Beck and Hayek... yes, Hayek dude!

[Brant Gaede]

A moral standard, perhaps, but not necessarily the only moral standard. Hayek, like Mises, was a utilitarian. I am not contesting that. What I am contesting is your claim that he was some kind of collectivist. He wasn't, unless we expand the meaning of "collectivist" to include everyone who disagrees with Rand's ethical egoism.

Ghs

Well, what was his personal moral default and is it reflected in his political-economic social philosophy?

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

A moral standard, perhaps, but not necessarily the only moral standard. Hayek, like Mises, was a utilitarian. I am not contesting that. What I am contesting is your claim that he was some kind of collectivist. He wasn't, unless we expand the meaning of "collectivist" to include everyone who disagrees with Rand's ethical egoism.

Ghs

Well, what was his personal moral default and is it reflected in his political-economic social philosophy?

--Brant

I don't know how to answer this question. I have never read Hayek for the sake of reading Hayek -- as I have done, for example, with John Locke and Adam Smith. I only read Hayek carefully in those areas where I can learn from him. His statements on ethics have struck me as so vague and poorly formulated that I haven't paid much attention to them. I have never been able to find a coherent moral theory in Hayek's writings, and I am far from alone.

I don't need to be reminded, again and again, that many things Hayek said are unacceptable to Randians. This is true of every classical liberal I have read -- from John Locke to Adam Smith to Herbert Spencer. I have learned an enormous amount from such writers over the past 40 years, but none of this would have happened if I had focused on points of disagreement and repudiated every statement about the public good as "collectivism" or every reference to the virtue of benevolence as "altruism."

There are various ways to justify a free society, and I welcome each and every one of them. Even when I disagree with some of the arguments, they often prove suggestive for my own thinking.

In addition to his invaluable writings on economics and social theory, Hayek was the key founder of the Mont Pelerin Society, whose members have been instrumental in reviving interest in free market and other classical liberal ideas since WWII. To dismiss this man who did so much for the cause of liberty as a "collectivist" is obscene. This reminds me of those critics of Rand who have called her a "fascist"

We need to remember that classical liberals were far more successful in furthering the cause of individual freedom (religious liberty, freedom of speech and press, etc.) than Randians have ever been, or probably ever will be -- and in some ways early liberals faced even greater obstacles than we do. Does this mean that all of their arguments for freedom were sound? No, of course not. But their magnificent victories do suggest that we might learn something from them.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

We need to remember that classical liberals were far more successful in furthering the cause of individual freedom (religious liberty, freedom of speech and press, etc.) than Randians have ever been, or probably ever will be -- and in some ways early liberals faced even greater obstacles than we do. Does this mean that all of their arguments for freedom were sound? No, of course not. But their magnificent victories do suggest that we might learn something from them.

Ghs

Okay. Can we call Rand a classical liberal? And don't you think the proper time to judge her influence relative to those others might be two or three hundred years from now?

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

We need to remember that classical liberals were far more successful in furthering the cause of individual freedom (religious liberty, freedom of speech and press, etc.) than Randians have ever been, or probably ever will be -- and in some ways early liberals faced even greater obstacles than we do. Does this mean that all of their arguments for freedom were sound? No, of course not. But their magnificent victories do suggest that we might learn something from them.

Ghs

Okay. Can we call Rand a classical liberal? And don't you think the proper time to judge her influence relative to those others might be two or three hundred years from now?

--Brant

"Classical liberalism" is a very broad category, so whether or not to include Rand (and other libertarians) is a judgment call. I have sometimes represented libertarianism as the radical wing of classical liberalism, and there is considerable historical justification for this classification. Nonetheless, there are some significant differences between traditional liberals and modern libertarians, such as their respective views on taxation.

Bernard Bailyn and other historians have described the views of America's Founders as "libertarian," partially because of their emphasis on the rights of resistance and revolution. This usage is sometimes contrasted with 19th century liberalism, which for the most part did not have this radical edge.

I spoke of Randians, not Rand per se. With some exceptions, I am not especially optimistic about their long-range influence on freedom. The exceptions are those Randians who have educated themselves in a variety of disciplines and who therefore work from a perspective that is broader than what Rand herself provided. The insular perspective of some Randians prevents them from utilizing some very powerful arguments for freedom.

The influence of many classical liberal writers did not take 200-300 years. In some cases it was a matter of two or three decades.

Ghs

[Dennis Hardin]

If you read the two paragraphs by Hayek that precede the one you quoted, you will see that Hayek is attempting to summarize the views of Adam Smith. Although he doesn't do a stellar job in the quoted passage, I think the major point is clear enough, if read in context.

The danger here, George, is making the case for freedom in terms that concede statist premises and thereby undercut that same cause. You acknowledge elsewhere on this thread that Hayek (specifically his Constitution of Liberty) can be read as endorsing plans as nefarious as Obamacare. Yet you insist that “some Objectivists” (like me, no doubt) do reprehensible harm by refusing to credit Hayek.

No one is denying that Hayek may have made some valuable contributions to economic theory. But to embrace him without spelling out how many of his formulations can be used by enemies of freedom is, in my view, much more destructive to the cause of freedom. From a cultural-historical perspective, I consider philosophy immensely more influential than economics.

The reason Objectivists typically prefer Mises is that he was much more of a radical advocate for laissez faire capitalism. Of course, he also had strong misgivings about Hayek. Here’s an interesting quote regarding Mises reaction to The Road to Serfdom:

Mises was very happy about the success of the book. However, he too thought that Hayek had made his case in misleading terms. Hayek had singled out economic planning as the root cause of the various policies that threatened political and economic freedom. But there is no danger in planning per se. The real question is: who should do the planning, and how should the plans be applied? Should there be only one plan imposed by the power of the state on all citizens? Or should there be many different plans, made by each individual or head of household? Mises emphasized this crucial distinction in a speech delivered on 30 March 1945 to the American Academy of Political Science. He left implicit the fact that his speech was a critical review of Hayek's book.

No doubt you are aware of Mises’ initial skepticism regarding the Mont Pelerin society because of the potential for promoting interventionism, as well as the incident in which he stormed out of one of their meetings, saying, "You're all a bunch of socialists.” Frankly, I wish Mises had been even more consistent, but he was definitely far superior to any of his peers. (BTW, I do not mean to downplay the importance of the Mont Pelerin Society. I’m just using that example to underscore Mises’ particular uniqueness.)

Ghs: After all, when Randians advocate a free society, they don't justify their position by maintaining that freedom is good only because it benefits them personally.

DH: That’s true. Instead, they show that there is no conflict between the moral (i.e., self-interest) and the practical (i.e., an outcome which, in the long term, favors everyone.)

Ghs: This is a very odd distinction between the "moral" and the "practical." Since when in the Randian world do outcomes that benefit everyone constitute the "practical" aspect of self-interested actions?

Objectivists don’t recognize any dichotomy between the moral and the practical. There is no reason you can’t describe something as practical which also happens to be good. To justify freedom only because it benefits everyone leads to disaster politically.

A moral standard, perhaps, but not necessarily the only moral standard. Hayek, like Mises, was a utilitarian. I am not contesting that. What I am contesting is your claim that he was some kind of collectivist. He wasn't, unless we expand the meaning of "collectivist" to include everyone who disagrees with Rand's ethical egoism.

Any system which demands of the individual that he subordinate his interests to that of the majority is essentially collectivist, including utilitarianism. By the way, I disagree that Mises was a utilitarian, although I know Rothbard and others think he was.

The fact that Mises discusses utilitarian arguments and praises some of those who made such arguments does not imply that he endorses those arguments. His approach to economics was rather, value-free, i.e., he was exclusively focused on whether specific policies would achieve their purported goals. In fact, in Chapter 35 of Human Action, he rejects utilitarian arguments per se as “void of significance.: “It can be invoked for the justification of every variety of social organization…” He shows how it may have been applied to such abhorrent human outrages as slavery and Nazism. “A principle that is broad enough to cover all doctrines, however conflicting with one another, is of no use at all.”

I don't need to be reminded, again and again, that many things Hayek said are unacceptable to Randians. This is true of every classical liberal I have read -- from John Locke to Adam Smith to Herbert Spencer. I have learned an enormous amount from such writers over the past 40 years, but none of this would have happened if I had focused on points of disagreement and repudiated every statement about the public good as "collectivism" or every reference to the virtue of benevolence as "altruism."

So is that your takeway from this discussion? That it demonstrates the “insular perspective of some Randians ”? I frequently read authors who are both collectivist and altruistic and find a great deal of value in what they have to say. I wouldn’t waste my time if the point was to “focus on points of disagreement.” I don’t care to read much of Hayek, but then I am not particularly interested in economics, either. And I don’t proclaim an author as unqualifiedly brilliant when I know that some of their thinking is seriously flawed and fraught with disastrous implications. I make an effort to clarify a writer’s contradictions before I endorse them.

In addition to his invaluable writings on economics and social theory, Hayek was the key founder of the Mont Pelerin Society, whose members have been instrumental in reviving interest in free market and other classical liberal ideas since WWII. To dismiss this man who did so much for the cause of liberty as a "collectivist" is obscene. This reminds me of those critics of Rand who have called her a "fascist."

