The Rewrite Squad

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 12 Q&A

CD 2, track 3, 13:07 through 15:18

Now, this is a very peculiar question: John Galt told people, "Stop supporting your own destroyers, the evil of the world is made possible by nothing but the sanction you give it, withdraw your sanction, withdraw your support," but didn't he also say the looters want you to break their rules, so that they can control you? (Incidentally, no, he didn't. Umm, Dr. Ferris did. It's true, but John Galt never told about, talked about it.) If so, then how can one withdraw his support, without losing one's freedom in the process? Can you give some example in today's context?

I don't know what it's about, so I'll answer very briefly. The evil of the world is made by the sanction of the victim. Withdraw your sanction, withdraw your support. What Galt meant, and you can check on the context, is ideological, philosophical. Do not accept your enemy's ideas. Do not compromise with today's trends. Do not pretend that you approve of today's ideas for some ulterior motives. That does, and when you want to and can oppose those ideas. But I don't know what the question means about, euhh: how can one withdraw support without losing one's freedom? About which country are you talking? The United States is quite badly off, but not that badly that you would lose your freedom for refusing, euh, to share the ideas of your enemies. If you mean paying taxes, well, that's, that's a small thing way down the line. That's not how you support today's government. You support it every time you tacitly, euh, accept collectivist-altruist-statist slogans or irrationalist issues. That's the real support. Taxes are way down the line of importance.

Ayn Rand Answers (pp. 130-131)

Mayhew rearranges the answer, making Rand appear surer of the question than she really was. ("I don't know what it's about" is deleted.)

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 11 Q&A

CD 3, track 1, 0:25 through 1:17

Now Can you have good art with a bad sense of life? For example, is Rembrandt's exquisitely rendered side of beef (which I alluded to), uh, bad art because it is an unworthy subject, or is it good art with a bad sense of life?

Uhh, it's very bad art, because it selected a very bad subject. It's bad art, skillfully done. But as to sense of life, you can't derive any sense of life from that particular painting, which is another, uh, reason for considering it bad art. It communicates nothing, except the skill of how realistically that, euh, beef is presented. Now, other Rembrandt paintings have a very malevolent sense of life. Uh, he was certainly malevolent-universe.

Ayn Rand Answers (p. 225)

It's bad art, because he selected a bad subject. But it's bad art skillfully done. As for sense of life, you can't derive any from that painting, which is another reason it's bad art. It communicates nothing but the skill it took to present that beef realistically. Other Rembrandt paintings, however, have a malevolent sense of life.

Another Mayhew-emphasis.

[9thdoctor]

is Rembrandt's exquisitely rendered side of beef (which I alluded to), uh, bad art because it is an unworthy subject, or is it good art with a bad sense of life?

Uhh, it's very bad art, because it selected a very bad subject.

In his day people had to go to a butcher to get meat, and a hanging side of beef wouldn’t necessarily have been a horrible sight, it may even have been appetizing. I wonder if he painted it for a meat market, in Antwerp (not too far away) one of the major old buildings, now a museum, is the Butcher’s Hall (Vleeshuis).

You can see the painting here:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Rembrandt_Harmensz._van_Rijn_053.jpg

I saw it in the Louvre, and this picture doesn’t do it justice.

[Jonathan]

Here's an interesting take on the Flayed Ox:

http://stupidd.blogspot.com/2008/03/rembrandt-van-rijn-carcass-of-beef.html

If I recall, Sister Wendy had a similar but even more positive view of it.

I wonder if it ever crossed Rand's mind to entertain the possibility that she might not have been the highest quality receiver of communications when it came to the various art forms.

J

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 11 Q&A

CD 2, track 5, 1:49 through 2:19

Now, a question, uhh, somewhat the same kind.

Are there any writers today whose work could properly be classified as Romantic?

No.

Do you care to comment on the current status of literature?

No. [Laughter] Incidentally, I don't have a magnifying glass to find it. [More laughter]

Ayn Rand Answers (p. 211)

Could you comment on the current status of literature?

No. I don't have a magnifying glass.

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 11 Q&A

CD 3, track 1, 4:30 through 8:18

Now, uh, Many people claim to like all kinds of music, art, etc. How is this possible, if art reveals their implicit sense of life?

