A Critique of Ayn Rand's Contextual Theory of Knowledge

[imurray]

I like this definition of 'knowledge' - structure. To know is to know structure. It is not a question of what's true or false it is a question improving our symbolic models of what is going on. Then you don't need a contextual theory of knowledge because at any given time your model can always be improved when further structure becomes apparent.

Might not improvements be thought of as finding out what's true or false about something? For instance, when I think of my model of, say, a physical system, such as a volcano, I make an improvement to this because I believe something in my current model -- or its structure (if using "structure" here is believed to add value) -- is incorrect -- e.g., doesn't capture some relevant feature of the real physical system -- or, in other words, is false. Merely using another word -- structure or whatever you care to come up with next -- only seems to hide this, don't you think?

Dan,

I have not given this much thought, but prima facie GS's "definition" of knowlege seems the most objective. You accused him of using the term "structure" to add value, but I see it as value neutral. It conceives of knowledge as an ongoing process where at any given moment it is what it is. On the other hand words like "improvement", "true", or "false", "better" or "worse" are value judgments. To use your example of the model volcano: according to GS's definition the first model represented a structure commensurate with what had been observed up to the point it was created - the second model represents a structure commensurate with what had been observed up until it was created. According to your definition, the second model is an improvement of the first, but isn't "improvement" an extraneous value judgment; as would be "truer", "better", etc? His definition describes an objective process while yours describes a series of value judgments. Feedback welcome.

Ian

[tjohnson]

Dan,

I have not given this much thought, but prima facie GS's "definition" of knowlege seems the most objective. You accused him of using the term "structure" to add value, but I see it as value neutral. It conceives of knowledge as an ongoing process where at any given moment it is what it is. On the other hand words like "improvement", "true", or "false", "better" or "worse" are value judgments. To use your example of the model volcano: according to GS's definition the first model represented a structure commensurate with what had been observed up to the point it was created - the second model represents a structure commensurate with what had been observed up until it was created. According to your definition, the second model is an improvement of the first, but isn't "improvement" an extraneous value judgment; as would be "truer", "better", etc? His definition describes an objective process while yours describes a series of value judgments. Feedback welcome.

Ian

Hi Ian,

There has to be a criteria for determining the value of a given theoretical construct but my point is this criteria is given by statistical methods and not a simple "true or false". This is a quantum leap in epistemology and not one that is easily made and I mean "quantum" in a literal sense because it is in QM that this has become apparent.

[dan2100]

I like this definition of 'knowledge' - structure. To know is to know structure. It is not a question of what's true or false it is a question improving our symbolic models of what is going on. Then you don't need a contextual theory of knowledge because at any given time your model can always be improved when further structure becomes apparent.

Might not improvements be thought of as finding out what's true or false about something? For instance, when I think of my model of, say, a physical system, such as a volcano, I make an improvement to this because I believe something in my current model -- or its structure (if using "structure" here is believed to add value) -- is incorrect -- e.g., doesn't capture some relevant feature of the real physical system -- or, in other words, is false. Merely using another word -- structure or whatever you care to come up with next -- only seems to hide this, don't you think?

Well, if we know something about the structure of events, but not all, then our calculations will always be approximate. This is why probability theory is so important because it replaces 2-valued logic with infinite valued logic. As we learn more about a given system our calculations get more and more accurate and probability of "correct structure" increases.

I'm not denying all of this; merely saying that this doesn't resolve all the problems and is only a roundabout way of getting to the same ends. Moreover (how often does one get to use "moreover" in a sentence?), when comparing two approximate models for a given set of data or in a given context, it might be that one is more precise than the other (or it might not be, but let's stick with the case where one is a better approximation than the other). In that case, one might say one model captures more of the truth of the situation than the other -- using "structure" here only uses different words to mean much the same thing. Even your use of "correct structure" seems to belie your view.

Let me put this another way. If something is an approximation of something else, then this presupposes that the approximation is not completely true about the thing it's approximating and in comparing two approximations one might be considered truer than the other. (Of course, at this point, one could introduce things like precisive vs. nonprecisive abstractions. See, e.g., "Realism and Abstraction in Economics: Aristotle and Mises versus Friedman" by Roderick Long at: http://mises.org/journals/qjae/pdf/qjae9_3_1.pdf )

[dan2100]

I like this definition of 'knowledge' - structure. To know is to know structure. It is not a question of what's true or false it is a question improving our symbolic models of what is going on. Then you don't need a contextual theory of knowledge because at any given time your model can always be improved when further structure becomes apparent.