Well, your arguments have not succeeded in persuading me to your view, but I certainly don’t want to be obscene. I’m sorry. I’ll try my best to reform.

I have always had the highest respect for you, George. And I have learned a great deal from your writings over the years. But logic is the only thing that’s going to change my mind about Hayek.

[George H. Smith]

The fact that Mises discusses utilitarian arguments and praises some of those who made such arguments does not imply that he endorses those arguments. His approach to economics was rather, value-free, i.e., he was exclusively focused on whether specific policies would achieve their purported goals. In fact, in Chapter 35 of Human Action, he rejects utilitarian arguments per se as “void of significance.: “It can be invoked for the justification of every variety of social organization…” He shows how it may have been applied to such abhorrent human outrages as slavery and Nazism. “A principle that is broad enough to cover all doctrines, however conflicting with one another, is of no use at all.”

You have misunderstood Mises here. He is not objecting to utilitarianism per se, a position he frequently defended. Rather, he is simply objecting to the way the notion of "happiness" is used in welfare economics. Immediately before the snippets you quoted, Mises writes:

[social man] must adjust his conduct to the requirements of social cooperation and look upon his fellow men's success as an indispensable condition of his own. From this point of view one may describe the objective of social cooperation as the realization of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Hardly anybody would venture to object to this definition of the most desirable state of affairs and to contend that it is not a good thing to see as many people as happy as possible. All the attacks directed against the Bentham formula have centered around ambiguities or misunderstandings concerning the notion of happiness; they have not affected the postulate that the good, whatever it may be, should be imparted to the greatest number.

However, if we interpret welfare in this manner, the concept is void of any specific significance. It can be invoked for the justification of every variety of social organization....

(Human Action, 3rd ed., Regnery, 833-34, my italics.)

Earlier in Human Action (p. 175), Mises endorses "the teachings of utilitarian philosophy and classical economics," claiming that they "have nothing at all to do with the doctrine of natural right." Mises continues:

With them the only point that matters is social utility. They recommended popular government, private property, tolerance, and freedom not because they are natural and just, but because they are beneficial....Bentham, the radical, shouted: "Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense."...The Utilitarians do not combat arbitrary government and privileges because they are against natural law but because they are detrimental to prosperity. They recommend equality under the civil law not because men are equal but because such a policy is beneficial to the commonweal.

If any doubts remain about Mises' utilitarianism, consider this passage from Theory and History (Arlington, p 54):

Conduct suited to preserve social cooperation is just, conduct detrimental to the preservation of society is unjust. There cannot be any question of organizing society according to the postulates of an arbitrary preconceived idea of justice....Social utility is the only standard of justice. It is the sole guide of legislation.

I daresay that if Hayek had written the preceding passages, you would take them as conclusive proof that Hayek was a "collectivist." So are you willing to say the same of Mises? There was not a dime's worth of difference in their views on these matters. (I should add that Mises distorted the views of many classical liberals more than Hayek did.)

Mises, having explicitly repudiated natural rights, gives the following justification for governmental coercion:

What the social apparatus of compulsion and coercion achieves is that individuals, whom malice, short-sightedness or mental inferiority prevent from realizing that by indulging in acts that are destroying society they are hurting themselves and all other human beings.... (Human Action, 281).

The priority that Mises gives to society over the individual permits him to claim that taxation and military conscription are consistent with -- indeed, indispensable to -- a free society:

If the government of a free country forces every citizen to cooperate fully in its designs to repel the aggressors and every able-bodied man to join the armed forces, it does not impose upon the individual a duty that would step beyond the tasks the praxeological law dictates....He who in our age opposes armaments and conscription is, perhaps unbeknown to himself, an abettor of those aiming at the enslavement of all. (Human Action, 282.)

So, Dennis, by your standards, is this not about as "collectivist" as it gets. So why does Mises get a pass and Hayek doesn't?

To make matters worse, one of Mises' chief objections to socialists is that many claim that values are objective. Mises will have none of this.

Judgments of value are voluntaristic. They express feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters them. With regard to them there cannot be any question of truth and falsity. They are ultimate and not subject to any proof or evidence. (Theory and History, 19.)

The above views are defended by Mises in various books and essays. Yet I would not call him a collectivist for the same reasons that I would not call Hayek a collectivist, since their fundamental premises are virtually identical. Hence if you insist on dubbing Hayek a collectivist, you will need to tar Mises with the same brush.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

No doubt you are aware of Mises’ initial skepticism regarding the Mont Pelerin society because of the potential for promoting interventionism, as well as the incident in which he stormed out of one of their meetings, saying, "You're all a bunch of socialists.” Frankly, I wish Mises had been even more consistent, but he was definitely far superior to any of his peers. (BTW, I do not mean to downplay the importance of the Mont Pelerin Society. I’m just using that example to underscore Mises’ particular uniqueness.)

No, I am not aware of any "initial skepticism" by Mises. As Israel Kirzner notes in Ludwig von Mises: The Man and His Economics (p. 27): "Mises had been a founding member of the [Mont Pelerin] Society (although as the years went by, he became increasingly disturbed by what he considered to be faulty views expressed at its periodic meetings by some of its newer members)." (My italics.)

Hayek wanted to call this organization "The Acton Society." In A History of The Mont Pelerin Society (p. 43), the historian R.M. Hartwell explains why:

Hayek's preference was for Acton. Acton had believed individual liberty to be of supreme value, not just a means to "a higher political end." Acton had written that "liberty is the only object which benefits all alike" and that the democratic spirit implied that "every man's free will should be as unfettered as possible."...Hayek also admired Acton's belief in the universal validity of moral standards, "to suffer no man and no cause to escape the undying penalty which history has to inflict on wrong."

That's some kind of collectivism!

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

If you read the two paragraphs by Hayek that precede the one you quoted, you will see that Hayek is attempting to summarize the views of Adam Smith. Although he doesn't do a stellar job in the quoted passage, I think the major point is clear enough, if read in context.

The danger here, George, is making the case for freedom in terms that concede statist premises and thereby undercut that same cause. You acknowledge elsewhere on this thread that Hayek (specifically his Constitution of Liberty) can be read as endorsing plans as nefarious as Obamacare. Yet you insist that “some Objectivists” (like me, no doubt) do reprehensible harm by refusing to credit Hayek.

I'm unclear what you mean by "statist premises." I think Rand conceded a crucial statist premise when she argued for a monopolistic government, but I wouldn't call her a statist or a collectivist.

I commented earlier on the disconnect between Hayek's fundamental premises and his specific policy recommendations. Chandran Kukathas makes the same point in Hayek and Modern Liberalism (p. 174): "Hayek's views on the tasks of government appear as arbitrary pronouncements bearing little relation to his own, or indeed any, moral theory."

Kukathas (p. 166) summarizes Hayek's basic approach as follows:

[Hayek] argues that in a liberal society people are most likely to achieve their various purposes because it is a society in which the protection of individual domains by rules of just conduct leaves them free to use their knowledge to pursue those purposes. In effect, he brings a substantial sociology to defend the claim that the good society must be one in which rules of justice seek to preserve entitlements (or rights) rather than to distribute benefits and burdens according to desert or merit or need.

Again, this is a very peculiar brand of collectivism.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

So is that your takeway from this discussion? That it demonstrates the “insular perspective of some Randians ”? I frequently read authors who are both collectivist and altruistic and find a great deal of value in what they have to say. I wouldn’t waste my time if the point was to “focus on points of disagreement.” I don’t care to read much of Hayek, but then I am not particularly interested in economics, either. And I don’t proclaim an author as unqualifiedly brilliant when I know that some of their thinking is seriously flawed and fraught with disastrous implications. I make an effort to clarify a writer’s contradictions before I endorse them.

My comment about the "insular perspective" of some Randians appeared in a reply to Brant. It most certainly was not directed at you; I was thinking mainly of ARI types.

I'm sorry if I gave the wrong impression.

Ghs

[Dennis Hardin]

[social man] must adjust his conduct to the requirements of social cooperation and look upon his fellow men's success as an indispensable condition of his own. From this point of view one may describe the objective of social cooperation as the realization of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Hardly anybody would venture to object to this definition of the most desirable state of affairs and to contend that it is not a good thing to see as many people as happy as possible. All the attacks directed against the Bentham formula have centered around ambiguities or misunderstandings concerning the notion of happiness; they have not affected the postulate that the good, whatever it may be, should be imparted to the greatest number.

However, if we interpret welfare in this manner, the concept is void of any specific significance. It can be invoked for the justification of every variety of social organization....

(Human Action, 3rd ed., Regnery, 833-34, my italics.)

George,

I read the passages you quoted above, and I understand Mises to mean the following: Of course everyone wants to see as many people happy as possible, but we cannot use that as a way to justify economic policy. In economics and social theory—where the goal is improving social welfare—the concept is “void of significance.” And then he gives the examples of slavery and Nazism. Utilitarianism is useless because it “can be invoked for the justification of every variety of social organization.”

