How would distinguish conceptual behavior?

[dan2100]

Add to this, there would be a difference, in my understanding, between a concept as abstraction and a perceptual abstraction. The latter would be much more limited and not able, in my understanding, to be further abstracted -- whereas with the former there's no inherent limit to the level of abstraction, hence Rand's "abstraction from abstractions" phrase.

I see. Well, the way I look at it is that a perception is an abstraction and these abstractions may be grouped or classified (abstracted further). So in my view, concepts are already abstractions of abstractions.

There is a sense in which I believe you are right here, but I think this blurs the line a bit. For instance, in perception, while perceptual systems do chuck out a lot of information, the object of perception is immediate to the perceptual system. Immediately perceived objects are, in other words, essential to perception. The same is not true for concepts.

In another sense, a perception and a concept are both forms of awareness. And it seems humans, at least, can be aware of, from their armchair or internally, the process of abstracting in concepts. The process of perception seems another matter. It seems like perception is a given for a perceptual consciousness. (Granted, one might argue that really low-level concepts -- the ones that are typically hard to define or defined by showing -- have a fairly obscure abstracting process.)

Finally, linking these two points together -- immediacy and opaqueness of perception -- perceptions are linked one-to-oine to a perceptual object whereas concepts seem to be a many-to-one link to either perceptions or other concepts. My perception of my neighbor's dog this morning links up to that actual dog whereas my concepts of "dog" and "neighbor" are not so linked. This applies across time and across the variances instances of a concept. The latter seems easier to grasp -- e.g., my concept of "neighbor" can cover more than just one neighbor and can seemingly cover an unlimited number of such instances. (And, indeed, applying this concept, I'd think I have many neighbors -- all covered under the concept of "neighbor." But I wouldn't say I have many neighbors all covered under one perception of them unless I was actually perceiving them together as a unit as in the case of where they were all gathered together on my lawn burning an effigy of yours truly. The perception doesn't cover an unlimited number of instances, but just the one instance.

Over time -- the former in this context -- is meant that, even if I can relate my perception this morning of my neighbor walking her dog to my perception of her yesterday walking the same dog, these are two perceptions. Yet, they'd be covered by the same concept. (You might offer, though, that my relating my perception of her and her dog yesterday with that of my perception of her and her dog today is a form of abstraction -- and that, of course, many different kinds of animals do this. Here, I think there is something close to conception going on, but I have to mull over it some more.)

[tjohnson]

Add to this, there would be a difference, in my understanding, between a concept as abstraction and a perceptual abstraction. The latter would be much more limited and not able, in my understanding, to be further abstracted -- whereas with the former there's no inherent limit to the level of abstraction, hence Rand's "abstraction from abstractions" phrase.

I see. Well, the way I look at it is that a perception is an abstraction and these abstractions may be grouped or classified (abstracted further). So in my view, concepts are already abstractions of abstractions.

There is a sense in which I believe you are right here, but I think this blurs the line a bit. For instance, in perception, while perceptual systems do chuck out a lot of information, the object of perception is immediate to the perceptual system. Immediately perceived objects are, in other words, essential to perception. The same is not true for concepts.

I am not disregarding the rest of your post but I want to comment on this point for now. I claim that the "object" refers to something in our brains. If we both look at an object, say a pencil, is your "pencil" the same as mine? No, it is entirely unique and exists only in your nervous system. The phrase "that is a pencil" actually conceals this fact and should technically be understood to mean "I perceive (or abstract) what is called a pencil". Of course we don't talk that this just as we don't refer to cheese as "bacteria laden milk product" but speaking about speaking is more difficult than speaking about things. This is the central thesis of general semantics - that the structure of our commonly used language leads us to confuse or conflate different orders or levels of abstraction.

[dan2100]

Add to this, there would be a difference, in my understanding, between a concept as abstraction and a perceptual abstraction. The latter would be much more limited and not able, in my understanding, to be further abstracted -- whereas with the former there's no inherent limit to the level of abstraction, hence Rand's "abstraction from abstractions" phrase.

I see. Well, the way I look at it is that a perception is an abstraction and these abstractions may be grouped or classified (abstracted further). So in my view, concepts are already abstractions of abstractions.

There is a sense in which I believe you are right here, but I think this blurs the line a bit. For instance, in perception, while perceptual systems do chuck out a lot of information, the object of perception is immediate to the perceptual system. Immediately perceived objects are, in other words, essential to perception. The same is not true for concepts.