Might not improvements be thought of as finding out what's true or false about something? For instance, when I think of my model of, say, a physical system, such as a volcano, I make an improvement to this because I believe something in my current model -- or its structure (if using "structure" here is believed to add value) -- is incorrect -- e.g., doesn't capture some relevant feature of the real physical system -- or, in other words, is false. Merely using another word -- structure or whatever you care to come up with next -- only seems to hide this, don't you think?

Dan,

I have not given this much thought, but prima facie GS's "definition" of knowlege seems the most objective. You accused him of using the term "structure" to add value, but I see it as value neutral.

My point was not that one would switch to his idea, I hope, because one thought it actually was an improvement. I wasn't accusing him in the sense that this is something he wouldn't want to do. I presume he is aiming at this because he believes it's more objective or better. In that case, he is making a value choice, but so what?

It conceives of knowledge as an ongoing process where at any given moment it is what it is. On the other hand words like "improvement", "true", or "false", "better" or "worse" are value judgments. To use your example of the model volcano: according to GS's definition the first model represented a structure commensurate with what had been observed up to the point it was created - the second model represents a structure commensurate with what had been observed up until it was created. According to your definition, the second model is an improvement of the first, but isn't "improvement" an extraneous value judgment; as would be "truer", "better", etc? His definition describes an objective process while yours describes a series of value judgments. Feedback welcome.

This is to look at things ahistorically and acontextually. Of course, one model might fit one set of data while another model fits another set of data. But the usual case in science, including geology is that one set of data is often better because it includes the other set as a subset or a boundary condition. In other words, these models aren't seen as floating around in some space of models, but the worker is actually looking for the model that captures more of the real system -- or more of the revelant or interesting features of the real system. As more is found out, yes, more has to be included or accounted for. But if you're going to disregard this, then there is no ongoing process -- just a series of unrelated moments, or of unrelated models and unrelated data.

[tjohnson]

In that case, one might say one model captures more of the truth of the situation than the other -- using "structure" here only uses different words to mean much the same thing. Even your use of "correct structure" seems to belie your view.

The problem as I see it is that using 'true' and 'false' with respect to a complex model is inappropriate. You have to introduce levels of "truthness" and I don't think the formulation lends itself to this. There is, however, well developed formulations in probability and statistics to handle this situation.

[dan2100]

In that case, one might say one model captures more of the truth of the situation than the other -- using "structure" here only uses different words to mean much the same thing. Even your use of "correct structure" seems to belie your view.

The problem as I see it is that using 'true' and 'false' with respect to a complex model is inappropriate. You have to introduce levels of "truthness" and I don't think the formulation lends itself to this. There is, however, well developed formulations in probability and statistics to handle this situation.

While I agree that there might be complicated cases, including cases where one has two models where one can't currently decide which is better. But even if you introduce a probabilistic view and statistical tests, this still doesn't rid truth and falsity from them. It merely means there's a complicated way of arriving at them. For instance, two or more models might be very complex and only open to statistical tests on an empirical level (let's say the theoretical structure is not decisive). In which case, one still might say that the model that passes the appropriate tests is the better -- truer one -- than the one that doesn't.

(There are also other complications here too. I hope we're talking about models that aim to capture something about reality and not merely models that fit certain data. In the latter case, think of an equation of a lower degree that can fit data generated by an equation of a higher degree. In this case, over a certain range or within a certain level of approximation, the former equation fits the latter's data, but it really isn't actually capturing what's going on outside that approximation. A favorite example among Austrian economists and their fellow travelers seems to be that of predicting the next "Lord of the Rings" movie. Had you seen the first movie and the second, you might predict that in the following year a third one would come out -- a purely empirical generalization -- and you'd be right. But if you went on to say the year after that there'd be a fourth one, you'd be wrong. Why? Your model here seems to capture nothing relavent about "Lord of the Rings" movies, especially the fact that they're based on the books. Had you known the latter, you'd probably have predicted there will be three and only three movies -- assuming the movies are based on each book, none of the other material, and that the rule is "one movie per book." Using this model, you might go on to predict that there might be seven "Chronicles of Narnia" movies -- since there are seven novels in that series. But imagine, in both cases, that you came up with models that made the correct predictions -- three "Lord of the Rings" films and seven "Chronicles" ones -- would you model really be said to be truthful if it made the correct prediction but couldn't tell anything of why this was so? Surely, you might say it captured something about the structure of both, but how would you say this was meaningful? It might be sheer coincidence...)

[Xray]

Are you telling me that your belief that your house number is, say, 123, is not justified? Are you telling me that if someone asked why you believe this to be your number, you could not provide good and adequate reasons -- i.e., justification -- for your belief? Of course you could, and the same applies (in most cases) to one's birth date.

This discussion has become extremely bizarre.