Earlier in Human Action (p. 175), Mises endorses "the teachings of utilitarian philosophy and classical economics," claiming that they "have nothing at all to do with the doctrine of natural right." Mises continues:

With them the only point that matters is social utility. They recommended popular government, private property, tolerance, and freedom not because they are natural and just, but because they are beneficial....Bentham, the radical, shouted: "Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense."...The Utilitarians do not combat arbitrary government and privileges because they are against natural law but because they are detrimental to prosperity. They recommend equality under the civil law not because men are equal but because such a policy is beneficial to the commonweal.

In this passage from Human Action, I don’t see where Mises endorses "the teachings of utilitarian philosophy and classical economics.” He speaks of “the utilitarians” without endorsing them or claiming to be one of them. He describes utilitarian doctrines in more or less favorable terms, but stops short of any explicit agreement with them.

Conduct suited to preserve social cooperation is just, conduct detrimental to the preservation of society is unjust. There cannot be any question of organizing society according to the postulates of an arbitrary preconceived idea of justice....Social utility is the only standard of justice. It is the sole guide of legislation.

Theory and History

In your quote from Theory and History, he speaks of the values of “social cooperation” and the “preservation of society,” both of which are values I would endorse, as would any sane person. Obviously I do not agree that “social utility” is a proper standard of justice, but I would not say this makes him a “collectivist.” We can speak in a general way about the importance of social utility without implying that maximizing such utility is a moral criterion for the organization of society.

(Unfortunately, my copy of Theory and History is still in one of the dozens of boxes that appear to be taking on the status of furniture following my recent move. So all I have to go on here is your brief excerpt.)

Also, as I understand it, Mises’ theory of praxeology presumes that value judgments are irrelevant. Such a value-free approach is applied consistently by Mises. Again, he often analyzes the utilitarian approaches of others, but without ever endorsing that ethical premise. In any case, I have encountered others much more knowledgeable than myself who consider his writings on economics as neutral with respect to any particular value system.

This is how your quote regarding Mises’ sanction of coercion reads in my version:

In the market society, direct compulsion and coercion are practiced only [to prevent] acts detrimental to social cooperation. For the rest, individuals are not molested by the police power….(p. 285)

The other passage regarding conscription is totally missing from my copy. In the introduction to the version I have (the “scholars edition” published in 1998), the editor states the following:

“… revised editions introduce a different focus on the necessary and specific powers of government, which appear rather expansive by Misesian standards….These later editions substantially alter the definition of freedom itself. In the original, Mises states: ‘A man is free as far as he can live and get on without being at the mercy of arbitray decisions on the part of other people.’(pp. xxii)

…these added passages go even further to permit conscription, and it is here we find a direct inconsistency with Mises’ prior writings….the passage stands in contradiction to the discussion and rejection of conscription as a species of interventionism which…leads inevitably to socialism and total war…”(pp. xxiii)

Finally, I certainly agree that Mises’ view of values in general as subjective was highly objectionable. No question about that. Philosophically, he left a lot to be desired. But what I don’t find are frequent passages where he seems to endorse the premises so common to Hayek’s writings that (a) capitalism works because mankind is basically irrational, and (b ) that our principal aim should be that every man “contribute as much as possible to the needs of other men.” I think the average reader could read Mises without feeling subjected to an all-out assault on reason and individualism, and I consider that a very significant difference.

Incidentally, I’m delighted that you don’t see me as one of those Objectivists with an “insular perspective.” That’s good to know.

I will try to respond to your other posts soon. Right now, I am exhausted.

[George H. Smith]

In this passage from Human Action, I don’t see where Mises endorses "the teachings of utilitarian philosophy and classical economics.” He speaks of “the utilitarians” without endorsing them or claiming to be one of them. He describes utilitarian doctrines in more or less favorable terms, but stops short of any explicit agreement with them.

You need to read more Mises. He frequently endorsed the views of the classical economists in these matters.

In your quote from Theory and History, he speaks of the values of “social cooperation” and the “preservation of society,” both of which are values I would endorse, as would any sane person. Obviously I do not agree that “social utility” is a proper standard of justice, but I would not say this makes him a “collectivist.” We can speak in a general way about the importance of social utility without implying that maximizing such utility is a moral criterion for the organization of society.

You are being much more understanding and sympathetic to Mises than you have been to Hayek. If you look at Volume 2 of Hayek's Law, Legislation, and Liberty (pp. 17ff), you will find a discussion of "The constructivist fallacy of utilitarianism" where Hayek criticizes the Benthamite notion of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Both Hayek and Mises were rule utilitarians; there was no substantial difference between them in this respect. When Hayek speaks of social utility (or the public good), he, like Mises, means general rules that enable individuals to pursue their own ends. There is nothing "collectivist" about this idea. On the contrary, as Hayek writes in Vol. 1 (p. 61):

The preservation of a free system is so difficult precisely because it requires a constant rejection of measures which appear to be required to secure particular results, on no stronger grounds than that they conflict with a general rule, and frequently without our knowing what will be the costs of not observing the rule in the particular instance. A successful defense of freedom must therefore be dogmatic and make no concessions to expediency ....

This doesn't sound at all like the "collectivist" Hayek that you have portrayed.

Also, as I understand it, Mises’ theory of praxeology presumes that value judgments are irrelevant. Such a value-free approach is applied consistently by Mises. Again, he often analyzes the utilitarian approaches of others, but without ever endorsing that ethical premise.

Misesian praxeology is value-free, but this didn't prevent Mises from embracing ethical utilitarianism, any more than it prevents you or me from embracing ethical egoism. Are you suggesting that Mises had no moral opinions whatsoever?

This is how your quote regarding Mises’ sanction of coercion reads in my version:

In the market society, direct compulsion and coercion are practiced only [to prevent] acts detrimental to social cooperation. For the rest, individuals are not molested by the police power….(p. 285)

The other passage regarding conscription is totally missing from my copy. In the introduction to the version I have (the “scholars edition” published in 1998), the editor states the following:

“… revised editions introduce a different focus on the necessary and specific powers of government, which appear rather expansive by Misesian standards….These later editions substantially alter the definition of freedom itself. In the original, Mises states: ‘A man is free as far as he can live and get on without being at the mercy of arbitray decisions on the part of other people.’(pp. xxii)

…these added passages go even further to permit conscription, and it is here we find a direct inconsistency with Mises’ prior writings….the passage stands in contradiction to the discussion and rejection of conscription as a species of interventionism which…leads inevitably to socialism and total war…”(pp. xxiii)

The "Scholar's Edition" (published by the Mises Institute) is the first English edition of Human Action. Mises' final revisions were incorporated in the third edition, which is the one I quoted from and which is where we find his defense of conscription. That was his final word on the subject.

Finally, I certainly agree that Mises’ view of values in general as subjective was highly objectionable. No question about that. Philosophically, he left a lot to be desired. But what I don’t find are frequent passages where he seems to endorse the premises so common to Hayek’s writings that (a) capitalism works because mankind is basically irrational, and (b ) that our principal aim should be that every man “contribute as much as possible to the needs of other men.”

Hayek didn't hold either of the views that you attribute to him. There are many reasons to criticize Hayek, but to understand what these are, you first need to read more Hayek than you have -- and to read him for the purpose of understanding his overall approach rather than focusing on some out-of-context passages.

I think the average reader could read Mises without feeling subjected to an all-out assault on reason and individualism, and I consider that a very significant difference.

I assumed you were a cut above the "average reader."

It is absurd -- there is no other word for it -- to accuse Hayek of launching an "all-out assault on reason and individualism." I seriously doubt if even the "average reader" would get that impression.

If you would like to read a good summary of Hayek's overall approach, read his contribution to Toward Liberty: Essays in Honor of Ludwig von Mises, vol. 1 [1971], which is available online. This essay , which contains some of the same material found in Law, Legislation, and Liberty, including the passage I quoted above, begins:

A condition of liberty in which all are allowed to use their own knowledge for their own purposes, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal application, is likely to produce for them the best conditions for achieving their respective aims.

Shortly thereafter, Hayek continues:

I will not attempt here a fuller definition of the term “freedom” or enlarge upon why we regard freedom as so important. That I have attempted elsewhere. But a few words should be said about why I prefer the short formula by which I have above described the condition of freedom as a state in which each can use his knowledge for his own purposes to the classical phrase of Adam Smith of “every man, so long as he does not violate the laws of justice, [being] left perfectly free to pursue his own interests in his own way.” The reason for my preference is that the latter formula unnecessarily and unfortunately suggests, without intending to, a connection of the argument for individual freedom with egotism or selfishness. The freedom to pursue his own aims is in fact at least as important for the complete altruist as for the most selfish. Altruism, to be a virtue, certainly does not presuppose that one has to follow another person's will. But it is true that much pretended altruism consists in a desire to make others serve the ends which the “altruist” regards as important.

Hayek's opposition to coercive altruism, which he calls "pretended altruism," could scarcely be more clear. What more do you want before you correct your misrepresentations of Hayek? A complete and unqualified endorsement of Galt's Speech?

Ghs

[Dennis Hardin]

DH: No doubt you are aware of Mises’ initial skepticism regarding the Mont Pelerin society because of the potential for promoting interventionism..