I am not disregarding the rest of your post but I want to comment on this point for now. I claim that the "object" refers to something in our brains. If we both look at an object, say a pencil, is your "pencil" the same as mine? No, it is entirely unique and exists only in your nervous system. The phrase "that is a pencil" actually conceals this fact and should technically be understood to mean "I perceive (or abstract) what is called a pencil". Of course we don't talk that this just as we don't refer to cheese as "bacteria laden milk product" but speaking about speaking is more difficult than speaking about things. This is the central thesis of general semantics - that the structure of our commonly used language leads us to confuse or conflate different orders or levels of abstraction.

I understand, but disagree with that view -- well, in a way that goes beyond naive realism. I don't think the object of perception is in our brains or minds. It's outside it. Perception is the act of being aware of some object -- specifically, being able to discriminate that object from a background or other objects. In this sense, from the outside, if someone were to ask what do both you and I perceive -- or what is our perception -- it would be of the pencil.

Granted, owing to differences in perspective, etc. you and I would be perceiving the pencil in a slightly different manner, but the cause and object of our perception is the pencil. If this is not the case, then, yes, there's no link between the object and what's perceived, but in that case -- the sort of Cartesian view of perception -- then we're no longer, in my view, talking about perception and this view would lead, if applied consistently, to skepticism or solipsism. But this is a topic for another post and a much longer discussion than one of just how to detect concepts in animals.

(Full disclosure: I basically agree with and rely on David Kelley's views on this issue -- as given in his The Evidence of the Senses. I highly recommend that book.)

Now this doesn't clear up everything and an analogy might help out here -- as I do think there is some real blurriness (as opposed to merely messy theorizing) at the boundaries. The analogy is you and I perceiving two things or events where one of us has more knowledge to bear. Let's say it's a marriage ceremony and let's posit I'm utterly ignorant about marriage ceremonies, the goings on and all that. In that case, I think it's going to be very hard for you to distinguish where your conceptual knowledge starts and ends and your perceptions start and end. Much of your conceptual knowledge will be brought to bear and you'll likely "perceive" things that I'll miss or you'll miss things I actually perceive (e.g., see, hear, smell, etc.). Some of this will be because your ability to perceptually discriminate will be informed or refined by your conceptual knowledge. Whereas I might perceive some women standing around, you might say, "That's the bride and the bride's maids." And your experience will like you saw the bride and some bride's maids whereas I'll just perceive, say, a few women standing on a platform. Does this make sense?

My point here is this is like the valley/mountain distinction early. It might hard to tell where one ends and begins, but that wouldn't mean there no such things as and no important differences between valleys and mountains.

[tjohnson]

I understand, but disagree with that view -- well, in a way that goes beyond naive realism. I don't think the object of perception is in our brains or minds. It's outside it. Perception is the act of being aware of some object -- specifically, being able to discriminate that object from a background or other objects. In this sense, from the outside, if someone were to ask what do both you and I perceive -- or what is our perception -- it would be of the pencil.

Here is another analogy; Suppose you live in a room and your only access to the outside world is via a computer console and you have no knowledge that the outside world even exists. You "see objects" and see how they interact and you can even interact with them with your mouse. You talk about these objects and their characteristics, behaviour, etc. and so you gain knowledge of these things. What I am suggesting is that our nervous system represents the computer console in this analogy. It filters everything and presents "us" with a representation (abstraction) and this would be all we have to deal with if we did not have science - we cannot know directly what is outside our skin but with science we can form a theoretical structure of "reality". In the case of animals, these abstractions are all they have and so these abstractions are reality to them. I frankly don't under stand how anyone can not see this. Our "objects" are no more outside our skins than the ones in your camera, are they? The only difference is that our representational system is organic and the camera's is inorganic.

[tjohnson]

Now this doesn't clear up everything and an analogy might help out here -- as I do think there is some real blurriness (as opposed to merely messy theorizing) at the boundaries. The analogy is you and I perceiving two things or events where one of us has more knowledge to bear. Let's say it's a marriage ceremony and let's posit I'm utterly ignorant about marriage ceremonies, the goings on and all that. In that case, I think it's going to be very hard for you to distinguish where your conceptual knowledge starts and ends and your perceptions start and end. Much of your conceptual knowledge will be brought to bear and you'll likely "perceive" things that I'll miss or you'll miss things I actually perceive (e.g., see, hear, smell, etc.). Some of this will be because your ability to perceptually discriminate will be informed or refined by your conceptual knowledge. Whereas I might perceive some women standing around, you might say, "That's the bride and the bride's maids." And your experience will like you saw the bride and some bride's maids whereas I'll just perceive, say, a few women standing on a platform. Does this make sense?

