Settling the debate on Altruism

[Xray]

Brant Gaede: There is no such thing as "unbridled capitalism" even in theoretical anarchical constructs. Rand never advocated any such thing whatever any such thing is.

She sure did advocate it:

When I say "capitalism", I mean a full, pure, uncontrolled, unregulated laissez-faire capitalism" with a separation of state and economics. (Rand, TVOS, p. 37).

She's a school teacher and she frequently uses her pedagogical technique as she did here. It's a way of maintaining intellectual and actual physical control of children. It is not Socratic. Unfortunately, it pushes my very wrong buttons.

My goal as a teacher is the exact opposite: I encourage independent thinking. A task I'm very committed to. "Sapere aude" is my motto.

For independent thinkers a far less prone to seek answers to their questions from ideologists.

Being a teacher, I also don't get upset at temper flare-ups or attempts at bullying, like in GHS's # 1049 post. We are group animals, therefore "attacks" of that type are not surprising.

GHS: Stop selectively editing my comments and then playing the dumb, innocent bimbo.

Typical example of a temper flare-up. No problem on my part (see my above comment on this).

GHS: Here is what I wrote just before the passage you quoted:

Are you serious? We are talking about an article titled "ATLAS SHRIEKED: Ayn Rand’s First Love and Mentor Was A Sadistic Serial Killer Who Dismembered Little Girls." First love? Mentor?

So do you think that Ames was telling the truth when he called "a sadistic serial killer" Rand's "first love and mentor"? Are you insane? Or merely stupid?

Calm down, George. In a polemic and sarcastic article, you will encounter exaggerations and distortions. Since you use sarcasm and polemic as well, this will hardly be news to you. ;)

My interests was in direct quotes from Rand in that article, and it looks like Ames distorted nothing here:

PLAYBOY: According to your philosophy, work and achievement are the highest goals of life. Do you regard as immoral those who find greater fulfillment in the warmth of friendship and family ties?

RAND: If they place such things as friendship and family ties above their own productive work, yes, then they are immoral. Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man's life. A man who places others first, above his own creative work, is an emotional parasite; whereas, if he places his work first, there is no conflict between his work and his enjoyment of human relationships.

You commented:

GHS: Note that the last part of Rand's response (beginning with "whereas") was omitted from the quotation by Ames, who cut it off in mid-sentence. Why am I not surprised?

The cut-off part merely explains Rand's position further, which is why leaving it out was no distortion. On the contrary, it just shows once more how out of touch with reality Rand was in claiming:

"whereas, if he places his work first, there is no conflict between his work and his enjoyment of human relationships." (Rand)

http://ellensplace.net/ar_pboy.html

There is no conflict?? Maybe not in Ayn Rand's Ivory Tower fantasy, but people, if they place their work first, can (and often do) get in conflicts with family members/friends. So there can of course be "conflict between one's work and enjoyment of human relatioships" for those who place their work first.

Edited May 12, 2010 by Xray

[Dragonfly]

RAND: If they place such things as friendship and family ties above their own productive work, yes, then they are immoral. Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man's life. A man who places others first, above his own creative work, is an emotional parasite; whereas, if he places his work first, there is no conflict between his work and his enjoyment of human relationships.

You commented:

GHS: Note that the last part of Rand's response (beginning with "whereas") was omitted from the quotation by Ames, who cut it off in mid-sentence. Why am I not surprised?

The cut-off part merely explains Rand's position further, which is why leaving it out was no distortion.

That was also my reaction, the deleted part only confirms the first part: if Rand thinks that placing your family and friends above your work makes you an emotional parasite, it's logical that she thinks the reverse (placing your work first) is the right thing to do. Moreover, claiming that there is then no conflict between your work and your enjoyment of human relationships doesn't make it better.

[Brant Gaede]

Brant Gaede: There is no such thing as "unbridled capitalism" even in theoretical anarchical constructs. Rand never advocated any such thing whatever any such thing is.

She sure did advocate it:

When I say "capitalism", I mean a full, pure, uncontrolled, unregulated laissez-faire capitalism" with a separation of state and economics. (Rand, TVOS, p. 37).

