Man qua Man

[Christopher]

Pulling this hot topic out of the altruism thread (which is being bogged down by some other conflicts right now):

In what system does the paraphrased assertion "man is an end in himself; man should live for his health and happiness" appropriate?

From an Evolutionary standpoint, man is an end to the survival of his genes.

From a Philosophical standpoint, the assertion is often stated definitely.

From a Universal standpoint, nobody knows the point of life at all.

I think if we define the system to which the assertion "man qua man" belongs, then the truth or fallacy of this statement becomes inherent. Science is not the place to start with such an assertion since science must resort to Evolutionary Theory. Therefore, the only other possible systems are that of non-contradictory logic and existentialism (small e).

1. From a non-contradictory standpoint, it seems to me that the system that holds values (consciousness) cannot value anything above the system, otherwise the value itself seemingly self-contradicts the validity of its own system.

2. From an existential standpoint (for those who do not believe in Determinism), consciousness as such is a system that exists only for the sake of its existence. Biological impulses, etc. that are evolved are a part of but not definitively the force guiding the value system. From this perspective, consciousness is merely awareness, and it can have no purpose for existing other than the sake of its own existence.

That's my take. Really my main point here is that we need to look at the background system in which we are making the assertion "man qua man," because the context determines the accuracy of the statement.

[bmacwilliam]

I think if we define the system to which the assertion "man qua man" belongs, then the truth or fallacy of this statement becomes inherent. Science is not the place to start with such an assertion since science must resort to Evolutionary Theory. Therefore, the only other possible systems are that of non-contradictory logic and existentialism (small e).

I don't understand "Science is not the place to start..."

Bob

[tjohnson]

I think if we define the system to which the assertion "man qua man" belongs, then the truth or fallacy of this statement becomes inherent. Science is not the place to start with such an assertion since science must resort to Evolutionary Theory. Therefore, the only other possible systems are that of non-contradictory logic and existentialism (small e).

I don't understand "Science is not the place to start..."

Bob

Yeah, why can't we have a science of man? Let's start with looking at an activity that is unique to man, oh I know, it's called science.

[tjohnson]

Here is a start to having a science on man.

Terms like ‘logic’ or ‘psychology’ are applied in many different senses, but, among others, they are used

as labels for certain disciplines called sciences. ‘Logic’ is defined as the ‘science of

the laws of thought’. Obviously, then, to produce ‘logic’ we should have to study all

forms of human behaviour connected directly with mentation; we should have to

study not only the mentations in the daily life of the average Smiths, Browns.

, but we should have to study the mentations of Joneses and Whites when they use

their ‘mind’ at its best; namely, when they mathematize, scientize.

, and we should also have to study the mentations of those

whom we call ‘insane’, when they use their ‘mind’ at its worst. It is not our aim to

give a detailed list of these forms of human behaviour which we should study, since

all should be studied. It is enough for our purpose to emphasize the two main

omissions; namely, the study of mathematics and the study of ‘insanity’.

[...]

Here, perhaps, it may be advisable to interpolate a short explanation. When we

deal with human affairs and man, we sometimes use the term ‘ought’, which is very

often used arbitrarily, dogmatically, and absolutistically, and so its use has become

discredited. In many quarters, this term is very unpopular, and, it must be admitted,

justly so. My use of it is that of the engineer, who undertakes to study a machine

entirely unknown to him—let us say, a motorcycle. He would study and analyse its

structure, and, finally, would give a verdict that with such a structure, under certain

circumstances, this machine ought to work in a particular way.

[syrakusos]

The problem is not "man" but "qua."

Do we intend the nominative plural neuter of qui (who)?

Do we intend the ablative feminine singular of qui (who)?

I believe that Ayn Rand intended "quā" (where, which way, as far as, whether), not "qua."

"Man as far as man" makes more sense than "man being carried away as a woman" or "men who are things."

Until we resolve qua qua qua, we cannot discuss man qua man.

Edited March 27, 2010 by Michael E. Marotta

[Dragonfly]

Quamvis sint sub aqua, sub aqua maledicere temptant.

[Christopher]

Yeah, why can't we have a science of man? Let's start with looking at an activity that is unique to man, oh I know, it's called science.

Well if we define science as a process of validatating and cataloguing observations and deductions based on empirical evidence, we've already failed to take into account man's unique capability of conceptual thinking and being.

[tjohnson]

Yeah, why can't we have a science of man? Let's start with looking at an activity that is unique to man, oh I know, it's called science.

Well if we define science as a process of validatating and cataloguing observations and deductions based on empirical evidence, we've already failed to take into account man's unique capability of conceptual thinking and being.

I would venture that "validatating and cataloguing observations" is pretty well the same as "conceptual thinking", or at least very closely related.

[anthony]

The problem is not "man" but "qua."

Do we intend the nominative plural neuter of qui (who)?

Do we intend the ablative feminine singular of qui (who)?

I believe that Ayn Rand intended "quā" (where, which way, as far as, whether), not "qua."

"Man as far as man" makes more sense than "man being carried away as a woman" or "men who are things."

Until we resolve qua qua qua, we cannot discuss man qua man.

I'm surprised that there's any ambiguity on this, as Michael's definition here has always seemed self-referring and self-evident and true.

Man as Man - his objective nature; universal; as he is, has always been, and will always be; by the sum total, and to the limits, of his capability; etc. (My reading.)

A query - to be more precise shouldn't it read : "man qua Man" ?

This introduces the broader concept of a single man, against the background of "Man" in general.

I've taken this to aid my own understanding, but correct me if I'm over-reaching.

Anyway, as Ghs has pointed out elsewhere, "Man qua Man" had been accepted by philosophers back to Aristotle. So we should get it straight. ;)

Tony

[tjohnson]

Man as Man - his objective nature; universal; as he is, has always been, and will always be; by the sum total, and to the limits, of his capability; etc. (My reading.)

Yes, this is the "essence" of aristotelianism, but science has moved away from "essences" to a more functional approach. Why not "man as he does" instead of "man as he is"?

[BaalChatzaf]

Man as Man - his objective nature; universal; as he is, has always been, and will always be; by the sum total, and to the limits, of his capability; etc. (My reading.)

Yes, this is the "essence" of aristotelianism, but science has moved away from "essences" to a more functional approach. Why not "man as he does" instead of "man as he is"?

Essences are the Black Hole of Science which is why they were given up in the physical (hard) sciences. Science became most successful when it dealt with the phenomena. If some physicists want to be "closet realists" there is no harm done as long as the science they practice is phenomenological. As Feynman would have said: "Shut up and calculate".

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Peter]

Christopher wrote:

In what system does the paraphrased assertion "man is an end in himself; man should live for his health and happiness" appropriate?

From an Evolutionary standpoint, man is an end to the survival of his genes.

From a Philosophical standpoint, the assertion is often stated definitely.

From a Universal standpoint, nobody knows the point of life at all.

end quote

Great thread Chris. My post includes a short thread, “Objectivism’s values and virtues.” Once again, I am saying no one is being forced to read old letters. Ignore them if you wish, but I think Christopher’s question, “In what system . . .” is answered with the word *Objectivism.*

Tony wrote:

I'm surprised that there's any ambiguity on this, as Michael's definition here has always seemed self-referring and self-evident and true.

Man as Man - his objective nature; universal; as he is, has always been, and will always be; by the sum total, and to the limits, of his capability; etc. (My reading.)

A query - to be more precise shouldn't it read : "man qua Man" ?

This introduces the broader concept of a single man, against the background of "Man" in general.

I've taken this to aid my own understanding, but correct me if I'm over-reaching.

Anyway, as Ghs has pointed out elsewhere, "Man qua Man" had been accepted by philosophers back to Aristotle. So we should get it straight.

John wrote:

Yes, this is the "essence" of aristotelianism, but science has moved away from "essences" to a more functional approach. Why not "man as he does" instead of "man as he is"?

Ba'al Chatzaf wrote:

Essences are the Black Hole of Science which is why they were given up in the physical (hard) sciences. Science became most successful when it dealt with the phenomena. If some physicists want to be "closet realists" there is no harm done as long as the science they practice is phenomenological. As Feynman would have said: "Shut up and calculate".