Yes, it makes a great deal of sense to me. You are getting close to the whole Whorf-Sapir idea here. In gs, this is referred to loosely as the effect of higher order abstractions (language and knowledge) on lower order abstractions (perceptions and conceptions). I often use the example of a doctor with xrays. If you are a trained surgeon and you routinely examine xray images and then go and cut people open to have a look you begin to know what these little "shadows" here and there mean. To a layman it could mean absolutely nothing - he would perceive nothing of any importance from the image but the surgeon would say "there's a tumour right there", for example.

[dan2100]

Now this doesn't clear up everything and an analogy might help out here -- as I do think there is some real blurriness (as opposed to merely messy theorizing) at the boundaries. The analogy is you and I perceiving two things or events where one of us has more knowledge to bear. Let's say it's a marriage ceremony and let's posit I'm utterly ignorant about marriage ceremonies, the goings on and all that. In that case, I think it's going to be very hard for you to distinguish where your conceptual knowledge starts and ends and your perceptions start and end. Much of your conceptual knowledge will be brought to bear and you'll likely "perceive" things that I'll miss or you'll miss things I actually perceive (e.g., see, hear, smell, etc.). Some of this will be because your ability to perceptually discriminate will be informed or refined by your conceptual knowledge. Whereas I might perceive some women standing around, you might say, "That's the bride and the bride's maids." And your experience will like you saw the bride and some bride's maids whereas I'll just perceive, say, a few women standing on a platform. Does this make sense?

Yes, it makes a great deal of sense to me. You are getting close to the whole Whorf-Sapir idea here. In gs, this is referred to loosely as the effect of higher order abstractions (language and knowledge) on lower order abstractions (perceptions and conceptions). I often use the example of a doctor with xrays. If you are a trained surgeon and you routinely examine xray images and then go and cut people open to have a look you begin to know what these little "shadows" here and there mean. To a layman it could mean absolutely nothing - he would perceive nothing of any importance from the image but the surgeon would say "there's a tumour right there", for example.

Yes, close to it -- Whorf-Sapir -- but not accepting it -- at least, not in its strong form and not in a purely linguistic manner. (On the latter, presumably, doctors without language could learn to perceptually discriminate those same shadows. This is probably more a matter of conceptual or perceptual learning than of language.) Both of us would still perceive -- if we could each separate out our perceptions from our other mental equipment -- the same things. Thus, I wouldn't agree with someone told me, when I was in high school, that Pacific Northwest peoples or Pacific Islanders (I forget which) literally couldn't see the Europeans' ships in the bay. They could most definitely see those ships -- well, presuming that had decent eye sight and the like -- though they might have interpreted them in various ways. (Kelley also treats perceptual judgment in his book. Again, I highly recommend it. I'll probably post my review of it here soon.)

[dan2100]

I understand, but disagree with that view -- well, in a way that goes beyond naive realism. I don't think the object of perception is in our brains or minds. It's outside it. Perception is the act of being aware of some object -- specifically, being able to discriminate that object from a background or other objects. In this sense, from the outside, if someone were to ask what do both you and I perceive -- or what is our perception -- it would be of the pencil.

Here is another analogy; Suppose you live in a room and your only access to the outside world is via a computer console and you have no knowledge that the outside world even exists. You "see objects" and see how they interact and you can even interact with them with your mouse. You talk about these objects and their characteristics, behaviour, etc. and so you gain knowledge of these things. What I am suggesting is that our nervous system represents the computer console in this analogy. It filters everything and presents "us" with a representation (abstraction) and this would be all we have to deal with if we did not have science - we cannot know directly what is outside our skin but with science we can form a theoretical structure of "reality". In the case of animals, these abstractions are all they have and so these abstractions are reality to them. I frankly don't under stand how anyone can not see this. Our "objects" are no more outside our skins than the ones in your camera, are they? The only difference is that our representational system is organic and the camera's is inorganic.

The problem with this view -- and, I submit, with probably all forms of perceptual representationalism -- is that you're assuming there is an direct form of perceptual awareness. You already agree on that, but you're just pushing this back to inside the mind (or brain). Well, how does the man inside the room perceive the computer console, mouse, and the room itself?