Ghs

It is not my "belief" that my house number is such and such. Calling it "belief" (adding "justified" does not help) is what makes the discussion bizarre.

Yeah, that sure is bizarre.

American Heritage Dictionary:

Belief:

"2. Mental acceptance of and conviction in the truth, actuality, or validity of something:

"3. Something believed or accepted as true, especially a particular tenet or a body of tenets accepted by a group of persons."

Here are some other definitions, pulled more or less at random from Internet dictionaries:

"any cognitive content held as true"

"Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a proposition or premise to be true."

"Mental acceptance of a claim as truth"

"conviction of the truth of some statement or the reality of some being or phenomenon especially when based on examination of evidence"

I could go on, but what's the point? You already have your mind made up about everything under the sun, reasonable arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.

Stop wasting my time.

Ghs

The definitions of belief don't help to differentiate propositions claiming knowledge from propositions uttering belief.

For there IS of course a difference between stating "I believe X is the case" and "I know X is the case".

You claim that "Knowledge is justified, true belief" is a "standard definition" of 'knowledge'.

Then how do you explain that no definition of "knowledge" listed in 'standard dictionaries' contains the term 'belief'?

I'll await your response before continuing.

Here you go:

knowl·edge (nlj)

n.

1. The state or fact of knowing.

2. Familiarity, awareness, or understanding gained through experience or study.

3. The sum or range of what has been perceived, discovered, or learned.

4. Learning; erudition: teachers of great knowledge.

5. Specific information about something.

6. Carnal knowledge.

[Middle English knoulech : knouen, to know; see know + -leche, n. suff.]

Synonyms: knowledge, information, learning, erudition, lore1, scholarship

These nouns refer to what is known, as through study or experience. Knowledge is the broadest: "Science is organized knowledge" (Herbert Spencer).

Information often implies a collection of facts and data: "A man's judgment cannot be better than the information on which he has based it" (Arthur Hays Sulzberger).

Learning usually refers to knowledge gained by schooling and study: "Learning ... must be sought for with ardor and attended to with diligence" (Abigail Adams).

Erudition implies profound, often specialized knowledge: "Some have criticized his poetry as elitist, unnecessarily impervious to readers who do not share his erudition" (Elizabeth Kastor).

Lore is usually applied to knowledge gained through tradition or anecdote about a particular subject: Many American folktales concern the lore of frontier life.

Scholarship is the mastery of a particular area of learning reflected in a scholar's work: A good journal article shows ample evidence of the author's scholarship.

The American Heritage® Dictionary of the English Language, Fourth Edition copyright ©2000 by Houghton Mifflin Company. Updated in 2009. Published by Houghton Mifflin Company. All rights reserved.

knowledge [ˈnɒlɪdʒ]

n

1. the facts, feelings or experiences known by a person or group of people

2. the state of knowing

3. awareness, consciousness, or familiarity gained by experience or learning

4. erudition or informed learning

5. specific information about a subject

6. (Law) sexual intercourse (obsolete except in the legal phrase carnal knowledge)

come to one's knowledge to become known to one

to my knowledge

a. as I understand it

b. as I know

Edited May 14, 2010 by Xray

[dan2100]

Are you telling me that your belief that your house number is, say, 123, is not justified? Are you telling me that if someone asked why you believe this to be your number, you could not provide good and adequate reasons -- i.e., justification -- for your belief? Of course you could, and the same applies (in most cases) to one's birth date.

This discussion has become extremely bizarre.

Ghs

It is not my "belief" that my house number is such and such. Calling it "belief" (adding "justified" does not help) is what makes the discussion bizarre.

Yeah, that sure is bizarre.

American Heritage Dictionary:

Belief:

"2. Mental acceptance of and conviction in the truth, actuality, or validity of something:

"3. Something believed or accepted as true, especially a particular tenet or a body of tenets accepted by a group of persons."

Here are some other definitions, pulled more or less at random from Internet dictionaries:

"any cognitive content held as true"

"Belief is the psychological state in which an individual holds a proposition or premise to be true."

"Mental acceptance of a claim as truth"

"conviction of the truth of some statement or the reality of some being or phenomenon especially when based on examination of evidence"

I could go on, but what's the point? You already have your mind made up about everything under the sun, reasonable arguments to the contrary notwithstanding.

Stop wasting my time.

Ghs

The definitions of belief don't help to differentiate propositions claiming knowledge from propositions uttering belief.

For there IS of course a difference between stating "I believe X is the case" and "I know X is the case".

But it seemed to me that George was stating that if he stated he knew something, then you can safely assume he also believes that same something.

Edited May 14, 2010 by Dan Ust

[George H. Smith]

The definitions of belief don't help to differentiate propositions claiming knowledge from propositions uttering belief.

