The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics

[Daniel Barnes]

Daniel, I introduced the issue, but you then adopted the false definition. Substitute "adopted" for "gave" in the first quote from me above. I stated it as a definition which had been used (by Newton), but then you "gave" it in the sense of adopting it. Please trace back carefully through the sequence of posts between you and me.

Yes, I adopted it. That is what you do with conventions, Ellen. So what? You can make a decision to give a term a certain meaning, to stick such-and-such a label on it. It's one of the standard refutations I offer time and again in my criticism of Rand's doctrine of "true" and "false" meanings - that is, the part where she claims that differences of opinion over meanings can be settled by "logic". A person decides to call "sacrifice" one thing, and not another - they don't derive it. Same with "gravity". You appear to be conflating two problems: this one, and the issue of testability below.

In Rand's view of definitions, of course definitions are hypotheses -- they're always-revisable-with-further-knowledge attempts to identify the most accurate distinguishing characteristic(s) of a category -- and of course they can be outright falsified as incorrect classifications as well as being superseded by further knowledge.

Oh, right. So now in Rand's view, definitions are really hypotheses?

Leaving aside the issue that I have never read Rand call them such directly anywhere, how do you think that helps Rand's claim about the truth/falsity of definitions?

Because the falsifiability of hypotheses, Ellen, comes not from the fact that they are hypotheses, but from whether they are testable or not.

As there is nothing in the ITOE, nor AFAIK anywhere in Rand's entire corpus, linking truth/falsity of definitions to testability, plus when we see Rand apply her theory in two important cases ("selfishness", "sacrifice") we get, in your own words, two "goofs, PLUS the fact that there is no evidence that Rand even realised they were "goofs", leads one to the not-unreasonable conclusion that she was not aware of this distinction.

As this distinction is the only thing that would make her theory even begin to be viable, and she is unaware of it, the only way we can say her theory is "right" is in the broken-clock-being-right-twice-a-day sense, as I have already said. It's like saying Ptolemy was right because now and then the epicycles might coincide with Einstein's predictions.

You can do that, of course. You can save any theory that way. But I would prefer to say that it was wrong.

See my earlier posts here and here where I've already made these exact points.

I'm at a loss trying to connect things you're asking with any belief that you ever read ITOE.

Likewise. In fact you seem to bent on rewriting it.

Edited August 6, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Brant Gaede]

Oh, right. So now in Rand's view, definitions are really hypotheses?

Leaving aside the issue that I have never read Rand call them such directly anywhere, how do you think that helps Rand's claim about the truth/falsity of definitions?

Because the falsifiability of hypotheses, Ellen, comes not from the fact that they are hypotheses, but from whether they are testable or not.

Pardon a little digression here, but isn't "falsifiable" better put than "testable"? The latter seems a tad too broad and doesn't convey as much information regarding hypotheses.

Rand didn't understand science too well and I think it was willful. Willful because science conflicts with the implicit (cultural) "Absolutely!" premise of Objectivism.

--Brant

[Daniel Barnes]

Oh, right. So now in Rand's view, definitions are really hypotheses?

Leaving aside the issue that I have never read Rand call them such directly anywhere, how do you think that helps Rand's claim about the truth/falsity of definitions?

Because the falsifiability of hypotheses, Ellen, comes not from the fact that they are hypotheses, but from whether they are testable or not.

Pardon a little digression here, but isn't "falsifiable" better put than "testable"? The latter seems a tad too broad and doesn't convey as much information regarding hypotheses.

Rand didn't understand science too well and I think it was willful. Willful because science conflicts with the implicit (cultural) "Absolutely!" premise of Objectivism.

--Brant

"Testable" isn't too bad, I don't think. They're reasonably interchangeable. I was also writing somewhat in haste, hope the point was reasonably clear.

On your second point, I am about to reply to GHs on the same issue. I agree with you in general, but I see it as a bit more like a kind of power struggle.