If these people sincerely do like all fields of art, yes, I'm sure that they're sincere. But from a certain aspect, one could say, this might mean that they like all kinds of art—or that they like none.

You can, uh, say that, equally, because a consistent sense of life, which makes person like certain particular works and, therefore, recognize his own view of the universe, is a very rare achievement. There's very few people whose tastes are motivated by consistent values. It's already a great psychological achievement—psychological and moral—to achieve values and, therefore a clear-cut sense of life, even subconsciously.

Therefore, the people who like everything equally can be explained in one of two ways: either they have not, uh, observed or experienced enough artworks to care very much, so that they have a generalized, almost child-like interest in all art as a spectacle, but have never defined what they like particularly, which is fine. That tells you something about their sense of life: that it's unformed, not very valuing, and, euh, it's still in the process of formation. Or, it can be that they truly do not have any values and, therefore, everything appeals to them equally, because nothing appeals to them too much. Both types of people are possible.

But remember that if most people have a sense of life they never identify, formed by accident, and subconsciously they wouldn't know what they like or don't like, they may have perfectly good buried premises why they like a certain work of art and may feel guilty about it; uh, or they may force themselves to like something which they don't really like, but which is conventionally acceptable, and reproach themselves for not being able to like it.

There are so many different combinations of premises possible that you could not make a general rule applying to all the people who claim that they like all kinds of art. Well, if, you can say the same even about people who claim they only like Romantic art or only Objectivist art (if there were such a thing, which—be careful—there aren't, there isn't).

You cannot say, euh, about anyone, that you know for sure what their premises are. Most people are inconsistent consciously, and they certainly would be inconsistent subconsciously.

And when, and before you deluge me with questions about no "Objectivist art," my novels are Objectivist, and that's all I know, because I translated my sense of life into conscious terms, and I can say that. Uhh, I can't say it about anyone else. And also, no such formulas would necessarily apply. I think my husband's painting, for instance, is exactly in his field what my novels are in mine, but I would never call it "Objectivist painting." No such term would be appropriate.

Ayn Rand Answers (pp. 184-185)

Mayhew pointlessly trims here and there and removes flavor. For instance, he gets rid of Rand's phrase "buried premises."

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 11 Q&A

CD 3, track 2, 0:00 through 2:38

All right, now… On page 123 of The Romantic Manifesto, you state that artistic creation and rational cognition are two different methods of using one's consciousness, which need not clash, but are not the same. Would you explain the difference? For example, is artistic creation a subconscious pictorial process, while rational cognition is conscious and verbal?

Uh, no, this is not true. Euhh that's not, the, euhh, the issue. The iss, it's true that rational cognition is conscious and verbal. Unless you have, uk, put your knowledge, your conclusion, in verbal form, you don't really know what you have concluded, and you would not be able to retain it. But artistic creation is not subconscious and pictorial. It's pictorial for the visual arts, but not the other arts. Uk, the difference is that in artistic creation, you are not bound by reality in the strict sense of the word. Reality is only your material, your foundation. It sets the limits for you; it tells you what it is that you have to re-arrange or re-create selectively. So that, in that sense, it is a consequence of cognition. You have to observe and know something about reality, before you could begin to re-arrange it. But in artistic creation, whether you do a great deal of it subconsciously, but you check the process always consciously, in artistic creation you re-arrange the material of what you know about reality.

In rational cognition, if you want me to be very severe, I would say, "You don't exist." You are just a mirror, except that you have to direct that process by which you grasp the reality outside of yourself. In rational cognition, you have to be not a creator, not a re-a, re-arranger, but only the most honest, the most passionately honest, observer. And there is no standard, no emotions involved, nothing except one emotion: love for the truth and, therefore, the desire to find the truth, which is the only standard of a process of rational cognition. It is totally existence-oriented.

Ayn Rand Answers (pp. 160-161)

In rational cognition—to be severe—I'd say you don't exist.

Mayhew-emphasis again…

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 11 Q&A

CD 3, track 2, 2:39 through 4:38

(Peikoff whispers…) All right. (Peikoff whispers…). Eyuh (Peikoff whispers) Yes. Well, what do I have, five minutes? I wanted to announce…

Since an artwork is created fundamentally for the artist's own purposes and enjoyment, would the artist be justified in the, re-creating reality via a code of geometric symbols, intelligible only to himself and those who possess the code?

