The stuff of reality beyond the senses

[Christopher]

Michael, this question is for you, although I wanted to open up the topic to everybody:

I've been meaning to ask about your beliefs of the universe (ever a light topic of conversation). We seem to share some similar views, and I have been pondering a question lately and looking for thoughtful responses from like-minded folk. Specifically, it seems to me that we cannot create a volitional system out a deterministic system; therefore, consciousness cannot be wholly a product of biology/chemistry/physics. If it were, causation would be outside the domain of consciousness.

Given this view, it seems to me that when considering the "stuff" the universe is made up of, universal consciousness (or some form of stuff that can only be internally apprehended and not perceived through sensory input) must also exist. It is the system of this stuff, so-to-speak, that consciousness is partially derived from. What are your views, in a nutshell, on this? Do you think the universe is made up of more than the system of sensory-perceived matter and energy?

Christopher

[Dragonfly]

Specifically, it seems to me that we cannot create a volitional system out a deterministic system;

On the contrary, that is perfectly possible.

[BaalChatzaf]

Michael, this question is for you, although I wanted to open up the topic to everybody:

I've been meaning to ask about your beliefs of the universe (ever a light topic of conversation). We seem to share some similar views, and I have been pondering a question lately and looking for thoughtful responses from like-minded folk. Specifically, it seems to me that we cannot create a volitional system out a deterministic system; therefore, consciousness cannot be wholly a product of biology/chemistry/physics. If it were, causation would be outside the domain of consciousness.

Given this view, it seems to me that when considering the "stuff" the universe is made up of, universal consciousness (or some form of stuff that can only be internally apprehended and not perceived through sensory input) must also exist. It is the system of this stuff, so-to-speak, that consciousness is partially derived from. What are your views, in a nutshell, on this? Do you think the universe is made up of more than the system of sensory-perceived matter and energy?

Christopher

Everything is made of physical stuff. We cannot perceive but a small subset of the Stuff of Reality because our senses are crude. Even with our best instruments we are fifteen orders of magnitude removed from Planck Length, the smallest distance our physical theories can comprehend. There is no Mystery/Spirit Stuff separate from Physical Stuff. Our consciousness is an effect of physical causes whether or not we understand it completely or not. There is no duality between Mind and Brain. Mind is what Brains do. Rene Descartes got science and philosophy royally screwed up when he postulated a Mind Body duality. There is no such duality. It was all in Descartes mind (er.... brain).

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

Specifically, it seems to me that we cannot create a volitional system out a deterministic system;

On the contrary, that is perfectly possible.

There are totally deterministic physical systems which exhibit chaotic behavior, i.e. behavior which cannot be will predicted unless we know the initial or boundary conditions to infinite precision. Chaotic behavior has a superficial resemblance to random behavior. For example a compound pendulum given large oscillations will exhibit chaotic motions.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Christopher,

I have encountered a lot of problems in discussing this, but the vast majority of them end up being either semantics or an overblown need for certainty.

Take Bob's last post as a good example of semantics. A "deterministic physical system which exhibits chaotic behavior"?

Hmmmm...

I guess it depends on how you define it. I always understood deterministic to be the opposite of chaos.

The point is, the chaos element in the universe is recognized one way or another in a statement like his, whether you say it is part of a "deterministic physical system" or simply say we don't know enough about it to really say anything with certainty.

An overblown need for certainty would be the insistance on the existence of God—or the lack of existence, for that matter—as fact.

We can say some things with certainty, though. This is why I like using the concept of "standard" in thinking. All knowledge, in my conception, exists in relation to a standard.

The standard for human knowledge takes into account the human knowledge gathering and processing faculty (sense organs, nervous system and brain system). Any pronouncement about the nature of the universe that does not take this standard into account steps outside the bounds of human knowledge.

When we deal with knowledge coming from sense organs and the nervous system, things are simple and certainty is easy. One aspect of the brain system, though, throws a monkeywrench in the works for certainty about the rest: the mind (or consciousness, or volitional awareness, or whatever you want to call the thing that makes you "you."). With the mind, we can introspect and "observe" our thoughts without sensory input. We can even modify essential low-level body functions like where to send blood by simply wishing it to happen in a certain manner. That opens the door to a hell of a lot of information that cannot be accounted for by using words like "deterministic" or even "faith."