My understanding of "unbridled capitalism" is what happens when there is no government or state to protect individual rights. It really can't exist because everybody is hunkering down doing minimal trading while war lords fight it out. She advocated courts to settle "disputes" among men and the rule of law to settle if not prevent conflicts. This has to involve economic disputes and conflicts too and the maintenance of property rights. Hence her statement you quoted above is in conflict with the other things she advocated. While I grant you that you got me on this, I was taking the broader view and focusing on her own broader view, not a polemical statement of the type she so enjoyed. I do not remember if she defended corporations as legal entities, but historian Robert Hessen, one of her followers, wrote a book entitled In Defense of the Corporation which I have not read. Separating capitalism from the rule of law makes as much sense as separating human beings from their sexuality.

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

"whereas, if he places his work first, there is no conflict between his work and his enjoyment of human relationships." (Rand)

http://ellensplace.net/ar_pboy.html

There is no conflict?? Maybe not in Ayn Rand's Ivory Tower fantasy, but people, if they place their work first, can (and often do) get in conflicts with family members/friends. So there can of course be "conflict between one's work and enjoyment of human relatioships" for those who place their work first.

Human relationships invariably involve friction. No matter how much lubrication of various types one uses it can only be reduced, not eliminated. She seems to be selling her philosophy. After you drive it awhile the description will wear off in favor of the actuality, especially if there is an accident.

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

She's a school teacher and she frequently uses her pedagogical technique as she did here. It's a way of maintaining intellectual and actual physical control of children. It is not Socratic. Unfortunately, it pushes my very wrong buttons.

My goal as a teacher is the exact opposite: I encourage independent thinking. A task I'm very committed to. "Sapere aude" is my motto.

For independent thinkers a far less prone to seek answers to their questions from ideologists.

Being a teacher, I also don't get upset at temper flare-ups or attempts at bullying, like in GHS's # 1049 post. We are group animals, therefore "attacks" of that type are not surprising.

Your students attack you?

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

Being a teacher, I also don't get upset at temper flare-ups or attempts at bullying, like in GHS's # 1049 post. We are group animals, therefore "attacks" of that type are not surprising.

I have done a lot of teaching as well? So what?

As for my "attacks," has it ever occurred to you that there is a good reason why your posts have elicited such negative reactions from OLers, even long before I happened along? You have probably convinced yourself that you are the Virgin Mary of OL -- an independent, open-minded thinker who has been misunderstood and unfairly attacked by a bunch of Randian ideologues.

I was warned about you when I first returned to OL. But even after we had some run-ins, I still defended you. Now, after many more encounters with you, I can better appreciate the reasons for those early warnings.

Lest I attack you with sarcasm and polemics once again, suffice it to say that you are somewhat deficient in the intellectual integrity department. Instead of blaming everyone else, you should tend to your own garden first if you want to improve your reputation around here. I couldn't care less if you agree with Rand or not. It is your slipshod manner of dealing with ideas, and your determination to paint Rand's ideas in the darkest colors possible, that I cannot stomach.

Your current defense of Ames, as if chopping off a critical part of Rand's statement makes no difference whatsoever, is one of the most torturous examples of intellectual gymnastics that I have ever had the displeasure to witness.

You won't cut any slack for any OLer who dares to defend Rand, but you display abundant tolerance for a writer who obviously knows zilch about Rand and whose sole purpose in penning his article was to make Rand look like a nut-job, so he could thereby discredit Tea Party activists who have been influenced by her.

So go on your merry way, Virgin Mary, secure in the conviction that you, and you alone, are the only true freethinker on OL. We all have our pleasant illusions, and if that is the illusion that makes you feel superior, so be it. But it's a waste of time to discuss ideas with you, and I'm fed up.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

My goal as a teacher is the exact opposite: I encourage independent thinking. A task I'm very committed to. "Sapere aude" is my motto.

For independent thinkers a far less prone to seek answers to their questions from ideologists.

Being a teacher, I also don't get upset at temper flare-ups or attempts at bullying, like in GHS's # 1049 post. We are group animals, therefore "attacks" of that type are not surprising.

Your students attack you?

--Brant

One can always hope.

"I remember the staff at our public school. You know, we had a saying, uh, that those who can't do teach, and those who can't teach, teach gym. And, uh, those who couldn't do anything, I think, were assigned to our school."