That’s a great start guys. In the following thread the creator of Wikipedia, Jimbo Wales, makes an appearance, and Roger Bissell RE-WRITES a bit of Objectivism. Shudder. No wonder Roger is persona non grata at ARI,

Peter

From: "William Dwyer" <wswdwyer@attbi.com>

Reply-To: wswdwyer@attbi.com

To: <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: Objectivism's values and virtues

Date: Sun, 29 Jun 2003 16:11:18 -0700

Very little if any mention is ever made on this list of Objectivism’s values and virtues, so I thought they might be worth a brief discussion for those who are not especially familiar with them. There are three cardinal values and seven cardinal virtues in the Objectivist ethics.

The values are: reason (as one's only means of knowledge), purpose (as the choice to pursue happiness), and self-esteem, (as the belief that one is able to achieve happiness and worthy of achieving it).

The virtues are understood as the principled *means* of gaining and keeping these values. As Rand puts it, "'Value' is that which one acts to gain and keep, 'virtue' is the action by which one gains and keeps it." [FNI, 147' pb 121] "Virtue," she says, "is not an end in itself. Virtue is not its own reward... [Rather] *Life* is the reward of virtue -- and happiness is the goal and the reward of life." [FNI, 156, pb 128]

For Rand, virtues involve a relationship between existence and consciousness and therefore entail the recognition of certain facts. Accordingly, Objectivism's virtues are:

1) Rationality, which is the recognition that existence exists and that nothing can take precedence over the act of perceiving it;

2) Independence, which is the recognition that you must think independently and not subordinate your judgment to that of others;

3) Integrity, which is the recognition that you must remain true to your convictions;

4) Honesty, which is the recognition that the real is (and the) unreal can have no value and, moreover, that respect for truth is not a social duty but a selfish virtue.

5) Justice, which is the recognition that you must judge other people as conscientiously as you judge inanimate objects, condemning their vices and praising their virtues;

6) Productiveness, which is the recognition that productive work is the process by which your consciousness controls your existence, and that you must choose a line of work that is commensurate with your abilities;

and

7) Pride, which is the recognition that you are your own highest value, that a virtuous character has to be earned, and that the result of earning it is self-esteem.

The difference between pride and self-esteem may not always be clear and is admittedly a subtle one, but for Objectivism, pride consists of recognizing the importance of a good character and what it takes to earn it. When someone says, "Take pride in your job," (an aside from Peter, I started a thread on the Young and The Restless, where it was pointed out that Jack Abbott was more of an Objectivist than Victor Newman, because of this virtue) he is saying, consider it important enough to do well. By the same token, when someone says, "Take pride in yourself or in your character," he is saying, consider a good character important enough to be worth acquiring. Self-esteem, on the other hand, is the *consequence* of earning a good character; it is the experience of efficacy and self-worth that comes from having earned it.

Of course, these virtues offer a very general guide for living one's life; they don't give a detailed blue-print, but they do provide an indispensable foundation for "gaining and keeping" Objectivism's cardinal values of reason, of purpose (defined as one's own happiness) and of self-esteem (defined as a sense of personal efficacy and self-worth).

It should be noted that Rand gives a more elaborate definition of these virtues in “For the New Intellectual,” starting on page 157; pb, p. 128).

-- Bill

From: Ellen Moore <ellen_moore@mb.sympatico.ca>

To: Atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: Re: Objectivism's values and virtues

Date: Tue, 01 Jul 2003 12:31:43 -0500

Bill, this is a well-presented summary.

Do you think you could present a challenging ethical issue that would be a challenge for discussion on Atlantis - one which is not reducible to isolated physical particles? :-)

What about the ethics of parental lack of responsibility - those who refuse to learn how to parent objectively? Or anything else that is ethical and controversial that has not been discussed ad nauseum?

Ellen

From: "William Dwyer" <wswdwyer@comcast.net>

Reply-To: wswdwyer@comcast.net

To: <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: RE: Objectivism's values and virtues

Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2003 15:07:29 -0700

Ellen Moore wrote, "Bill, this is a well-presented summary."

Thank you.

She asked, "Do you think you could present a challenging ethical issue that would be a challenge for discussion on Atlantis - one which is not reducible to isolated physical particles? :-)"

Actually, I thought I might present some questions on the seven virtues that were originally included in "A Study Guide to the Ethics of Objectivism" by Leonard Peikoff and revised by Leonard Peikoff and David

Kelley (1977).

For example, on the primary virtue, which is RATIONALITY, the authors asks: "What, in essence, does the virtue of rationality consist of and require. In particular, make clear the relationship between the exercise of rationality and the policy of being "pro-effort."

References which may help in answering this question are: _For the New Intellectual_ (Galt's speech), 146-147, and 89-101; _The Virtue of Selfishness_ ("The Objectivist Ethics"), 13-14; _Atlas Shrugged_, 738-741).

(Unfortunately, all page numbers refer to the hardback editions, and I haven't had time to cross-reference them with the paperback editions, so if you don't have the hardbacks, as I do, then you may have to do some hunting, but it will at least give you an idea of where to look.)

If anyone would like to attempt an answer onlist, feel free. But do your homework.

-- Bill

From: PaleoObjectivist@aol.com

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: Re: ATL: Objectivism's values and virtues

Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2003 18:55:38 EDT

Monart forwarded the following from Starship Forum, where he replied to Bill's post on "Objectivism's values and virtues."

>I thank Bill for his review of the objectivist values and virtues as described by Rand. I find Bill's posts always clear, orderly, and instructive. He also recently, in postings at OWL, defended with adeptness the absoluteness of principles. Bill should write a objectivist philosophy textbook to surpass Peikoff's, if Bill isn't

doing so already, and if he's wealthy enough to finance such a monumental endeavor.

I agree with Monart's assessment of the quality of Bill's writing and thinking, and that he ought to write a book on Objectivist philosophy. I have plans of my own along those lines, and I could use the help, so if I were wealthy enough, I would hire Bill to help with the writing. In fact, I have already approached Bill to co-write a book with me, for free, but he wisely deferred such efforts to a later time. He is quite busy now finishing a degree program and looking for work, so I will be twisting his arm again once he has settled into his new routine. :-)

> Some questions:

>

> Bill, I wonder if you believe that Rand's 3/7 Credo is exhaustive, such that any other value/virtue is merely derivative of the first 3/7. (Rand has stated that there's really only one primary value: Reason, and one primary virtue: Rationality; all other values and virtues are derivatives and expansions.)

Monart, while it's true that Rand viewed ~Rationality~ as the primary ~virtue~ of the Objectivist ethics, I don't think it's correct that she said that ~Reason~ was the one primary ~value~. If you'll check out "The Objectivist Ethics" in ~The Virtue of Selfishness~, you'll note that she said that Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem were, together, the three ~cardinal~ values of the Objectivist ethics. Also, there were three virtues which corresponded to them: Rationality, Productiveness, and Pride. This means that Rationality is the virtue by which man achieves the value of Reason, Productiveness is the virtue by which man achieves the value of Purpose, and Pride ("moral ambitiousness") is the virtue by which man archives the value of Self-Esteem.

However, it is unclear from Rand's writing exactly how she viewed the relationship between the values and the virtues. In ~Atlas Shrugged~, she said: "These three values [Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem] imply and require all of man's virtues" (p. 936), but in ~The Virtue of Selfishness~, she said: "Rationality is the source of all [man's] other virtues" (p. 33). This suggests that Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem ~together~ "imply and require" Rationality, which in turn is the "source" of the rest of the virtues -- and thus that Reason, Purpose, and Self- Esteem are the source (of the source) of the rest of the virtues. Yet, as noted in the previous paragraph, the three cardinal values and virtues are paired, each virtue being the means by which the

corresponding value is achieved.

I think the way to resolve this apparent confusion is to realize, as Rand points out, that the ~results~ of exercising the virtue of Rationality are the additional (in this case, ~concomitant~) virtues of Productiveness and Pride ("Reason is the source, the precondition of his productive work -- pride is the result." VOS, p. 25). So, achievement of the value of Purpose requires the exercise of the virtue of Productiveness, which requires the exercise of the virtue of Rationality. Similarly, achievement of the value of Self-Esteem requires the exercise of the virtue of Pride, which requires the exercise of the virtue of Rationality. And since you are exercising Rationality in order to achieve the values of Purpose and Self-Esteem, you are concomitantly achieving the value of Reason. Thus, as Rand says, the three cardinal values of the Objectivist ethics really ~do~ work together as "the means to and the realization of one's ultimate value, one's own life..." (VOS, p. 25)

For this reason, I don't agree with you that Reason is the "primary value." Reason is not the ~source~ of Purpose and Self-Esteem, but their ~concomitant~. It is ~Rationality~ that is their source. Again, ~together~ they are "the means to and the realization of one's ultimate value, one's own life..." That is why Rand calls them the "cardinal" values of the Objectivist ethics; they are the values that are ~most important~ in achieving one's ~fundamental~ value, one's life.