The answer is: no, not any more than a tealeaf reader or an ES, ESP example or any other mystic. If you want to create your own code of symbols, what are you creating it for? To deceive somebody, because if you are dealing with reality, and you are oriented toward reality, even if you create something for your own enjoyment, you do it rationally. And rationally means: by the code of symbols of words, which are intelligible to you, primarily, and to anyone else. But they have to be intelligible to someone else to be valid and objective. If you want to devise your own geometric symbols or, for that matter, your own language of "gloop" and "bloop," go right ahead; but don't talk about "art."

Ayn Rand Answers (p. 223)

They must be intelligible to someone else to be valid and objective.

Mayhew continues his campaign to stamp out every "has to."

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 11 Q&A

CD 3, track 1, 12:20 through 14:56

Now, Would you elaborate on your statement that it would be anachronistic to classify Greek sculpture as Romantic art?

Uh, that's to Dr. Peikoff, but I'll answer it. Yes, because Romanticism is, ehh, an art movement specifically of the 19^th century. It was born then, it was defined then, and the first works in literature, particularly, appeared late, uh, 18^th, early 19^th century. There are a, uk, uk, great many philosophical ideas behind it, which would not be part of and were not available in Greek philosophy, even though Aristotle's view of aesthetics (not the whole of his view, just certain ideas) were the basic foundation of Romantic art. But that isn't the only element of Romantic art; and it would be completely wrong to apply it to Greece.

Visually, ehh, strictly aesthetically, Romantic art is always stylized. The better the art, the more clear and more attractive and intelligent the stylization. Greek sculpture is not stylized. It is beautiful Naturalism. It is slightly exaggerated, kind of idealized human form. It's not stylization; and as such, there's no choice of values. It's not Romantic. All it has in common with Romanticism is that it presents man at his best, uh, in the form of gods; or rather, they saw their gods, ek, in human form, as the best possible to man.

Well, there's different standards there. I don't like any of the ancient statues, except the Venus de Milo, and then technically, because she's so magnificently done. I saw her in person, and it's remarkable how the texture of the body is projected in that ancient, pitted, cracked marble; and you have a feeling you can touch the soft flesh. It's beautifully done, but that isn't enough for a sense of life approval. Greek men are too beefy for my taste. And read the description of Galt's body in the torture scene. I specifically mention why. They're not active men; they're not modern men; they're not Romantic men. Galt is.

Ayn Rand Answers (pp. 224-225)

I don't like any ancient statues, except the Venus de Milo, and then technically, because she is so magnificently done. I saw her in person, and it's remarkable how the texture of the body is projected in the ancient, pitted marble. You feel you can touch the soft flesh. But that isn't enough for a sense-of-life approval. Ancient Greek statues of men are too "beefy" for my tastes. I specifically mention why in my description of Galt's body in the torture scene: they are not active men, modern men, Romantic men; Galt is.

Compare Rand's last paragraph with Mayhew's to see the sheer pointlessness of his rewriting.

[Chris Grieb]

I am curious if anyone can say when Ayn Rand would have seen the Venus de Milo. I don't recall any mention of her ever visiting Paris. Hasn't the Venus de Milo always been at the Louvre?

[Robert Campbell]

Chris,

Except when it was being hidden during World War II, the Venus de Milo has apparently been in the Louvre since the 1820s.

Anne Heller's book (p. 52) says that that Ayn Rand traveled through Paris on the way from Berlin to Le Havre, where she caught the ocean liner to New York. So her one opportunity to see the Venus de Milo would have been in early February 1926.

Robert Campbell

[9thdoctor]

Except when it was being hidden during World War II, the Venus de Milo has apparently been in the Louvre since the 1820s.

Then presumably she saw Rembrandt’s Flayed Ox in person as well. Yet she doesn’t comment on the Winged Victory of Samothrace, which is displayed right nearby to the Venus de Milo, and which is positively overwhelming. You could even say she damns it by omission, that’s hard to understand.

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 12

CD 2, track 4, 0:00 through 0:58

Mmm, Is it now the time for an Objectivist politician, or should we Objectivists go to the classroom only?

