What we think about our psychology...

[Christopher]

No matter the degree of our conviction regarding a belief about the universe, our belief may be correct or incorrect.

This is fairly simple to understand as it applies to the external world, yet I see this idea consistently misunderstood as it applies to our own psychology.

No matter the degree our conviction regarding beliefs about our own psychology, our beliefs may be correct or incorrect. In application, this means that even when we apprehend a psychological state as independent and healthy, it may in fact be reactive and unhealthy. Or, what I observe is the ultimate struggle for Objectivists, we may experience a state of consciousness and related behavior as "selfless" (e.g. empathy), yet in absolute terms this selfless-experienced may be objectively selfish.

The internal identification of an experience is not the truth of what that experience necessarily represents. So don't feel scared to feel helpless or selfless, that may be the most healthy and independent experience you can have in the moment!

[Brant Gaede]

No matter the degree of our conviction regarding a belief about the universe, our belief may be correct or incorrect.

This is fairly simple to understand as it applies to the external world, yet I see this idea consistently misunderstood as it applies to our own psychology.

No matter the degree our conviction regarding beliefs about our own psychology, our beliefs may be correct or incorrect. In application, this means that even when we apprehend a psychological state as independent and healthy, it may in fact be reactive and unhealthy. Or, what I observe is the ultimate struggle for Objectivists, we may experience a state of consciousness and related behavior as "selfless" (e.g. empathy), yet in absolute terms this selfless-experienced may be objectively selfish.

The internal identification of an experience is not the truth of what that experience necessarily represents. So don't feel scared to feel helpless or selfless, that may be the most healthy and independent experience you can have in the moment!

Belief is not a cognitive tool.

--Brant

[BaalChatzaf]

Belief is not a cognitive tool.

--Brant

Our belief that events and processes have causes leads us to look for causes, so that belief is a cognitive tool. It guides our thinking.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Brant Gaede]

Belief is not a cognitive tool.

--Brant

Our belief that events and processes have causes leads us to look for causes, so that belief is a cognitive tool. It guides our thinking.

Ba'al Chatzaf

You can say that in the same sense you can refer to axioms as a starting point for rational inquiry. But that is only like saying the foundation of a house keeps the rain off our heads when it's really the roof.

--Brant

[Philip Coates]

"a belief about the universe"

"our conviction regarding beliefs about our own psychology"

"when we apprehend a psychological state"

"we may experience a state of consciousness and related behavior as "selfless" (e.g. empathy)"

"don't feel scared to feel helpless or selfless"

Christopher, if you were to descend a bit more from the highly abstract level in your posts and give detailed examples, it would make what you have to say much clearer. So that whatever you have in your head is clear to the reader.

"Empathy" is one example, but even that could be concretized further: Try to describe a concrete person in a concrete place having a specific experience.

And you only get to mentioning 'empathy' after the long preceding discussion of abstract phrases, so it is only then that one begins to have an idea what you are talking about. Even an academic philosopher gives lots and lots of examples.

[Barbara Branden]

Christopher, I' agree with Phil that your statement desperately needs examples. As it stands, it is a series only of broad, complex abstractions, which you give us no reasons, nothing about our own experiences of reality, to believe are true,. You do not connect your abstractions to the realities observable by your reader. So your statement reads as a string of unsubstantiated assertions. If one happens to agree with you -- which I do in part, if I understand you -- it can only be because one has already had experiences which bear out your abstractions.

Barbara

[Christopher]

Thank you for the feedback, I did not realize I was being so obtuse. In fact, I had in mind a previous thread, but I'm failing to find it.

Assertion: we label psychological experiences based on their "feel," but the feel does not necessarily describe the objectivity of experience.

Example (all my examples pertain to dyadic relationships):

1. A man experiences what he labels as "feeling emotional dependent" on a woman. The woman opens him to a set of experiences that he would otherwise not have... I assert that this "dependency" may not be in conflict with autonomy.

2. A man cheats on a woman, the woman is left feeling helpless, hurt, anxious, and loss. These experiences make her feel like the bottom of a shoe, like "less-than" the man. I propose that these feelings are not necessarily indicators that the woman lacks independence or self-esteem; rather, these experiences can be healthy and normal in response to the loss of intimacy and connection.

3. A lover sacrifices her own needs to help her partner. She does not do this because she wants to continue the relationship, she does not do this because she might need her partner to do something for her in the future. She does this merely out of a sense of empathy.

Driving off the 3rd example, we come to the experience of "sacrifice." What we might label as feeling like a "sacrifice" (e.g. I sacrificed my happiness to help people I don't know) may not be a sacrifice as it is defined objectively (choosing a lesser value for a higher value). In other words, even if something feels like a sacrifice and therefore an Objectivist would not be motivated to take such action, I assert that the feeling is not necessarily an indicator of whether the action is an objective sacrifice.

Edited July 6, 2010 by Christopher

[Philip Coates]

Christopher, I think I probably agree with all three of your examples.

The only reason I qualify it with "I think" and "probably" is because being even more concrete would be necessary to make the examples even more clear. Especially in number three: "sacrifices her own needs to help her partner." What specifically are you talking about? Are they superficial needs or ones that are indispensable? She cuts off her arm or she gives up an evening out? She postpones having fun so she can console someone? Or she foresakes her true opinions or her career because it threatens his inadequacy or his sense the man should earn more than the woman?

Different evaluations in these different cases. Your statement is still too abstract: Concretes matter and determine the degree and nature and appropriateness of the 'sacrifice'.

That said, it doesn't sound like any of your examples are necessarily sacrificial, in the Objectivist sense of giving up a higher value for a lower. Nor is it inappropriate to feel dependent on someone in the appropriate context. And you should have negative feelings -- "helpless, hurt, anxious, and [a sense of] loss" -- in response to something like the loss or end of a serious romantic relationship.

If you don't, there is something wrong with you. You are repressing your emotions.

Edited July 6, 2010 by Philip Coates

[Dragonfly]

Driving off the 3rd example, we come to the experience of "sacrifice." What we might label as feeling like a "sacrifice" (e.g. I sacrificed my happiness to help people I don't know) may not be a sacrifice as it is defined objectively (choosing a lesser value for a higher value).

Ha ha ha! You mean the Randian definition, there's nothing objective about that, your example in fact shows how impractical that definition is.

[BaalChatzaf]

Belief is not a cognitive tool.

--Brant

Our belief that events and processes have causes leads us to look for causes, so that belief is a cognitive tool. It guides our thinking.

Ba'al Chatzaf

You can say that in the same sense you can refer to axioms as a starting point for rational inquiry. But that is only like saying the foundation of a house keeps the rain off our heads when it's really the roof.

--Brant

In a way that is true. W.O. a foundation there would be no way of supporting a roof to keep the rain of our heads. Our axiomatic principles guide our thinking so they are part of cognition and integration.

Ba'al Chatzaf