As for where Rand got these three cardinal values for Objectivism, I think that the best explanation is found, oddly perhaps, in her esthetics essay, "The Psycho-Epistemology of Art" (~The Romantic Manifesto~). Rand says there are certain "metaphysical questions," i.e., questions about "man's fundamental view of himself and of existence." (TRM, p. 19) The answers to these questions determine a great deal about one's life, not only one's sense of life and one's preferences in art and human relationships, but also "the kind of ethics men will accept and practice; the answers are the link between metaphysics and ethics." (TRM, p. 19) (Note, here, that Rand says the ~kind~ of ethics, not all the details or nuances that distinguish, for instance, one form of egoism from another.)

So, what are those questions, and how do they relate to the cardinal values of Objectivism? Refer to the first full paragraph of p. 19 in VOS:

1. "Is the universe intelligible to man, or unintelligible and unknowable?" Objectivism's answer is: The world is intelligible, and my mind is competent to gain knowledge of the world. Plus, life/survival is my standard of value. Plus, I need to gain knowledge in order to survive. Plus, being rational is my means to gaining knowledge. So, because I want to survive, I should value reason (i.e., exercise rationality in order to achieve reason and thus survive).

2. "Can man find happiness on earth, or is he doomed to frustration and despair? Does man have the power of ~choice~, the power to choose his goals and to achieve them, the power to direct the course of his life -- or is he the helpless plaything of forces beyond his control, which determine his fate?"

Objectivism's answer is: Man can find happiness and choose and achieve values and direct the course of his life. Plus: life/survival is my standard of value. Plus: I need to be happy and choose and achieve my values and direct the course of my life. Plus, being purposeful is my means to becoming happy and to choosing and achieving my values and to directing the course of my life. So, because I want to survive, I should value purpose (i.e., exercise productiveness in order to achieve purpose and thus to survive).

3. "Is man, by nature, to be valued as good, or to be despised as evil?" Objectivism's answer is: Man by nature is to be valued as good. Plus, life/survival is my standard of value. Plus, I need to feel that I am good and worthy in order to be motivated to survive. Plus, esteeming myself is my means to feeling that I am good and worthy. So, because I want to survive, I should value self-esteem (i.e., exercise pride aka moral ambitiousness in order to achieve self-esteem and thus to survive).

Note that it is possible for a person to adopt all three, or just any two, or any one, or ~none~ of the cardinal values (and their corresponding virtues) in their explicit philosophy (if they have one). However, it is a fact that, in order to survive, they must either smuggle them in to their actions at least to ~some~ extent and/or exist parasitically off of those people who do accept them. It might be interesting to evaluate the various other ethical philosophies in such terms, but the important point here is the general form of one's ethics being a derivation of one's general view of the relationship between man and existence.

[Historical note: I presented this insight during a question-answer session at the 2001 Objectivist Center Advanced Seminar in Johnstown PA, which was moderated by Will Thomas. The following month, on 7/29/01, I presented a short paper "The Metaphysical Source of the Cardinal Values of Objectivism" in a discussion at Nathaniel Branden's apartment. Some time later, Will Thomas present similar thoughts in a short piece in TOC's ~Navigator~, so this somewhat obscure view of Rand's is finally receiving proper attention.]

> What about David Kelley's argument that Benevolence is an 8th, distinguishable objectivist virtue (as presented in his _Unrugged Individualism: The Selfish Basis of Benevolence_)? Or is Benevolence merely an application of the virtue of Justice, as is claimed by some objectivists, like the ARIans?

I think that Benevolence is a corollary of Justice. It is an aspect of "giving each man his due." This means judging them and treating them accordingly. As Rand points out in "The Ethics of Emergencies", "a rational man regards strangers as innocent until proved guilty, and grants them that initial good will in the name of their human potential. After that he judges them according to the moral character they have actualized....If he finds them to be virtuous, he grants them personal, individual value and appreciation, in proportion to their virtues. It is on the ground of that generalized good will and respect for the value of human life that one helps strangers in an emergency -- AND ONLY IN AN EMERGENCY." (VOS, p. 47) For people one knows and values personally, however, one helps them because and to the extent that doing so is a "practical implementation of friendship, affection and love," i.e., one incorporates "the welfare (the ~rational~ welfare) of the person involved into one's own hierarchy of values, then act accordingly." (VOS, p. 46) This are applications of the virtue of benevolence, which clearly seems to be a corollary of the virtue of justice.

> What about (moral) Courage, having the strength of will to do the right deed? Should that be another distinctive virtue, or should courage remain implicit and embedded in each of the main seven?

Although Rand did not speak explicitly of courage in "The Objectivist Ethics," she did in "Galt's Speech" in ~Atlas Shrugged~. There, in a paragraph expounding on the virtue of integrity, she said that "courage and confidence are practical necessities, that courage is the practical form of being true to existence, of being true to one's own consciousness." (AS, 937) She also, in that paragraph, made a comparison between integrity and honesty: "Integrity is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake your consciousness, just as honesty is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake existence..." (AS, 936-7) For that reason, (moral) courage is a essential moral/emotional attribute of both integrity and honesty. Consistent integrity and honesty require moral courage. In this respect, courage is a subsidiary virtue to integrity and honesty.

> The objectivist ethics is not yet being widely accepted and practiced, even though Rand's books continue to be bestsellers. Is that still because of lack of knowledge, or because of cowardice, or because of evil intent, or because of political disincentives, or what?

It is easier and less risky to buy and read than it is to put into practice what one learns and accepts from what one has read. The latter takes ~work~ and has ~consequences~, each of which can be unpleasant. Also, people can misinterpret Rand's ethics and thus misapply it. And many people read and ~reject~ Rand's ethics. So, I'd say it's a combination of all of the above.

> Is there a direct proportionate relationship between consistent practice of objectivist ethics and achieving financial wealth, a la Hill's "Think and Grow Rich"? How significant a factor is the predatory government and > its beneficiaries upon an objectivist's creation of wealth? Or, should one's rational intelligence be capable of overcoming any predation, a la Ragnar Danneskjold?

>From my own perspective, all you need is one or two significant screw-ups in your personal life to set you back years, if not decades, in achieving financial wealth. By the time you crawl out from underneath the emotional and financial rubble, you're older and have less energy and fewer years left in which to make

your pile. But suppose you ~don't~ make any bad mistakes, and still don't end up rich. The reason is that there are no guarantees in life. Wealth is not an inexorable consequence of Rationality.

> While there are some objectivists who are wealthy from being successful in one business or another, are there any objectivists who are wealthy *qua* objectivists, except for Rand herself? (and maybe Peikoff, via > inheritance, and perhaps Branden, too). Considering that objectivism is a philosophy that should radically benefit all human beings, there are very few professionals who have even made a successful living from teaching or selling objectivism -- just a handful at TOC and at ARI. Why?

It's a market problem. You have to identify customers and present them with a superior product. Not everyone will succeed in that marketplace, whether as an artist (Rand's novels are the only financially significant esthetic product of the Objectivist movement, to date) or as a teacher/author of Objectivist philosophy.

Having said all that, I must say that my life has been ~enriched~ by Objectivism, both in my personal relationships (I wouldn't have the wonderful wife and two of my absolute best friends, if it weren't for Objectivism) and in my career and hobbies (especially writing in the areas of philosophy and psychology). While I would not turn up my nose at an ethically acquired mound of moolah, I am much more concerned with the spiritual riches that come from the satisfaction of a personal and productive life well lived, and O'ism has helped me to do that.

I hope these comments are helpful to you and others on the list, Monart. Thanks for posing such an intriguing set of questions!