--Alvy Singer (Woody Allen), in "Annie Hall."

Ghs

[Xray]

The fact that you disagree with the reasons for a position does not make that position arbitrary. If the reasons are defective, unsound, or inadequate, then the position is unjustified, not arbitrary.

Correct. But arbitrary positions "bolstered" by defective/unsound/inadequate reasons frequently go hand in hand.

Can you give an example of an arbitrary position where this is not the case?

GHS: Your penchant to quote selectively extends beyond Rand to NB. You seem to forget that the title of NB's paper is "The Benefits and Hazards of Ayn Rand's Philosophy." And you conveniently ignore passages like the following:

"Ayn Rand has an incredible vision to offer—in many respects a radiantly rational one. I am convinced that there are errors in that vision and elements that need to be changed, eliminated, modified, or added and amplified, but I am also convinced that there is a great deal in her vision that will stand the test of time."

In each quote I gave, I linked to the whole article (# 984 here), even spoke of it as a 'must-read'.

Yes, the title is "The Benefits and Hazards of Ayn Rand's Philosophy", but the impression I got from reading the complete article was that NB was very critical. Actually the "Hazards" section occupies a far larger space than the "Benefits" section.

I was surprised at how outspoken NB was, i. e. when he spoke of Objectivism as encouraging emotional repression.

NB has come a long, long way from the time when he was a Rand disciple who mostly repeated her thoughts. i. e. in essays like "The Psychology of Pleasure".

Imo he has emancipated himself from Ayn Rand to a high degree.

As for the "incredible vision" Ayn Rand has to offer - some of her thoughts are very inspiring. "Check your premises" for example is one of the best advices a philosopher can give. Or take her rejection of altruism as an ideology which demands that one serve others first (or "God", "one's country", etc.). Her stance on that is very convincing.

But as for her "objective morality" claim - do you think it stands up to scrutiny? It rests on the idea of objective value (for this is the root premise of Objectivism) - so in case you claim objective values exist, the onus probandi is on you. Do you think you can meet the burden of proof?

Brant Gaede Your students attack you?

I was referring to attacks and attempts at bullying among the students; as a teacher, you will come across them and have strategies available how to deal with them.

quote provided by GHS:

"I remember the staff at our public school. You know, we had a saying, uh, that those who can't do teach, and those who can't teach, teach gym. And, uh, those who couldn't do anything, I think, were assigned to our school."

--Alvy Singer (Woody Allen), in "Annie Hall."

Ghs

Allen is a genius in witty remarks, presented in sparkling dialogue.

I love that movie, have watched it several times. I love most of Allen's films, especially those with Diane Keaton as his partner. She and Allen were a perfect match.

I recently rewatched "Love and Death" and had to laugh when Boris and his cousin Sonya were having this heated philosophical debate about "Subjectivity" and "Objectivity". ;)

GHS: You have probably convinced yourself that you are the Virgin Mary of OL -- an independent, open-minded thinker who has been misunderstood and unfairly attacked by a bunch of Randian ideologues.

"Virgin Mary"?? Um, I don't have the impression that things like checking premises stood high on the Virgin Mary's list. If this had been the case, I suppose Gabriel could not have gotten her to believe that God would sire her offspring.

On a more serious note, and getting back to the altruism topic - here is a quote from NB from the article (excerpt from post # 984):

Nathaniel Branden: "I am referring to the principle of benevolence, mutual helpfulness and mutual aid between human beings. I believe it is a virtue to support life. I believe it is a virtue to assist those who are struggling for life. I believe it is a virtue to seek to alleviate suffering. None of this entails the notion of self-sacrifice. I am not saying that we should place the interests of others above our own. I am not saying that our primary moral obligation is to alleviate the pain of others. I am not saying that we do not have the right to place our own interests first. I am saying that the principle of benevolence and mutual aid is entirely compatible with an ethic of self-interest and more: An ethic of self-interest logically must advocate the principle of benevolence and mutual aid.

Given that we live in society, and given that misfortune or tragedy can strike any one of us, it is clearly in our self-interest to live in a world in which human beings deal with one another in a spirit of mutual benevolence and helpfulness. Could anyone seriously argue that the principle of mutual aid does not have survival value?