Edited August 6, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Xray]

Rand regarded epistemology ("a science devoted to the discovery of the proper methods of acquiring and validating knowledge"} as the "foundation of philosophy" (ITOE 36, 74).

Epistemology is basic indeed. This is why false premises in the epistemological field have such disastrous consequences for a philosophy.

[replying to D. Barnes]:

I think you will find that one cannot choose the most plausible option among different conceptions of "mind" by consulting a dictionary. Well, maybe you can -- since you seem to regard dictionaries as the ultimate fount of philosophic wisdom. No need to give any serious thought to how to formulate our basic concepts. Just consult a dictionary, learn how a word is generally used, and all your philosophical problems will be solved.

If a scientist claims that he is going to investigate the existence of God, it would of course be absurd to suggest that he give some serious philosophic thought to what he means by the word before undertaking his investigation. Only a fool like Rand would ever make such an outrageous claim. The scientist can always look up the word "God" in a dictionary, after all, and go from there.

Dictionaries provide text corpora documenting the use of language. No one here has suggested that they are “the ultimate fount of philosophic wisdom”.

As for "outrageous claims" - Rand's allegation that “God” is no concept because “a concept has to involve two or more concretes” (ITOE, p. 148) is yet another example where she, based on false premises, drives her own epistemological vehicle against the wall.

(What please are the “two or more concretes” of e. g. the concept "pride"?)

"God" is an audiovisual symbol referring to the idea, to the concept of a supernatural being.

Concepts can be formed without having any objective referent. Just think of a concept like "Utopia".

Ghs: Of course, there remains the problem of different dictionary definitions of terms like "mind" and "God." Perhaps the rigorous scientific procedure known as "Eeny, meeny, miny, moe" will take care of that problem.

Are dictionary definitions of “mind” and “god” so unintelligible that they leave you completely confused as to what is meant?

[replying to Ba’al]: Are you aware that philosophy was regarded as a science for many centuries, and is still so regarded in some circles?

With natural science and many other disciplines having become independent of philosophy in the course of history, where do you see the place of philosophy in today’s time?

Ghs: The same is true of the subdivisions of philosophy, such as the "science of ethics." (There are books with this title.)

Titles don’t mean that much. So if author X writes a book with title “Introduction to Epistemology” it says nothing about the author having accomplished the task or not.

One of your books has the title: “The Case Against God”. Epistemologically speaking, making a case against a god of whom we have no empirical evidence is impossible. For making a case against X posits X as existent.

Your book is actually case against the idea of a god, and those ideas do exist.

But as you said, your publisher thought of “The Case Against God” as the better title, and of course, from a management perspective having sales in mind, he was 100 per cent right in his assessment. For the title has quite a 'dramatic' touch.

As for books bearing titles like “The science of ethics”: Anything can become the object of scientific study.

One can study and analyze ethical concepts, or study and analyze the concepts of a god in in various religious beliefs.

Ghs: Of course, given your previous remarks about word meaning and definitions, I know that you would never call this usage "wrong" or "incorrect." That's very sporting of you, especially since I happen to think it is incorrect to call philosophy a "science." It is a cognitive discipline, but not a science.

Do you also disagree with Rand calling epistemology a science?

What role do you assign to that cognitive discipline "philosophy" in the face of scientific research?

Do you think it possible that e. g. “epistemology” will become more and more the terrain of neuroscience, biology and other branches of science? Imo this is already the case.

Edited August 6, 2010 by Xray

[Daniel Barnes]

Rand was making a general point about the relationship between philosophy and science -- (etc)

Now, turning to this, it occurs to me that we might be looking at this from different ends.

I'm starting from the other end if you like: from what I would call Objectivism's bent towards pseudoscience.

The Objectivist variant of pseudoscience isn't the pyramids-and-UFOs-variety, but instead is more a deliberate and obstinate opposition to some of the most important and successful scientific theories of the last 100 years. And it's not like it's even a productive opposition. Quite the reverse. It's just blank hostility, seemingly combined with an urge to return to the age of Newton.