Best 2 all,

REBRoger E. Bissell, musician-writer

From: "William Dwyer" <wswdwyer@comcast.net>

Reply-To: wswdwyer@comcast.net

To: "'Atlantis'" <atlantis@wetheliving.com>

Subject: ATL: RE: Objectivism's values and virtues

Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2003 16:34:39 -0700

Monart Pon wrote,

"I thank Bill for his review of the objectivist values and virtues as described by Rand. I find Bill's posts always clear, orderly, and instructive. He also recently, in postings at OWL, defended with adeptness the absoluteness of principles. Bill should write a objectivist philosophy textbook to surpass Peikoff's, if Bill isn't doing so already, and if he's wealthy enough to finance such a monumental endeavor."

Monart, thank you for your kind and generous compliments, but I will state for the record that I do not possess anywhere near the understanding of Objectivism that Peikoff does. Whatever you may think of him, he does, in my humble opinion, almost certainly have a better grasp of Rand's philosophy than I do.

By the way, although humility is not included explicitly in the Objectivist virtues, I think that if we define it as "a recognition of our own limitations," then it would qualify as a legitimate virtue, and would presumably be subsumed under the virtue of honesty.

Monart asked:

"Bill, I wonder if you believe that Rand's 3/7 Credo is exhaustive, such that any other value/virtue is merely derivative of the first 3/7. (Rand has stated that there's really only one primary value: Reason, and one primary virtue: Rationality; all other values and virtues are derivatives and expansions.)

"What about David Kelley's argument that Benevolence is an 8th, distinguishable objectivist virtue (as presented in his _Unrugged Individualism: The Selfish Basis of Benevolence_)? Or is Benevolence merely an application of the virtue of Justice, as is claimed by some objectivists, like the ARIans?"

Yes, I think that benevolence probably is included in the virtue of justice, which, for Objectivists, consists in judging people for what they are and treating them accordingly -- in other words, in giving them what they deserve. But what does a person deserve? Does he deserve to be treated rudely, insultingly and disdainfully simply because you disagree with his ideas, or think that he's not very bright? I think that benevolence is a special instance of the virtue of justice, which involves a certain degree or respect for people's feelings.

Benevolence can also be manifested in how we treat animals. I worked for awhile in a lab that did experiments on rabbits. The lab techs would always anesthetize the rabbits, so as not to subject them to unnecessary pain, before sacrificing them.

This principle is evident as well in our prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. A person may deserve to be killed, but we don't torture him to death in the process. By the same token, he may deserve to be criticized, but we don't humiliate him in the process, and so on.

In other words, we don't subject other human beings and animals to _unnecessary_ pain or discomfort. Avoiding the infliction of unnecessary pain or discomfort improves the quality of our social existence, besides which the infliction of unnecessary suffering is simply offensive to human sensibilities, which arise from the empathy that we naturally feel in varying degrees toward other people and animals.

Monart asked, "What about (moral) Courage, having the strength of will to do the right deed? Should that be another distinctive virtue, or should courage remain implicit and embedded in each of the main seven?"

Rand includes courage in the virtue of integrity. She writes:

"Integrity is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake your consciousness, just as honesty is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake existence -- that man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness, and that he may permit no breach between body and mind, between action and thought, between his life and his convictions -- that, like a judge impervious to public opinion, he may not sacrifice his convictions to the wishes of others, be it the whole of mankind shouting pleas or threats against him -- that courage and confidence are practical necessities, that courage is the practical form of being true to existence, of being true to truth, and confidence is the practical form of being true to one's own consciousness." FNI, 158, hb)

-- Bill

From: Ellen Moore <ellen_moore@mb.sympatico.ca>

To: Atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: Re: Objectivism's values and virtues

Date: Sun, 06 Jul 2003 13:17:23 -0500

Roger had written,

"> For this reason, I don't agree with you that Reason is the "primary value." Reason is not the ~source~ of Purpose and Self-Esteem, but their ~concomitant~. It is ~Rationality~ that is their source. Again, ~together~ they are "the means to and the realization of one's ultimate value, one's own life..."

Monart explains,

"I acknowledge what you say here, and was fully aware of it when I wrote the above about Reason being the one primary value. I was making the point that the other values of Purpose and Self-Esteem were corollaries of Reason, in that if one were to analyze and apply the value of Reason to the problem of life, the values of Purpose and Self-Esteem would emerge. Also, I had in mind the numerous places where Rand stated that Reason is the essential, basic means of survival -- places like in the familiar statement of Rand's: "My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute." "

Monart is correct about the premise that re: values and virtues, reason is *primary*. In the use of the term "cardinal", Rand used its usual meaning as "fundamental", but as far as ethical values and virtues is concerned, they are not primary but function after the correct epistemology [theory of knowledge] is validated by the method of reason. Objectivity is validated by reason. Values and virtues are validated by means of reason. Reason, in this context, is clearly the *primary* value, and its corresponding primary virtue is rationality. But "fundamental" and "primary" have different meanings The hierarchy implied here moves from - the basic cognitive premise is based on facts of reality as evaluated and validated by the method of reason, i.e., from metaphysics to epistemology to ethics - values and virtues – where reason and rationality ARE primary.

In the last long post by Roger on this topic, I understood, if I am correct, that he is saying that the virtue of rationality precedes the value of reason. I take it that he is following the explanations that a values is THAT which one acts to gain and/or keep, and a virtue is the ACT by which one gains and keeps a value.

But that sequence is not how Rand explains the virtue of rationality. See VOS, pages 25 - 26, her description of the virtues, all are applications of rationality. Starting with:

"The virtue of *Rationality* means the recognition and acceptance of reason [the value] as one's only source of knowledge, one's only judge of values and one's only guide to action."

This means that Reason is the primary method by which one validates one's epistemology -- and that points to the existence of the human attribute of volitional consciousness [in metaphysics], full conscious awareness of one's perception of reality, of concept formation, of logic, of objectivity, of values, virtues and psychological character with the values of purpose and self-esteem producing [all the other virtues together] concomitant with pride and individual happiness.

I see the key to all of this is a primary necessity for one to understand the identity of reason in order for one to truly value its causes and effects. [And it took an in depth study and the writing of an 80 page essay to understand exactly what absolute essentials are necessary to compose the nature of, and one's ability to learn to, Reason, and to value the volitional action of Reasoning - which in itself IS the virtue of rationality.]

Ellen

From: PaleoObjectivist@aol.com

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: Re: ATL: Re: Objectivism's values and virtues

Date: Sun, 6 Jul 2003 21:22:27 EDT

I previously wrote in reply to Monart:

>For this reason, I don't agree with you that Reason is the "primary value." Reason is not the ~source~ of Purpose and Self-Esteem, but their ~concomitant~. It is ~Rationality~ that is their source. Again, ~together~ they are "the means to and the realization of one's ultimate value, one's own life..." [That is a direct quote from Rand VOS p. 27.]

Monart replied:

>I acknowledge what you say here, and was fully aware of it when I wrote the above about Reason being the one primary value. I was making the point that the other values of Purpose and Self-Esteem were corollaries of Reason, in that if one were to analyze and apply the value of Reason to the problem of life, the values of Purpose and Self-Esteem would emerge. Also, I had in mind the numerous places where Rand stated that Reason is the essential, basic means of survival -- places like in the familiar statement of Rand's: "My philosophy, in essence, is the concept of man as a heroic being, with his own happiness as the moral purpose of his life, with productive achievement as his noblest activity, and reason as his only absolute."

Ellen Moore comments:

>Monart is correct about the premise that re: values and virtues, reason is *primary*. In the use of the term "cardinal", Rand used its usual meaning as "fundamental", but as far as ethical values and virtues is concerned, they are not primary but function after the correct epistemology [theory of knowledge] is validated by the method of reason. Objectivity is validated by reason. Values and virtues are validated by means of reason. Reason, in this context, is clearly the *primary* value, and its corresponding primary virtue is rationality. But "fundamental" and "primary" have different meanings The hierarchy implied here moves from - the basic cognitive premise is based on facts of reality as evaluated and validated by the method of reason, i.e., from metaphysics to epistemology to ethics - values and virtues – where reason and rationality ARE primary.

>

> In the last long post by Roger on this topic, I understood, if I am correct, that he is saying that the virtue of rationality precedes the value of reason. I take it that he is following the explanations that a values is THAT which one acts to gain and/or keep, and a virtue is the ACT by which one gains and [i.e., and/or] keeps a value.