In my recovery from addiction, I decided to rethink everything I used to be certain of. I started with metaphysics and epistemology. Reality-wise, I decided that the universe was a big honking place (going in both directions, macro and micro). Epistemologically, I decided there is no way I would ever know all that, especially from direct observation. I based this on what I have observed as starters. I also decided that if human beings were part of the evolutionary process, it did not make any sense to imagine that humans had reached the limit of evolving since there is no cause I could detect to believe that other than the vanity or insecurity of determined thinkers.

Based on these premises, I decided that I could have certain knowledge in some areas—i.e., information that my organism could process, and when it was impossible to verify a fact with observation of some kind (including mental exercises), I would just leave the question open in my mind.

Some people take the following stance: If human beings cannot observe something, it cannot possibly exist.

As I hold that human beings are still evolving, I hold that there are parts of reality that human beings possibly cannot process yet.

I also suspect (and I cannot state with certainty) that our minds are developing a new organ of awareness that can accesss such parts of reality. Things are dim now because we are evolving faculty. It is not fully formed.

Like I said, this is speculation. But given many cross-culture reports throughout history that have shown similar results on certain issues (often set in religious contexts), I think it is pretty good speculation.

The short answer to your question is that I refuse to claim the existence or nonexistence of something if I do not have some means of verifying my claim.

Being a human, I have great difficulty separating metaphysics from human knowledge. That leaves a lot of unanswered questions, but ironically, this makes me feel secure and certain. Although some of my knoweldge is uncertain and will remain that way during my lifetime, some of it is certain and I can verify it.

Socrates said, "Know thyself."

I find that to be the best starting point of all, and, although this is a summary of my thoughts on the nature of reality, these basic ideas are the best I can do so far.

Michael

EDIT: Actually there is something I did not mention, which I have called top down and bottom up before. It's the form and content thing. You need both. Not just one or the other. Spatially, this could be called a question of boundaries. What is inside the boundary and what is out, and which part governs the nature of the boundary?

I say both do.

I even suspect there are parts of reality that govern the formation of boundaries and the construction of entities that work jointly with the nature of subparticles.

[James Heaps-Nelson]

Michael,

I'll cut through the definitional stuff. There are systems with closed form mathematical expressions that obey classical physics like Bob's compound pendulum that do not have predictable behavior that can be projected out in time. Beyond a very short time, initial conditions have to be resupplied. There are all kinds of systems like this. Even planetary orbital mechanics with an object passing through a Lagrange point can act like this.

Jim

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

James,

I suppose there are.

How does this cut through the definitional stuff?

Michael

[James Heaps-Nelson]

James,

I suppose there are.

How does this cut through the definitional stuff?

Michael

You seemed to get caught up on the word deterministic. That can mean either predictable or something with definite causes for its position and momentum (i.e. not primarily governed by quantum mechanics). Most physicists use the latter terminology.

BTW, the people who think that impredictability of neural processes have something to do with quantum mechanics are holding onto an implausible notion. Most of the relevant processes such as neural dark currents and the like take place on physical scales much larger than those that are primarily influenced by quantum mechanics.

There are interesting chemical systems that are primarily a result of quantum perturbation, however. Ilya Prigogine discusses a system that actually fluctuates in color on the macro-level based on quantum perturbation in his book: The End of Certainty.

Jim

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

BTW, the people who think that impredictability of neural processes have something to do with quantum mechanics are holding onto an implausible notion.

Jim,

I personally don't know enough about neural processes or quantum mechanics to say.

I do know that nerves have a specific form. What caused them to be that way? I have not yet seen an argument that convinces me to root all causality in the nature and behavior of subparticles. Against that objection, I have read determinists talk about "systems." Well, what causes systems? "They just are" or "they emerge" does not satisfy my natural human curiosity. I am interested in what governs the emergence of systems. I believe the micro level is only part of wholes.

Nor have I seen any argument that convinces me that knowledge exists without the limitations of the human knowledge faculties. Thus all claims that the universe is unconditionally this or that are suspect to me. The fundamental axioms are true because we observe them all the time. Stating things like "the universe is finite" as a fact is a waste on me. I not only see this "verified" with wordplay (like projecting stuff and calling it fact), there is no way I can verify it. Nor can I imagine any way to verify this at the present human level of knowledge.

I am reading many things when I get the time. You have good suggestions.

Recently I have been going through The Culture Code by Clotaire Rapaille, which opened my mind to the possibility of including "reptilian-brain imprints" as referents in normative abstractions. Although Rapaille's kind of research is more surveying than anything else, and there is some showmanship involved, the big-picture patterns he identifies is fascinating. His work cuts directly to the root of how we integrate and evaluate aspects of existence on first blush (first "imprintable" blush, that is) and his patterns are demonstrable through success and failure in large-scale sales campaigns.