Now, I see a clash a bit like Shermer's point: how does a philosophy ostensibly devoted to reason, reality, science, and free intellectual inquiry end up here? I then start groping backwards from that point: looking at Rand's comments about science - like everything else! - being "dependent" on philosophy, her habit of dictating what certain terms do and do not mean, the idea that philosophy might issue certain "provisos" which science must not question, the idea that the scientist - and anyone else! - who starts with the wrong philosophy will inexorably produce "corrupt" knowledge, and of course the idea that all other philosophies are wrong, and even corrupt, other than Objectivism.

I put all that together, combined with a good dash of doctrinal egoism, and I see something like a kind of power struggle, with intellectual barricades being built up against anything that might challenge authority of the philosophy - and philosophers - at the centre. (This general tendency is of course hardly unique to Objectivism - but from its blurb, we should expect Objectivism to be far less inclined to it, not more.) And science is surely a prime candidate for this.

Now of course this is all very piecemeal. But perhaps you can start to see how I might end up with my interpretation. And further, I think the difference between my interpretation and yours is that my interpretation starts to explain, and even predict, the outcomes we see.

Edited August 6, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Daniel Barnes]

Pardon a little digression here, but isn't "falsifiable" better put than "testable"? The latter seems a tad too broad and doesn't convey as much information regarding hypotheses.

Oh, and by the way Brant, I meant to add what with Fred Seddon and his "We may know p, but p may be false" (skip to the end of this essay) and now Ellen and her "definitions are hypotheses", at this rate Critical Rationalism and Objectivism will soon be holding hands and singing "Kumbaya" down the back of the bus...;-)

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Daniel,

I think George was on to something with Barnes's Razor.

Even when you start to look at other perspectives, the ultimate goal ends up with you trying to demonstrate how this particular perspective proves Rand was wrong. No matter how remote the nuance or how general the observation, it always goes back to one more proof that Rand was wrong.

The start of the Barnes gospel: "In the beginning, Rand was wrong. And the Objectivist movement was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of Rand moved upon the face of the emptiness. And Rand said, Let there be light: but there was darkness."

If Rand were still alive, I would say, "Get a room."

You've got it bad for her.

Michael

[Philip Coates]

Subject: In Praise of George H. Smith...No, I'm Not Joking

I've had many bitter battles with GHS. And I certainly often find him to be snarky, insulting, badly mistaken on many issues.

But he is widely read and has made many excellent and interesting posts on this thread (and several other science and philosophy related threads lately) about philosophy, logic, epistemology, science, Rand. And I find that he's probably just wasting his time debating ideas with several of the more disgusting frequent posters and professional nit-pickers on this thread and one or two other current threads:

When he says something the clowns misstate it.

When they don't misstate it, the morons oversimplify it.

When they don't oversimplify it, the catatonics simply ignore it.

When they can't ignore it because it stings too much, the midgets try to make a snarky or jokey point to deflect it.

If I were George, I would just bail out on trying to compete in the Epistemological Special Olympics.

I don't know how much patience he has, but certainly a lot more than me.

Edited August 6, 2010 by Philip Coates

[Brant Gaede]

As for "outrageous claims" - Rand's allegation that "God" is no concept because "a concept has to involve two or more concretes" (ITOE, p. 148) is yet another example where she, based on false premises, drives her own epistemological vehicle against the wall.

(What please are the "two or more concretes" of e. g. the concept "pride"?)

"God" is an audiovisual symbol referring to the idea, to the concept of a supernatural being.

Concepts can be formed without having any objective referent. Just think of a concept like "Utopia".

Rand on p 148 of ITOE is not Rand but Binswanger-Peikoff's representation of Rand, which may or may not be correct. Anyway, I don't care.

If some thing's wrong with ITOE just ID and correct it. It will still be Objectivism--no?