Ghs: No, I am not aware of any "initial skepticism" by Mises.

Here is the history of Mises’ initial resistance to the Mont Pelerin Society, from The Ludwig von Mises Institute:

Exactly one year after the establishment of the Foundation for Economic Education in New York, another organization was brought into existence to provide a forum for the exchange and development of ideas from a classical-liberal perspective…[The] initiative fell quite naturally into the hands of Hayek, who was well known on both sides of the Atlantic — due to the success of The Road to Serfdom and also because he was among the first western intellectuals to renew contacts with his continental counterparts after the war…[in Oslo in 1946] the plan for an "Acton-Tocqueville Society" must have taken shape. By the end of the year, [Hayek] had found the necessary funds to sponsor the event from Swiss (through Hunold) and American (Volker Fund) sources, and he wrote a letter of invitation to some fifty persons for a ten-day conference in the Swiss Alps, at the bottom of Mount Pèlerin on Lake Geneva.

Hayek was probably anticipating trouble with Mises: on the invitation letter to Mises, Hayek added a hand-written apology that he had not had the time to discuss his plan with him in any detail. His apprehension turned out to be right. Mises went through the roof, writing to Hayek that he could not leave NYU in April and that he "abhorred the idea of going to Europe. I have seen enough decline already."At Hazlitt's request, he had written a four-page memorandum containing his "Observations on Professor Hayek's Plan." Here he stated that many similar plans to stem the tide of totalitarianism had been pursued in the past several decades — he himself had been involved in some of these projects — and each time the plan failed because these friends of liberty had themselves already been infected by the statist virus: "They did not realize that freedom is inextricably linked with the market economy. They endorsed by and large the critical part of the socialist programs. They were committed to a middle-of-the-road solution, to interventionism." At the end of the memorandum, he stated his main objection:

The weak point in Professor Hayek's plan is that it relies upon the cooperation of many men who are known for their endorsement of interventionism. It is necessary to clarify this point before the meeting starts. As I understand the plan, it is not the task of this meeting to discuss anew whether or not a government decree or a union dictate has the power to raise the standard of living of the masses. If somebody wants to discuss these problems, there is no need for him to make a pilgrimage to the Mount Pèlerin. He can find in his neighborhood ample opportunity to do so.

In his letter to Hayek, he was more specific:

I am primarily concerned about the participation of Röpke, who is an outspoken interventionist. I think the same holds true for Brandt, Gideonse, and Eastman. All three of them are contributors to the purely socialist — even though decidedly anti-Soviet — New Leader.

Still Mises did not rule out his participation, but he did suggest a postponement of the conference until September. This turned out to be impracticable, though, and Hayek undertook another attempt to convince his old mentor in early February. He downplayed the significance of Brandt, Gideonse, and Eastman's connections to the New Leader, mentioning that he himself had written for this magazine. But more importantly, he argued that the program of the conference was still quite open and that the main purpose of the meeting on Lake Geneva — and of subsequent meetings — would be to win over especially those historians and political scientists, who still harbored wrong ideas on a number of issues, but who were willing to learn. This seems to have been enough to convince Mises to attend…

I don’t mean to make a big deal out of this, but to me it highlights how concerned Mises was about the need for total consistency in the ideological battle for laissez-faire principles.

DH: The danger here, George, is making the case for freedom terms that concede statist premises and thereby undercut that same cause.

Ghs: I'm unclear what you mean by "statist premises."

Hayek: “…it is merely one aspect of a view which in general rates rather low the place which reason plays in human affairs, which contends that man has achieved what he has in spite of the fact that he is only partly guided by reason, and that his individual reason is very limited and imperfect…”

Statist premise #1: Reason plays a minimal role in human affairs. Or, to put it another way, people are too dumb to know what's good for them. (I know, I know. Hayek never said that. The point is that he implied it. And not just once or twice.)

Hayek: “The chief concern of the great individualist writers was indeed to find a set of institutions by which man could be induced, by his own choice and from the motives which determined his ordinary conduct, to contribute as much as possible to the need of all others; and their discovery was that the system of private property did provide such inducements to a much greater extent than had yet been understood…”

Statist premise #2: The proper role of government is to induce men “to contribute as much as possible to the need of all others..”

Statists frequently use both premises to justify government intervention. For evidence, please tune in to the evening news. Both ideas serve as the leitmotif of the Obama administration.

Again, I am not denying that Hayek may well have had the best of intentions, that he undoubtedly saw himself as an individualist, that his contributions to economics were valuable, that many of his writings and theories were terrific. But his gross inconsistencies served to strengthen the arguments of his enemies.

Regarding the views of Mises, you say the following in your last post:

The "Scholar's Edition" (published by the Mises Institute) is the first English edition of Human Action. Mises' final revisions were incorporated in the third edition, which is the one I quoted from and which is where we find his defense of conscription. That was his final word on the subject.

The quotations I cited suggest that the experts at the Mises Institute would disagree with you. But I don’t want to launch into a whole separate debate on that issue; frankly, I just don’t have the expertise for it. I don’t think Mises was a utilitarian, but he certainly made his share of philosophical errors. You are quite right about that. Since I don’t want to be unfair to Hayek, I will hereby proceed to amend my own "absurd" viewpoint (while leaving the essential elements of my "absurdity" intact).

Much of Hayek’s writing portrays man as weak and malleable--like a clump of clay that can be molded by social institutions into a tool to serve "the need of all others.” On the other hand, much of his writing does clearly support liberty and individualism. No doubt Kukathas was right in saying that he wanted a “society in which the protection of individual domains by rules of just conduct leaves them free to use their knowledge to pursue those purposes.” To that extent, Hayek was definitely not a collectivist. So I will revise my position to the point of calling Hayek a “tacit collectivist”—the way he went about arguing for individualism often tended to smuggle in a lot of unspoken collectivist ideas. And a lot of what he wrote was very probably free of such implications.

And I will concede that this would apply to most free market economists in varying degrees. Henry Hazlitt was certainly not a collectivist, yet (like Hayek) he was also a utilitarian. But I would give Hazlitt enormous credit for at least trying to make his ethical utilitarianism compatible with individual self-interest. In Foundations of Morality, he argued for what he called “rule-utilitarianism”—a code for gauging individual conduct--apparently because he realized that the macro perspective of “the greatest good for the greatest number” alone was potentially an extremely disastrous principle.

DH: I think the average reader could read Mises without feeling subjected to an all-out assault on reason and individualism, and I consider that a very significant difference.

Ghs: I assumed you were a cut above the "average reader." It is absurd -- there is no other word for it -- to accuse Hayek of launching an "all-out assault on reason and individualism." I seriously doubt if even the "average reader" would get that impression.

Ghs: Hayek didn't hold either of the views that you attribute to him. There are many reasons to criticize Hayek, but to understand what these are, you first need to read more Hayek than you have…

It isn’t absurd at all. One glance at the various quotations I cited earlier in this thread shows how they could very easily lead “the average reader” to conclude that Hayek held these premises. In a way, that is really the whole point. Most people are not going to take the time to analyze Hayek enough to see that he may have meant something very different from what was implied and, as a result, take away some potentially very destructive ideas. It is very likely that he did not mean to leave those implications, but most people are not going to see that. That’s why I think it is important to point those premises out and show how they differ from excellent passages such as this one (which you cite):

A condition of liberty in which all are allowed to use their own knowledge for their own purposes, restrained only by rules of just conduct of universal application, is likely to produce for them the best conditions for achieving their respective aims.

No doubt there is much in Hayek I could wholeheartedly endorse. But then, I have never really denied that.

It is interesting that you add this final quote from Hayek:

The reason for my preference [regarding definitions of freedom] is that the latter formula unnecessarily and unfortunately suggests, without intending to, a connection of the argument for individual freedom with egotism or selfishness…

…but that is a matter for another thread. I think it’s called “Christianity and Liberty.” I am planning another visit there sometime soon.

[George H. Smith]

Here is the history of Mises’ initial resistance to the Mont Pelerin Society, from The Ludwig von Mises Institute:

...Still Mises did not rule out his participation, but he did suggest a postponement of the conference until September. This turned out to be impracticable, though, and Hayek undertook another attempt to convince his old mentor in early February. He downplayed the significance of Brandt, Gideonse, and Eastman's connections to the New Leader, mentioning that he himself had written for this magazine. But more importantly, he argued that the program of the conference was still quite open and that the main purpose of the meeting on Lake Geneva — and of subsequent meetings — would be to win over especially those historians and political scientists, who still harbored wrong ideas on a number of issues, but who were willing to learn. This seems to have been enough to convince Mises to attend…

I don’t mean to make a big deal out of this, but to me it highlights how concerned Mises was about the need for total consistency in the ideological battle for laissez-faire principles.

Hayek obviously shared the same concern. According to this account, Hayek told Mises that the "main purpose of the meeting" was to "win over especially those historians and political scientists, who still harbored wrong ideas on a number of issues, but who were willing to learn." So how does this make Hayek any less concerned than Mises about consistency? Your own quotation refutes the claim you are making. If Hayek didn't care about inconsistent defenders of the free market, he would not have wished to win them over to the positions that he and Mises shared.