It is not the function of standard dictionaries to draw philosophical distinctions.

For there IS of course a difference between stating "I believe X is the case" and "I know X is the case".

In some contexts, yes; in some contexts, no. As I said before, if you can get more philosophical mileage from differentiating "belief" from "knowledge," then more power to you. I personally find it more helpful to treat "belief" as a generic term for "mental assent" and work from there.

You claim that "Knowledge is justified, true belief" is a "standard definition" of 'knowledge'.

This is a standard definition among philosophers, who frequently refine the meanings of ordinary words in order to draw important distinctions. As I wrote in Why Atheism? (p. 126) in regard to John Locke:

Language has two basic functions, according to Locke: The first is to facilitate our own thinking, and the second is to communicate our thoughts to others. In most cases these goals are served quite well by natural language -- i.e., language that has evolved spontaneously over time to serve many purposes, rather than having been designed for a single purpose – but a problem arises when this informal means of communication is applied to the more exacting demands of philosophy. The “civil use” of language, whereby words “serve for the upholding common Commerce about the ordinary Affairs and Conveniences of civil life,” is “very distinct” from the “philosophical use” of language, whereby words “convey the precise Notions of Things, and…express, in general Propositions, certain and undoubted truths….”

Then how do you explain that no definition of "knowledge" listed in 'standard dictionaries' contains the term 'belief'?

I explain this in the same way that I explain the fact that standard dictionaries define "believe" and "belief" in a way that includes knowledge, e.g.: "believe: To accept as true or real" (American Heritage).

Here you go:

knowl·edge (nlj)

n.

1. The state or fact of knowing.

What is the "state" referred to here, if not the state of mental assent, i.e., belief?

If your philosophical investigations are confined to reading dictionaries, you won't get very far.

Ghs

[BaalChatzaf]

If A "knows" X then it follows that A believes X, where X is a proposition or judgment.

If A "knows" X it does not follow that X is a true proposition or judgment. Human history is filled with propositions "known" to be true but turned out to be false. A "knows" X is true, and X is true are two different assertions. It is possible for X to be true and no one knows that X is true.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Xray]

Dan Ust: But it seemed to me that George was stating that if he stated he knew something, then you can safely assume he also believes that same something.

No one disputed this. For having knowledge of something always implies belief in that same something, That is, one can't know something but at the same time not believe in the knowledge.

"I know Susie took the cookies from the jar. For I've seen her take them", a mother might say.

But to say one believes something to be true makes a clear disticnition between belief and knowledge of a fact.

So while stating knowledge of a fact implies belief in the fact, stating a belief does imply the knowledge leading to certainty.

"I believe Susie took the cookies from the jar". When the mother says this, this statement does not imply Susie actually took them. While mother may have good reasons to believe Susie took them, using the term "belief" makes it clear she can't state it with certainty. If she could, she would have used "I know".

For there IS of course a difference between stating "I believe X is the case" and "I know X is the case".

In some contexts, yes; in some contexts, no. As I said before, if you can get more philosophical mileage from differentiating "belief" from "knowledge," then more power to you. I personally find it more helpful to treat "belief" as a generic term for "mental assent" and work from there.

I find the opposite more helpful, not because of philosophical mileage I hope to get, but because I think it is clearer.

I try to adhere to the principle of maximum clarity in all discussions, no matter in what field.

The issue is Rand's contextual theory of knowledge.

GHS: The philosophical question raised by this story is this: Was the early belief -- that each blood type is compatible with its own type – true or false?

It is a scientific question. The answer is clear: FALSE, i. e. it was an error about a fact.

Ba'al Chatzaf: If A "knows" X then it follows that A believes X, where X is a proposition or judgment.

If A "knows" X it does not follow that X is a true proposition or judgment.

Imo phrasing it "A thinks he/she knows X" is clearer.

BC: Human history is filled with propositions "known" to be true but turned out to be false. A "knows" X is true, and X is true are two different assertions.

What was held to be true can turn out to be an error.

It is possible for X to be true and no one knows that X is true.

Indeed, the truth about a fact exists independently of people's propositons claiming this or that to be true.

A simple example: there are some cookies missing from a previously full jar. How they got to be missing, one may never find out, that is, the truth about the actual sequence of events may never be revealed.

Leonard Peikoff (quoted by GHS): “This proposition represented real knowledge when it was first reached, and it still does so; in fact, like all properly formulated truths, this truth is immutable."

This proposition represented what was held to be true, not real knowledge, for real knowledge would have had to include the Rh factor. Based on the limited knowledge available back then, a wrong conclusion was drawn.