In fact, I have been thinking a lot about the referents of normative abstractions recently, but that discussion belongs to a different thread.

Michael

[Xray]

Specifically, it seems to me that we cannot create a volitional system out a deterministic system; therefore, consciousness cannot be wholly a product of biology/chemistry/physics. If it were, causation would be outside the domain of consciousness.

If you would precisely define "deterministic" first, TIA.

And what do you mean by volitional "system"? Volition is something which can be observed in humans, also in higher developed animals.

As volitional, goal-seeking entities, human beings can even decide to end their lives.

[Christopher]

Good comments. I see your position Michael as that being there is no evidence to discuss the principle in either direction, therefore there is no validity to make an assertion in either direction (assertions have no purpose). My only catch is that the logic of volition based on a deterministic system is impossible; therefore, certain axioms (which of course cannot be proved) must be established in concordance with this knowledge.

Regarding Dragonfly's comment: I suggest looking up Goedel's Incompleteness theorem. The assertion that volition can exist in a deterministic system is equivalent to saying "this sentence is a lie." It is an assertion that undermines the premises of the system in which the assertion is made. But I think this is the big oversight that occurs in many many people who assert that the mind is a function of the brain.

Ba'al: To address what you mentioned, here is a definition of determinism:

1 : a theory or doctrine that acts of the will, occurrences in nature, or social or psychological phenomena are causally determined by preceding events or natural laws

Even chaos theory and quantum events as causal agents are "deterministic" in the sense that they are causal forces outside consciousness (and hence, non-volitional). You seem to agree with this. However, and here's the big catch, most of us have probably read Branden's Psychology of Self-Esteem, in which he asserts Objectively (capital O) the following:

Knowledge consists of the correct identification of the facts of reality; and in order for man to know that the contents of his mind do constitute knowledge, in order for him to know that he has identified the facts of reality correctly, he requires a means of testing his conclusions. The means is the process of reasoning - of testing his conclusions against reality and checking for contradictions. But this validation is possible only if his capacity to judge is free - i.e. nonconditional (given a normal brain). If his capacity to judge is not free, there is no way for a man to disciminate between his beliefs and those of a raving lunatic. (p.54)

NB has several paragraphs and a chapter devoted to free will and reason which encompass this comment, but we can see where his logic is going. Basically, the absence of free will levels the playing field for legitimacy of all beliefs, especially since judging legitimacy itself would also be a function of determinism. Therefore according to his logic, when claiming the mind is non-volitional/deterministic/ruled entirely by outside causal agents, you undermine the premises that give validity to your assertion. Again we must reference Goedel's Incompleteness Theorem... "this sentence is a lie." ...

The assertion that our mind is deterministic requires a system reliant upon the premise of free will if the assertion is to be considered meaningful. If in fact you claim determinism exists and you are right, your assertion becomes meaningless.

Christopher

[Dragonfly]

Regarding Dragonfly's comment: I suggest looking up Goedel's Incompleteness theorem. The assertion that volition can exist in a deterministic system is equivalent to saying "this sentence is a lie."

I think I know a lot more about Goedel's incompleteness theorem than you do, so spare me the condescending remarks. It's obvious that you have no idea what you're talking about. Probably you've just heard something about Penrose's argument against AI using Goedel's theorem. Well, let me tell you that that argument has been refuted long ago. See for example http://www2.truman.edu/~edis/writings/articles/goedel.pdf or Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea, ch. 15.

Knowledge consists of the correct identification of the facts of reality; and in order for man to know that the contents of his mind do constitute knowledge, in order for him to know that he has identified the facts of reality correctly, he requires a means of testing his conclusions. The means is the process of reasoning - of testing his conclusions against reality and checking for contradictions. But this validation is possible only if his capacity to judge is free - i.e. nonconditional (given a normal brain). If his capacity to judge is not free, there is no way for a man to disciminate between his beliefs and those of a raving lunatic. (p.54)

That is a nonsense argument. Even a simple chess computer (simple compared to the human brain) can make valid choices, and the best even better than any human can. Nevertheless the chess computer is a deterministic device. Deterministic computers can also discover new mathematical laws, so it seems deterministic machines can do better than a raving lunatic (or most other humans for that matter).