Hayek: “…it is merely one aspect of a view which in general rates rather low the place which reason plays in human affairs, which contends that man has achieved what he has in spite of the fact that he is only partly guided by reason, and that his individual reason is very limited and imperfect…”

Statist premise #1: Reason plays a minimal role in human affairs. Or, to put it another way, people are too dumb to know what's good for them. (I know, I know. Hayek never said that. The point is that he implied it. And not just once or twice.)

I explained before what Hayek meant in passages like this, and not just once or twice. I even quoted Hayek to the effect that he never intended to denigrate the role of reason but only wished to demonstrate its inadequacies in the sphere of social planning. Hayek never said or implied that "people are too dumb to know what's good for them." On the contrary, this is the exact opposite of what he believed. He said again and again that people are very competent to pursue their own values and happiness, and that they should be left free to do so. Hayek argues extensively for this position; for example, he points out that individuals have local knowledge of particular circumstances and contingencies that no central planner could ever possess.

Hayek: “The chief concern of the great individualist writers was indeed to find a set of institutions by which man could be induced, by his own choice and from the motives which determined his ordinary conduct, to contribute as much as possible to the need of all others; and their discovery was that the system of private property did provide such inducements to a much greater extent than had yet been understood…”

Statist premise #2: The proper role of government is to induce men “to contribute as much as possible to the need of all others..”

How you got from the quoted passage, which doesn't refer to government at all, to your conclusion, which talks about "the proper role of government," is anyone's guess. There is a long story behind the "invisible hand" argument that Hayek mentions, including the attempt of classical liberals to prove that the free market promotes the public interest rather than special interests (or "partial interests," as they were often called during the 18th century), but it is painfully obvious that none of this context matters to you.

Regarding the views of Mises, you say the following in your last post:

The "Scholar's Edition" (published by the Mises Institute) is the first English edition of Human Action. Mises' final revisions were incorporated in the third edition, which is the one I quoted from and which is where we find his defense of conscription. That was his final word on the subject.

The quotations I cited suggest that the experts at the Mises Institute would disagree with you.

Disagree with me about what? Why do you suppose Mises revised Human Action by including an argument for conscription that was not present in the first edition? Do you suppose he did this on a lark, perhaps to confuse people?

All that your supposed "expert" said was that Mises' later defense of conscription was not consistent with his basic principles. But even this is wrong. It was quite consistent with his rejection of natural rights and his defense of utilitarianism.

I don’t think Mises was a utilitarian, but he certainly made his share of philosophical errors.

Okay, we will simply ignore Mises' extended defense of utilitarianism in Chapter 3 of Theory and History, including his statement, which I quoted previously: "Social utility is the only the standard of justice. It is the sole guide of legislation."

We will also ignore the section titled "The Utilitarian Doctrine Restated" (pp. 55-61), in which Mises defends utilitarianism against its critics and attempts to give it a more precise formulation than we find in some earlier defenders. We will ignore Mises' repeated assertions about what utilitarianism, properly understood, does and does not "teach." how critics "misconstrue the utilitarian doctrine," and how utilitarianism differs from "collectivism."

We will pretend that Mises never wrote these things, so as not to contradict your unnamed "experts."

I have no more patience to continue this discussion.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Having composed myself, I have a few more comments.

Henry Hazlitt was certainly not a collectivist, yet (like Hayek) he was also a utilitarian. But I would give Hazlitt enormous credit for at least trying to make his ethical utilitarianism compatible with individual self-interest. In Foundations of Morality, he argued for what he called “rule-utilitarianism”—a code for gauging individual conduct--apparently because he realized that the macro perspective of “the greatest good for the greatest number” alone was potentially an extremely disastrous principle.

In the same post you responded to, I wrote:

You are being much more understanding and sympathetic to Mises than you have been to Hayek. If you look at Volume 2 of Hayek's Law, Legislation, and Liberty (pp. 17ff), you will find a discussion of "The constructivist fallacy of utilitarianism" where Hayek criticizes the Benthamite notion of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Both Hayek and Mises were rule utilitarians; there was no substantial difference between them in this respect. When Hayek speaks of social utility (or the public good), he, like Mises, means general rules that enable individuals to pursue their own ends. There is nothing "collectivist" about this idea.

In other words, Hayek, Mises, and Hazlitt don't disagree in this matter. All adopted the standard classical liberal line, such as defended by Adam Smith, about the compatibility of self-interest and the public interest (or social good). Contrary to your suggestion, Hayek explains the reasons for this compatibility in considerable detail -- indeed, far more than Hazlitt ever does -- so, by your standard, Hayek also deserves "enormous credit."

You correctly point out that Hazlitt was not a collectivist, despite his rule utilitarianism. The same is true of Hayek (who often cites Hume's classic defense of rule utilitarianism). This has been my basic point all along.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

No doubt Kukathas was right in saying that he wanted a “society in which the protection of individual domains by rules of just conduct leaves them free to use their knowledge to pursue those purposes.” To that extent, Hayek was definitely not a collectivist. So I will revise my position to the point of calling Hayek a “tacit collectivist”—the way he went about arguing for individualism often tended to smuggle in a lot of unspoken collectivist ideas....

You could just as well argue that Rand's "man qua man" justifications for rights and freedom are implicitly collectivistic. As I pointed out in an earlier post, by MQM Rand doesn't mean you or me or any other particular individual. Rather, MQM refers to all individuals, collectively considered.

By using MQM arguments, Rand appears to avoid the notion of the common good, public good, etc. But this is only an appearance. MQM, despite presenting "himself" as an individual, does not denote any particular concrete individual to the exclusion of others. Rather, MQM is an abstract individual -- and this abstraction, when concretized, denotes all individuals, in virtue of their common characteristics.

When Rand speaks of the good of MQM, she is simply expressing in different terms what has traditionally been called the "common good." Thus, if you wish to brand appeals to the common good (as we find in find in Hayek and other rule utilitarians) implicitly collectivistic ("tacit" is not the best word here), then the same reasoning would apply to Rand, after we have unpacked the meaning of MQM.

Ghs

[Dennis Hardin]

No doubt Kukathas was right in saying that he wanted a “society in which the protection of individual domains by rules of just conduct leaves them free to use their knowledge to pursue those purposes.” To that extent, Hayek was definitely not a collectivist. So I will revise my position to the point of calling Hayek a “tacit collectivist”—the way he went about arguing for individualism often tended to smuggle in a lot of unspoken collectivist ideas....

You could just as well argue that Rand's "man qua man" justifications for rights and freedom are implicitly collectivistic. As I pointed out in an earlier post, by MQM Rand doesn't mean you or me or any other particular individual. Rather, MQM refers to all individuals, collectively considered.

By using MQM arguments, Rand appears to avoid the notion of the common good, public good, etc. But this is only an appearance. MQM, despite presenting "himself" as an individual, does not denote any particular concrete individual to the exclusion of others. Rather, MQM is an abstract individual -- and this abstraction, when concretized, denotes all individuals, in virtue of their common characteristics.

When Rand speaks of the good of MQM, she is simply expressing in different terms what has traditionally been called the "common good." Thus, if you wish to brand appeals to the common good (as we find in find in Hayek and other rule utilitarians) implicitly collectivistic ("tacit" is not the best word here), then the same reasoning would apply to Rand, after we have unpacked the meaning of MQM.

Ghs

Here is Rand's reference to man qua man in “The Objectivist Ethics”:

“Such is the meaning of the definition: that which is required for man’s survival qua man. It does not mean a momentary or a merely physical survival. It does not mean the momentary physical survival of a mindless brute, waiting for another brute to crush his skull. It does not mean the momentary physical survival of a crawling aggregate of muscles who is willing to accept any terms, obey any thug and surrender any values, for the ske of what is known as ‘survival at any price,’ which may or may not last a week or a year. ‘Man’s survival qua man’ means the terms, methods, conditions and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan—in all those aspects of his existence which are open to his choice.”

The Virtue of Selfishness, Ayn Rand, New American Library, 1964, p. 18

Here is what she has to say about the “common good:”

The tribal notion of “the common good” has served as the moral justification of most social systems—and of all tyrannies—in history. The degree of a society’s enslavement or freedom corresponded to the degree to which that tribal slogan was invoked or ignored.

“The common good” (or “the public interest”) is an undefined and undefinable concept: there is no such entity as “the tribe” or “the public”; the tribe (or the public or society) is only a number of individual men. Nothing can be good for the tribe as such; “good” and “value” pertain only to a living organism—to an individual living organism—not to a disembodied aggregate of relationships.

“The common good” is a meaningless concept, unless taken literally, in which case its only possible meaning is: the sum of the good of all the individual men involved. But in that case, the concept is meaningless as a moral criterion: it leaves open the question of what is the good of individual men and how does one determine it?

It is not, however, in its literal meaning that that concept is generally used. It is accepted precisely for its elastic, undefinable, mystical character which serves, not as a moral guide, but as an escape from morality. Since the good is not applicable to the disembodied, it becomes a moral blank check for those who attempt to embody it.

