A Critique of Ayn Rand's Contextual Theory of Knowledge

[tjohnson]

Adding "now" is redundant; "is" is present tense. Adding "appears to me" implies some doubt; to include it when there is no doubt is silly.

Adding 'now' is not redundant, it's more accurate. By the time Aristotle finishes his sentence Plato might be standing. Also, have you ever heard of impaired vision or optical illusions? When our senses are involved there is always some doubt.

[George H. Smith]

From my historical research on the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion, I'm inclined to think that contextual certainty is similar to the latter-day, more extreme view of arbitrariness—both are Leonard Peikoff's creations. Even though Rand endorsed them, they're more accurately called Peikovian than Randian.

I had some reservations about this issue when I wrote the section posted on this thread. Some of the conclusions that Peikoff drew from Rand's contextualism struck me as so odd that I found it hard to believe that Rand herself would have endorsed them. For example Peikoff speaks of "immutable" truths that were subsequently revised. This is very odd, to say the least, since "immutable" means "not subject or susceptible to change" (American Heritage Dictionary).

This concern is why I wrote, "The philosopher Leonard Peikoff, a confidant of Rand’s for many years, has extended Rand’s contextualism beyond that which appears in Rand’s published writings, so I shall rely on his treatment."

I had no solid basis at the time to question if Peikoff's exposition was a "retroactive downgrading" of Rand's ideas, to use your felicitous expression. On the contrary, in the early 1970s a friend loaned me some bootlegged tapes of Peikoff's lectures on the Objectivist theory of knowledge, and I recalled that some of the questionable ideas that Peikoff defended in OPAR were present in those lectures as well -- though I don't think they were expressed in such an extreme form. (My memory is hazy after all these years.) And since those lectures were prepared and delivered while Rand was still alive, I assumed that she approved of them.

I cannot recall offhand whether Rand ever expressly stated that knowledge is contextually justified belief, and nothing more, or whether this is solely Peikoff's formulation.

I've run into the retroactive downgrading in a number of online discussions.

I have encountered the same thing, but mainly in the area of political theory. In their eagerness to slay the dragon of anarchism, some Objectivist types (including some fairly prominent ones) have argued that individual rights don't apply to social interaction until after a government has been established. The upshot of this Hobbesian argument is clear: Rights simply wouldn't exist in a society without government, and anyone who doesn't consent to a government would be a rightless being to whom anything could be done.

If ever there was an example of throwing out the baby with the bathwater, this is it. I find it hard to believe that Rand herself would have endorsed this approach, given her insistence that governments should be established to protect rights.

Whenever I encounter this retroactive downgrading of Rand's ideas, I want to say: "No, no -- you don't need to go to such absurd lengths to defend your position. You don't need to undercut Rand's political philosophy at its roots. There are much better ways to achieve your goal. If you want to defend minarchism, here is what you should say...."

I know you are not an anarchist, but I suspect you have had similar thoughts when confronted with the retroactive downgrading of Rand's ideas in other fields.

I like the term "retroactive downgrading." I think I'll steal it. B)

Ghs

[Robert Campbell]

George,

I haven't heard Leonard Peikoff's 1960s lectures on Objectivist epistemology. These would help to settle some questions about the origins both of contextual certainty and the latter-day doctrine of the arbitrary.

In any event, objectionable features of both doctrines are on display in his 1976 lectures on Objectivism, which got Rand's imprimatur.

While there is no question about Rand's endorsement of these notions, it's hard to find clear cases of her actually stating them.

I've found two references by Rand to the doctrine of the arbitrary assertion, neither of them very detailed, and neither of them published during her lifetime (what's more, editorial tampering hasn't been ruled out, in the case of the remark that appears in the back of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, 2nd edition).

Contextual certainty I haven't researched so closely, but off-hand I can't recall any published exposition by Rand.

What I'm positive would have gotten Leonard Peikoff a slap on the hand, while AR was still around, is his use of "immutable" in that passage from OPAR.

"Immutable" is a word that Peikoff had previously associated with Parmenides, Plato, and certain brands of religion. In his article "Dogmatism, Pragmatism, and Nazism," he defined dogma as "faith in immutable revelations." So his employment of "immutable" in connection with developing or evolving knowledge (a "spiral progression," as he called it in the 1976 lectures) is perverse.

Robert Campbell

PS. Whatever the quality of her arguments concerning anarchism, Rand would never have endorsed the claim that one is rightless until or unless subject to a government. I'm confident she would have rejected it, with considerable indignation.

