

\

[kiaer.ts]

The entire sequence of a rational course of pedagogy screams out the truth of her theory.

If you're going to make comparisons with testable physical theories, such as the laws regarding gases, then perhaps you might suggest some ways we could test the truth of Rand's theory of concept-formation? What might some experiments look like?

\

You use words like testable, but I am not sure you really understand what they mean. Surely you are aware that one doesn't do experiments in the historical/comparative sciences in the same sense that one does experiments in path-independent sciences. Would you glibly ask a paleontologist to do an "experiment" to prove that birds evolved from dinosaurs? What is done are observations. If you want to do experiments, get the informed consent of a few dozen five year olds.

Maybe you were an only child and are too old to remember it, by I remember my own stagewise process of having to learn basic concepts prior to more abstract ones, and remember witnessing the same in friends and relatives. Have you never learned anything new as an adult? Have you never taught anyone anything?

There are volumes and volumes written by developmental psychologists such as Jean Piaget that catalog developmental universals governing the hierarchical order in which children achieve certain concepts. You will find nothing but confirmation for her theories in their work.

Perhaps you could try presenting three counter examples if you think Rand's theories are so easily dismissed.

Edited August 30, 2010 by Ted Keer

[kiaer.ts]

There are volumes and volumes written by developmental psychologists such as Jean Piaget that catalog developmental universals governing the hierarchical order in which children achieve certain concepts. You will find nothing but confirmation for her theories in their work.

From the Wikipedia article on Piaget:

Third Piaget: The Elaboration of the Logical Model of Intellectual Development

In the model Piaget developed in stage three, he argued the idea that intelligence develops in a series of stages that are related to age and are progressive because one stage must be accomplished before the next can occur. For each stage of development the child forms a view of reality for that age period. At the next stage, the child must keep up with earlier level of mental abilities to reconstruct concepts. Piaget concluded intellectual development as an upward expanding spiral in which children must constantly reconstruct the ideas formed at earlier levels with new, higher order concepts acquired at the next level.

It is primarily the Third Piaget that was incorporated into American psychology when Piaget's ideas were "rediscovered" in the 1960s.^[8]

[edit]Fourth Piaget: The Study of Figurative thought

Piaget studied areas of intelligence like perception and memory that aren’t entirely logical. Logical concepts are described as being completely reversible because they can always get back to the starting point. The perceptual concepts Piaget studied could not be manipulated. To describe the figurative process, Piaget uses pictures as examples. Pictures can’t be separated because contours cannot be separated from the forms they outline. Memory is the same way. It is never completely reversible. During this last period of work, Piaget and his colleague Inhelder also published books on perception, memory, and other figurative processes such as learning during this last period.^[9][10][11]

• Sensorimotor stage: from birth to age 2. Children experience the world through movement and senses (use five senses to explore the world). During the sensorimotor stage children are extremely egocentric, meaning they cannot perceive the world from others' viewpoints. The sensorimotor stage is divided into six substages: "(1) simple reflexes; (2) first habits and primary circular reactions; (3) secondary circular reactions; (4) coordination of secondary circular reactions; (5) tertiary circular reactions, novelty, and curiosity; and (6) internalization of schemes." ^[12]

Simple reflexes is from birth to 1 month old. At this time infants use reflexes such as rooting and sucking.

First habits and primary circular reactions is from 1 month to 4 months old. During this time infants learn to coordinate sensation and two types of scheme (habit and circular reactions). A primary circular reaction is when the infant tries to reproduce an event that happened by accident (ex: sucking thumb).

The third stage, secondary circular reactions, occurs when the infant is 4 to 8 months old. At this time they become aware of things beyond their own body; they are more object oriented. At this time they might accidentally shake a rattle and continue to do it for sake of satisfaction.

Coordination of secondary circular reactions is from 8 months to 12 months old. During this stage they can do things intentionally. They can now combine and recombine schemes and try to reach a goal (ex: use a stick to reach something). They also understand object permanence during this stage. That is, they understand that objects continue to exist even when they can't see them.