Edited May 22, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

Ghs: As I said before, if you can get more philosophical mileage from differentiating "belief" from "knowledge," then more power to you. I personally find it more helpful to treat "belief" as a generic term for "mental assent" and work from there.

I find the opposite more helpful, not because of philosophical mileage I hope to get, but because I think it is clearer.

I try to adhere to the principle of maximum clarity in all discussions, no matter in what field.

Bully for you. Of course, I use the term "belief" as I do because I always strive for maximum obscurity in all discussions, no matter in what field.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Ghs: As I said before, if you can get more philosophical mileage from differentiating "belief" from "knowledge," then more power to you. I personally find it more helpful to treat "belief" as a generic term for "mental assent" and work from there.

I find the opposite more helpful, not because of philosophical mileage I hope to get, but because I think it is clearer.

I try to adhere to the principle of maximum clarity in all discussions, no matter in what field.

Bully for you. Of course, I use the term "belief" as I do because I always strive for maximum obscurity in all discussions, no matter in what field.

Ghs

I KNEW IT! Damn, I'm good!

--Brant

[Xray]

Ghs: As I said before, if you can get more philosophical mileage from differentiating "belief" from "knowledge," then more power to you. I personally find it more helpful to treat "belief" as a generic term for "mental assent" and work from there.

I find the opposite more helpful, not because of philosophical mileage I hope to get, but because I think it is clearer.

I try to adhere to the principle of maximum clarity in all discussions, no matter in what field.

GHS:

Bully for you.

I had to look up what "bully for you" means. If I hadn't, I would have interpreted it wrongly. Those "dictionaries" seem to be of some use after all. ;)

GHS: Of course, I use the term "belief" as I do because I always strive for maximum obscurity in all discussions, no matter in what field.

That would explain a lot (just kidding of course).

I appreciate your sense of humor. Being able to laugh at oneself lightens up those debates considerably.

I like this definition of 'knowledge' - structure. To know is to know structure. It is not a question of what's true or false it is a question improving our symbolic models of what is going on. Then you don't need a contextual theory of knowledge because at any given time your model can always be improved when further structure becomes apparent.

From my linguistics course, I have retained this definition of structure:

"Struktur ist die Menge der die Elemente enes Systems verbindenden Beziehungen", translated:

"Structure is the set of relations connecting the elements of a system".

But is "structure" the same as "knowledge"?

Edited May 23, 2010 by Xray

[Philip Coates]

Subject: 'Certainty', 'Truth'; and 'Knowledge' -- Are they all contextual in Objectivism?

1. > "the belief of early medical researchers that four types of blood (A, B, AB, and O), while incompatible with each other, are each compatible with their own type. It was later discovered that this was not always the case..later explained by the RH factor...Was the early belief -- that each blood type is compatible with its own type – true or false?...According to the conventional view (which I am defending), this belief, though justified given the information available to researchers at the time, was in fact false, because it did not take into account the RH factor, which was discovered later. But Peikoff disagrees. " [GHS, Why Atheism?, Chapter Four, "Belief and Knowledge."]

Objectivists make a distinction between certainty and truth. The latter is correspondence with reality. The former is how much evidence one has leading to knowing that correspondence with reality.

Peikoff's view is not that that truth is contextual, but that -certainty- is contextual.

George has misunderstood what the Oist concept of contextuality is intended to apply to.

I don't have a transcript of Peikoff on this, so I don't know if he ever mistakenly or sloppily used the terms certainty and truth as synonyms; if so Rand would have taken him out back for a beating. But I have heard Peikoff speak dozens of teams of 'contextual certainty'. I don't recall him speaking loosely of 'contextual truth'.)

2. G's use of contextual knowledge in "A critique of Ayn Rand's Contextual Theory of Knowledge" is confusing - and he should revise it:

'Knowledge' is sometimes used as a synonym for truth and sometimes as a synonym for what we are certain about. Also knowledge is sometimes used in the non-conceptual arena, such as for sensations and percepts.

Objectivism has a contextual theory of certainty. It does not have a contextual theory of truth or a contextual theory of (all_ knowledge.

[George H. Smith]

Subject: 'Certainty', 'Truth'; and 'Knowledge' -- Are they all contextual in Objectivism?

1. > "the belief of early medical researchers that four types of blood (A, B, AB, and O), while incompatible with each other, are each compatible with their own type. It was later discovered that this was not always the case..later explained by the RH factor...Was the early belief -- that each blood type is compatible with its own type – true or false?...According to the conventional view (which I am defending), this belief, though justified given the information available to researchers at the time, was in fact false, because it did not take into account the RH factor, which was discovered later. But Peikoff disagrees. " [GHS, Why Atheism?, Chapter Four, "Belief and Knowledge."]