It certainly is not time for an Objectivist politician. To whom would he speak? He cannot run an educational campaign and a political campaign at the same time. Who would understand him? If there is an Objectivist politician in 50 years, you might be doing very well. But by the time it's possible, he practically wouldn't be necessary. Uh, the country's public opinion would go in the direction of freedom and reason. Therefore, we Objectivists—and I hope that term is not metaphorical, let's suppose there are such things—uk, we should go to the classroom only and first, most, and foremost. Anything you can do to correct the situation in the classroom would be excellent.

Ayn Rand Answers (p. 52)

Heavily edited. Rand's pessimistic aside—"Therefore, we Objectivists—and I hope that term is not metaphorical, let's suppose there are such things"—is left on the cutting room floor.

[jeffrey smith]

Except when it was being hidden during World War II, the Venus de Milo has apparently been in the Louvre since the 1820s.

Then presumably she saw Rembrandt’s Flayed Ox in person as well. Yet she doesn’t comment on the Winged Victory of Samothrace, which is displayed right nearby to the Venus de Milo, and which is positively overwhelming. You could even say she damns it by omission, that’s hard to understand.

I believe she was trying to expound on Greek naturalism, by explaining how natural seeming the "skin" of the statue was. The merits of Nike* would be irrelevant to that point, so I wouldn't say she was omitting it on purpose.

Apparently she did not realize that Greek art was in fact highly stylized: that the Greek scupltors were in general attempting to portray ideal human bodies, and used naturalistic effects simply to enhance that ideal

Jeffrey S.

*Yes, those sneakers actually have a name that means something

[Chris Grieb]

Robert; Thanks you for Heller reference about her being in Paris.

I must note that Mary Ann Sures in her esthetic's course talked about and was very impressed by Winged Victory.

[DavidMcK]

If I remember my college course in Art History correctly, the Greek statues were painted over after they were finished so the exquisite textures weren't in evidence.

[Robert Campbell]

David,

Not only were the statues painted, but an image of Aphrodite would have been decked out with a crown, a necklace, and probably other jewelry.

Robert Campbell

[9thdoctor]

I don't like any of the ancient statues, except the Venus de Milo, and then technically, because she's so magnificently done.

Yet she doesn’t comment on the Winged Victory of Samothrace, which is displayed right nearby to the Venus de Milo, and which is positively overwhelming. You could even say she damns it by omission, that’s hard to understand.

I believe she was trying to expound on Greek naturalism, by explaining how natural seeming the "skin" of the statue was. The merits of Nike* would be irrelevant to that point, so I wouldn't say she was omitting it on purpose.

Apparently she did not realize that Greek art was in fact highly stylized

I don’t follow, I’m using a very fair and literal interpretation of what she said.

Meanwhile, is there anything more “stylised” than the Venus of Lespugue?

[Robert Campbell]

ND,

I think Rand's use of the term "stylized" merits a closer look.

Those Paleolithic Venuses are incredibly stylized, as one would normally understand the word.

Greek statues are stylized, too.

Not to mention, say, Ancient Egyptian temple and tomb reliefs.

"Stylized" appears several times in Rand's diaries from 1967-1968, where she praises Nathaniel Branden for aiming to live a "stylized life," and condemns him for having failed to.

For her, "stylized" appears to have been as much a moral notion as an aesthetic one, and its meaning is hard to disengage from the mythology she aimed to create.

Robert Campbell

[DavidMcK]

By stylized I believe she meant something like 'almost mathematical'; note her description of Dominique's face in TF, with the rectangular eyes and how often people are described as having angular planes, etc. You could give countless examples and the one that comes to mind is in We The Living someone exclaims about a nature scene that it is almost artificial. It was connected to her epistemology also..the stick figure idea.

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 12 Q&A

CD 2, track 4, 0:59 through 6:42

I have just about two minutes …

This is a long question. I won't read it, because it's based on a falsehood, but I'd like to answer. It's somebody who claims that a lady professor at Columbia University said she heard me, euh, make a speech at Columbia in which I "proved" that only, uh, creation of material goods could occur only under a capitalist system, and that "from this you concluded (me) that Sputnik did not exist."