[Daniel Barnes]

Yes, but without that problematic term 'truth'. We have seen that if a statement is deemed TRUE at one point in time the very same statement may be deemed FALSE at another point in time. 'Structural similarity', on the other hand allows for revision over time.

The term "truth" is problematic in respect to Randian epistemological theory. This is because, contra Peikoff's dissembling, Rand's theory does lead to relativistic and subjectivist consequences. Peikoff's only defense against this amounts to some word-games combined with some rhetorical attempts to intimidate. If you don't like word-games, and are not easily intimidated, you will not find his arguments at all credible.

It's not so problematic in terms of your own field, semantics, where we find Tarski's theory, as promoted by my main man Karl Popper, renovates the old Correspondence Theory.

So why we need "structural similarity" I have no idea.

Edited March 1, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[tjohnson]

It's not so problematic in terms of your own field, semantics, where we find Tarski's theory, as promoted by my main man Karl Popper, renovates the old Correspondence Theory.

General semantics is far, far different than semantics.

[Selene]

It's not so problematic in terms of your own field, semantics, where we find Tarski's theory, as promoted by my main man Karl Popper, renovates the old Correspondence Theory.

General semantics is far, far different than semantics.

Yep.

Lieutenant Semantics changed a lot with his big promotion!

Adam

[merjet]

It's not so problematic in terms of your own field, semantics, where we find Tarski's theory, as promoted by my main man Karl Popper, renovates the old Correspondence Theory.

So what? Tarski himself said his theory only applies to formal languages and not natural languages. The site you linked even says so: "It is important to note that as Tarski originally formulated it, this theory applies only to formal languages. He gave a number of reasons for not extending his theory to natural languages" [snip].

[Robert Campbell]

Merlin,

There have been attempts more recently to construct Tarskian truth definitions for natural languages; for instance, "Montague grammar" (developed in the late 1960s by Richard Montague) and Barwise and Perry's "situation semantics" (1970s and 1980s).

Model-theoretic semantics for a natural language is really hard to do, and the existing efforts have been sharply criticized.

Robert Campbell

[Daniel Barnes]

It's not so problematic in terms of your own field, semantics, where we find Tarski's theory, as promoted by my main man Karl Popper, renovates the old Correspondence Theory.

So what? Tarski himself said his theory only applies to formal languages and not natural languages. The site you linked even says so: "It is important to note that as Tarski originally formulated it, this theory applies only to formal languages. He gave a number of reasons for not extending his theory to natural languages" [snip].

Don't believe everything you read in the Wikipedia. Of course, I don't believe everything Karl Popper says either. Just most things...;-) But perhaps he has blundered. Susan Haack thinks so.

The situation is actually mired in some controversy. What isn't?!

But then I didn't it claim it was unproblematic in the first place, just less so AFAICS than Peikoff's hopeless attempts at an argument.

Edited March 2, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

It's not so problematic in terms of your own field, semantics, where we find Tarski's theory, as promoted by my main man Karl Popper, renovates the old Correspondence Theory.

So what? Tarski himself said his theory only applies to formal languages and not natural languages. The site you linked even says so: "It is important to note that as Tarski originally formulated it, this theory applies only to formal languages. He gave a number of reasons for not extending his theory to natural languages" [snip].

Don't believe everything you read in the Wikipedia. Of course, I don't believe everything Karl Popper says either. Just most things...;-) But perhaps he has blundered. Susan Haack thinks so.

The situation is actually mired in some controversy. What isn't?!

But then I didn't it claim it was unproblematic in the first place, just less so AFAICS than Peikoff's hopeless attempts at an argument.

Before we compare Peikoff too unfavorably to Popper perhaps we should start a thread on Popper's defense of a "third world" of knowledge -- i.e., "knowledge in the objective sense [of] knowledge without a knower " -- "that has admittedly much in common with Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas, and therefore also with Hegel's Objective Spirit...." (From "Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject," in Objective Knowledge.)

I have been reading Popper for many years, and I like him a great deal in some areas, but a few of his articles in Objective Knowledge are as indefensible as anything Peikoff ever wrote.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

Before we compare Peikoff too unfavorably to Popper perhaps we should start a thread on Popper's defense of a "third world" of knowledge -- i.e., "knowledge in the objective sense [of] knowledge without a knower " -- "that has admittedly much in common with Plato's theory of Forms or Ideas, and therefore also with Hegel's Objective Spirit...." (From "Epistemology Without a Knowing Subject," in Objective Knowledge.)