When “the common good” of a society is regarded as something apart from and superior to the individual good of its members, it means that the good of some men takes precedence over the good of others, with those others consigned to the status of sacrificial animals. It is tacitly assumed, in such cases, that “the common good” means “the good of the majority” as against the minority or the individual. Observe the significant fact that that assumption is tacit: even the most collectivized mentalities seem to sense the impossibility of justifying it morally. But “the good of the majority,” too, is only a pretense and a delusion: since, in fact, the violation of an individual’s rights means the abrogation of all rights, it delivers the helpless majority into the power of any gang that proclaims itself to be “the voice of society” and proceeds to rule by means of physical force, until deposed by another gang employing the same means.

If one begins by defining the good of individual men, one will accept as proper only a society in which that good is achieved and achievable. But if one begins by accepting “the common good” as an axiom and regarding individual good as its possible but not necessary consequence (not necessary in any particular case), one ends up with such a gruesome absurdity as Soviet Russia, a country professedly dedicated to “the common good,” where, with the exception of a minuscule clique of rulers, the entire population has existed in subhuman misery for over two generations.

The Ayn Rand Lexicon

Man qua man means and can only mean: a standard applicable to each and every individual man. “Common good” typically refers to the good of some or most men. When we are discussing some goal or plan which is beneficial to man qua man, we must include all individual men. Because the term “common good” is inherently elastic, it can either mean all individual men or only some men, leaving out some others. When it is used to justify a plan or policy that benefits some men at the expense of others, it is collectivist. As Rand says, the term ‘common good’ is used precisely because of its elasticity. Man qua man does not lend itself to a collectivist interpretation.

Try using man qua man to justify Obamacare in a way that would be plausible to anyone with half a brain. Go ahead. Make my day.

Curious as to why I’m not responding to your other two posts? Try using a snotty, disrespectful tone in your response to this one.

[Dennis Hardin]

I came across considerable material relevant to this discussion in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies and Literature of Liberty, and I cannot resist the temptation to add it here as a postscript to yesterday’s entry. It relates directly to the differences between Mises and Hayek in general and, more specifically, to the assertion that my view of Hayek’s "all-out assault on reason" is “absurd.”

Another way to highlight the difference between Hayek and Mises is with respect to the influence of Kant in their respective approaches to value theory. Both endorsed a subjectivist value theory, but Hayek was considerably more skeptical than was Mises. This appears to have been his basis for describing mankind as “very irrational” and for emphasizing the limited role of reason in human life. (See the specific quotations below.) In The Sensory Order, Hayek dispenses with all concern with “how things really are in the world.”

“…[A] question like ‘what is X?’ has meaning only within a given order, and…within this limit it must always refer to the relation of one particular event to other events belonging to the same order.”

“…[T]he elimination of the hypothetical ‘pure’ or ‘primary’ core of sensation, supposed not to be due to earlier experience, but either to involve some direct communication of properties of the external objects, or to constitute irreducible mental atoms or elements, disposes of various philosophical puzzles which arise from the lack of meaning of these hypotheses.”

“…The conception of an original pure core of sensation which is merely modified by experience is an entirely unnecessary fiction.”

[The above quotes are from "F.A. Hayek and the Rebirth of Classical Liberalism," by John N. Gray, in Literature of Liberty, Winter, 1982]

Quoting John Gray:

“Hayek is a Kantian, then, in disavowing in science or in philosophy any Aristotelian method of seeking the essence or natures of things. We cannot know how things are in the world, but only how our mind itself organizes the jumble of its experiences.”

Here are two quotes which I cited earlier in this thread reflecting Hayek’s appraisal of the role of reason in mans’ life:

The antirationalistic approach, which regards man not as a highly rational and intelligent but as a very irrational and fallible being, whose individual errors are corrected only in the course of a social process…is probably the most characteristic feature of English individualism….

It is merely one aspect of an even wider difference between a view which in general rates rather low the role which reason plays in human affairs…and that reason is very limited and imperfect…and a view which assumes that…everything which man achieves is the direct result of…the control of individual reason….

Individualism and Economic Order, Friedrich A. Hayek

Hayek’s overall purpose seems to be that of demolishing Cartesian rationalism, minimizing the role of reason in human valuation and social order in general as a way of showing the impracticality of all social planning. This played an important role in the development of his theory of the “Spontaneous Order” in economic life.

Mises was also influenced by Kant with respect to his view of praxeology as an a priori science of human action. Mises’ view is subjective insofar as it posits man’s reliance on an innate frame of value reference unrelated to an objective reality. But there are crucial respects in which Mises and Hayek differ. First of all, Mises’ seems to have taken away radically different conclusions about the nature and limits of reason.

In Human Action, in the chapter entitled "Economics and The Revolt Against Reason," following a discussion of the ways in which thinkers like Hegel and Comte used a fallacious concept of human reason, Mises says:

“Many more facts of this kind could be mentioned. But they are no argument against reason, rationalism and rationality. These dreams have nothing at all to do with the question of whether or not reason is the right and only instrument for man in his endeavors to attain as much knowledge as is accessible to him…”[p. 73]

Human Action, Scholars Edition, 1998

Here and elsewhere in Human Action, Mises unfortunately describes reason as limited in its capacity to provide “perfect cognition of all things” and “ultimate knowledge” [p. 25], but, unlike Hayek, these conclusions by Mises do not play a central role in his value theory.

In an issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies devoted to the topic of “Ayn Rand Among the Austrians” (Volume 6, Number 2, Spring 2005), there are numerous articles discussing similarities in the theories of Mises and Rand. George Reisman, for instance, considers that Mises was led to a belief in the subjectivism of values by a misunderstanding of the concept of objectivity. Reisman states:

“…I believe Mises support of ‘apriorism’ and his use of the method of ‘imaginary constructions’ in economic theory is also fundamentally consistent with Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism.”

Another article by Edward Younkins in the same issue of JARS—“Menger, Mises, Rand and Beyond”—recounts the following explanation by Hans-Herman Hoppe regarding the manner in which Mises’ praxeology resolves the Kantian disconnect between the human mind and reality:

…Mises adds one more extremely important insight that Kant had only vaguely glimpsed. It has been a common quarrel with Kantianism that this philosophy seemed to imply some sort of idealism. For if, as Kant sees it, true synthetic a priori propositions are propositions about how our mind works and must of necessity work, how can it be explained that such mental categories fit reality?

Mises provides the solution to this challenge (in Human Action). It is true, as Kant says, that true synthetic a priori propositions are grounded in self-evident axioms and that these axioms have to be understood by reflection upon ourselves rather than being in any meaningful sense "observable." Yet we have to go one step further. We must recognize that such necessary truths are not simply categories of our mind, but that our mind is one of acting persons. Our mental categories have to be understood as ultimately grounded in categories of action. And as soon as this is recognized, all idealistic suggestions immediately disappear. Instead, an epistemology claiming the existence of true synthetic a priori propositions becomes a realistic epistemology. Since it is understood as ultimately grounded in categories of action, the gulf between the mental and the real, outside, physical world is bridged. As categories of action, they must be mental things as much as they are characteristics of reality. For it is through actions that the mind and reality make contact.

Praxeology and Economic Science, Hans-Herman Hoppe (emphasis mine)

Again, it is clear to me that Mises and Hayek are worlds apart in their approaches to defending the free market, and that Hayek’s writings and theories, in contrast to his mentor, reflect a fundamental disrespect for reason and human cognition.

[Brant Gaede]

Man qua man means and can only mean: a standard applicable to each and every individual man. "Common good" typically refers to the good of some or most men. When we are discussing some goal or plan which is beneficial to man qua man, we must include all individual men. Because the term "common good" is inherently elastic, it can either mean all individual men or only some men, leaving out some others. When it is used to justify a plan or policy that benefits some men at the expense of others, it is collectivist. As Rand says, the term 'common good' is used precisely because of its elasticity. Man qua man does not lend itself to a collectivist interpretation.

"Applicable," by whom? Should be, if it should be, and ought to be, if it ought to be, are not the same as "is." In this case "is" is in the minds of a few intellectuals. When you generalize to the whole human race, and if you do that then let us say "Human Qua Human" and dump the adult masculine bias, you generalize right over any known and unknown exceptions. One of the first things needing doing is to investigate the human race in all its diversity using all "soft" scientific disciplines such as sociology, history, psychology, cultural anthropology, climate, religion, philosophy, warfare, agriculture, hunter-gatherer, urbanization tendencies, industrialization, disease, freedom and its lack, etc. Just referencing 45 year-old Rand won't cut it.

The way to get ought from is is to find out what is is. Call it "A." Then find out what you want. Call it "C." Ought is "B." Ought is the in-between. If you want C you ought to do B because A is A (sorry; I couldn't resist). Man is A. What man needs is B if he wants to get C. Moral or not in this formulation hasn't been addressed. If you want a moral existence, C, you ought to do (and maybe refrain from doing) B considering man's nature A. Man abstracted is not abstracted from all members of the human race but from generalizable human characteristics, especially a working mind, a potentially rational, reasoning mind using facts and logic to a productive result. If we want that we need freedom and freedom is what we ought to have. To get it we need an ethics. Etc. The moral imperative of a society that protects individual rights is vitiated by their violation. The violation is anything contrary.