That—if you… I don't apologize for what I am going to say—tell that lady she is saying "B.S.," and you know what word I'm using, and if you want to spell it out fully, tell her so. I would never have said this, because, observe: this is Rationalism, the idea of proving something out of context, without reference to reality, simply proving by that, uh, ih, by syllogisms that something exists or doesn't exist. I never employ this method. What, and…

To begin with, I never made this speech to this effect. What I might have done is answered or touched on it in a question period, and then, what I would have said is that I do not believe any Soviet claims about the existence of their Sputnik. I didn't at the time, and I do believe it today, because they finally brought it here; and what did our, uhh, NASA people found—they shouldn't have had that, euh, joint mission, you know, but granting that they had it—they found that the Soviet space development is way, way behind ours. Now, that you can conclude from the fact of dealing with a dictatorship, not from deductions through rationalistic logic.

At the time, shortly after Atlas was published, a time when I was speaking in universities, there were a great many doubts about the authenticity of the Soviet reports about the Sputnik, but real, proper, scientific doubts—there were books published—and it was, they were never answered [pounding podium]. There was at one time a nationally circulated statement to the effect that a Russian spaceship had photographed the other side of the moon. Then there were a few doubts, then complete silence; not a word is said today about the other side of the moon, or the Russian claim of it, euhw, a decade ago; whereas now, Americans have photographed the other of the moon, and they know what it looks like; not a word about what was that report ten or twelve years ago. The moral of all this is as follows: you cannot believe any scientific claims that comes out of Soviet Russia or any other dictatorship.

Now, it isn't true that material production is possible only under capitalism. Material prosperity, successful production, innovation, and originality are possible only under a capitalist system. But if no goods could be produced by imitation, well then, the whole world, including half of the United States, would die, because there is th, that little freedom left in the world. What this lady missed is the fact that, ih, no matter how enslaved people are and no matter how bad they treat, they, badly treat the innovator, there is always the aspect of stealing.

And today, I would believe that the Russians are doing something in space. Why? Because they have had ample opportunity to learn from this country [pounding podium]. Also, there can always be an exception or a very talented man who somehow, though I don't know how, will rise to some prominence in, under a dictatorship—I mean, in a technological or the, productive, uh, field. He won't last long, as you've seen over and over again under Russian dictatorship and all others—same in German dictatorship. Uhh, therefore, to say no progress can come out of, ub, a dictatorship and no abundance, no prosperity—and to deduce that from the nature of the system in reality, that's one thing. And to say, we can produce only under capitalism, therefore, Sputnik doesn't exist—I say, yeah, I don't know whether it existed in those years, because we have not, no evidence of it except Soviet claim. But it doesn't mean that it, that, you can say, "It does not exist," without reference to the facts.

And therefore, tell that lady that Rationalism is a very bad philosophical disease anyway, and if she obviously suffers from it, uh, I ought to give her my sympathy, but I don't. And she should not ascribe it to me. All right. [Applause] Allow, allow me to thank you, I'm very glad to have answered questions here, I'm glad to see you all, and I wish you best premises. [Lengthy applause]

Ayn Rand Answers (pp. 33-34)

It isn't true that material production is possible only under capitalism. Material prosperity, however—successful production, innovation, originality—is possible only under capitalism.

[Mayhew-emphasis and Rand-emphasis rarely coincide.]

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 12 Q&A

CD 2, track 3, 0:44 through 9:13

A'ight. Ehh, now, uh, here's the first question.

How would one define his own sense of life? What kind of words would one use: "happy," "sad," "sensitive"? And should one be able to define it? In how much detail? Could you give a sample description of someone's sense of life—for example, the character of Scarlett O'Hara in Gone with the Wind? Is it necessary for a novelist to know the sense of life of the characters he writes? How would he use this in working out the characters?

Now, there is a fundamental mistake in this question. It treats the issue of sense of life as if it were a conscious, rational, philosophical conviction. A sense of life is not intellectual, it's not a conviction. It's an emotional sum, a sum of conclusions made subconsciously and emotionally. In, uh, every discussion of sense of life, I have always stressed that it is an emotional sum, which is why men cannot be guided by sense of life alone, why they are helpless, uhh, without a conscious philosophy. Now, to take the specific questions here …

The first paragraph: how would one define his own sense of life? What kind of words would one use: "happy," "sad," "sensitive"? And should one be able to define it? In how much detail?... Ehh, to begin with: how would one define his own sense of life? By introspection. That is the only means of doing it.

And one doesn't start by defining one's sense of life. One better start by defining the causes of, uh, nature of, one's emotions. One has to first learn how to identify the exact nature of what you feel and why you feel it in any given instance and any particular example that you might care to choose. First, learn to be at home and well acquainted—I would almost say, be on intimate terms—with your emotions. Learn how to know within a very short period of time, in conscious words (underscored, in conscious words—not approximately) what you felt and why you felt it.