[jeffrey smith]

Knowledge consists of the correct identification of the facts of reality; and in order for man to know that the contents of his mind do constitute knowledge, in order for him to know that he has identified the facts of reality correctly, he requires a means of testing his conclusions. The means is the process of reasoning - of testing his conclusions against reality and checking for contradictions. But this validation is possible only if his capacity to judge is free - i.e. nonconditional (given a normal brain). If his capacity to judge is not free, there is no way for a man to disciminate between his beliefs and those of a raving lunatic. (p.54)

That is a nonsense argument. Even a simple chess computer (simple compared to the human brain) can make valid choices, and the best even better than any human can. Nevertheless the chess computer is a deterministic device. Deterministic computers can also discover new mathematical laws, so it seems deterministic machines can do better than a raving lunatic (or most other humans for that matter).

But computers can not on their own initiative set out to discover new mathematical laws, or even think of the possibility that there may be unknown mathematical laws waiting to be discovered. A computer can look ahead and choose which are the best strategic moves to make in a particular game; but a computer can not on its own initiative invent a new game. Nor is a computer asked to choose among competing metaphysical theories, which is where Branden was aiming at.

[BaalChatzaf]

Regarding Dragonfly's comment: I suggest looking up Goedel's Incompleteness theorem. The assertion that volition can exist in a deterministic system is equivalent to saying "this sentence is a lie." It is an assertion that undermines the premises of the system in which the assertion is made. But I think this is the big oversight that occurs in many many people who assert that the mind is a function of the brain.

The Goedel Incompleteness theorem states that if a formal first order system is capable of expressing the axioms of arithmetic there exist a well formed formula of the system G, such that neither G nor -G are provable. The second incompleteness theorem says that such a formal system is incapable of proving its own consistency. There is no mention of determinism or non determinism in the matter.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del_incompleteness_theorem

More nonsense has been uttered about Goedel's Incompleteness Theorems than about any other theorem in mathematics.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

. But I think this is the big oversight that occurs in many many people who assert that the mind is a function of the brain.

Minds are not magical entities. The Mind is a cluster of processes that the brain carries out. It is a physical effect of a physical cause. Everything that exists in the real world is physical.

Consciousness is an complicated set of electrochemical processes taking place in brains.

Our most profound thoughts are electrochemical happenings in the our brains.

Thinking humans and piles of dung are made of essentially the same stuff (atoms operating according to physical laws). We are sh*t that walks and talks.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[BaalChatzaf]

99.999.. percent of the physical universe is beyond our senses. Fortunately we can track the small portion of the physical universe that is essential to our survival and success in reproduction.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

99.999.. percent of the physical universe is beyond our senses.

Bob,

Doesn't this statement presume knowledge of what is not knowable by human beings? And 99.999.. % at that?

Michael

[Dragonfly]

But computers can not on their own initiative set out to discover new mathematical laws, or even think of the possibility that there may be unknown mathematical laws waiting to be discovered. A computer can look ahead and choose which are the best strategic moves to make in a particular game; but a computer can not on its own initiative invent a new game. Nor is a computer asked to choose among competing metaphysical theories, which is where Branden was aiming at.

Nobody claims that a computer now can do all the things that a human being can do, we'll probably have to wait at least many decades for that, if not more, but it shows that making intelligent choices that increase knowledge can be done by deterministic machines. That the range of the choices by machines is at the moment still very small compared to the huge range of the options and choices for the survival machine called man is not relevant. There is no reason to assume that in the future artificial machines couldn't design artificial machines (with all the desired possibilities for doing things, like playing chess or even creating their own philosophies) themselves, without human intervention (apart from creating those first machines).

[Christopher]

Crazy discussions

Dragonfly, I studied Goedel's theorem independently and came up with my assertion that volition cannot be based on a deterministic system. I was not familiar with Penrose's work until you shared it, but given that I reach the same conclusion as a known mathematical physicist, I suspect I understand it just fine.

Even critics who disagreed with many of Penrose's conclusions http://hanson.gmu.edu/penrose.html still agree that volition cannot exist in a deterministic universe.

I read your paper on using randomness as a characteristic of non-deterministic systems. The problem with this usage is that randomness continues to imply a causal agent outside of consciousness (and hence contradicts volition). Even if human behavior can be described as a mixture of randomness and algorithms, it undermines completely the system upon which judgments of validity rests. To say that judgment is a product not just of previous states but is also a product of randomness is actually worse off! Volition, in this case, may instead be the force that directs the "seemingly-random" digit creation, not some external actual "random" event.