Objectivists make a distinction between certainty and truth. The latter is correspondence with reality. The former is how much evidence one has leading to knowing that correspondence with reality.

Peikoff's view is not that that truth is contextual, but that -certainty- is contextual.

George has misunderstood what the Oist concept of contextuality is intended to apply to.

I don't have a transcript of Peikoff on this, so I don't know if he ever mistakenly or sloppily used the terms certainty and truth as synonyms; if so Rand would have taken him out back for a beating. But I have heard Peikoff speak dozens of teams of 'contextual certainty'. I don't recall him speaking loosely of 'contextual truth'.)

2. G's use of contextual knowledge in "A critique of Ayn Rand's Contextual Theory of Knowledge" is confusing - and he should revise it:

'Knowledge' is sometimes used as a synonym for truth and sometimes as a synonym for what we are certain about. Also knowledge is sometimes used in the non-conceptual arena, such as for sensations and percepts.

Objectivism has a contextual theory of certainty. It does not have a contextual theory of truth or a contextual theory of (all_ knowledge.

You conveniently overlooked this passage by Peikoff that I quoted from OPAR:

“This proposition represented real knowledge when it was first reached, and it still does so; in fact, like all properly formulated truths, this truth is immutable. Within the context initially specified, A bloods are and always will be compatible.” (My italics.)

Read Peikoff's discussion in OPAR, which is where all the quotations were taken from. He is talking about contextual truths, not merely contextual certainty. If the latter were the case, I would have had no problem.

Peter Schwartz goes into more detail in his ARI tapes on Contextualism. He gives more extreme examples of how truth is contextual. Some of those examples are virtually unbelievable. For example, he says something to the effect that the laws of logic are not true for someone who doesn't understand them. I considered including a passage or two from Schwartz in my discussion, but I didn't like the idea of quoting recorded material.

I was very careful when I wrote that section. So if you are going to tell me that I should revise something, you had better get your facts straight

Ghs

[Philip Coates]

First, I made clear in my post that the word knowledge can be used in more than one way, but your chapter makes a stronger claim than contextual knowledge, it refers to contextual truth. And that is not how Objectivists, or anyone else, uses the word truth.

Truth is correspondence of a statement to reality; it is not the assessment of how much evidence one has for correspondence to reality. Nor is the latter the Oist view even if Peter S. or someone else might have misused the word 'truth'.

Second, I never "conveniently" overlook anything, you insulting son of a bitch!!!!

[George H. Smith]

First, I made clear in my post that the word knowledge can be used in more than one way, but your chapter makes a stronger claim than contextual knowledge, it refers to contextual truth. And that is not how Objectivists, or anyone else, uses the word truth.

Truth is correspondence of a statement to reality; it is not the assessment of how much evidence one has for correspondence to reality. Nor is the latter the Oist view even if Peter S. or someone else might have misused the word 'truth'.

Second, I never "conveniently" overlook anything, you insulting son of a bitch!!!!

I mention the correspondence theory of truth, but I also explain how the Peikovian approach is not the traditional one.

Schwartz does not merely "misuse" the word "truth." He develops in greater detail the theory of truth that was explicitly stated by Peikoff. What the hell do you suppose Peikoff meant in calling a flawed theory of blood types an immutable truth? Do you know what "immutable" means?

I'm not going to waste my time educating you about Peikovian epistemology. Read OPAR for yourself.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

There is an interesting story about how I came to own the two-tape set on Contextualism by Peter Schwartz.

Around 1997, I was talking on the phone to my best friend, Greg, from my high school days (we became Objectivists together) about ARI. Greg had been a regular contributor to ARI for years and had attended tons of lectures and courses, but he was becoming disillusioned. When I asked why, he replied that the ARI crowd was going off the deep-end philosophically.

I wanted details, of course, so Greg mentioned the tapes by Schwartz on Contextualism. He said that, according to Schwartz, a syllogism is not valid for someone who does not understand the principles of syllogistic reasoning.

I absolutely refused to believe Greg. I insisted that he must have misunderstood the point, because it was too absurd to be credible. Greg, in turn, insisted that he was right, that Schwartz was very clear on this point.

I stood my ground, refusing to believe that any Objectivist could say such a silly thing. There was no way; Greg had to have misunderstood.

My stubbornness finally pissed off Greg so much that he said that he would order an extra set of the tapes and send them to me, so I could listen for myself.

The tapes arrived around two weeks later. Damned if Greg wasn't right. Even the validity of a syllogism, according to Schwartz, is contextual.

I called Greg and apologized for treating him like a dummy. (I still have the tapes, but my cassette player hasn't worked in years.)