Also, if you can only perceive directly the contents of your brain or mind, then, I submit, you'll have no means of knowing about anything else -- even that you have a brain, nervous system, skin, or that there are even other people you can confer with about what's outside these or to form some scientific view of the world. You're just stuck inside there -- in the inner theater -- and have no means of telling anything that's outside it.

Let me be clear here: even science would not help you as you'd have no way of knowing whether any experiments -- which you'd have to perceive, no? -- were telling you something about an outside world or were just parts of your mind. You also wouldn't be able to collaborate with others because, again, you'd have no way of knowing of these others, including whether they exist.

How can anyone not agree with the Cartesian or representationalist view here? First, one must ask why anyone would accept that view in the first place. What gives rise to it? What problems is it supposed to resolve? I think here Rand was correct in that all of these views engage in the fallacy of the stolen concept -- or, as others would call it, the genetic fallacy: they rest their conclusion on denying premises or they build representationalism from concepts that would, if consistently applied, not support it.

[tjohnson]

I think the problem boils down to the idea of 'existence'. When I say "that pencil exists" I really mean "I abstract (perceive) a pencil". This represents a functional view rather than subject-predicate view, which is outdated. I think it's illegitimate to speak of existence independent of observer because it's impossible to demonstrate. In other words, i have very little use for the term 'existence'. That about sums it up for me.

[dan2100]

I think the problem boils down to the idea of 'existence'. When I say "that pencil exists" I really mean "I abstract (perceive) a pencil". This represents a functional view rather than subject-predicate view, which is outdated. I think it's illegitimate to speak of existence independent of observer because it's impossible to demonstrate. In other words, i have very little use for the term 'existence'. That about sums it up for me.

I expect a follower of Korzybski to have problems with "existence."

That said, however, I think to accurately say, "I perceive a pencil" -- or something a little less technical sounding, such as "I see a pencil" -- there must be an pencil -- an observer-independent object that one is perceiving. I know this notion might sound ridiculous, especially to anyone coming after Descartes, Berkeley, and Hume. And I'm not putting forth the notion without realizing their and other criticisms of my view. (Of course, I'm not saying my view is original here either. I'm relying on the work of Rand, Peikoff, Kelley, and others (including Copleston for his criticisms of Berkeley's views of perception) here.)

Before presenting a full case for what I'll call, following Kelley, the realist view (albeit, not the naive realist view), let me ask you a question: Why do you have a problem with allowing for mind-independent or observer-independent things -- or a problem with being aware of and knowing them?

[tjohnson]

That said, however, I think to accurately say, "I perceive a pencil" -- or something a little less technical sounding, such as "I see a pencil" -- there must be an pencil -- an observer-independent object that one is perceiving.

All I can say is this; according to our neurological science what happens is that light is stimulating our neurons and our cortex is producing an image of the "pencil". Now, for there to be an object for this observer there must be BOTH, ie. some stimuli and the nervous system. I guess what I'm saying is that the stimuli (light in this case) is what is independent of the observer, not "the object". You see, an animal could never know that.

[Guyau]

Pleased to see Dan’s serious pursuits in this area.

Evidence that Infants Can Deduce Abstract Relations

Adele Diamond (2006)

Some research on unit reduction and concepts:

Conceptual Knowledge Increases Infant’s Memory Capacity

Lisa Feigenson and Justin Halberda (2008)

From relations of overall similarity to relations of part-identity, or aspect-identity:

Research of Linda Smith

I enthusiastically recommend Terrence Deacon’s The Symbolic Species, which is referred to in connection with Rand’s epistemological ideas in Note 37 of “Universals and Measurement.”

See also Critical Belief here.

[tjohnson]

That said, however, I think to accurately say, "I perceive a pencil" -- or something a little less technical sounding, such as "I see a pencil" -- there must be an pencil -- an observer-independent object that one is perceiving.

All I can say is this; according to our neurological science what happens is that light is stimulating our neurons and our cortex is producing an image of the "pencil". Now, for there to be an object for this observer there must be BOTH, ie. some stimuli and the nervous system. I guess what I'm saying is that the stimuli (light in this case) is what is independent of the observer, not "the object". You see, an animal could never know that.

I would just like to add to my comments above. We have to be very clear about exactly what is independent of observer and this is precisely what science attempts to do. My assertion is that one individual alone cannot establish what is independent of his own observation process - it requires corroboration from others because our perceptions are easily coloured by affective factors due to our organic nature. You cannot separate "mind" and "emotion" completely.