After you have become acquainted with yourself emotionally, when you no longer have any great mysteries to yourself, then you can start to identify your sense of life. And the best, and perhaps only, way to identify it is by observing your own reactions to art. There are two realms in life where sense of life is predominant in them: sex and art. Uh, in sex, it wouldn't be as clear to you, and it's harder to identify your own sexual reactions. But, euh, if you want the best avenue—it's not a shortcut, it's pretty difficult—to your own subconscious, observe what you feel in regard to art and why you feel it. Select particular literature, painting, and perhaps sculpture, because those are easiest to identify conceptually. Music is very important, but it's terribly hard to translate into firm concepts, and it has no basic vocabulary. Therefore, observe yourself as honestly as you can, because you are the only judge, jury, prosecutor, and defender, in your aesthetic reactions.

When you really feel an emotion about something in realm of art, ask yourself: What is it that you like about it, and why do you like it? That might give you some idea of, of your basic metaphysical convictions, because what a sense of life presents emotionally is your metaphysics, but in the form of emotions, not conscious convictions.

Now, how would, what words could one use: "happy," "sad," "sensitive"? No. That is superficial. When, ehh, people use the expression "tragic sense of life," that's just a foreshortening. There may be any number of perfectly different or even opposite senses of life, euh, i.e., metaphysics, which all could be called "tragic." It isn't important to characterize your sense of life.

What's important is to translate it into conscious convictions and ask yourself: Are my conscious, my subconscious ideas right or wrong? Do I consciously believe them? Or have I made a mistake in my childhood? And then you translate your sense of life into convictions, and you hold them, you hold your feeling in the form of articulate convictions. You will notice, if you want to know what's the sign of succeeding, you will notice that there is no clash between your conscious convictions and your subconscious, sense of life emotions. When you've reached that stage, you know you have identified all the essentials of your sense of life.

Eah, and now, in how much detail? Sense of life doesn't deal with details, just as emotions don't. It deals with fundamentals. Which fundamentals? Philosophical ones. What you learn in philosophy is what forms categories and classifications in your subconscious and forms your sense of life. Therefore, if you decide that you know what you emotionally, in, uh, sense of life terms, feel about the nature of the world, the nature of your means of cognition, man's nature, and his morality—what he should do with his life, in the broadest terms—if you know that, that's sufficient to know your own sense of life.

Now, in the light of what I have said, it is, of course, totally impossible to name the sense of life of fiction characters. You might name the sense of life of you, your closest friends, and then I doubt it. You may, after some years, know approximately the sense of life of the person you love, your wife or husband. Nobody beyond that. You cannot judge the sense of life of another person. That would be psychologizing. Judge them on their philosophical convictions; never mind what they feel as they express their ideas or whether what they is feel something else. That's not for you to judge, it's of no relevance. Euhh, judge people by their stated convictions. In the world of art, you can say, "I like this man's sense of life," even though his conscious convictions are, uh, somewhat different or opposite. But then his psychology is not what you are concerned with. You're concerned with the ideas as they are expressed in his work.

It would be impossible to say the, tell the sense of life of a character in fiction. What you have to be able to tell is his convictions, his basic views on life. And I think Scarlett O'Hara had a pretty cheap, social metaphysical view of life, that's all. She was not a good character at all. In fact, none of them were in Gone with the Wind. It's a very fascinating novel. I like it very much. I think it's an excellent example of Romantic fiction—but the characters in it are atrocious. Uhh, now, is it necessary for a novelist to know the sense of life of the characters he writes? No. It's not necessary. It's impossible. How would he use this in working out the characters? He uses their conscious convictions.

Ayn Rand Answers (pp. 185-187)

Mayhew inserted a reference explaining social metaphysics—it quotes from an article by Ayn Rand. A good Peikovian mustn't, under any circumstances, cite Nathaniel Branden's articles on the subject…

The final paragraph in Mayhew's rendition did not come from this answer.