--Brant

isn't every common noun a concept regardless of number of referents?--doesn't "God" reference, say, the Greek gods or patriarchy: my tribe is headed by an old white-haired man with a beard and so does yours and if they say "Jump!" we jump and if they say kill all the inhabitants of that town over there plus the cattle we go kill 'em?--that God is another word for State and if one doesn't get you the other one will?

(desperately searching for incoherence)

Edited August 6, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Brant Gaede]

Subject: In Praise of George H. Smith...No, I'm Not Joking

I've had many bitter battles with GHS. And I certainly often find him to be snarky, insulting, badly mistaken on many issues.

But he is widely read and has made many excellent and interesting posts on this thread (and several other science and philosophy related threads lately) about philosophy, logic, epistemology, science, Rand. And I find that he's probably just wasting his time debating ideas with several of the more disgusting frequent posters and professional nit-pickers on this thread and one or two other current threads:

When he says something the clowns misstate it.

When they don't misstate it, the morons oversimplify it.

When they don't oversimplify it, the catatonics simply ignore it.

When they can't ignore it because it stings too much, the midgets try to make a snarky or jokey point to deflect it.

If I were George, I would just bail out on trying to compete in the Epistemological Special Olympics.

I don't know how much patience he has, but certainly a lot more than me.

What are you talking about? He's going head to head with the anti-Randian Daniel Barnes with Xray a side-show. That's about it.

--Brant

I use to like you but the "like you" well is running out of water with your purblind ad hominem transference in this case

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Brant,

I think Phil is having a bad day.

(And he sucks at playing Perigo... )

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

Brant,

I think Phil is having a bad day.

(And he sucks at playing Perigo... )

Michael, his ideas keep running away from his facts.

--Brant

[Philip Coates]

Brant and Michael, I shouldn't have used the ad hominem words....really bad day....to say the least. Taking care of a slowly dying parent, I have to remain benevolent and keep a good attitude in her presence. Try to be there, make sure she has everything, be gentle and not impatient with lapses and mental problems. But I think it is having some negative spillover or pressure cooker effect. I'm way more cranky and a lot less patient than I was even a year, even six months ago.

(Probably more information than anyone wants to know.)

Edited August 7, 2010 by Philip Coates

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Phil,

I hope things get better for you soon.

Be well.

Michael

[Brant Gaede]

Brant and Michael, I shouldn't have used the ad hominem words....really bad day....to say the least. Taking care of a slowly dying parent, I have to remain benevolent and keep a good attitude in her presence. Try to be there, make sure she has everything, be gentle and not impatient with lapses and mental problems. But I think it is having some negative spillover or pressure cooker effect. I'm way more cranky and a lot less patient than I was even a year, even six months ago.

(Probably more information than anyone wants to know.)

Don't worry about it, Phil. I'm taking care of my 95yo demented--not too badly demented--Mother. I'm pretty sure she won't make it to 96 three months from now, but she's been surprising me for years. I've probably saved her life several times since I came back to Tucson. Too bad we don't live in the same town; we could give each other time off--go fishing. If you ever get time off, go to the shore; the ocean just drains the stress right out of you.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

As for "outrageous claims" - Rand's allegation that “God” is no concept because “a concept has to involve two or more concretes” (ITOE, p. 148) is yet another example where she, based on false premises, drives her own epistemological vehicle against the wall.

You have conveniently neglected to mention the context of this argument. Rand attributes the position that we can have no concept of God because he is sui generis to unspecified theists. This is a correct observation. For example, in his refutation of Anselm's Ontological Argument, Thomas Aquinas maintains that God's essence is identical with his existence. Thus if we could know God's essence -- i.e., if we could form a concept of God -- we would also know, without further reasoning, that God exists. This would be a self-evident truth, and Anselm's argument would be valid.