Ghs

[kiaer.ts]

What the hell do you suppose Peikoff meant in calling a flawed theory of blood types an immutable truth? Do you know what "immutable" means?

But Peikoff is referring not to an "absolute" theory of blood types, but to a qualified one, limited by a disclaimer to the effect that, in so far as blood compatibility is determined by the A and B factors, the following interactions will occur between A, B, AB and O bloodtypes, providing these reasons for rejection between certain transfusion partners. The Rh factor lay outside that scope, and would not have invalidated a properly qualified theory of A and B factors. Sure, some fool may have made the unwarranted claim that these were the only relevant factors. He would have been wrong not only because the Rh factor could have been a cause of rejection between otherwise compatible candidates, but also because it might, for example, be possible that a certain types of immune deficiencies might lead to a blood recipient not rejecting incompatible blood. That is all that should be meant by context--keeping in mind the ceteris paribus disclaimer--that all other things being equal, these effects will result from those causes.

I have to agree with Phil here regarding the general point. In so far as it is possible that various latter day ARIans may have said silly and sloppy things it only discredits them and their esoteric tracts, not Rand's notion of contextual certainty.

[George H. Smith]

What the hell do you suppose Peikoff meant in calling a flawed theory of blood types an immutable truth? Do you know what "immutable" means?

But Peikoff is referring not to an "absolute" theory of blood types, but to a qualified one, limited by a disclaimer to the effect that, in so far as blood compatibility is determined by the A and B factors, the following interactions will occur between A, B, AB and O bloodtypes, providing these reasons for rejection between certain transfusion partners. The Rh factor lay outside that scope, and would not have invalidated a properly qualified theory of A and B factors. Sure, some fool may have made the unwarranted claim that these were the only relevant factors. He would have been wrong not only because the Rh factor could have been a cause of rejection between otherwise compatible candidates, but also because it might, for example, be possible that a certain types of immune deficiencies might lead to a blood recipient not rejecting incompatible blood. That is all that should be meant by context--keeping in mind the ceteris paribus disclaimer--that all other things being equal, these effects will result from those causes.

I have to agree with Phil here regarding the general point. In so far as it is possible that various latter day ARIans may have said silly and sloppy things it only discredits them and their esoteric tracts, not Rand's notion of contextual certainty.

Okay, everyone, dust off your copies of OPAR and follow along. Everything I have to say will be a repetition of what I said in my excerpt, but I will now let Peikoff speak for himself instead of paraphrasing him as much as I did.

Remember how I qualified Peikoff's endorsement of the traditional correspondence theory of truth? Here is how he puts it (p. 171):

Logical processing of an idea within a specific context of knowledge is necessary and sufficient to establish the idea's truth.

Note how Peikoff stresses "and sufficient." He does this because he knows that his view deviates from the traditional correspondence theory, according to which justification is necessary but not sufficient for the truth of a proposition. The proposition, in this approach, must actually be true, as a matter of fact. As I put it in my account, a belief can be justified without being true.

I explain in my chapter why Peikoff amends the traditional account. He does so because he wants to avoid the idea of abstract truth without a knowing mind. Some of his remarks on arbitrary assertions (pp. 163-171), which immediately precede the section "Certainty as Contextual," are highly relevant here.

This remark (p. 165) is especially pertinent.

There can be no "correspondence" or "recognition" without the mind that corresponds or recognizes.

This means that to speak of "correspondence" without a knowing mind that identifies the correspondence is impermissible. Now let's fast forward to Peikoff's example of blood types (p. 173f.) and see how he applies his ideas.

The proposition in question is: "A bloods are compatible." This was later discovered to be false, owing to the RH factor. Nevertheless, Peikoff insists that "like all properly formulated truths, this truth ["A bloods are compatible"} is immutable."

It is very important to note that Peikoff does not merely say that the initial belief was justified. He claims that the proposition "A bloods are compatible" was and is true, even immutably true.

Now, Peikoff says this because the initial proposition was justified in the context of knowledge then available. . And because it was justified, it was also true. (Recall the statement I quoted earlier: "Logical processing of an idea within a specific context of knowledge is necessary and sufficient to establish the idea's truth.)

I agree that the initial proposition was justified, but because not all type A bloods are in fact compatible (as was later discovered), the proposition was not true , not even in the context of knowledge then available.

Peikoff rejects my approach, which is the traditional one, for two reasons, both of which are indicated in the passages I quoted above:

(1) No claim of correspondence can legitimately be made except by a knowing mind, so to refer to an abstract truth --namely, that "A bloods are compatible" was false even when it was a justified belief -- is to appeal to an out-of-context notion of truth. It is to say that a proposition can be true in an abstract manner, even when there exists no justification to believe in its truth. There is no room for an abstract theory of correspondence in Peikoff's approach.