No, that's ~not~ what I am saying. You ~choose~ reason as a value and you then ~choose~ to act to gain and/or keep it. In general, you first have to decide what your values are before you can act virtuously to obtain them. However, in terms of cause and effect, you ~do~ have to ~act~ before you can ~gain and/or keep~ something that you have chosen to be a value.

By changing "and/or" to "and" in referring to Rand's definition of "virtue," Ellen has obscured an important point. Some values are already there, and virtue consists from that point in acting to ~keep~ them. For instance, ~life~ is something we all begin with, and we value it even on the pre-conceptual, pre-moral level, and act automatically to keep it. But at some point, we realize that acting automatically is not enough to sustain our lives, that we must behave ~deliberately~ and in a focused, rational manner if we are to survive. That is, we realize that rationality is necessary to living. This is ~long~ before we engage in formal philosophical thinking and go through all the derivations and deep conceptual study from metaphysics and epistemology through ethics that Ellen refers to.

At some later point, we realize that there are three factors, i.e., values, on which our lives ~hinge~ (thus "cardinal" -- see the etymological derivation of the word) -- and these, as Rand notes, are reason, purpose, and self-esteem. Because the are the hinge or pivotal values in human live, this is why Rand said that "to live, man must hold three things as the supreme and ruling values of his life." (Galt's Speech, FNI, p. 128)

Reason may be, as Peikoff says, the "greatest" of the three and "[make] the others possible" (see OPAR, p. 220), but there is no denying that Rand said that ~all three~ of the cardinal values ~together~ "imply and require all of man's virtues." (GS, FNI, p. 128)

Ellen and Monart seem to be revising Rand's reference to Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem as the three ~cardinal~ values of the Objectivist ethics in a way that views Purpose and Self-Esteem as the cardinals and Reason as the ~pope~. :-)

>But that sequence is not how Rand explains the virtue of rationality. See VOS, pages 25 - 26, her description of the virtues, all are applications of rationality.

Not obviously so. In the one long paragraph on the virtue of Rationality (VOS, pp. 28-29 -- I assume Ellen is using a hardbound version of VOS), Rand says, "The virtue of Rationality...means...the virtue of Independence, ...the virtue of Integrity, ...the virtue of Honesty,...the virtue of Justice..."

In two additional, separate paragraphs, Rand speaks of the virtues of Productiveness and Pride (p. 29), and she does not there make the same unequivocal connection between those virtues and Rationality as she does between Independence / Integrity / Honesty / Justice and Rationality. True, there is a ~mention~ of Rationality in her paragraphs on Productiveness and Pride, but it is clear that she does not view them as ~subsidiary~ or ~corollary~ virtues of Rationality in the same way that she does Independence, Integrity, Honesty, and Justice. And this, I suggest, is because she views Productiveness as corresponding to Purpose, Pride as corresponding to Self-Esteem, and Rationality ~along with~ Independence, Integrity, Honesty, and Justice as corresponding to Reason. Any other reading, it seems to me, does not agree with the parallel structure of Rand's discussion -- nor with her statement (in Galt's Speech) that ~all~ three cardinal values ~together~ imply and necessitate ~all seven~ of the virtues.

> Starting with:

> "The virtue of *Rationality* means the recognition and acceptance of reason [the value] as one's only source of knowledge, one's only judge of values and one's only guide to action."

>

> This means that Reason is the primary method by which one validates one's epistemology

It ~does~? How does Reason get demoted from "one's ~only~ source of knowledge" to "the ~primary~ method by which one validates one's epistemology"? (emphases added) What ~other~ method is there than Reason for validating one's epistemology?

Interesting discussion, but not all of Ellen's comments seem consistent with Rand's philosophy. I notice that she used the word "primary" an awful lot (including in some of the passages I deleted). Perhaps she got carried away a bit? A mild case of "primary-itis"? :-)

In studying Rand's "The Objectivist Ethics," I was struck by the negative, polemical manner in which she characterized the virtue of Pride:

"The virtue of Pride is the recognition of the fact 'that as man must produce the physical values he needs to sustain his life, so he must acquire the values of character that make his life worth sustaining -- that as man is a being of self-made wealth, so he is a being of self-made soul.' (Atlas Shrugged) The virtue of Pride can best be described by the term 'moral ambitiousness.' It means that one must earn the right to hold oneself as one's own highest value by achieving one's own moral perfection -- which one achieves [here comes the negative part] by never accepting any code of irrational virtues impossible to practice and by never failing to practice the virtues one knows to be rational -- by never accepting an unearned guilt and never earning any, or, if one ~has~ earned it, never leaving it uncorrected -- by never resigning oneself passively to any flaws in one's character -- by never placing any concern, wish, fear or mood of the moment above the reality of one's own self-esteem. And, above all, it means one's rejection of the role of a sacrificial animal, the rejection of any doctrine that preaches self-immolation as a moral virtue or duty." (VOS, pp. 29-30)

I count six uses of "never" and two of "rejection." That's pretty negative, if you ask me. (In a similar manner, but to a much lesser degree, Rand uses negative terms in characterizing the virtues of Integrity, Honesty, and Justice, while – somewhat surprisingly -- using positive terms in characterizing Rationality and Independence.)

Now, there is nothing wrong with polemics per se. But in laying out her ~positive~ case and, particularly, in ~characterizing~ the virtues, it would seem most helpful to stick to the high ground, to point toward what one ~aspires~ to, rather than focusing so relentless on what one ~rejects~.

If I had written the last half of that paragraph (or been asked by Rand for comments :-), I would have written something like:

[beginning with Rand's wording] The virtue of Pride can best be described by the term 'moral ambitiousness.' It means that one must earn the right to hold oneself as one's own highest value by achieving one's own moral perfection -- which one achieves.... [here I would break off from Rand's verbiage and write the following]

....by scrupulously adopting a code of rational virtues that are possible to practice and by scrupulously practicing those virtues -- by scrupulously correcting any guilt that one has earned -- by scrupulously correcting any flaws in one's character -- by scrupulously holding the reality of one's own self-esteem above any concern, wish, fear or mood of the moment. And, above all, it means one's scrupulous adherence to the principle that one is, like every other human being, an end in oneself, not a means to the ends of others.

~Then~, Rand could have trotted in all the negative stuff. But I think she should ~first~ have given a nice, clean ~positive~ statement of what pride and "moral ambitiousness" entail before galloping off into "never"-"never" land. :-)

Best 2 all,

REB

Roger E. Bissell, musician-writer

From: Ellen Moore <ellen_moore@mb.sympatico.ca>

To: Atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: Re: a more positive view of pride

Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2003 15:33:42 -0500

So, Roger, now you want to rewrite Rand?

Surely you understand that her words, "never accepting ...", and your words, "scrupulously adopting ..." have the same meaning? And that Rand's context was that which made it necessary to teach a new concept of pride WAS of explaining pride as a virtue - in opposition to sinful - to show every reader that pride is NOT a sin as we had always been taught by mysticism. This is in the same context that she taught that *selfishness* is a rational virtue.

Ellen

From: PaleoObjectivist@aol.com

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: Re: ATL: Re: a more positive view of pride

Date: Mon, 7 Jul 2003 20:11:28 EDT

Ellen Moore wrote:

> So, Roger, now you want to rewrite Rand?

>

> Surely you understand that her words, "never accepting ...", and your words, "scrupulously adopting ..." have the same meaning?

Yes, and so do "Don't be a bad boy" and "Be a good boy." But there is a world of difference, psychologically, in what is conveyed to the child or student of ethics by these two ways of stating the issue. And it is revealing, as well, of the psychology of the person who chooses to frame it in the negative, rather than the positive.

> And that Rand's context was that which made it necessary to teach a new concept of pride WAS of explaining pride as a virtue - in opposition to sinful - to show every reader that pride is NOT a sin as we had always been taught by mysticism. This is in the same context that she taught that *selfishness* is a rational virtue.

Yes, but look again at the paragraph. Just before the section with the seven instances "never" (not six, as I erroneously stated), Rand says that pride involves "moral perfection" and "moral ambitiousness." Then she goes on to explain these ~positive~ aspects of pride, not in terms of what we should DO, but in terms of what we should NOT do. To me, a description of the virtue of pride, which is supposed to be a positive, with a barrage of negative terms does not have its priorities straight. You uphold the good, ~then~ you denounce the bad, if you feel you must. That's how Rand and Peikoff taught me to approach philosophy.