But Aquinas goes on to argue that we cannot know God's essence. We cannot form a proper concept of God, because we cannot conceive of a Being whose essence and existence are the same thing. God is sui generis ; he is totally unlike anything of which we can conceive. In Randian terms, there is no conceptual common denominator, no similarities between God and other existents that would enable us to place God in a broader category of existents (a genus)and then identify his distinguishing characteristics. Therefore, as we are unable to relate any of God's attributes to anything we can possibly know, we can have no concept of God. (See my discussion of the Ontological Argument in Chapter 9 ("Metaphysical Muddles") of Why Atheism?

Before presenting this historical argument, Rand presents the standard atheist argument that many of the traditional attributes of "God" are "impossible" and "irrational." She specifically calls "God" an "invalid concept" and refers readers to her discussion of invalid concepts in ITOE. This is what Rand means when she says that God "is not a concept." She means it is not a valid concept. She concedes that "one could say it is a concept in the sense in which a dramatist uses concepts to create a character." (So much for Xray's later mention of Utopia as a supposed objection to Rand.)

In her discussion of invalid concepts (ITOE, 49), Rand writes: "There are such things as invalid concepts, i.e., words that represent attempts to integrate errors, contradictions, or false propositions...or words without specific definitions, without referents, which can mean anything to anyone." Given this explanation, Rand was correct to call "God" an invalid concept.

Xray will now probably object to Rand's notion of invalid concepts. Fine -- after she is tagged by Daniel, she can get back in the ring and attempt to pin Rand for a three-count by any means possible. I simply wish to point out the extreme carelessness, not to mention deceptiveness, of her initial remarks. Xray made no mention that the sui generis argument was cited by Rand as a traditional argument used by "proponents of that [theistic] viewpoint, and that, according to this position, "God isn't even supposed to be a concept." Rand was right about this. The claim that God is unknowable has been a mainstream Christian doctrine for many centuries. And one cannot form a concept of something that is unknowable; if one could, it would not be unknowable.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

Fine -- after she is tagged by Daniel, she can get back in the ring and attempt to pin Rand for a three-count by any means possible.

Lordy, GHS, how you're losing the plot.

Edited August 7, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[merjet]

As for "outrageous claims" - Rand's allegation that “God” is no concept because “a concept has to involve two or more concretes” (ITOE, p. 148) is yet another example where she, based on false premises, drives her own epistemological vehicle against the wall.

George, in addition to what you say, it has been pointed out more than once to Xray (and Neil Parille) that her argument is fallacious . Ayn Rand often used "concept" to mean "universal", which does refer to multiple concretes. Not all concepts are universals. Ones that refer to an alleged, singular being like God is not a universal. On the other hand, "god" is a universal, since it can refer to Greek gods, Roman gods, etc.

It seems that no matter how many times somebody identifies Xray's mistakes, she keeps repeating them anyway. It is like talking to a brick wall

Edited August 7, 2010 by Merlin Jetton

[Ellen Stuttle]

'Tis time for quoting the lady herself:

[bold emphasis mine]

pg. 45, ITOE

The specific steps given in this example are not necessarily the literal steps of the conceptual development of every man, there may be many more steps (or fewer), they may not be as clearly and consciously delimited--but this is the pattern of development which most concepts and definitions undergo in a man's mind with the growth of his knowledge. It is the pattern which makes intensive study and, therefore, the growth of knowledge--and of science possible.

Now observe, on the above example, the process of determining an essential characteristic, the rule of fundamentality. When a given group of existents has more than one characteristic distinguishing it from other existents, man must observe the relationships among these various characteristics and discover the one on which all the others (or the greatest number of others) depend, i.e., the fundamental characteristic without which the others would not be possible. This fundamental characteristic is the essential distinguishing characteristic of the existents involved, and the proper defining characteristic of the concept.