I am not talking about "mutual aid" coercively orchestrated by a government. I am talking about the private, voluntary actions of individual men and women functioning on their own initiative and by their own standards. By treating the issue of help to others almost entirely in the context of self-sacrifice and/or in the context of government coercion, Rand largely neglects a vas"

The quote breaks off here - does anyone know how the text continues?

Imo these are wonderful words by NB! Aren't they something we could all agree on here?

He does not claim "X is a virtue", but says "I believe it is a virtue" that is, according to his individual standards of personal value. This is a position of expressing one's subjective values without trying to impose them on others.

Calling values "subjective" has nothing to do with them being "whimsical", "irrational" or anything of the sort.

"The subjective means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional", Rand said and many of her followers uncritically accepted this personal association of hers as if it were an 'objective definition' of the term.

Edited May 13, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

Note how [NB] does not claim "X is a virtue", but says "I believe it is a virtue, that is, according to his individual standards of personal value. This is a position of expressing one's subjective values without trying to impose them on others.

When someone says "X is a virute," we may safely assume that he believes that X is a virtue. And when someone says "I believe that X is a virtue," he might be expressing some degree of probability rather than certainty -- but this doesn't mean that he regards his belief as a mere "subjective" expression without a foundation in objective standards. NB certainly doesn't believe that his value judgments lack such an objective foundation.

You continue to use the word "subjective" in an highly ambiguous way. In some contexts, your use of "subjective" is fully compatible with claiming objective certainly for one's belief.

Lastly, where did you ever get the idea that arguing vigorously for one's beliefs qualifies as an attempt to "impose them on others"? This notion is ludicrous, so long as you are free to read or not to read someone, and so long as you are presumed to have progressed from the mental immaturity of a young child to the status of a rational adult.

For future reference, if I should say something like "values are objective," you may safely assume that I believe that values are objective. You may assume, in other words, that I am expressing my own beliefs, not the beliefs of other people.

I earnestly hope this clarification will make you feel less oppressed.

Ghs

[Xray]

Note how [NB] does not claim "X is a virtue", but says "I believe it is a virtue, that is, according to his individual standards of personal value. This is a position of expressing one's subjective values without trying to impose them on others.

When someone says "X is a virute," we may safely assume that he believes that X is a virtue. And when someone says "I believe that X is a virtue," he might be expressing some degree of probability rather than certainty --

It is exactly that fine line which can separate individualism from dogmatism in this case.

GHS: but this doesn't mean that he regards his belief as a mere "subjective" expression without a foundation in objective standards.

Speaking of "objective standards" can be misleading here. While standards do (objectively) exist (for example, the standard (objectively) exists in certain societies for women to veil their face in public), it is the values those (objective) standards are based on which are to be examined. But how can those values be "objective", since something becomes of value to a person (or group) only in respect to a (subjectively) chosen goal?

For example, to an islamic fundamentalist, the act of women veiling their faces is regarded as a value. If you asked the man whether this value is objective, I bet he would reply "yes". ALL ideologists claim that their values are "objective".

I grew up indcoctrinated as a Roman Catholic with a laundry list of cardinal (objective) values and virtues (since you are an ex-Catholic as well, you know how it feels to be indoctrinated with values and virtues which are not to be questioned in their objective value - after all, it was taught that the Ten Commandments were actually given to Moses by God).

On the "Moral Certainty" thread, we have not gotten very far yet in examining whether objective values exist at all. It has stopped with "instrumental values" being regarded as not sufficient, given that an instrumental value is a value "suited to purpose", which means that e. g. a killer's well-functioning gun or a dictator's well-functioning censorship would also be "objective" values if one equates "objective" value with a mere "instrumental" value.

GHS: NB certainly doesn't believe that his value judgments lack such an objective foundation.

You continue to use the word "subjective" in an highly ambiguous way. In some contexts, your use of "subjective" is fully compatible with claiming objective certainly for one's belief.

Imo what you call ambiguity is influenced by Rand's strange idea of everything 'subjective' as not to be taken seriously since it "means the arbitrary, the irrational, the blindly emotional" (Rand).

Imo cleansing yourself of Rand's influence here will open an unbiased view of the term subjective.