[Christopher]

Another nice way to think about this would be to imagine the nervous system as a measurement instrument. The readings from an ohmmeter would display the existence of a pencil very differently than say an ultraviolet lens.

[tjohnson]

Another nice way to think about this would be to imagine the nervous system as a measurement instrument. The readings from an ohmmeter would display the existence of a pencil very differently than say an ultraviolet lens.

Very true, and even blind people who have to rely on touch and smell would have a very different object in mind when abstracting "a pencil".

[Christopher]

Yes. And not to suggest that perceptions are arbitrary either. I think the basis for perceiving the universe as we do is to be aware of aspects of reality that affect the makeup of our organism. We do not perceive the universe the way we do because it is the way the universe should be perceived. We perceive through our senses because the information provided by our senses help us navigate the world in a manner suitable/healthy for our organismic survival.

So objectivity is fundamentally premised upon the organization of life. Further, it's impossible to say that life as we know it fundamentally explains the structure of the universe because we cannot perceive the universe in a way to understand life other than the way our own lives are organized (i.e. just because life evolved as such doesn't mean that the evolution of this life explains fundamentally how the universe operates). Claims about objectivity independent of life are at best circular. Or as Ted says it, "whooa"

[Leonid]

Dan "How would distinguish conceptual behavior?"

If I were you, I wouldn’t trouble myself too much about this question. If Rex one day will develop conceptual thinking he will let you know. He would have to find the way to designate his concepts in order to communicate them. In other words, he'll develop language.

Edited April 4, 2010 by Leonid

[dan2100]

Dan "How would distinguish conceptual behavior?"

If I were you, I wouldn’t trouble myself too much about this question. If Rex one day will develop conceptual thinking he will let you know. He would have to find the way to designate his concepts in order to communicate them. In other words, he'll develop language.

Trying to catch up with the backlog, so I'll start with the latest post first...

Actually, I think the connection between language and conceptuality is an open issue. While I do believe the kind of language humans have now is certainly links up with and is probably mostly based on conceptuality, I don't think conceptuality necessitates language.

Also, there's no guarantee that were the two essentiallty linked -- i.e., to have one, you need the other -- that this would mean Rex would, if he had concepts, sit up an state this clearly in a way you or I would understand -- any more than you or I hearing a language would don't understand would be able to clearly distinguish the words and translate them into English or whatever language we happen to know.

[dan2100]

That said, however, I think to accurately say, "I perceive a pencil" -- or something a little less technical sounding, such as "I see a pencil" -- there must be an pencil -- an observer-independent object that one is perceiving.

All I can say is this; according to our neurological science what happens is that light is stimulating our neurons and our cortex is producing an image of the "pencil". Now, for there to be an object for this observer there must be BOTH, ie. some stimuli and the nervous system. I guess what I'm saying is that the stimuli (light in this case) is what is independent of the observer, not "the object". You see, an animal could never know that.

I submit, if your view -- the basic representationalist view -- were true, then you couldn't know that -- about your neural systems, about your cortex, about how your eyes work. All of these facts, the theorizing based on them, and the testing to confirm such theorizing (and uncover new facts) all rest on the presumption that you perceive a mind-independent reality. Take away that presumption and the rest might just as well be a dream. Don't you agree?

Now, that said, it's true that the perceptual systems and mind work in a specific way and under various constraints. This is nothing new. And it's true that the external view of a perceptual system or of a perceiving mind reveals a causal process -- from external object to the sensory system to awareness -- even if some aspects of this are still obscure. But this external view must be compatible with the internal view of the perceiving subject. Kelley's work tries to -- and, in my view, mostly succeeds -- in integrating the external view, including the science of perception, with the internal, phenomonological aspects.

Let me elaborate a little further on your earlier comment on perceptions and concepts both being abstractions by stressing again their differences in a way that undermines representationalism. Representations can, in their function as representations, be off -- they might misrepresent. This can be the case with concepts -- as in the problem of overgeneralizing. In that particular case, a concept is covering more than it should and, thus, misrepresenting reality. Don't you agree? A perception can never do this. Why? A perception is not a representation. It's simply a discrimination of something external to the perceiving mind. This might seem wrong. After all, for example, you see a mirage and, say, "Aha! My perceptions are misrepresenting reality!" But, in fact, it's not your perceptions that are off, but your judging that hot air moving over land is really water. Your perceptions are not wrong, in this case; you're merely perceiving things that look similar and judging they are similar.