Metaphysically, a fundamental characteristic is that distinctive characteristic which makes the greatest number of others possible; epistemologically, it is the one that explains the greatest number of others.

pg. 47-48

Remember that concept-formation is a method of cognition, man's method, and that concepts represent classifications of observed existents according to their relationships to other observed existents. Since man is not omniscient, a definition cannot be changelessly absolute, because it cannot establish the relationship of a given group of existents to everything else in the unvierse, including the undiscovered and unknown. And for the very same reasons, a definition is false and worthless if it is not contextually absolute--if it does not specify the known relationships among existents (in terms of the known essential characteristics) or if it contradicts the known (by omission or evasion).

The nominalists of modern philosophy, particularly the logical positivists and linguistic analysts, claim that the alternative of true or false is not applicable to definitions, only to "factual" propositions. Since words, they claim, represent arbitrary human (social) conventions, and concepts have no objective referents in reality, a definition can be neither true nor false. The assault on reason has never reached a deeper level or a lower depth than this.

Propositions consist of words--and the question of how a series of sounds unrelated to the facts of reality can produce a "factual" proposition or establish a criterion of discrimination between truth and falsehood, is a question not worth debating. Nor can it be debated by means of inarticulate sounds that switch meanings at the whim of any speaker's mood, stupor or expediency of any given moment. (But the results of that notion can be observed in university classrooms, in the offices of psychiatrists, or on the front pages of today's newspapers.)

Truth is the product of the recognition (i.e., the identification) of the facts of reality. Man identifies and integrates the facts of reality by means of concepts. He retains concepts in his mind by means of definitions. He organizes concepts into propositions--and the truth or falsehood of his propositions rests, not only on their relation to the facts he asserts, but also on the truth or falsehood of the definitions of the concepts he uses to assert them, which rests on the truth or falsehood of his designations of essential characteristics.

Every concept stands for a number of propositions. A concept identifying perceptual concretes stands for some implicit propositions; but on the higher levels of abstraction, a concept stands for chains and paragraphs and pages of explicit propositions referring to complex factual data. A definition is the condensation of a vast body of observations--and stands or falls with the truth or falsehood of these observations. Let me repeat: a definition is a condensation. As a legal preamble (referring here to epistemological law), every definition begins with the implicit proposition: "After full consideration of all the known facts pertaining to this group of existents, the following has been demonstrated to be their essential, therefore defining, characteristic..."

How would you suppose observing and discovering and demonstrating could be done without testing at each step?

And notice her saying that definitions can change with the growth of knowledge.

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

Next, a post of mine from last December:

Daniel,

I have other projects uppermost at the moment, but I will try to get back to you on this.

Meanwhile, I submit to your attention a quote from Popper which concludes a segment wherein he describes the maturing of his thought on "nominalism" and his coming to think that his choice of "methodological nominalism" as a description for his views was misleading:

Unended Quest

Routledge Classics Paperback, 1992

pg. 18

I now believe that Polanyi and Gomperz were both right. Polany was right because the natural sciences are largely free from verbal discussion, while verbalism was, and still is, rampant in many forms in the social sciences. [....] Gomperz was right because a realist who believes in an "external world" necessarily believes in the existence of a cosmos rather than a chaos; that is, in regularities. And though I felt more opposed to classical essentialism than to nominalism, I did not then realize that, in substituting the problem of biological adaptation to regularities for the problem of the existence of similarities, I stood closer to "realism" than to nominalism.

Popper ended up with a view very close to Rand's -- or put that the other way around if you prefer: Rand's view was very close to Popper's mature view. Although I agree with you that she was an "essentialist," she was not a classical essentialist (and he wasn't what's generally called a "nominalist").

Ellen

[Ellen Stuttle]

And Daniel's reply from last December:

I have other projects uppermost at the moment, but I will try to get back to you on this.

So do I, including my review of Burn's book (very favourable) which has been sitting in draft for weeks and which I really must finish before anything else.