Speaking of one's inability to know another's sense of life, now might be a good time to make a request: Please don't send me records or recommend music. You have no way of knowing my sense of life, although you have a better way of knowing mine than I have of knowing yours, since you've read my books, and my sense of life is on every page. You would have some grasp of it—but I hate to think how little. I hate the painful embarrassment I feel when somebody sends me music they know I'd love, and my reaction is the opposite: It's impossible music. I feel completely misunderstood, yet the person's intentions were good. Nobody but my husband can give me works of art and know infallibly, as he does, that I'll like them. So please don't try it. It's no reflection on you or on me. It's simply that sense of life is very private.

He took it from another answer later during this Q&A and grafted it on. See below.

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 12 Q&A

CD 2, track 3, 10:14 through 13:06

Could Miss Rand tell us the TV programs that she watches for pleasure?

Heh heh, I wish I could! There is truly nothing today, but nothing. I watch, rrr, the evening news just for information, but for pleasure? Well, I th, I'm afraid to name them because you will all think it's terribly important. I think the three I'm going to name are very bad, as they have terrible flaws; they're only semi-Romantic, but at least semi. That's "Hawaii Five-O," "Barnaby Jones," and the new one, "Charlie's Angels." [Laughter] Now, this is not philosophy and not even a great pleasure, but it's a good relaxation, when you're very tired [Laughter]…

Oh, by the way, uh, euh, to the author who sent me the question about the poems, I have, uh, Kipling's complete poems, so don't send me copies of them.

And I would find this the, perhaps the right moment to say one general request, ub, pertaining to art and sense of life. Please do not send me books, unless it's one by your own and you're sure that you won't shock me. If it's a good Objectivist work, yes, I'd like to see it. But, uh, no books for pleasure. Don't recommend them.

And above all, don't ever, ever send me records or recommend music. You have no way of knowing my sense of life, even though you have a better way of doing it than I can know yours, because since you've read my books, my sense of life is all over every page, and you would have some grasp of it, but I hate to think how little. I hate the kind of very painful embarrassment, which I feel when somebody sends me—it's happened several times with records—ek, music which they feel they know I'd love and it's the exact opposite, it's impossible music. I feel completely misunderstood, yet I know the person's intentions were good. I hate to do anything about it, to acknowledge or not to acknowledge, and I think the best way would be to explain to you why nobody except my husband actually can give me paintings or records and know infallibly, as he does, what I would or would not like. Nobody else can be that sure, so please, don't try it. It's no reflection on you, nor on me. It's just that sense of life is enormously private.

Ayn Rand Answers: partly included

Mayhew didn't use this question, or the first two paragraphs of Rand's answer to it. He took the last two paragraphs, cut out the comments about sending her books, and attached them to the end of her previous answer on sense of life, which appears in his book on pp. 185-187.

This qualifies as a hand-in-the-cookie jar moment because Rand's latter-day preference in TV shows is rather well known. Must the non-specialist audience be spared the revelation that Rand watched "Charlie's Angels"?

[9thdoctor]

I hate the kind of very painful embarrassment, which I feel when somebody sends me—it's happened several times with records—ek, music which they feel they know I'd love and it's the exact opposite, it's impossible music.

I wonder if someone had just sent her a copy of 2112 by Rush, it came out in 1976 and includes the line “With acknowledgement to the genus of Ayn Rand”. No, I didn’t misspell it, that’s what it says on my copy. Kinda Nietzschean when you think about it, that spelling.

[Robert Campbell]

Philosophy of Objectivism 1976

Lecture 11 Q&A

CD 2, track 4, 6:12 through 13:37

This is a rather long and interesting question.

Concerning Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina, you have stated that this is the most evil novel ever written, arguing that as a "novel on a grand scale, a classic with a serious theme, it is the most evil novel, morally, which does not necessarily detract from its literary quality." You defined the theme as "it is evil and futile to be motivated by the pursuit of happiness." You further argue: "Practically every line, every characteristic, and everything is a unity that does constitute a great work of art, only it is a unity employed in a very evil purpose." It appears that there are two criteria involved in calling this "the most evil novel every written": one, the theme is fundamentally evil and, two, that such an evil theme is expressed by so great a unity of plot, theme, and characterization. (Incidentally, Anna Karenina has no plot; don't give it an honor it doesn't deserve. It has a story of sorts.) Uh, in effect, it is not simply the evilness of the theme, but the extreme technical competence of the author in expressing this theme, which accounts for evil on so grand a scale. Is this a correct understanding of your position?