This, again, is not to say perceptions don't abstract, but that they do it in different way than concepts. Why this is so is a matter for further discussion, but you do agree, I trust, that the two are very different in this respect?

[dan2100]

That said, however, I think to accurately say, "I perceive a pencil" -- or something a little less technical sounding, such as "I see a pencil" -- there must be an pencil -- an observer-independent object that one is perceiving.

All I can say is this; according to our neurological science what happens is that light is stimulating our neurons and our cortex is producing an image of the "pencil". Now, for there to be an object for this observer there must be BOTH, ie. some stimuli and the nervous system. I guess what I'm saying is that the stimuli (light in this case) is what is independent of the observer, not "the object". You see, an animal could never know that.

I would just like to add to my comments above. We have to be very clear about exactly what is independent of observer and this is precisely what science attempts to do. My assertion is that one individual alone cannot establish what is independent of his own observation process - it requires corroboration from others because our perceptions are easily coloured by affective factors due to our organic nature. You cannot separate "mind" and "emotion" completely.

This is a typical view of how to validate perception, but it relies on the presumption one can be sure other individuals who can help one corroborate one's perceptions exist and, what's more, can be reliably perceived by one. If you can already perceive others, then the original problem disappears -- since you're already admitting you can perceive an external world. If you can't perceive them, then you're stuck with the original problem and must retreat to skepticism or some form of idealism -- since you can't possibly know others exist or reliably perceive them if they do. Don't you agree?

[tjohnson]

I would just like to add to my comments above. We have to be very clear about exactly what is independent of observer and this is precisely what science attempts to do. My assertion is that one individual alone cannot establish what is independent of his own observation process - it requires corroboration from others because our perceptions are easily coloured by affective factors due to our organic nature. You cannot separate "mind" and "emotion" completely.

This is a typical view of how to validate perception, but it relies on the presumption one can be sure other individuals who can help one corroborate one's perceptions exist and, what's more, can be reliably perceived by one. If you can already perceive others, then the original problem disappears -- since you're already admitting you can perceive an external world. If you can't perceive them, then you're stuck with the original problem and must retreat to skepticism or some form of idealism -- since you can't possibly know others exist or reliably perceive them if they do. Don't you agree?

I am not going to use the word 'exists'. I admit that I perceive objects (and other people ). But what I (and others) abstract is only a small part of the story that we get with our limited and often coloured perception.

[tjohnson]

Let me elaborate a little further on your earlier comment on perceptions and concepts both being abstractions by stressing again their differences in a way that undermines representationalism. Representations can, in their function as representations, be off -- they might misrepresent. This can be the case with concepts -- as in the problem of overgeneralizing. In that particular case, a concept is covering more than it should and, thus, misrepresenting reality. Don't you agree? A perception can never do this. Why? A perception is not a representation. It's simply a discrimination of something external to the perceiving mind. This might seem wrong. After all, for example, you see a mirage and, say, "Aha! My perceptions are misrepresenting reality!" But, in fact, it's not your perceptions that are off, but your judging that hot air moving over land is really water. Your perceptions are not wrong, in this case; you're merely perceiving things that look similar and judging they are similar.

This, again, is not to say perceptions don't abstract, but that they do it in different way than concepts. Why this is so is a matter for further discussion, but you do agree, I trust, that the two are very different in this respect?

OK, I am not referring to optical (or other illusions) here. I agree that perceptions and conceptions are different kinds of abstractions, but I think it is useful to include them both in the category of 'abstractions'. Perceptions would be of a lower order than conceptions and historically (and evolutionally) would occur first. Conceptions would normally be based on repeated perceptions, however, it is possible to have concepts by postulation (due to Northrop) in which we haven't actually perceived an object with said characteristics. An 'electron' would be in this category.

[Dragonfly]

Let me elaborate a little further on your earlier comment on perceptions and concepts both being abstractions by stressing again their differences in a way that undermines representationalism. Representations can, in their function as representations, be off -- they might misrepresent. This can be the case with concepts -- as in the problem of overgeneralizing. In that particular case, a concept is covering more than it should and, thus, misrepresenting reality. Don't you agree? A perception can never do this. Why? A perception is not a representation. It's simply a discrimination of something external to the perceiving mind. This might seem wrong. After all, for example, you see a mirage and, say, "Aha! My perceptions are misrepresenting reality!" But, in fact, it's not your perceptions that are off, but your judging that hot air moving over land is really water.