--Brant

and that's the way it is

[George H. Smith]

Man qua man means and can only mean: a standard applicable to each and every individual man. “Common good” typically refers to the good of some or most men.

Historically, the "common good" referred to a fundamental "good" (i.e., a value) that all men have in common. Liberal political theorists often argued that respecting individual rights promotes the common good, because each individual, possessing the common faculty of reason, requires freedom to act on his own judgment. This is essentially no different than Rand's justification for rights.

When we are discussing some goal or plan which is beneficial to man qua man, we must include all individual men. Because the term “common good” is inherently elastic, it can either mean all individual men or only some men, leaving out some others.

The expression "common good" is not inherently elastic, but it has been abused; there is no question about that.

When it is used to justify a plan or policy that benefits some men at the expense of others, it is collectivist. As Rand says, the term ‘common good’ is used precisely because of its elasticity. Man qua man does not lend itself to a collectivist interpretation.

For over 2000 years, "man qua man" has been used by Aristotelian political philosophers to defend policies that are collectivist. When Aristotle argued that "man is naturally a political animal" and when he concluded that the state is logically prior to the individual, he meant man qua man.

Try using man qua man to justify Obamacare in a way that would be plausible to anyone with half a brain. Go ahead. Make my day.

I don't need to make the case, since it has been made many times by Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophers. Consider the Thomistic text Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics, by Thomas J. Higgins (Bruce Pub., 1950). As you might have guessed from the title, this book of chock full of MQM arguments.

Higgins ridicules the "laissez-faire view" of the State as "individualism run wild" and notes the "pernicious effect of this doctrine." It means that "the State must stand by while the little man is exploited by the big man." Its "root is greed." Higgins claims that "the atrocious evils of industrial slavery were the inevitable consequences of the laissez-faire doctrine." Using MQM arguments, Higgins goes on to argue, with various theses, corollaries, and proofs, for the "organic structure of the State" and how it should care for people in those cases where people cannot care for themselves. Also included in over 100 pages MQM arguments are justifications for the right to a decent wage and other positive rights that libertarians reject.

As I said, these MQM arguments are standard fare among Aristotelians. They have been around a lot longer than Rand's use of MQM, and many Aristotelians with more than half a brain have found them plausible.

The notion that MQM arguments are inherently more precise than "common good" arguments is demonstrably wrong, especially since, as traditionally used, they mean the same thing. Something good for MQM is simply a good that all men have in common.

This is what the "common good" meant, especially in Aristotelian political theory. In particular cases, some appeals to MQM have been more precise than some appeals to the "common good," and vice versa. It depends on the philosopher.

I trust I have made your day.

Curious as to why I’m not responding to your other two posts? Try using a snotty, disrespectful tone in your response to this one.

I presented an explicit statement by Mises in which he embraces utilitarianism. Theory and History is available online, so you could have easily read his defense of utiltiarianism in that book. This would have been a common courtesy, but instead you merely repeated your claim, based on nothing at all, that Mises was not a utilitarian.

Why would you waste my time in this manner when you could have easily checked my source? Your reaction was rude and deserved a snotty reply.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

It is hard to attack reason by writing books which ask the reader to reason.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

I came across considerable material relevant to this discussion in The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies and Literature of Liberty, and I cannot resist the temptation to add it here as a postscript to yesterday’s entry. It relates directly to the differences between Mises and Hayek in general and, more specifically, to the assertion that my view of Hayek’s "all-out assault on reason" is “absurd.”

Another way to highlight the difference between Hayek and Mises is with respect to the influence of Kant in their respective approaches to value theory. Both endorsed a subjectivist value theory, but Hayek was considerably more skeptical than was Mises. This appears to have been his basis for describing mankind as “very irrational” and for emphasizing the limited role of reason in human life. (See the specific quotations below.) In The Sensory Order, Hayek dispenses with all concern with “how things really are in the world.”

First, Kant was not a subjectivist in moral theory, so it is incorrect to speak of Kant's "influence" in this regard.

Second, both Hayek and Mises were influenced by Kant's epistemological theories, so both were highly skeptical of man's ability to attain metaphysical knowledge via reason alone. In a passage from Human Action (3rd ed., Regnery, p. 25) that you quoted from yourself, Mises claims that metaphysical knowledge is ultimately a matter of faith: "Reasoning and scientific inquiry can never bring full ease of mind, apodictic certainty, and perfect cognition of all things. He who seeks this must apply to faith and try to quiet his conscience by embracing a creed or a metaphysical doctrine."

Quoting John Gray:

“Hayek is a Kantian, then, in disavowing in science or in philosophy any Aristotelian method of seeking the essence or natures of things. We cannot know how things are in the world, but only how our mind itself organizes the jumble of its experiences.”

The Kantian Mises said very similar things. For example, in the first chapter of The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, he wrote: "What we know is what the nature or structure of our senses and of our mind makes comprehensible to us. We see reality, not as it “is” and may appear to a perfect being, but only as the quality of our mind and of our senses enables us to see it."

Mises was also influenced by Kant with respect to his view of praxeology as an a priori science of human action. Mises’ view is subjective insofar as it posits man’s reliance on an innate frame of value reference unrelated to an objective reality. But there are crucial respects in which Mises and Hayek differ. First of all, Mises’ seems to have taken away radically different conclusions about the nature and limits of reason.

...Here and elsewhere in Human Action, Mises unfortunately describes reason as limited in its capacity to provide “perfect cognition of all things” and “ultimate knowledge” [p. 25], but, unlike Hayek, these conclusions by Mises do not play a central role in his value theory.

Mises' position on the subjectivity of value judgments was extremely radical. In Human Action (p. 19), he wrote:

Human action is necessarily always rational. The term rational action is therefore pleonastic and must be rejected as such. When applied to the ultimate ends of action, the terms rational and irrational are inappropriate and meaningless. The ultimate end of action is always the satisfaction of some desires of the acting man. Since nobody is in a position to substitute his own value judgments for those of the acting individual, it is vain to pass judgment on other people’s aims and volitions. (My italics.)

In Human Action, in the chapter entitled "Economics and The Revolt Against Reason," following a discussion of the ways in which thinkers like Hegel and Comte used a fallacious concept of human reason, Mises says:

“Many more facts of this kind could be mentioned. But they are no argument against reason, rationalism and rationality. These dreams have nothing at all to do with the question of whether or not reason is the right and only instrument for man in his endeavors to attain as much knowledge as is accessible to him…”[p. 73]

Human Action, Scholars Edition, 1998

Early on in this exchange I explicitly noted that Mises was more rationalistic than Hayek. I also noted that I prefer the Misesian over the Hayekian approach in this respect, so you don't need to convince me.

Part of the difference between Mises and Hayek was real, and part was more a matter of phraseology. Even so, as indicated in Hayek's defense of reason that I quoted in an earlier post, Hayek fully agreed with Mises that "reason is the right and only instrument for man in his endeavors to attain as much knowledge as is accessible to him."

In an issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies devoted to the topic of “Ayn Rand Among the Austrians” (Volume 6, Number 2, Spring 2005), there are numerous articles discussing similarities in the theories of Mises and Rand. George Reisman, for instance, considers that Mises was led to a belief in the subjectivism of values by a misunderstanding of the concept of objectivity. Reisman states:

“…I believe Mises support of ‘apriorism’ and his use of the method of ‘imaginary constructions’ in economic theory is also fundamentally consistent with Rand’s philosophy of Objectivism.”

This is incorrect so far as Mises' apriorism is concerned, though Reisman is correct about imaginary constructions, which have nothing to do with apriorism. However, as Rothbard repeatedly argued, it is a relatively simple matter to translate the valid insights of Misesian apriorism into terms acceptable to an empiricist like Rand. I have made similar comments about Hayek's valid insights.

Another article by Edward Younkins in the same issue of JARS—“Menger, Mises, Rand and Beyond”—recounts the following explanation by Hans-Herman Hoppe regarding the manner in which Mises’ praxeology resolves the Kantian disconnect between the human mind and reality:

…Mises adds one more extremely important insight that Kant had only vaguely glimpsed. It has been a common quarrel with Kantianism that this philosophy seemed to imply some sort of idealism. For if, as Kant sees it, true synthetic a priori propositions are propositions about how our mind works and must of necessity work, how can it be explained that such mental categories fit reality?

Mises provides the solution to this challenge (in Human Action). It is true, as Kant says, that true synthetic a priori propositions are grounded in self-evident axioms and that these axioms have to be understood by reflection upon ourselves rather than being in any meaningful sense "observable." Yet we have to go one step further. We must recognize that such necessary truths are not simply categories of our mind, but that our mind is one of acting persons. Our mental categories have to be understood as ultimately grounded in categories of action. And as soon as this is recognized, all idealistic suggestions immediately disappear. Instead, an epistemology claiming the existence of true synthetic a priori propositions becomes a realistic epistemology. Since it is understood as ultimately grounded in categories of action, the gulf between the mental and the real, outside, physical world is bridged. As categories of action, they must be mental things as much as they are characteristics of reality. For it is through actions that the mind and reality make contact.