The fifth stage occurs from 12 months old to 18 months old. During this stage infants explore new possibilities of objects; they try different things to get different results.

During the last stage they are 18 to 24 months old. During this stage they shift to symbolic thinking. ^[12] Some followers of Piaget's studies of infancy, such as Kenneth Kaye^[13] argue that his contribution was as an observer of countless phenomena not previously described, but that he didn't offer explanation of the processes in real time that cause those developments, beyond analogizing them to broad concepts about biological adaptation generally.

• Preoperational stage: from ages 2 to 7 (magical thinking predominates. Acquisition of motor skills). Egocentrism begins strongly and then weakens. Children cannot conserve or use logical thinking.

• Concrete operational stage: from ages 7 to 12 (children begin to think logically but are very concrete in their thinking). Children can now conserve and think logically but only with practical aids. They are no longer egocentric.

• Formal operational stage: from age 12 onwards (development of abstract reasoning). Children develop abstract thought and can easily conserve and think logically in their mind.

[Daniel Barnes]

You use words like testable, but I am not sure you really understand what they mean. Surely you are aware that one doesn't do experiments in the historical/comparative sciences in the same sense that one does experiments in path-independent sciences. Would you glibly ask a paleontologist to do an "experiment" to prove that birds evolved from dinosaurs? What is done are observations. If you want to do experiments, get the informed consent of a few dozen five year olds.

Oh, right, so "one doesn't do" such experiments...but then on the other hand one might by recruiting a few dozen five year olds...

So could we design some experiments that might empirically test Rand's theory or not?

If so, what might they look like?

There are volumes and volumes written by developmental psychologists such as Jean Piaget that catalog developmental universals governing the hierarchical order in which children achieve certain concepts. You will find nothing but confirmation for her theories in their work.

Perhaps you could try presenting three counter examples if you think Rand's theories are so easily dismissed.

I agree that it is very hard to dismiss an unfalsifiable theory.

[kiaer.ts]

You use words like testable, but I am not sure you really understand what they mean. Surely you are aware that one doesn't do experiments in the historical/comparative sciences in the same sense that one does experiments in path-independent sciences. Would you glibly ask a paleontologist to do an "experiment" to prove that birds evolved from dinosaurs? What is done are observations. If you want to do experiments, get the informed consent of a few dozen five year olds.

Oh, right, so "one doesn't do" such experiments...but then on the other hand one might by recruiting a few dozen five year olds...

So could we design some experiments that might empirically test Rand's theory or not?

If so, what might they look like?

There are volumes and volumes written by developmental psychologists such as Jean Piaget that catalog developmental universals governing the hierarchical order in which children achieve certain concepts. You will find nothing but confirmation for her theories in their work.

Perhaps you could try presenting three counter examples if you think Rand's theories are so easily dismissed.

I agree that it is very hard to dismiss an unfalsifiable theory.

Your comments are sophomoric. You want an "experiment"? Okay, try to teach formal long division to a child who cannot count, without teaching them to count. But of course any real experiment would have to have all sorts of controls. You'd run into the problem of floating abstractions, with the child being able to parrot the formulae without knowing their actual import. Some children might induce the intermediate concepts on their own. How would you control all the variables for such an experiment? Can you think of an ethical way to do such an experiment, on, say, a few dozen five year olds? Of course not. But that's convenient to you, since the last thing you would actually want would be a test.

I've already provided you with the work of Jean Piaget as painstaking observational evidence that supports Rand's theories. There's no more respected name in developmental psychology. The burden is on you to show how his work is not relevant or contradicts Rand.

In the meantime you simply repeat yourself using the buzzwords of a pre-packaged skeptic. Rand's theory would be falsified by the first human who could comprehend calculus without understanding multiplication.

As a precondition for further discussion, please explain to me in your own words the difference between what I, using my own words, have above called the historical/comparative and the path-independent science and the difference between how each gathers evidence. Consider it my giving you a turing test of your good faith.