The proposition "Values are subjective" recognizes that values are always the result of human choice, that is, something can become "a value" only if an individual or group attribute value to it ("value to whom"). It says nothing about what these values are.

Nor does it exclude giving reasons for one's choice which are based on fact. For example, if my subjectively chosen goal is to have a peaceful relationship with my surroundings, picking a fight with my neighbors over stuff like their teenage kids playing music a bit loud it is not an effective means to achieve this goal.

For whether a means to achieve a chosen goal is suitable or not - this CAN be "objectively" examined and evaluated.

GHS: Lastly, where did you ever get the idea that arguing vigorously for one's beliefs qualifies as an attempt to "impose them on others"?

It is not vigorous arguing for one's belief as such, but imo Rand's intolerance toward dissenters was troubling.

The "revenge scene" in AS where all those perish in the tunnel who don't

share the Objectivist code of values illustrates (albeit clothed in fiction) what is in store for (I'm tempted to say) non-believers in the ideology. The same goes for Dagny shooting the guard.

Is AS "only" a work of fiction? In Rand's view, no. It was far more than that in her eyes, and it is far moretahtaht in every reader's eyes, whether they are Objectivists or not. AS is a non-fiction treatise in the guise of a novel, like Dragonfly put it so well.

Ayn Rand meant it. She used artistic license for dramatic effects for an ideological purpose.

I have sometimes asked myself what she would have done if she had had the political power to put her ideas in practice. Have you asked ourself this question as well?

GHS: For future reference, if I should say something like "values are objective," you may safely assume that I believe that values are objective. You may assume, in other words, that I am expressing my own beliefs, not the beliefs of other people.

It is true that presenting a statement as fact implies belief in the alleged fact. For it is impossible to claim something to be a fact without also believing it.

What is regarded as knowledge automatically implies belief, but belief does not automatically imply knowledge.

So there is a difference between the proposition "I believe that objective values exist", and between the proposition "[i know that] "Objective values exist".

Edited May 14, 2010 by Xray

[Xray]

[Too late to edit - correction of a passage in my # 1060 post]:

(Reply to George H. Smith):

Is AS "only" a work of fiction? In Rand's view, no. It was far more than that in her eyes, and it is far more than that in her readers' eyes, whether they are Objectivists or not. AS is a non-fiction treatise in the guise of a novel, like Dragonfly put it so well.

Ayn Rand meant it. The artistic license she used for dramatic effects served her ideological purpose.

I have sometimes asked myself what she would have done if she had had the political power to put her ideas into practice. Have you asked yourself this question too?

Edited May 14, 2010 by Xray

[Brant Gaede]

[Too late to edit - correction of a passage in my # 1060 post]:

(Reply to George H. Smith):

Is AS "only" a work of fiction? In Rand's view, no. It was far more than that in her eyes, and it is far more than that in her readers' eyes, whether they are Objectivists or not. AS is a non-fiction treatise in the guise of a novel, like Dragonfly put it so well.

Ayn Rand meant it. The artistic license she used for dramatic effects served her ideological purpose.

I have sometimes asked myself what she would have done if she had had the political power to put her ideas into practice. Have you asked yourself this question too?

The question, of course, is factually unanswerable. It might be good for a thought experiment, but it would tell us nothing about her. It begs the whole question of what kind of person she'd have had to be to get that power in the first place. Then we could nonsensically ask in that world what she would have done if she had been a novelist instead. We would not be privileged to know she would have been a great novelist and why.

--Brant

Edited May 14, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[imurray]

When someone says "X is a virute," we may safely assume that he believes that X is a virtue. And when someone says "I believe that X is a virtue," he might be expressing some degree of probability rather than certainty -- but this doesn't mean that he regards his belief as a mere "subjective" expression without a foundation in objective standards. NB certainly doesn't believe that his value judgments lack such an objective foundation.

You continue to use the word "subjective" in an highly ambiguous way. In some contexts, your use of "subjective" is fully compatible with claiming objective certainly for one's belief.

Lastly, where did you ever get the idea that arguing vigorously for one's beliefs qualifies as an attempt to "impose them on others"? This notion is ludicrous, so long as you are free to read or not to read someone, and so long as you are presumed to have progressed from the mental immaturity of a young child to the status of a rational adult.