Again, this is where Peikoff's discussion of arbitrary assertions becomes relevant. An arbitrary assertion, i.e., an assertion for which no evidence has been given, is neither true nor false. "One must treat it as if nothing has been said." And: "The true is identified by reference to a body of evidence; it is pronounced true because it can be integrated without contradiction into a total context." (My italics.)

(2) Thus, when Peikoff says that the original belief that "A bloods are compatible" was justified, he necessarily means, given his concept of truth as nothing more than justified belief, that that belief was also true. It was (and is) true because it was justified by logical validation and could be integrated within the context of knowledge available at that time.

This is a contextual theory of truth, not merely a contextual theory of knowledge or certainty. Truth is an epistemological claim based on evidence and integration, and if these requirements were fulfilled at one time, then the relevant proposition is immutably true for all time, even if it was later revised. It was true then, even if it is not true now.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Sounds like the validation of induction by bypassing the problem completely--that is, put X number of particulars into a context and go with those only.

--Brant

[kiaer.ts]

? Here is how he puts it (p. 171):

Logical processing of an idea within a specific context of knowledge is necessary and sufficient to establish the idea's truth.

Well, Tthat's just ridiculous - I'd have to see the full context, but even then, the sentence is unacceptable.

There can be no "correspondence" or "recognition" without the mind that corresponds or recognizes.

That's incontrovertible.

And this:

I have to agree with Phil here regarding the general point. In so far as it is possible that various latter day ARIans may have said silly and sloppy things it only discredits them and their esoteric tracts, not Rand's notion of contextual certainty.

Still stands.

Edited September 15, 2010 by Ted Keer

[George H. Smith]

? Here is how he puts it (p. 171):

Logical processing of an idea within a specific context of knowledge is necessary and sufficient to establish the idea's truth.

That's just ridiculous - I'd have to see the full context, but even then, the sentence is unacceptable.

There can be no "correspondence" or "recognition" without the mind that corresponds or recognizes.

That's incontrovertible.

And this:

I have to agree with Phil here regarding the general point. In so far as it is possible that various latter day ARIans may have said silly and sloppy things it only discredits them and their esoteric tracts, not Rand's notion of contextual certainty.

Still stands.

If you regard Peikoff's first claim, quoted above, as "ridiculous," then the entire foundation of his argument collapses.

Schwartz's argument, to the effect that validity is contextual, is simply a logical extension of Peikoff's position. If a knowing mind does not know why a syllogism is valid, then the syllogism is not valid for him. Why? Because with validity, as with truth, we need a knowing mind that identifies the nature of deductive reasoning. We cannot merely refer to the validity of syllogisms in the abstract. There must be identification of validity, just as there must be identification of truth.

As Peikoff puts it (OPAR, p. 166), "A savage's memorized recital of an arithmetical sum" is like the squawking of a parrot, i.e, neither true nor false, merely meaningless. But "the same utterance by a man who understands the reason behind it would constitute a truth."

All you have to do is substitute "syllogism" for "arithmetical sum" and you have Schwartz's argument, precisely.

Ghs

[kiaer.ts]

? Here is how he puts it (p. 171):

Logical processing of an idea within a specific context of knowledge is necessary and sufficient to establish the idea's truth.

That's just ridiculous - I'd have to see the full context, but even then, the sentence is unacceptable.

There can be no "correspondence" or "recognition" without the mind that corresponds or recognizes.

That's incontrovertible.

And this:

I have to agree with Phil here regarding the general point. In so far as it is possible that various latter day ARIans may have said silly and sloppy things it only discredits them and their esoteric tracts, not Rand's notion of contextual certainty.

Still stands.

If you regard Peikoff's first claim, quoted above, as "ridiculous," then the entire foundation of his argument collapses.

Schwartz's argument, to the effect that validity is contextual, is simply a logical extension of Peikoff's position. If a knowing mind does not know why a syllogism is valid, then the syllogism is not valid for him. Why? Because with validity, as with truth, we need a knowing mind that identifies the nature of deductive reasoning. We cannot merely refer to the validity of syllogisms in the abstract. There must be identification of validity, just as there must be identification of truth.

As Peikoff puts it (OPAR, p. 166), "A savage's memorized recital of an arithmetical sum" is like the squawking of a parrot, i.e, neither true nor false, merely meaningless. But "the same utterance by a man who understands the reason behind it would constitute a truth."

All you have to do is substitute "syllogism" for "arithmetical sum" and you have Schwartz's argument, precisely.

Ghs

Well, like I said, I am not interested in defending Peikoff.

I agree with the savage and the sum or the syllogism example, however--vox flatus enim.