Do the positive statement first, ~then~ the polemics against your enemy. My complaint is that she was not following her own advice in this particular passage. Now, I find myself appalled that you do not seem to understand this basic point of human psychology and positive philosophizing. Is it possible that you are being overly defensive of Rand here? Surely not every emphasis or slant she took in her non-fiction writing was the best one. Maybe she was in a bad mood or feeling particularly antagonistic when she wrote that passage, and she didn't bother to reconsider after she cooled off.

Anyway, I still think that my "re-write" would be a more effective way to begin in explaining to students of Objectivism exactly what "moral perfection" and "moral ambitiousness" are. And nothing you have said provides reason to think otherwise. If Rand's context was to teach pride as a virtue, rather than a sin, then she should have presented it on its own terms, not as the ~rejection of altruist virtues~. That should have come in an additional paragraph, if she felt that strongly that polemics were necessary and appropriate.

Monart wrote:

>So, I agree with Roger that the three cardinal values are Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem, even if I also believe that Reason is prior to and explains Purpose and Self-Esteem.

Ellen Moore commented:

>I agree with the latter statement because it specifically disagrees with Roger's apparent view that "cardinal" means these three values' status are all on the same level. Monart is saying clearly that Reason is prior to the other two, and that Reason entails the other two "cardinals". Monart is right.

>

> Reason IS more fundamental, meaning *prior to* and *entails* purpose and self-esteem. It is reason that makes possible purpose and self-esteem.

I thought that ~all~ conscious creatures are purposeful. How, then, is it that humans are only capable of purposeful behavior if they engage in reason? Isn't it, instead, the fact that one's purpose needs to be in the service of ~one's life~, rather than something destructive to one's life or well-being, that one needs to guide one's choice of purpose with reason? Isn't it true that reason can only help one to achieve the ultimate value of one's life when it is put in the service of a productive purpose? Doesn't purpose, then, make it ~possible~ for reason to have any life-serving efficacy in the first place?

Unlike Ellen, I regard reason and purpose as ~reciprocally~ necessary, pivotally important values for human life.

> In fact, a more advanced way to look at the issue is that Reason is both the primary as well as the ultimate and absolute *purpose* of human volitional consciousness, i.e., of human teleology - purposiveness. And self-esteem is the consequence, the result, of achieving the vital human purposes of man qua man.

How is this "more advanced" than Rand's view that the ultimate purpose of human action (and thus, one would assume, human consciousness) is ~one's life~, which in turn has as ~its~ moral purpose ~one's happiness~? It is only because the ultimate value that is one's life ~hinges on~ (relies crucially upon) the values of Reason, Purpose, and Self-Esteem, that they are regarded by Rand as "cardinal" values. ("Cardinal" in its original

meaning meant "pivot" or "hinge.")

One more point: unlike Ellen, Rand said that "the central purpose of a rational man's life" is not reason but ~productive work~. (VOS, p. 25)

Roger E. Bissell, musician-writer

From: Santos <pandl@optonline.net>

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: RE: a more positive view of pride?

Date: Mon, 07 Jul 2003 22:59:37 -0400

Roger wrote:

//In studying Rand's "The Objectivist Ethics," I was struck by the negative, polemical manner in which she characterized the virtue of Pride://

Roger, you will be pleased to learn that at the TOC Seminar last week, William Thomas covered the virtue of Pride in a most positive manner beginning his lecture with, "You are your own highest value." He went on to distinguish between Pride (the traditional view, i.e. one of the seven deadly sins) with Rand's Objectivist approach.

Thomas said that the common understanding is that Pride leads to putting down others. Pride, according to Rand, does not demean others; it does not mean one becomes a braggart. Pride is self-love, not the emotion, but the self-regard, the selfishness of soul which desires the best of all things.

Pride is a commitment of achieving self-esteem by taking credit and responsibility for acting on one's judgment in accordance with moral principles. He borrowed a definition of self-esteem from Nathaniel Branden which puts it aptly: a psychological immune system.

Thomas also stated, "Accept yourself as you are. Remind yourself of your values and goals. Look at your progress on _your_ terms not by the standards of others." He concluded his talk with, "The noble soul has reverence for itself." (Friedrich Nietzsche)

I made the mistake at the lecture of taking some notes in shorthand, which I haven't used in about 25 years. I found that I can still write those squiggly symbols, I just can't read them back! :-(

Patricia

From: PaleoObjectivist@aol.com

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: Re: ATL: RE: a more positive view of pride?

Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2003 01:06:57 EDT

Yes, that's the kind of approach I noticed as being absent from Rand's paragraph on pride. I especially like the Nietzsche quote, which Rand included in her 25th anniversary introduction to ~The Fountainhead~. (As an undergraduate in music theory and composition, I wrote a 12-tone song with piano accompaniment as a setting for the passage including the above quote. I have since lost the manuscript, but I recall it being too intense for

the audience. Perhaps it was just my singing. :-)

Best 2 all,

REB

From: PaleoObjectivist@aol.com

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: Re: a more positive view of pride?

Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2003 04:04:39 EDT

Dear List Members:

I was going to post this on atlantis_II, but I can see now that doing so would have given their list undeserved value, and why should I do ~that~? They seem to be having immense difficulty getting any kind of philosophical discussion started over there. All they seem to be able to do is rancorously ridicule those who ~are~ talking about ideas without rancor and ridicule. Well, I'm not going to get drawn into that cesspool again. Feh! Instead, since it follows closely the points I made in my posts on the virtue of Pride, I'll just post it here....REB

==========================================

George Smith wrote on atlantis_II:

> First, Rand's discussion of "pride" is not "negative philosophizing," nor is it any more or less polemical than her typical style of writing. She defines "pride" in positive rather than negative terms, and to illustrate and explain a definition by giving examples of what it is not is a common and perfectly acceptable procedure.

I think that as we re-read that paragraph, we note that Rand explains how to ~achieve~ moral perfection and to ~act~ in a morally ambitious manner exclusively in negative terms. It's like a particularly negativistic school-marm telling someone how to be a "good boy" by ~not~ doing x, y, and z, rather than telling him ~to do~ a, b, and c. As I opined to Ellen Moore, "there is a world of difference, psychologically, in what is conveyed to the child or student of ethics by these two ways of stating the issue. And it is revealing, as well, of the psychology of the person who chooses to frame it in the negative, rather than the positive."

>Second, a discussion of Rand's three major virtues will go nowhere until her highly inadequate definition of a "virtue" is analyzed first. Contrary to Rand, a virtue is not an "act" (VOS, p. 25); it is a disposition, or moral habit. Aristotelians and Thomists are much better on this subject than Rand. Her treatment of "virtue," even allowing for its sketchiness, is one of the weakest parts of her moral theory.

George might also wish to take up his beef with the American Oxford Dictionary and with the etymology of the word itself. The AOD lists as its principal meaning of the term "BEHAVIOR showing high moral standards," which is Rand's "act" definition. A subsidiary meaning under this definition is "a quality considered morally good or desirable in a person." I take it that this is reasonably close to the "dispositional" definition that George prefers.

"Virtue" is a Middle English term from the Old French "vertu", in turn taken from the Latin "virtus," which means "valor, merit, moral perfection," which in turn comes from the Latin "vir," which means "man." Medals are given for ~acts~ of valor, not for having the ~disposition~ to engage in such acts. Rand, similarly, insisted that one is virtuous because one ~engages~ in good acts, not just because one ~aspires~ to have done so or because one has the ~potential~ to do so. She was contemptuous of the view "I am my good intentions," and of those who attempted to achieve stature by talking about what they are ~going~ to do -- and rightly so, I think.

>Third, pride does not qualify as a "virtue," even according to Rand's own definition, for it is not an "act." Moreover, Rand (VOS, 25) herself states pride "is the RESULT" of productive work (my caps). At best, this would make pride a secondary and contingent virtue rather than a primary one. At worst, it would disqualify pride as a virtue altogether, if it is the *result* of values already achieved rather than a *means* by which values are acquired.

I have a somewhat different interpretation and evaluation of what Rand wrote in that passage. First of all, she states that virtue is the act by which one gains and/or keeps a value. Second, she says that pride is the virtue that corresponds to the value of self-esteem. From this, you would expect to find verbiage from her that describes how to attain self-esteem by acting in a certain prideful manner. And here it is: "The virtue of Pride can best be described by the term 'moral ambitiousness.' It means that one must earn the right to hold oneself as one's own highest value [i.e., one must earn the VALUE of Self-Esteem] by achieving [i.e., ACTING so as to achieve] one's own moral perfection."