For future reference, if I should say something like "values are objective," you may safely assume that I believe that values are objective. You may assume, in other words, that I am expressing my own beliefs, not the beliefs of other people.

I earnestly hope this clarification will make you feel less oppressed.

Ghs

George,

Forgive me if I am regressing here, but I'm having a hard time with your above comment. I understood you over in the other thread (A Critique of...) where you defined "knowledge" as a "belief that is both justified and true," however, your line of reasoning above regarding "objective values" seems off.

Your article was a critique of Ayn Rand's contextual theory of knowledge - I was under the impression that the definition of "knowledge" you posited was your own and not Rands or NB's. I can only assume that when NB said "I believe it is a virtue" he wasn't using your definition, but his own which does not mean the same as "I know it is a virtue." I haven't read much of NB, but how can you justify writing that when he said "believe" he meant something closer to your definition and not Rand's (or his own)?

If you state that values are objective isn't that more than simply stating that we are justified in believing that values are objective? Doesn't it imply that the statement is objectively true? How can you posit objective values without first positing a foundation of objective truth in which they're situated? Within such a foundation it makes little difference if one believes in them or not, they are true regardless.

It's no consolation to Xray to say that she doesn't have to believe you - it's just a roundabout way of calling her irrational.

Your definition works well to get at the intent of what people mean when they say "I believe" and therefore get to justifications, but it's only a rhetorical trope if you are already working from a foundation of objective truth. Objective truth either is or isn't - belief and mental assent only play a role in the minds of individuals (subjects), i.e., your definition is only more than a rhetorical trope within a subjective system.

It works nicely to get "believers" to fall into the trap of having to argue rationally by providing justifications which can then be proved true or false (within an objective system). I'd argue that when a "believer" says "I believe in God" s/she actually means something closer to "I have faith in God." Faith requires no justifications. It's a no-win battle for "believers" who want to prove that God exist from a rational, objective, foundation. That's why faith is so darn important in religious doctrines.

Ian

Edited May 14, 2010 by Panoptic

[George H. Smith]

When someone says "X is a virtue," we may safely assume that he believes that X is a virtue. And when someone says "I believe that X is a virtue," he might be expressing some degree of probability rather than certainty -- but this doesn't mean that he regards his belief as a mere "subjective" expression without a foundation in objective standards. NB certainly doesn't believe that his value judgments lack such an objective foundation.

Ghs

George,

Forgive me if I am regressing here, but I'm having a hard time with your above comment. I understood you over in the other thread (A Critique of...) where you defined "knowledge" as a "belief that is both justified and true," however, your line of reasoning above regarding "objective values" seems off.

Your article was a critique of Ayn Rand's contextual theory of knowledge - I was under the impression that the definition of "knowledge" you posited was your own and not Rands or NB's. I can only assume that when NB said "I believe it is a virtue" he wasn't using your definition, but his own which does not mean the same as "I know it is a virtue." I haven't read much of NB, but how can you justify writing that when he said "believe" he meant something closer to your definition and not Rand's (or his own)?

If you state that values are objective isn't that more than simply stating that we are justified in believing that values are objective? Doesn't it imply that the statement is objectively true? How can you posit objective values without first positing a foundation of objective truth in which they're situated? Within such a foundation it makes little difference if one believes in them or not, they are true regardless.

This is becoming very tedious for me. Very little of what you wrote has anything to do with my point. I was only responding to Xray's claim about NB. Merely because NB wrote that he "believes" something is a virtue does not -- I repeat, does not -- necessarily mean that NB was denying an objective basis for his belief. It does not necessarily mean that he was merely expressing a personal preference.

Whatever the technicalities over the word "belief" may be, I can assure you that Nathaniel does not agree with Xray about the subjective nature of value judgments. Objective values are a recurring theme throughout all of his writings, both early and late.

None of this has anything to do with whether objective value can be justified or whether NB agrees with my critique of Rand's contextualism, Based on nothing more that an incidental use of a single word ("believe") by NB, Xray attempted to pull a subjective rabbit out of her hat. But the rabbit isn't there, as anyone who has read Nathaniel's books well knows.

I don't know how to put this any more clearly than I have.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Based on nothing more that an incidental use of a single word ("believe") by NB, Xray attempted to pull a subjective rabbit out of her hat. But the rabbit isn't there, as anyone who has read Nathaniel's books well knows.