[Daniel Barnes]

Your comments are sophomoric. You want an "experiment"? Okay, try to teach formal long division to a child who cannot count, without teaching them to count.

Well I suppose that is better than your example above, which is simply inane.

For what you would have demonstrated with your proposed test of Rand's theory is that Rand's epochal philosophical insight has been anticipated by only by the designers of almost every school math curriculum, not to mention almost every other school curriculum, in history.

I have no idea how, other than as superficially as your example above suggests, compatible Ayn Rand is with Piaget. Robert Campbell would have a better idea than I, he's written a fair bit on both. I do know, however, that Piaget had no problem with constructing experiments for his theories. Unfortunately for him, he clearly didn't have you to wise him up on the proper historical comparative method, the difficulties of controlling all those pesky variables, and of course the shocking ethical consequences of such tests. Otherwise he could have just done it the way you approve of: a few minutes introspecting, then whack out a 90 page ramble and job's done.

Why not just say Rand's theory isn't really testable, and leave it at that?

PS: Your argument seems to be of the following form:

"I claim a popular novelist with no psychological training and no peer recognition whatsoever in the field is nonetheless every bit the equal of the most famous developmental psychologists of all time. It's up to you to prove that she isn't."

Do you know why I might have trouble taking this seriously?

Edited August 30, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[tjohnson]

Karl Popper, from "Unended Quest" p 19-30.

Letters play a merely technical or pragmatic role in the formulation of words. In my opinion, words also play a merely technical or pragmatic role in the formulation of theories. Thus both letters and words are mere means to ends (different ends). And the only intellectually important ends are: the formulation of problems; the tentative proposing of theories to solve them; and the critical discussion of the competing theories....

Korzybski would call this, "the formulation of problems; the tentative proposing of theories to solve them", structure. He maintains this is the content of all our knowledge. Its obvious that words are not what they represent so what is the connection between them? It is structure. Our world (reality) has a certain structure and our knowledge (to be useful) must have a similar structure. The map=>territory analogy is extremely useful in this regard. Our language is like a map and it makes certain structural assertions, for instance Boston is north of New York. On a map you can see this structure visually whereas in language it requires more processing by the brain. Hence the expression "a picture is worth a thousand words".

[kiaer.ts]

Your comments are sophomoric. You want an "experiment"? Okay, try to teach formal long division to a child who cannot count, without teaching them to count.

Well I suppose that is better than your example above, which is simply inane.

For what you would have demonstrated with your proposed test of Rand's theory is that Rand's epochal philosophical insight has been anticipated by only by the designers of almost every school math curriculum, not to mention almost every other school curriculum, in history.

I have no idea how, other than as superficially as your example above suggests, compatible Ayn Rand is with Piaget. Robert Campbell would have a better idea than I, he's written a fair bit on both. I do know, however, that Piaget had no problem with constructing experiments for his theories. Unfortunately for him, he clearly didn't have you to wise him up on the proper historical comparative method, the difficulties of controlling all those pesky variables, and of course the shocking ethical consequences of such tests. Otherwise he could have just done it the way you approve of: a few minutes introspecting, then whack out a 90 page ramble and job's done.

Why not just say Rand's theory isn't really testable, and leave it at that?

PS: Your argument seems to be of the following form:

"I claim a popular novelist with no psychological training and no peer recognition whatsoever in the field is nonetheless every bit the equal of the most famous developmental psychologists of all time. It's up to you to prove that she isn't."

Do you know why I might have trouble taking this seriously?

Do you have any non-rhetorical questions about anything other than straw men?

I didn't think you had the ability or the good faaith to answer my last question to you..

Have the decency to play with your betes noires in private.

[merjet]

First, the referents of higher level concepts are always other concepts - they are "abstracted from abstractions", purportedly over manifold levels. How's ostensiveness going to work here, short of Vulcan mind-melding?

This is obviously wrong. The referents of a higher level concept are the referents of the lower level concepts that are combined into the higher one. One of the higher level concepts Rand discussed in ITOE is furniture. The referents of "furniture" are the referents of tables, chairs, beds, etc." Pointing to the concrete instances works fine.