Meanwhile, I submit to your attention a quote from Popper which concludes a segment wherein he describes the maturing of his thought on "nominalism" and his coming to think that his choice of "methodological nominalism" as a description for his views was misleading:

Yes, Popper eventually abandoned the "methodological" in his nominalism (and essentialism) when criticising the Aristotelian doctrine of definitions to as he felt this had become confusing. For example, the terms "methodological nominalism" and "methodological essentialism" are still in The Open Society, but do not occur in later condensations of these arguments (for example in "Popper Selections").

But this is merely terminological. The arguments themselves are AFAICS unchanged, as one can see by comparing the later condensation in Popper Selections (Two Kinds Of Definition) with the original (The Aristotelian Roots of Hegelianism, plus extensive notes) in The Open Society. I personally prefer the "methodological", because that's the type of problem this is. I think Popper shouldn't have bothered changing it.

Popper ended up with a view very close to Rand's -- or put that the other way around if you prefer: Rand's view was very close to Popper's mature view. Although I agree with you that she was an "essentialist," she was not a classical essentialist (and he wasn't what's generally called a "nominalist").

I strongly disagree that this is the case. There is nothing at all in Popper even remotely like Rand's claim that "The truth or falsehood of all of man’s conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions." All you will find is extensive arguments against this position in Popper, old and young.

So I think you are quite demonstrably wrong here. But that's ok: I don't expect you to be a Popper scholar, and it as I have written above it is a confusing subject. The confusion arises for two reasons: one, because Popper agrees that say, the laws of nature, or the purposes of artificial things might be said to be a kind of "essence" (eg the "essence" of a clock is to tell time) (Conjectures and Refutations, p142). Also, like "essences", these laws are often hidden from us. All this Popper admits. But what Popper proposes might be descibed roughly as nominalist means to essentialist ends.

Whereas Rand, in sharp contrast, adopted Aristotle's essentialist means wholesale. And therein lies the problem.

The other reason is that Rand is a vague and often highly confused writer, whose philosophy is (as you know) in my opinion pretty much a freestyle grab bag consisting of mostly shonky constructions held together by ad hoc adaptions and attempts to rhetorically intimidate. So you can certainly find similarities with other thinkers like Popper in Rand, but unfortunately all this does is demonstrates Rand's incoherence. Recall I myself have used Fred Seddon's formulation of Rand's "contextual" theory of knowledge myself (We may know P, but P may be false) to illustrate how Rand's theory results in a standard skeptical position. Yet I don't think there's even the faintest chance Rand realised that, or would ever admit it....;-)

[9thdoctor]

I finally got the audiobook version of the Harriman. I can’t say I got much out of it, it’s just a selected history of science, with attempts to tie in to Objectivism that weren’t particularly enlightening, and in the case of Kepler were certainly subject to rebuttal. BTW, the reading is utterly comical, with over dramatic inflections of conclusions (especially Peikoff’s grandiose introduction), and absurd foreign accents used for translated quotations (Copernicus gets a Polish accent etc.). It recalls that great line from Amadeus when Mozart described operas about mythological characters that sound like they “shit marble”.

Anyway, this dialogue with Daniel Barnes is turning into an exercise in same old, same old, could someone transcribe the material on Popper? It’s fairly brief and I’m interested to see his reaction.

[Ellen Stuttle]

The Objectivist variant of pseudoscience isn't the pyramids-and-UFOs-variety, but instead is more a deliberate and obstinate opposition to some of the most important and successful scientific theories of the last 100 years. And it's not like it's even a productive opposition. Quite the reverse. It's just blank hostility, seemingly combined with an urge to return to the age of Newton.

Now, I see a clash a bit like Shermer's point: how does a philosophy ostensibly devoted to reason, reality, science, and free intellectual inquiry end up here?

In a word, Peikoff. Things would have developed mighty differently, I think, after AR's death if Allan Blumenthal had been heir, or even remained as co-heir, to her estate.