No, perception implies an interpretation of what you see, otherwise it would be only a sensation, so the perception of a mirage as water is wrong. You perceive water, but it is hot air.

[Christopher]

OK, I am not referring to optical (or other illusions) here. I agree that perceptions and conceptions are different kinds of abstractions, but I think it is useful to include them both in the category of 'abstractions'. Perceptions would be of a lower order than conceptions and historically (and evolutionally) would occur first. Conceptions would normally be based on repeated perceptions, however, it is possible to have concepts by postulation (due to Northrop) in which we haven't actually perceived an object with said characteristics. An 'electron' would be in this category.

I'm curious as to your purpose for introducing the abstraction angle. Are you emphasizing the abstraction aspect in order to highlight the subjectivity generated by the observer?

[dan2100]

Let me elaborate a little further on your earlier comment on perceptions and concepts both being abstractions by stressing again their differences in a way that undermines representationalism. Representations can, in their function as representations, be off -- they might misrepresent. This can be the case with concepts -- as in the problem of overgeneralizing. In that particular case, a concept is covering more than it should and, thus, misrepresenting reality. Don't you agree? A perception can never do this. Why? A perception is not a representation. It's simply a discrimination of something external to the perceiving mind. This might seem wrong. After all, for example, you see a mirage and, say, "Aha! My perceptions are misrepresenting reality!" But, in fact, it's not your perceptions that are off, but your judging that hot air moving over land is really water.

No, perception implies an interpretation of what you see, otherwise it would be only a sensation, so the perception of a mirage as water is wrong. You perceive water, but it is hot air.

I would borrow a distinction from Kelley here: between perception and perceptual judgment. The former is what you perceive or, more spefically, the perception itself. The latter is, to use your term, the interpretation. For example, in the classic example, you see a straight stick in water and might judge it to be bent. Your actual perception here is just how the straightness of the stick is perceive when part of it is submerged in water.

Perhaps an analogy might prove helpful here. Dolphins look much like fish, but up close you'd be able to perceptually distinguish them. You'd also be able to distinguish in myriad other ways, especially once you could deploy your conceptual apparatus to the task. You might note, for instance, they suckle their young, breathe air, have similar bone structure to other mammals, and have much more complex brains than any fish. Once you knew this difference, you wouldn't mistake a dolphin for a fish. But with the mirage, no matter how well you know you might be mistaken in a judgment here -- about whether it's just hot air over dry land or an inviting lake -- it'll still look the same. There's no interpretation, in other words, involved. (The same goes for other illusions, including non-optical ones.) Your perceptual system -- in this case, your visual system -- is perceiving hot air and it perceives water much the same way. Your perceptual system isn't lying to you, though. Hot air rising over dry land, under the right conditions, just happens to look -- be perceived -- like water.

Also, sensation is another category all together. Perceptions are experienced, in a sense, as totalities or as discrimination of entities. Sensations -- as philosophers use the term -- are something rarely experienced. These would be of qualia alone and not as part of totalities. It's not a matter of you being given sensations and then building up perceptions. Rather, perceptions are already your starting point. Had you started from sensations, in my view, you'd never get to perceptions; the world would just be a jumble, James's "booming buzzing confusion" (if my memory's correct here; been a long time since I've read William James on this) and it'd only be the very lucky person who ever arrived at perceiving actual things in it. In fact, we'd probably not be having this conversation as humans would never have survived.

[tjohnson]

OK, I am not referring to optical (or other illusions) here. I agree that perceptions and conceptions are different kinds of abstractions, but I think it is useful to include them both in the category of 'abstractions'. Perceptions would be of a lower order than conceptions and historically (and evolutionally) would occur first. Conceptions would normally be based on repeated perceptions, however, it is possible to have concepts by postulation (due to Northrop) in which we haven't actually perceived an object with said characteristics. An 'electron' would be in this category.

I'm curious as to your purpose for introducing the abstraction angle. Are you emphasizing the abstraction aspect in order to highlight the subjectivity generated by the observer?

The word 'abstract', as a verb, often means something along the lines "to remove or extract". It also implies not all of something. So we abstract (extract some, but not all) from the stimuli we receive and thus perceive objects. So yes, there is an element of subjectivity in this process.