My quarrel with Rand was ~not~ over her (supposed) failure to define the virtue of Pride as an action. In fact actions one is ~not supposed to take~ in behaving with Pride (and so as to achieve one's Self-Esteem) are strewn throughout the latter 2/3 of the paragraph! It is in the ~negativity~ of the actions mentioned. George thinks that this is perfectly acceptable. I disagree.

> Roger wrote:

>"I can understand how methodological and structural issues in philosophy are not interesting to some people. Nitty- gritty, content issues are the real turn-on, more often than not. However, there seems to be less of ~that~ here than elsewhere, too. It certainly can't be for the lack of capable people, can it? So....testing, testing...."

>

> Well, we could always discuss how many tautologies it takes to defend psychological determinism. You've had a lot of practice at this, so you start. Either that, or we could use the statements that Mr. Tautology himself recently posted on Atlantis.

Well -- deep subject. Yet again, George has botched the opportunity to engage in philosophical discussion without gratuitous ridicule. Yet again, he has demonstrated why he and his cronies are not welcome on Atlantis. Ironically, "Hell's Kitchen" has once again become a Safe Zone for philosophy, and the supposed Libertarian haven on atlantis_II has become a philosophical wasteland. Values have consequences!

REB

From: Jimmy Wales <jwales@bomis.com>

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: Re: ATL: a more positive view of pride?

Date: Tue, 8 Jul 2003 09:39:28 -0700

I'd like to give that paragraph an even more positive rewrite than Roger did...

PaleoObjectivist@aol.com wrote:

>"The virtue of Pride is the recognition of the fact 'that as man must produce the physical values he needs to sustain his life, so he must acquire the values of character that make his life worth sustaining -- that as man is a being of self-made wealth, so he is a being of self-made soul.' (Atlas Shrugged) The virtue of Pride can best be described by the term 'moral ambitiousness.' It means that one must earn the right to hold oneself as one's own highest value by achieving one's own moral perfection -- which one achieves [here comes the negative part] by never accepting any code of irrational virtues impossible to practice and by never failing to practice the virtues one knows to be rational -- by never accepting an unearned guilt and never earning any, or, if one ~has~ earned it, never leaving it uncorrected -- by never resigning oneself passively to any flaws in one's character -- by never placing any concern, wish, fear or mood of the moment above the reality of one's own self-esteem. And, above all, it means one's rejection of the role of a sacrificial animal, the rejection of any doctrine that preaches self-immolation as a moral virtue or duty." (VOS, pp. 29-30)

Roger's rewrite:

>[beginning with Rand's wording] The virtue of Pride can best be described by the term 'moral ambitiousness.' It means that one must earn the right to hold oneself as one's own highest value by achieving one's own moral perfection -- which one achieves....

I would replace the deontic-sounding 'must' with 'can and should'... "It means that one can and should earn the right to hold oneself as one's own highest value by achieving one's own moral perfection...'

> ....by scrupulously adopting a code of rational virtues that are possible to practice and by scrupulously practicing those virtues -- by scrupulously correcting any guilt that one has earned -- by scrupulously correcting any flaws in one's character -- by scrupulously holding the reality of one's own self-esteem above any concern, wish, fear or mood of the moment. And, above all, it means one's scrupulous adherence to the principle that one is, like every other human being, an end in oneself, not a means to the ends of others.

Even with your rewrite, there's still a strong focus on the negatives, i.e. "guilt that one has earned", "flaws in one's character".

I thought it'd be easy to rewrite it again to give it a more positive spin, but instead I guess I'll just wrap up by saying that I think it could be done.

--Jimbo

From: Ellen Moore <ellen_moore@mb.sympatico.ca>

To: Atlantis@wetheliving.com

Subject: ATL: Re: A more positive view of pride

Date: Tue, 08 Jul 2003 15:38:41 -0500

Roger,

My highest compliments to you for your stand in this post to Atlantis maintaining the withdrawal of sanction and your further participation in discussion with those who have not earned the moral respect of their lack of civility. I personally thank you for supporting Atlantis' values.

The point I want to make clear is that it is perfectly acceptable for Rand to present her values expressed in both positive and negative format. On that point, I agree with GS, but I do not agree with him when that cesspool of ridicule he indulges in is what he called "polemics" [as he did in defending his arguments with Bill D. on OWL - in which, by the way, Bill's were superior.]

I do not agree with you that posing positive or negative assertions in any discussion is necessarily indicative of one's psychology – since both ways are commonplace and valuable for explanations and as teaching tools.

You wrote, in another post,

"That's how Rand and Peikoff taught me to approach philosophy. Do the positive statement first, ~then~ the polemics against your enemy. My complaint is that she was not following her own advice in this particular passage. "

My point is that is exactly what Rand did in this entire context. So your problem with it appears to be caused by your isolating the final paragraph on pride, and critiquing it without taking into account the prior context.

The point I'm making about your wanting to rewrite Rand on "pride", is that you are dropping the context of her previous discussion on all the other virtues in the earlier paragraphs. Pride, in that context, explains how to act with virtues to achieve the values of reason, purpose and self-esteem, and to maintain and integrate them into one's life. Then, after having presented the basic virtue of rationality and how to grasp all its subsumed key virtues, Rand explained what pride actually is in its virtuous actions, moral ambitiousness, and went on to say what not to do, and how not to act, in ways which regard pride as a sin. I think the whole text in this context in VOS is perfectly right and acceptable. And it does not show Rand as having any negative denotations or connotations in her personal psychology, i.e., not if the whole context is kept in mind. Can you see that describing pride, in that context, in only positive acts would entail a repetition of all the other already explained virtues. So she concludes by saying what pride is, and details how not to act.

Yes, I'm defending the fact that Rand did the right thing in explaining values and virtues. I don't think she was psychologically in a bad mood or was antagonistic -- True, she was in essence criticizing the ideas and actions that promote pride is a sin, and she

[BaalChatzaf]

From an Evolutionary standpoint, man is an end to the survival of his genes.

Man is the effect of certain physical (mainly biological) causes, not the end of anything. In nature there are no ends, just the effects of causes.

The Aristotelian essentialist teleological mode of thinking was (happily) purged from science centuries ago.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited March 28, 2010 by BaalChatzaf

[anthony]

Man as Man - his objective nature; universal; as he is, has always been, and will always be; by the sum total, and to the limits, of his capability; etc. (My reading.)

Yes, this is the "essence" of aristotelianism, but science has moved away from "essences" to a more functional approach. Why not "man as he does" instead of "man as he is"?

Hi GS,

You don't think that "Is" presupposes "Does" ?

Or that the fundamental and the functional have a cause and effect relationship?

I don't claim to have sorted out the knotty Is/Ought (so called) dichotomy, but I am on firmer ground with this Is/Do relationship.

Briefly, what Man (qua Man) can be, is what he can do - assuming acceptance his 'self-directing' capability, volition.

That science has moved away from this to the more functional approach is, if true, shocking, and it must move back tout de suite. (IMO)

Maybe then the most important science, philosophy, can come out of the closet.

Tony

[Christopher]

Man as Man - his objective nature; universal; as he is, has always been, and will always be; by the sum total, and to the limits, of his capability; etc. (My reading.)

Yes, this is the "essence" of aristotelianism, but science has moved away from "essences" to a more functional approach. Why not "man as he does" instead of "man as he is"?

Sure sure, both are interesting approaches. Regarding Man's objective nature, I think it's reductionistic to say his nature can be fully explained via Evolution (i.e. science). Volition cannot be explained by science. This Determinism vs. Free-Will debate has proceeded elsewhere, but it demonstrates the limits of science.

As for "man as he does," I like that. I always liked Rand's definition of life: self-generating and self-sustaining action. What does man do? Well, given that a number of motivations are psychological and originate from seemingly-unknown causes (i.e. free will), again science per se alone cannot explain man. That's why we must turn to philosophy or religion or whatever resonates with the internal experiences of man in order to help explain man's actions, man's purpose, man's ultimate end.

Edited March 28, 2010 by Christopher

[BaalChatzaf]

Sure sure, both are interesting approaches. Regarding Man's objective nature, I think it's reductionistic to say his nature can be fully explained via Evolution (i.e. science). Volition cannot be explained by science. This Determinism vs. Free-Will debate has proceeded elsewhere, but it demonstrates the limits of science.

the limits of current science.