Ellen

[Xray]

As for "outrageous claims" - Rand's allegation that “God” is no concept because “a concept has to involve two or more concretes” (ITOE, p. 148) is yet another example where she, based on false premises, drives her own epistemological vehicle against the wall.

You have conveniently neglected to mention the context of this argument. Rand attributes the position that we can have no concept of God because he is sui generis to unspecified theists.

I have not neglected anything here, but if you insist on mentioning it - it merely shows that Rand's idea of "concept" is the same as that which the "unspecified theists" have.

What she calls "concept" refers to "category", where at least "two concretes" are necessary for the formation of the category. While this may work for countable concretes like table, it already fails for uncountables like e. g. "mucus" and completely collapses when you try to apply it to abstract nouns lie e. g. "pride".

For the purpose of this discussion, let's call Rand and the unspecified theists "categorizers", since they obviously try to squeeze every audiovisual symbol of language (with the exception of proper names) into a 'genus-differentia' box.

Now the reasoning of both the theists and Ayn Radn goes: "God is no concept because one can't form a category with the genus god. A category has to involve two or more similar concretes."

All that says is that the audiovisual symbol god does not fit into the category they have established. A category has to have "two or more similar concretes".

In that case, countless audiovisual symbols like e. g. "mucus" and "pride" aren't "concepts" either, since they don't involve any concretes either. If you think they do, feel free to demonstrate.

The problem lies in Rand's approach to the term concept. To her, concept = category.

A category is a concept, but no concept per se.

The human mind is able to "conceive" of many ideas without having to fit them into into any categorial Procrustes bed.

The epistemological fallacy of the categorizer seems to be: "If an idea does not fit into my system of categorizing, it can't be valid."

As for having a concept, an idea of something does not have to imply knowledge. For example, one can have a concept, a "conceived idea of" higher developed beings populating the universe whose thinking abilities are so much superior to ours that to them, things which are difficult or impossible to understand for us, would be easy to understand. Maybe to them, the idea of infinite density of matter preceding the Big Bang would pose no problem in understanding.

Problem arise when concepts are presented as if they were fact. For example, if I claimed to know that such beings exist (or don't exist).

Ghs: Before presenting this historical argument, Rand presents the standard atheist argument that many of the traditional attributes of "God" are "impossible" and "irrational." She specifically calls "God" an "invalid concept" and refers readers to her discussion of invalid concepts in ITOE. This is what Rand means when she says that God "is not a concept." She means it is not a valid concept. She concedes that "one could say it is a concept in the sense in which a dramatist uses concepts to create a character." (So much for Xray's later mention of Utopia as a supposed objection to Rand.)

Whether a concept conforms to reality or not is independent of the fact that the concept exists. That was my point. How Rand 'judges' a concept's "validity" is another issue.

Ghs: I simply wish to point out the extreme carelessness, not to mention deceptiveness, of her initial remarks. Xray made no mention that the sui generis argument was cited by Rand as a traditional argument used by "proponents of that [theistic] viewpoint, and that, according to this position, "God isn't even supposed to be a concept." Rand was right about this.

See my points above about categorizing. The idea "that God is not even supposed to be a concept" is a self-created problem by the categorizers.

Ghs: The claim that God is unknowable has been a mainstream Christian doctrine for many centuries. And one cannot form a concept of something that is unknowable; if one could, it would not be unknowable.

Of course one can form a concept of something which we will never know. For example, you can form a concept, an idea in your mind about matter that "always was". You will have no way of knowing whether this concept conforms to reality, but the concept will be present in your mind. Would it be an 'invalid' concept just because you will never find out whether it conforms to reality?

Doesn't the problematic lie in a differnt area? Not in forming concepts about this or that but in presenting mere speculation and beliefs to others as if they were a fact?

Edited August 7, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

You would think Xray would want to improve ITOE, not toss it in the trash. That's, however, not the feeling I get. So, ray-gun gal, if IYHO ITOE was corrected in its flaws would you find value there? And if you would what would that be?

--Brant