Praxeology and Economic Science, Hans-Herman Hoppe (emphasis mine)

This is a reasonable interpretation. Too bad you aren't willing to grant the same courtesy to Hayek by interpreting his theories in a sympathetic manner.

Again, it is clear to me that Mises and Hayek are worlds apart in their approaches to defending the free market, and that Hayek’s writings and theories, in contrast to his mentor, reflect a fundamental disrespect for reason and human cognition.

You can say this as many times as you like. It still isn't true.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Early on in this exchange I explicitly noted that Mises was more rationalistic than Hayek. I also noted that I prefer the Misesian over the Hayekian approach in this respect, so you don't need to convince me.

A decade ago on Old Atlantis, I posted a list of my choices for the ten most important (nonfiction) books on freedom ever written. Human Action made my number two spot, second only to Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations.

Nothing by Hayek made my list. Nothing by Hayek would even make my top twenty list, though he might be included in my top thirty list.

I mention this tidbit to emphasize my greater esteem for the contributions of Mises over Hayek. As I have mentioned before in this thread, I am normally the person who criticizes Hayek in online debates, not the person who defends him.

Hayek wrote a lot that annoys me to no end, and this is the first time I have gone to such lengths to defend him. I do for the same reason that I have defended Herbert Spencer in many venues, despite the fact that I agree with Spencer on very little outside the realm of political theory. For me, this is a matter of intellectual justice.

For example, Spencer has been repeatedly attacked, and viciously so, for his "survival of the fittest" doctrine, which is typically mischaracterized as "Social Darwinism." Spencer's critics quote snippets from his writings without regard for their context, and I honestly think Dennis has done the same thing with Hayek. We all know how the same tactic has been employed against Ayn Rand.

Don't misunderstand me: I don't think Dennis has intentionally mischaracterized Hayek's approach. Far from it. What I think has happened is that, inspired by Rand's derogatory comments about Hayek, Dennis has focused on snippets from Hayek that appear to support the most unsympathetic interpretation possible. I get the impression that Dennis has not even read a single book by Hayek, though I could be wrong about this.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

This post is an incidental sidebar to something I wrote earlier today.

I quoted from the Thomistic book Man as Man: The Science and Art of Ethics, by Thomas J. Higgins. This book, as you may recall, attacks the "laissez-faire view" of the State, according to which government should concern itself only with the negative function of protecting individual rights.

Well, guess which philosopher Higgins singles out as the most influential proponent of the laissez-faire position? Immanuel Kant, that's who. Higgins goes so far as to say that "Kant originated this view and he arrived at it from his notion of rights."

The first part of this statement is incorrect -- Kant did not originate the laissez-faire theory of the State -- but the second part is correct. Kant's defense of individual rights, based on the notion of the moral "autonomy" of every person, was indeed the foundation for his defense of limited government. Higgins correctly points out that Kant distinguished between "an internal moral order and an external juridical order" and claimed that the proper function of government is to "safeguard such external conditions that the rights and liberties of all might harmoniously co-exist. Hence [government] exists to prohibit those external acts which would disturb that harmony of liberty. Nothing more."

Higgins (pp. 432-33) continues:

The economic liberals of the Manchester School [i.e., laissez-faire advocates like Richard Cobden and John Bright] adopted the Kantian view since it fitted in so well with their dream that society would reach an ideal state of prosperity if there were complete free trade and unlimited competition. For them the State is a benign policeman whose beat is restricted to the guardianship of commutative justice [i.e., the protection of equal rights, in contrast to distributive justice]. There is no such thing as social justice -- that would be plain socialism.

There is a delicious irony here. Thomists, like Rand, typically despise Kant (though I don't think any went so far as to dub him the most evil man in the history of western civilization). But Higgins and other Thomists (and Aristotelians generally) have a better understanding of Kant's political ideas and influence than Rand did. They understand Kant's intense individualism -- this is a major reason why they dislike him -- so from their perspective, it would come as no surprise that two of the greatest individualists and free-market advocates of the 20th century, Mises and Hayek, hailed from a Kantian background. The same fact is more difficult for an orthodox O'ist to explain.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Hayek: “The chief concern of the great individualist writers was indeed to find a set of institutions by which man could be induced, by his own choice and from the motives which determined his ordinary conduct, to contribute as much as possible to the need of all others; and their discovery was that the system of private property did provide such inducements to a much greater extent than had yet been understood…”

Statist premise #2: The proper role of government is to induce men “to contribute as much as possible to the need of all others..”

Statists frequently use both premises to justify government intervention. For evidence, please tune in to the evening news. Both ideas serve as the leitmotif of the Obama administration.

I have commented before on how Dennis has mangled the meaning of the above passage by Hayek, using it as a pillar passage to support his claim that Hayek was a collectivist.

What Dennis fails to mention is that Mises frequently made the same point. In Chapter 6 of The Ultimate Foundations of Economic Science (Liberty Fund ed., p. 100), Mises wrote:

The owner of producers’ goods is forced to employ them for the best possible satisfaction of the wants of the consumers. He forfeits his property if other people eclipse him by better serving the consumers. In the market economy property is acquired and preserved by serving the public and is lost when the public becomes dissatisfied with the way in which it is served. Private property in the factors of production is a public mandate, as it were, which is withdrawn as soon as the consumers think that other people would employ it more efficiently. By the instrumentality of the profit-and-loss system, the owners are forced to deal with “their” property as if it were other people’s property entrusted to them under the obligation to utilize it for the best possible satisfaction of the virtual beneficiaries, the consumers. All factors of production, including also the human factor, viz., labor, serve the totality of the members of the market economy. Such is the real meaning and character of private property in the material factors of production under capitalism. (My italics.)

Mises here elaborates on the same theme stated by Hayek, so if this theme condemns Hayek as a collectivist (or an implicit collectivist), it must also condemn Mises. As I have said before many times, there is no substantial difference between Hayek and Mises in these matters.

Ghs

[Xray]

No doubt Kukathas was right in saying that he wanted a “society in which the protection of individual domains by rules of just conduct leaves them free to use their knowledge to pursue those purposes.” To that extent, Hayek was definitely not a collectivist. So I will revise my position to the point of calling Hayek a “tacit collectivist”—the way he went about arguing for individualism often tended to smuggle in a lot of unspoken collectivist ideas....

You could just as well argue that Rand's "man qua man" justifications for rights and freedom are implicitly collectivistic. As I pointed out in an earlier post, by MQM Rand doesn't mean you or me or any other particular individual. Rather, MQM refers to all individuals, collectively considered.

By using MQM arguments, Rand appears to avoid the notion of the common good, public good, etc. But this is only an appearance. MQM, despite presenting "himself" as an individual, does not denote any particular concrete individual to the exclusion of others. Rather, MQM is an abstract individual -- and this abstraction, when concretized, denotes all individuals, in virtue of their common characteristics.

When Rand speaks of the good of MQM, she is simply expressing in different terms what has traditionally been called the "common good." Thus, if you wish to brand appeals to the common good (as we find in find in Hayek and other rule utilitarians) implicitly collectivistic ("tacit" is not the best word here), then the same reasoning would apply to Rand, after we have unpacked the meaning of MQM.

Ghs

Correct. "Man" in "Man qua Man" refers to the abstract category "Man" and, and like in "Man is mortal" the phrase "life proper to man" implies all members of the category.

For it would be absurd if a moralist, in his/her prescriptive ethics, presented a set of common values for all and then would exclude some individuals to whom the values don't apply.

So when all members of a class share values X, Y, Z, and if these values are labeled as "objectively good", it follows that those values are necessarily correlated with the idea of a "common good".

The idea of "objective value" and a "common good" are so closely connected that they can be called "twin concepts".

Can any one think of a philosophy/ideology out there which uses one concept without implying the other?

[Rand's article about the 'common good' is a rejection of manipulative attempts by ideologists to suggest to people they serve the "common good" if they do what the ideologists/political leaders want. "Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori" is a typical example.]

As I said, these MQM arguments are standard fare among Aristotelians. They have been around a lot longer than Rand's use of MQM, and many Aristotelians with more than half a brain have found them plausible.

A lot can be 'justified' using the "plausible" MQM argument. It depends on what your premises are.

From the premise that "the female is a misbegotten male", inferior to men in both mind and body, it was derived that a 'woman qua woman' existence means being naturally subject to the male. It was a perfectly "plausible" MQM argument back then, give the limited knowledge of the times. http://www.aquinasonline.com/Questions/women.html

Finally, I certainly agree that Mises’ view of values in general as subjective was highly objectionable.

What is your main objection?

Dennis Hardin: To make matters worse, one of Mises' chief objections to socialists is that many claim that values are objective. Mises will have none of this.

All ideologists claim their values to be objective, for no ideology can exist without the idea (I'm tempted to write illusion) of objective value.

I'm beginning to understand why some posters thought I was a Mises advocate when I began posting here ...

Edited June 28, 2010 by Xray