This is not the end of the question, but since it's a direct question here, I'll answer it. No, it's not a correct understanding of my position, because to begin with, the author here, the author of the question uses the word "evil" as if it were an aesthetic judgment, but it isn't. It's a moral judgment and a philosophical judgment.

Therefore, I didn't say "Anna Karenina is the worst novel aesthetically because its theme is so evil." Quite the opposite. I said it's a very well done novel; it's a good work of art. I wouldn't say great, but it's really well done for what it's preaching. But it's preaching evil. Now, it's not its technical competence that makes it evil, but the consistency of its hatred of man's happiness. I was here speaking about the theme, the philosophy and the moral value of the book, since the author deals with such a moral value, that is, the evil of the pursuit of happiness, according to him; and the novel is full of statements to the effect that, even if society is wrong, it is still your duty to comply with the conventions and live as society wants you to live. And if you break the convention, even though you were justified in a personal sense, you will be punished monstrously, because this is very evil—to look for happiness.

Now, the rest of the question: "Consider in this context that there are any number of modern novels with extremely evil themes, but which are so technically incompetent as to hardly be persuasive. Does all this not lead to the seeming paradox that for a novel to be monumentally evil, it must first be great from a technical point of view?"

Not really, be, because you're mixing certain levels here. The bad novels, such is modern evil, are bad art; and some of them are even outside the province of art. And as such, they're on a different, lower level of art, different from Anna Karenina. In a general way, however, it is true—now, this is not an aesthetic nor a moral judgment; well, it pertains more to morality than aesthetics—it is true, that if you are going to go below zero, as I call it, into the negative estimates rather than the positive, then the closer to zero that you are, the better. For instance, uh, eh, uh, take the same evil theme written by Tolstoy or by one of the modern writers. The modern one wouldn't even be able to communicate it. You wouldn't even know what he's talking about, let alone be impressed with his story or his method; so, you could morally give him, let's say, minus-5. Tolstoy deserves minus-100. [Laughter] I would say more, if you were to count. But let's assume that if there are 100 very influential and prominent well-done novels in the world, of good content or bad content: Tolstoy is #100. But it's minus-100, because he presents his point much better, more convincingly and, therefore, more possibly dangerously to the mentality of the reader than somebody who is totally inept.

In this way, the means do matter, but it's not because of an aesthetic issue. It's really the mathematics of morality. The same thing is true in politics. If you take two dictators—let's say, take Mussolini and Hitler—you might say, well, Mussolini was minus-50, but Hitler will be minus-50 zillions, uh, if, as a monstrous creature and as a degree of destruction and cruelty that he perpetrated. There is no really, much moral difference between the two men, but apparently Mussolini's premises or policy or by sheer accident, for whichever reason, in fact were more inept from the aspect of total dictatorship; whereas Hitler was more able, and Stalin even more able, because he had a bigger country and more ruthless means, more people to murder. So, that you take political power, dictatorship, which is a negative, the less efficient a man, the less evil he is; the more efficient, the more evil. So, therefore, whenever you deal with negatives, remember that the better you are at something which is morally bad, the worse you are, the more guilt to you; and that applies to Tolstoy. But this is not a literary judgment.

Literarily, I understood his message correctly, and I gave him credit for the way he carried it out. But it's a monstrous message. There is a lesser one, by the way, of almost the same theme. I wouldn't call it evil, I'd call it disgusting, because it's much more petty. It's Madame Bovary. That is the French equivalent of Anna Karenina, only even less metaphysical and more journalistic. Whereas Tolstoy was saying that no woman or no human being should try to pursue happiness, Madame Bovary merely says a woman shouldn't be romantic, which, eh, is a much narrower version of the same, uh, idea; but to that extent, it's a less evil and a much more inept novel than Anna Karenina.

Ayn Rand Answers (p. 205)

Mayhew broke this one into two answers.

In the first answer, he jettisoned the word "convention." What was wrong with Rand's use of it? He also took Rand's parenthetical reaction to the long question and relocated it in the middle of her answer.

Ayn Rand Answers (pp. 205-206)

In the second answer, Rand used some awkward constructions, but her phrasing, "the better you are at something which is morally bad, the worse you are," is nonetheless easier to follow than Mayhew's: "concerning moral negatives, the better you are, the worse you are morally."