So no matter how you look at it, you're incorrect. If you assume determinism is a system entirely based off of previous states, then the face value of your statement "volition can be derived from a deterministic system" is by definition incorrect. If instead you use the other dictionary term that defines determinism as external forces guiding choice (which includes randomness), then you're still incorrect... because in this case there is no such thing as volition, there is only the illusion of volition defined by a random generator.

Chris

Additionally: I will not accept personal criticisms. I called your intial assertion wrong because logically I believe it is. I can see how you might take this personally. You however did respond with a personal attack that needs no interpretation. You should be above that.

[BaalChatzaf]

Crazy discussions

Dragonfly, I studied Goedel's theorem independently and came up with my assertion that volition cannot be based on a deterministic system. I was not familiar with Penrose's work until you shared it, but given that I reach the same conclusion as a known mathematical physicist, I suspect I understand it just fine.

How did you reach your conclusion? There is nothing in the statement of either of Godel's Incompleteness Theorems that has any connection with determinism. A first order logic is complete if and only if for any closed well formed formula W in the logic either W is provable or -W is provable. Godel showed that in a first order formal system capable of formulating arithmetic if the system is consistent there exists a formula G such that neither G nor -G is provable. So where is the determinism or non-determinism?

Do you have any idea of what you are talking about?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Christopher]

Ba'al,

Geezus! Let's just look at your link on Wikipedia, shall we?

Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true,[1] but not provable in the theory (Kleene 1967, p. 250)...

For each consistent formal theory T having the required small amount of number theory, the corresponding Gödel sentence G asserts: “G cannot be proved to be true within the theory T”. If G were provable under the axioms and rules of inference of T, then T would have a theorem, G, which effectively contradicts itself, and thus the theory T would be inconsistent. This means that if the theory T is consistent then G cannot be proved within it. This means that G's claim about its own unprovability is correct; in this sense G is not only unprovable but true. Thus provability-within-the-theory-T is not the same as truth; the theory T is incomplete...

If G is true: G cannot be proved within the theory, and the theory is incomplete. If G is false: then G can be proved within the theory and then the theory is inconsistent, since G is both provable and refutable from T.

I'm not going to claim to be an expert at Goedel, but I will claim the following:

Within our system of knowledge, judgments of validity require reason, and reason depends on volition. If you are effectively going to assert that G is true given your boundary of knowledge, you are going to undermine the system of knowledge in which you're working. At that point, your head will explode... so proceed with caution.

A. Definition of an Objectivist's sytem: All reality is defined by the sensory world. The sensory world is controlled by laws. Knowledge represents reality. Knowledge depends on judgments of validity that require reason. Reason requires volition.

B. You assert determinism is true.

C. If you prove determinism is true, you correctly represent reality while negating the system of volition that allowed such knowledge, at which point your assertion is no longer valid (i.e. true). Thus, the system is inconsistent.

D. If you prove determinism is false, then you validate your knowledge, which unfortunately means that you validate

the sensory world which, alas, is deterministic.

Edited October 3, 2009 by Christopher

[BaalChatzaf]

Ba'al,

Geezus! Let's just look at your link on Wikipedia, shall we?

Any effectively generated theory capable of expressing elementary arithmetic cannot be both consistent and complete. In particular, for any consistent, effectively generated formal theory that proves certain basic arithmetic truths, there is an arithmetical statement that is true,[1] but not provable in the theory (Kleene 1967, p. 250)...

For each consistent formal theory T having the required small amount of number theory, the corresponding Gödel sentence G asserts: “G cannot be proved to be true within the theory T”. If G were provable under the axioms and rules of inference of T, then T would have a theorem, G, which effectively contradicts itself, and thus the theory T would be inconsistent. This means that if the theory T is consistent then G cannot be proved within it. This means that G's claim about its own unprovability is correct; in this sense G is not only unprovable but true. Thus provability-within-the-theory-T is not the same as truth; the theory T is incomplete...

If G is true: G cannot be proved within the theory, and the theory is incomplete. If G is false: then G can be proved within the theory and then the theory is inconsistent, since G is both provable and refutable from T.

I'm not going to claim to be an expert at Goedel, but I will claim the following:

Within our system of knowledge, judgments of validity require reason, and reason depends on volition. If you are effectively going to assert that G is true given your boundary of knowledge, you are going to undermine the system of knowledge in which you're working. At that point, your head will explode... so proceed with caution.