Second, as I've said many times before: if, below all these layers of abstraction, you're going to make ostensiveness - ie simply pointing - as the ultimate source of your appeal to the "truth" of your definition this seems to lead not to a problem of "truth" but to a problem of falsity. Effectively an ostensive definition seems to be no different from a mere assertion, and an untestable one at that.

Such silliness.

[Ellen Stuttle]

[....]

I think it's an important paragraph, since in it Popper acknowledges that we aren't going to understand what's being proposed by a theory if we don't know what's being meant by the words in which the theory is couched. The issue isn't the meaning OF words but what's meant BY the words.

I don't see how he could really say otherwise?

The point, Daniel, is that you keep insisting that Objectivism says otherwise.

2) The only parts of the passage quoted which I see Objectivism as possibly disputing are Popper's statements "In matters of the intellect, the only things worth striving for are true theories, or theories which come near the truth" and "[T]he only intellectually important ends are: the formulation of problems; the tentative proposing of theories to solve them; and the critical discussion of the competing theories." Since I don't know what he means by "matters of the intellect" and "intellectually important ends," I can't assess either my or Objectivism's degree of agreement with those statements.

??

What is so mysterious about prosaic, broad phrases like "matters of the intellect" that could lead an intelligent person such as yourself to say that you "don't know what he means by" them?!

I don't know what he means. He seems to me to be referring merely to scientific theories, and even there I wouldn't say that the "only intellectually important ends" are those he names. Does he consider, to give a couple examples, such endeavors as writing a novel or composing music "matters of the intellect"? Judging from his statements, his answer would be "no."

3) Objectivism isn't a member of the categories "meaning philosophies and language philosophies," though I think that you think it is.

Hey, I really don't think Rand meant to be a "scientific skeptic" either. But (at the very least) she is. Likewise, wittingly or no, she shares the verbalist approach of those she despises.

You may disagree of course.

Of course.

4) As I've pointed out before, Popper uses "concepts" as roughly equivalent to "designations" and "terms." Objectivism doesn't.

(Edit after I misread:) Concepts are closer to ideas in Objectivism, yes.

But the final step in the formation of a concept is the application of a word.

So that's where the rubber hits the road in Objectivism, and where the emphasis falls in discussing concepts, leading down the left hand side of the chart.

So you say.

Merlin has already addressed your reply to point 5.

Ellen

[Daniel Barnes]

First, the referents of higher level concepts are always other concepts - they are "abstracted from abstractions", purportedly over manifold levels. How's ostensiveness going to work here, short of Vulcan mind-melding?

This is obviously wrong. The referents of a higher level concept are the referents of the lower level concepts that are combined into the higher one. One of the higher level concepts Rand discussed in ITOE is furniture. The referents of "furniture" are the referents of tables, chairs, beds, etc." Pointing to the concrete instances works fine.

Well you may have a point there. I was thinking of higher higher-level concepts than "furniture", which I admit rarely attracts heated debate, even in Objectivism...;-) According to Peikoff (OPAR p91), talking about the higher level concept "organism": "...the more extensive acts of abstraction and integration...are not available on the perceptual level...there are no such things as 'organisms' to be seen...*"

That's the kind of level I was referring to. That which can't be seen obviously can't be pointed to.

Second, as I've said many times before: if, below all these layers of abstraction, you're going to make ostensiveness - ie simply pointing - as the ultimate source of your appeal to the "truth" of your definition this seems to lead not to a problem of "truth" but to a problem of falsity. Effectively an ostensive definition seems to be no different from a mere assertion, and an untestable one at that.

Such silliness.

Well, I'm just trying to see how this plays out. Let's try a little thought experiment.