I have been reading Popper for many years, and I like him a great deal in some areas, but a few of his articles in Objective Knowledge are as indefensible as anything Peikoff ever wrote.

I'd be delighted to. As it happens, I first encountered Popper via the "3 Worlds" conjecture; in an article in the New York Review of Books as I recall. The article was highly negative. But I thought the ideas being dismissed sounded more interesting than the person doing the dismissing, so I looked further.

So I'd be happy to defend it, although I am aware it is hardly flawless. In fact it's a pretty soft target. And I am sure Merlin has his World Series Edition baseball bat standing by...;-) The only issue is that I am off to Europe shortly, and am rather busy before then. So if you want to attack it amongst yourselves and be content with my acerbic one-liners now and then via iPhone from some airport somewhere, then fine. Otherwise it will have to wait.

Edited March 2, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[merjet]

As it happens, I first encountered Popper via the "3 Worlds" conjecture; in an article in the New York Review of Books as I recall. The article was highly negative. But I thought the ideas being dismissed sounded more interesting than the person doing the dismissing, so I looked further.

So I'd be happy to defend it, although I am aware it is hardly flawless. In fact it's a pretty soft target. And I am sure Merlin has his World Series Edition baseball bat standing by...;-)

I suspect Daniel is referring to this and this, which is about Popper's views on definitions, not "3 Worlds". The 1st link started a dialog that was continued in a new thread, the 2nd link. It was sidetracked pretty quickly.

[rhartford]

The thought that truth is possible also spurs us to greater and more careful effort to use cognitive processes, objective processes, that best reach truth.

Why couldn't the formulation of 'structural similarity' serve this purpose just as well as 'truth'?

My 4 year old grandchild readily knows the meaning of truth. When she hears something she knows is a falsehood, she emphatically states "that's not true." She has become so sophisticated that when she suspects I'm kidding her about something she will say "For Real!?" I hope that drive to know survives the onslaught those who find truth "problematic" and think "structural similarity" can equally serve the cause of knowing.

[tjohnson]

My 4 year old grandchild readily knows the meaning of truth. When she hears something she knows is a falsehood, she emphatically states "that's not true." She has become so sophisticated that when she suspects I'm kidding her about something she will say "For Real!?" I hope that drive to know survives the onslaught those who find truth "problematic" and think "structural similarity" can equally serve the cause of knowing.

A 4 year old child has been taught to speak and evaluate this way - this begins very early in life. This doesn't mean children couldn't be brought up very differently, ie. taught not to be so sure of themselves.

[rhartford]

My 4 year old grandchild readily knows the meaning of truth. When she hears something she knows is a falsehood, she emphatically states "that's not true." She has become so sophisticated that when she suspects I'm kidding her about something she will say "For Real!?" I hope that drive to know survives the onslaught those who find truth "problematic" and think "structural similarity" can equally serve the cause of knowing.

A 4 year old child has been taught to speak and evaluate this way - this begins very early in life. This doesn't mean children couldn't be brought up very differently, ie. taught not to be so sure of themselves.

I hope no one on this list would try to teach a child that was sure of her knowledge not to be so sure. A fundamental obligation of every parent is to teach a child how to assess his or her own knowledge, to praise children when they are sure they are right and are right, to correct children when they make an error and teach them how to correct errors, to guide them in judging the quality of their own knowledge, helping them to understand when they can be sure.

To do otherwise, to "[teach a child] not to be so sure of [his or her self]" when that sureness is warranted, would be a gross immorality and a tragedy.

Edited March 2, 2010 by Robert Hartford

[Selene]

My 4 year old grandchild readily knows the meaning of truth. When she hears something she knows is a falsehood, she emphatically states "that's not true." She has become so sophisticated that when she suspects I'm kidding her about something she will say "For Real!?" I hope that drive to know survives the onslaught those who find truth "problematic" and think "structural similarity" can equally serve the cause of knowing.

A 4 year old child has been taught to speak and evaluate this way - this begins very early in life. This doesn't mean children couldn't be brought up very differently, ie. taught not to be so sure of themselves.

This is a completely speculative argument by projecting. Can children be brought up differently, absolutely.

Do 90+% of parents bring their children up with the hope that they be able to speak and evaluate truth, absolutely.

Exceptions are not arguments.

Adam

[Xray]

... knowledge is merely justified belief and nothing more.