A. Definition of an Objectivist's sytem: All reality is defined by the sensory world. The sensory world is controlled by laws. Knowledge represents reality. Knowledge depends on judgments of validity that require reason. Reason requires volition.

B. You assert determinism is true.

C. If you prove determinism is true, you correctly represent reality while negating the system of volition that allowed such knowledge, at which point your assertion is no longer valid (i.e. true). Thus, the system is inconsistent.

D. If you prove determinism is false, then you validate your knowledge, which unfortunately means that you validate

the sensory world which, alas, is deterministic.

I never asserted determinism is true. At the level at which quantum effects are discernible the world is not deterministic.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Christopher]

I never asserted determinism is true. At the level at which quantum effects are discernible the world is not deterministic.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I will say that after having to take a very close look at my knowledge of Goedel, I can't say my claims are entirely perfect. You probably do know Goedel better than I do. The above logic I proposed may not be entirely precise, although I believe all the pieces are there. Another argument could be made that if the mind is the stuff of matter, then the mind is incapable of proving the axioms of the system because the mind is within the system.

I don't think Goedel's Theorem is the core of my presentation throughout this thread, although I have referred to it a number of times. More specifically, I am simply demonstrating that a system that claims the mind is a function entirely of the physical brain (i.e. of randomness and rules) cannot make a legitimate claim of having valid knowledge. In other words, claims of knowledge that the mind is a product of the brain are inconsistent with the system of knowing reality. I make this claim because of the extensive literature on the subject, of which Nathaniel Branden is the most salient to this forum.

But alas, my main intention was not about getting into a debate with you. I am happy to have MSK's thoughts. More to the point, I am trying to figure out how to proceed past this logical kung-fu dropkick against claims that the mind is entirely a product of the physical brain. I had wondered whether anyone had addressed this conflict head-on. Our discussion has probably quelched possible followup from people who are in a similar position of deduction as I.

Chris

[James Heaps-Nelson]

I never asserted determinism is true. At the level at which quantum effects are discernible the world is not deterministic.

Ba'al Chatzaf

I will say that after having to take a very close look at my knowledge of Goedel, I can't say my claims are entirely perfect. You probably do know Goedel better than I do. The above logic I proposed may not be entirely precise, although I believe all the pieces are there. Another argument could be made that if the mind is the stuff of matter, then the mind is incapable of proving the axioms of the system because the mind is within the system.

I don't think Goedel's Theorem is the core of my presentation throughout this thread, although I have referred to it a number of times. More specifically, I am simply demonstrating that a system that claims the mind is a function entirely of the physical brain (i.e. of randomness and rules) cannot make a legitimate claim of having valid knowledge. In other words, claims of knowledge that the mind is a product of the brain are inconsistent with the system of knowing reality. I make this claim because of the extensive literature on the subject, of which Nathaniel Branden is the most salient to this forum.

But alas, my main intention was not about getting into a debate with you. I am happy to have MSK's thoughts. More to the point, I am trying to figure out how to proceed past this logical kung-fu dropkick against claims that the mind is entirely a product of the physical brain. I had wondered whether anyone had addressed this conflict head-on. Our discussion has probably quelched possible followup from people who are in a similar position of deduction as I.

Chris

Chris,

Just because the mind is a product of the physical brain does not mean we don't have free will. The typical argument against the coherency of epistemology in determinism is that a deterministic system is necessitated to think or believe something and the truth or falsity is immaterial to whether we think or believe it.

Brains are not Laplacian systems and there are any number of reasons why they could be nondeterministic. I think nondeterminism probably comes about from chaotic systems with something akin to Lyapunov instability. It is also possible the quantum mechanical perturbation in far from equilibrium chemical systems arises in nondeterminism.

Free will likely arises from the conjunction between the aforementioned mechanisms of nondeterminism and brain structures that have evolved to have the facility for information storage of reasonable fidelity.

If you're interested in the interaction between brain-based epistemology and traditional epistemology, Gerald Edelman has a terrific book: Second Nature which takes up the subject.

Jim

Edited October 5, 2009 by James Heaps-Nelson

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

James,

Supposing my speculation is correct that we do not process some parts of reality (or we process them incorrectly) because the sense organs are being evolved or do not exist.

Using that as a premise for further speculation, isn't it plausible that forms and states (including life) would not just emerge from below, but simultaneously could be drawn upwards from above? (Above and below being metaphorical meaning smaller and bigger, part and whole, subatomic and macro cosmic, bottom and top, etc. Something, say, governing or forming things with gravity for starters...)

Michael