Say Rand and I, as a gauche new entrant to The Collective, are discussing the concept "selfishness". To define the (purely mental) concept that I choose to label "selfishness", I point to a man who buys shoes for himself instead of food for his child and say "that's what I mean by 'selfishness'". Rand, on the other hand, points to a man looking adoringly at his wife and says "that's what I mean by 'selfishness'"

Now, would Rand accept that my purely-mental-concept-that-I-choose-to-label-"selfishness" is just as "true" or "valid" or "proper" as hers given that, via the magical power of pointing, I have now grounded it resoundingly in reality by a method fully approved by herself? Would she agree that she is merely in possession of a different, yet equally grounded, purely-mental-concept-that-she-chooses-to-label "selfishness"? (whew!) And, that being the case, if we were to discuss the morality of a father who buys shoes rather than feed his child (and not the morality of being an uxorious husband), would she be just as happy to use the word "selfishness" to refer to such a concept as I have in mind, given that the concept is grounded in reality and the word is just a label after all? (and naturally I vice versa, with the caveat that her use of the term is more likely to be somewhat confusing to other people, given that my version is closer to the typical sense of the term).

Or would she in fact fix me with a basilisk-glare and inform me sternly that words have meanings...

This point, I think, is really what the issue turns on.

*This passage is slightly unclear; he may be referring to CCDs in part of it. But the latter part is clear enough.

Edited September 1, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

The point, Daniel, is that you keep insisting that Objectivism says otherwise.

If you keep insisting that Objectivism and Critical Rationalism are in such close agreement I really am going to have practise my harmonies on "Kumbaya"!

Edited September 1, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[merjet]

Well you may have a point there. I was thinking of higher higher-level concepts than "furniture", which I admit rarely attracts heated debate, even in Objectivism...;-) According to Peikoff (OPAR p91), talking about the higher level concept "organism": "...the more extensive acts of abstraction and integration...are not available on the perceptual level...there are no such things as 'organisms' to be seen...*"

That's the kind of level I was referring to. That which can't be seen obviously can't be pointed to.

....

*This passage is slightly unclear; he may be referring to CCDs in part of it. But the latter part is clear enough.

Clearly organisms can be seen in one sense. Visit a zoo and you will see plenty of them. So what Peikoff was trying to say is not clear. Guessing like you, he meant some of the similarities or CCDs aren't readily visible or even visible at all in a strict sense -- for example, metabolism and homeostasis. Also, the visible similarities between an amoeba and a human being are minimal.

There are also concepts that refer to non-visible things, e.g. belief, thought, ambition. So we can't point at them with a finger. However, we can call attention to them -- one of the typical dictionary meanings of "point." See here. Also, that a particular thought and thought in the abstract differ is quite clear.

Well, I'm just trying to see how this plays out. Let's try a little thought experiment.

Say Rand and I, as a gauche new entrant to The Collective, are discussing the concept "selfishness". To define the (purely mental) concept that I choose to label "selfishness", I point to a man who buys shoes for himself instead of food for his child and say "that's what I mean by 'selfishness'". Rand, on the other hand, points to a man looking adoringly at his wife and says "that's what I mean by 'selfishness'"

Now, would Rand accept that my purely-mental-concept-that-I-choose-to-label-"selfishness" is just as "true" or "valid" or "proper" as hers given that, via the magical power of pointing, I have now grounded it resoundingly in reality by a method fully approved by herself? Would she agree that she is merely in possession of a different, yet equally grounded, purely-mental-concept-that-she-chooses-to-label "selfishness"? (whew!) And, that being the case, if we were to discuss the morality of a father who buys shoes rather than feed his child (and not the morality of being an uxorious husband), would she be just as happy to use the word "selfishness" to refer to such a concept as I have in mind, given that the concept is grounded in reality and the word is just a label after all? (and naturally I vice versa, with the caveat that her use of the term is more likely to be somewhat confusing to other people, given that my version is closer to the typical sense of the term).

Or would she in fact fix me with a basilisk-glare and inform me sternly that words have meanings...

This point, I think, is really what the issue turns on.

Your examples are insufficient for me to discern what the people's motivation are. Why do they call their motives selfish? Regardless, they are instances of their concepts of selfish to which they can call attention.