On what does Rand base this definition?

For example, I "know" (= have knowledge of) my house number and the name of my dog. But there was no antecedent "belief" on my part which had to be validated ("justified") first to then qualify as knowledge.

Edited March 2, 2010 by Xray

[Selene]

... knowledge is merely justified belief and nothing more.

On what does Rand base this definition?

For example, I "know" (= have knowledge of) my house number and the name of my dog. But there was no antecedent "belief" on my part which had to be validated ("justified") first to then qualify as knowledge.

Did you need to have the knowledge that dog names and house numbers belonged to different concepts and referents?

[Daniel Barnes]

I suspect Daniel is referring to this and this, which is about Popper's views on definitions, not "3 Worlds".

Sorry, I meant that you seemed to have a low opinion of Popper in general.

Not that there's anything wrong with that...;-)

[BaalChatzaf]

I suspect Daniel is referring to this and this, which is about Popper's views on definitions, not "3 Worlds".

Sorry, I meant that you seemed to have a low opinion of Popper in general.

Not that there's anything wrong with that...;-)

Popper is one of the few philosophers of science that practicing scientists have any respect for.

Popper picked up where C.S. Peirce left off.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Daniel Barnes]

My 4 year old grandchild readily knows the meaning of truth. When she hears something she knows is a falsehood, she emphatically states "that's not true." She has become so sophisticated that when she suspects I'm kidding her about something she will say "For Real!?" I hope that drive to know survives the onslaught those who find truth "problematic" and think "structural similarity" can equally serve the cause of knowing.

I think RH's comment here nicely demonstrates a key confusion that a dose of Popper can quickly clear up.

This confusion arises between the meaning of the word "truth", and a criterion, or reliable indication of or test, for truth.

RH claims, quite rightly, that most people, even 4 year olds, know, roughly, the meaning of the word "truth." Thus the issue of meaning is not "problematic".

The "problematic" part is finding a criterion of truth.

Let's use a simple analogy. We know what we mean, roughly, by "cancer". However, what's much harder is discovering a reliable indication or test for cancer -a criterion for cancer, if you like. In fact it might require a battery of such tests before a diagnosis can be made, and even then it might be uncertain.

So now you can see there are really two issues here conflated in comments like the above.

1) The meaning of the word, "truth", which of course most 4-year olds know, so can't be considered a real problem.

and

2) A criterion or reliable test for truth. This is far more difficult, unless we think 4 year olds somehow just "know" how to tell truth from falsehood. It's this part that is "problematic", and with no real solution in sight.

Edited March 3, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Selene]

Daniel:

I am not being flippant by asking this:

And what would happen, to the human mind, if tomorrow morning, using a new thought process, possessed "a test, for truth?"

Adam

Edited March 3, 2010 by Selene

[George H. Smith]

My 4 year old grandchild readily knows the meaning of truth. When she hears something she knows is a falsehood, she emphatically states "that's not true." She has become so sophisticated that when she suspects I'm kidding her about something she will say "For Real!?" I hope that drive to know survives the onslaught those who find truth "problematic" and think "structural similarity" can equally serve the cause of knowing.

I think RH's comment here nicely demonstrates a key confusion that a dose of Popper can quickly clear up.

This confusion arises between the meaning of the word "truth", and a criterion, or reliable indication of or test, for truth.

A zillion philosophers have made the same distinction. Okay, maybe "zillion" is an exaggeration, but there are many.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

My 4 year old grandchild readily knows the meaning of truth. When she hears something she knows is a falsehood, she emphatically states "that's not true." She has become so sophisticated that when she suspects I'm kidding her about something she will say "For Real!?" I hope that drive to know survives the onslaught those who find truth "problematic" and think "structural similarity" can equally serve the cause of knowing.

I think RH's comment here nicely demonstrates a key confusion that a dose of Popper can quickly clear up.

This confusion arises between the meaning of the word "truth", and a criterion, or reliable indication of or test, for truth.

A zillion philosophers have made the same distinction. Okay, maybe "zillion" is an exaggeration, but there are many.

Good, let us hope that it becomes better known then so we don't have to rearrange quite so many pixels on internet forums.

[Daniel Barnes]

Daniel:

I am not being flippant by asking this:

And what would happen, to the human mind, if tomorrow morning, using a new thought process, possessed "a test, for truth?"

If you mean a reliable (ie infallible) test for truth, I am not being flippant by replying you wouldn't be human any more.