As for "man as he does," I like that. I always liked Rand's definition of life: self-generating and self-sustaining action.

Themodynamically bogus.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Christopher]

Ba'al,

The Big Bang is thermodynamic bogus. So much for this "science."

C'est la vie

[tjohnson]

Hi GS,

You don't think that "Is" presupposes "Does" ?

Or that the fundamental and the functional have a cause and effect relationship?

I don't claim to have sorted out the knotty Is/Ought (so called) dichotomy, but I am on firmer ground with this Is/Do relationship.

Briefly, what Man (qua Man) can be, is what he can do - assuming acceptance his 'self-directing' capability, volition.

That science has moved away from this to the more functional approach is, if true, shocking, and it must move back tout de suite. (IMO)

Maybe then the most important science, philosophy, can come out of the closet.

Tony

So then it becomes a question of what activities of mankind are the "best"? What behaviours in the past 2000 years do we want to set the standard with? It seems to me that objectivism says laissez-faire economics is the ideal - "man the trader". General semantics, on the other hand says "man the scientist" is the ideal.

[BaalChatzaf]

Ba'al,

The Big Bang is thermodynamic bogus. So much for this "science."

C'est la vie

Read Steinhardt and Turok's version. The ekpyrotic theory which reproduces all Big Bang predictions and does not put the Big Bang at the beginning. It is only an intermediate point in the coming and going of the eternal cosmos. See -Endless Universe: Beyond the Big Bang -- Rewriting Cosmic History- by Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dragonfly]

Ba'al,

The Big Bang is thermodynamic bogus. So much for this "science."

C'est la vie

Nonsense.

[Christopher]

Ba'al,

The Big Bang is thermodynamic bogus. So much for this "science."

C'est la vie

Read Steinhardt and Turok's version. The ekpyrotic theory which reproduces all Big Bang predictions and does not put the Big Bang at the beginning. It is only an intermediate point in the coming and going of the eternal cosmos. See -Endless Universe: Beyond the Big Bang -- Rewriting Cosmic History- by Paul Steinhardt and Neil Turok.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I like the idea of a larger-scope system. My only hesitation is the idea that the universe proceeds uni-directionally, which implies a beginning point and a theoretical endpoint (of perfect entropy). Can a uni-directional system be eternal and yet also decay? Eternal means we must conclude that there is mathematically an infinite amount of energy in the universe, otherwise there is by definition a "starting" point. And if there is infinite energy in the system, then the system never really decays on a universal scale.

[Christopher]

So then it becomes a question of what activities of mankind are the "best"? What behaviours in the past 2000 years do we want to set the standard with? It seems to me that objectivism says laissez-faire economics is the ideal - "man the trader". General semantics, on the other hand says "man the scientist" is the ideal.

"Man the scientist" would work if we define science as the process of observation and validation of all apprehensions. This definition is larger than but includes empirical events. The problem is that Evolutionary Theory is a scientific theory that rests within a strict system of empirical observation, so you would be crossing definitions of science here. What is your definition, GS?

[tjohnson]

"Man the scientist" would work if we define science as the process of observation and validation of all apprehensions. This definition is larger than but includes empirical events. The problem is that Evolutionary Theory is a scientific theory that rests within a strict system of empirical observation, so you would be crossing definitions of science here. What is your definition, GS?

Not really sure what you are getting at here. Korzybski based his system on the alleged fact that science was responsible for all mankind's progress and so we should look to science as a model of our behaviour. This immediately implies that we should try to use scientific method in our daily lives as much as possible, including economics , evolution, psychology etc.. Korzybski thought of science as an activity whereby humans coordinated their experience and observations and try to make sense of them as a species.

[Christopher]

"Man the scientist" would work if we define science as the process of observation and validation of all apprehensions. This definition is larger than but includes empirical events. The problem is that Evolutionary Theory is a scientific theory that rests within a strict system of empirical observation, so you would be crossing definitions of science here. What is your definition, GS?

Not really sure what you are getting at here. Korzybski based his system on the alleged fact that science was responsible for all mankind's progress and so we should look to science as a model of our behaviour. This immediately implies that we should try to use scientific method in our daily lives as much as possible, including economics , evolution, psychology etc.. Korzybski thought of science as an activity whereby humans coordinated their experience and observations and try to make sense of them as a species.

Well there is the common colloquial definition that science deals with "hard facts" rather than strictly represents a methodological process. This makes science applicable only to empirical events - physics, chemistry, biology, etc. etc. etc. - and cannot account for a volitional consciousness, internal phenomena, etc.

sci·ence   /ˈsaɪəns/ Show Spelled[sahy-uhns] Show IPA

–noun

1.a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically arranged and showing the operation of general laws: the mathematical sciences.

2.systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation.

3.any of the branches of natural or physical science.

4.systematized knowledge in general.

5.knowledge, as of facts or principles; knowledge gained by systematic study.

6.a particular branch of knowledge.

7.skill, esp. reflecting a precise application of facts or principles; proficiency.

Therefore, when people discuss the science of man, they argue that man is the sum product of biological evolution in a physical universe. However both biology and physics are deterministic systems, and so there is no discussion of psychological motivation without reference to the deterministic system of the empirical universe. From this perspective, we are forced to conclude rather illogical foundations for motivation - surival exclusively for the gene for instance. If we believe in volition, then we run into two paradoxes here: A ) the paradox of trying to "validate" information when one's processes are already predetermined; B ) whether we can be self-directed when the system of self-direction itself is hard-wired to submit to an external purpose. People become worker ants when we live for survival of our genes (i.e. when our entire purpose of living is derived from strictly empirical observations). Personally I find this distasteful. Likewise, observers of consciousness (meditators, etc.) tend to claim something else entirely by scientific process of observation and validation of phenomenal events which of course cannot be dealt with empirically. So you see, science as a "methodology applicable to all apprehensions" actually conflicts with science as a "methodology exclusive to empirical observations." Exclusively referencing Evolutionary Theory to understand man's purpose fits the latter science.

Edited March 28, 2010 by Christopher

[tjohnson]

Well there is the common colloquial definition that science deals with "hard facts" rather than strictly represents a methodological process. This makes science applicable only to empirical events - physics, chemistry, biology, etc. etc. etc. - and cannot account for a volitional consciousness, internal phenomena, etc.

sci·ence   /ˈsaɪəns/ Show Spelled[sahy-uhns] Show IPA

–noun

1.a branch of knowledge or study dealing with a body of facts or truths systematically arranged and showing the operation of general laws: the mathematical sciences.

2.systematic knowledge of the physical or material world gained through observation and experimentation.

3.any of the branches of natural or physical science.

4.systematized knowledge in general.

5.knowledge, as of facts or principles; knowledge gained by systematic study.

6.a particular branch of knowledge.

7.skill, esp. reflecting a precise application of facts or principles; proficiency.

Therefore, when people discuss the science of man, they argue that man is the sum product of biological evolution in a physical universe. However both biology and physics are deterministic systems, and so there is no discussion of psychological motivation without reference to the deterministic system of the empirical universe. From this perspective, we are forced to conclude rather illogical foundations for motivation - surival exclusively for the gene for instance. If we believe in volition, then we run into two paradoxes here: A ) the paradox of trying to "validate" information when one's processes are already predetermined; B ) whether we can be self-directed when the system of self-direction itself is hard-wired to submit to an external purpose. People become worker ants when we live for survival of our genes (i.e. when our entire purpose of living is derived from strictly empirical observations). Personally I find this distasteful. Likewise, observers of consciousness (meditators, etc.) tend to claim something else entirely by scientific process of observation and validation of phenomenal events which of course cannot be dealt with empirically. So you see, science as a "methodology applicable to all apprehensions" actually conflicts with science as a "methodology exclusive to empirical observations." Exclusively referencing Evolutionary Theory to understand man's purpose fits the latter science.

I believe you're quite right - science is usually viewed as a "body of knowledge" and not as an activity that defines humans - but maybe the latter could be a profitable way to look at it. I think our science of man is in it's infancy as yet and I think it's because, as you intimated, that studying ourselves is more difficult than studying other natural phenomena. It's difficult to be both the subject and the object of the process, n'est ce pas??