One last point....

Writers will often use expressions such as "I believe," or "In my opinion," or 'I think," or "In my judgment," etc., for stylistic or rhetorical reasons -- e.g., to soften the transition between sentences or paragraphs, or to convey a sense of intellectual modesty. To draw a philosophical conclusion from such usages is not warranted, unless one's conclusion is supported elsewhere in the text.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

I'd argue that when a "believer" says "I believe in God" s/she actually means something closer to "I have faith in God." Faith requires no justifications. It's a no-win battle for "believers" who want to prove that God exist from a rational, objective, foundation. That's why faith is so darn important in religious doctrines.

I deal with this issue briefly in Why Atheism? (Chapter Four) as follows:

Two Kinds of Belief

There are two major forms in which we express a belief, viz., “belief that” and “belief in.” To say, “I believe that Jesus was born in Bethlehem,” is to express one’s assent to the truth of this proposition. To say, “I believe in Jesus,” is to express one’s commitment to the person of Jesus as a religious authority who should be trusted in all things.

This second kind of belief – belief in rather than belief that – often conveys one’s devotion to someone or something of significant value. We see this kind of value-charged conviction in expressions like, “I believe in democracy” or, “I believe in freedom.” This kind of “belief in” always implies a corresponding “belief that” which articulates the reason for one’s devotion. The libertarian believes in freedom, because he believes that freedom is essential to individual happiness and a prosperous society. The Christian believes in Jesus because he believes that Jesus is the Son of God who died on the Cross to redeem the sins of mankind. In such cases, to “believe in” can express something more than one’s assent to the truth of a proposition; it can also convey one’s personal commitment to something of significant value.

The value-laden nature of personal beliefs helps to explain why we tend to be more jealous of our personal beliefs than our abstract knowledge-claims, often defending them with more vigor and passion. When someone criticizes my personal beliefs (i.e., my “beliefs in”), she is doing far more than challenging my abstract claim to know, for this knowledge claim constitutes the foundation of my most important value-commitments. And because my sense of “who I am” is inextricably linked to my fundamental values, I will defend the knowledge on which these values depend with great passion, as if I were fighting for my very existence – as indeed, in a psychological sense, I am.

Ghs

[anthony]

Ghs,

Your "belief in/ belief that" explanation has wide applications, and helps me clear up a few things.

Well articulated!

Tony

[Leonid]

If one says “I believe that X" the obvious question is whether this is justified belief or not. Justified belief is the one which is based on rational objective premises pertained to reality, and conclusions achieved by means of non-contradictory validation or induction. However it is not directly observed fact of reality. Justified belief may have different degrees of certainty-possible, probably, certain. A faith is belief which has no connection with reality. It is based on arbitrary premises. One cannot apply to faith the same epistemic tools as that which applicable to the justified belief. One doesn't treat reality and fantasy as epistemologically equal. That why agnosticism is epistemic fallacy.

Edited May 15, 2010 by Leonid

[Rich Engle]

Ghs,

Quoting your own book in the very sweetest of spots!

As a Unitarian Universalist, this further illuminates why I find your work, in general, to always refreshing, and even profound at times. I'll tell you why: because there is a gentle kindness to it. You don't (here, for sure, and mostly anywhere) go to denegrating the mystical experience, anymore than you really go after Theism more than it deserves. It is a very respectful form of writing, and for that, I respect you, for what it is worth.

That I continue to exist (such as I do) in O-world is, to me, a blessing. Or at least just good luck. You know, the whole atheism is mandatory thing.

Well, sure, sign my ass up. I don't believe in a Guy In The Sky. That is "Theism." That is, nor has ever been, the actual argument, as I believe you know.

I mean, you could most likely tolerate a secular humanist, right?

The division in one's thinking, or at least understanding of the difference between ecumenical and individual is a very difficult one, for most. To separate the things of organized religion (and that is a freak show if you look at all you can see), and individual spiritual thought, or consciousness.

To me, this is a given. More important, I think, is the integration work that is being done between science and spirituality. A lot of big boys have been weighing in on this, no?

Best,

rde

Best,

rde

Edited May 15, 2010 by Rich Engle

[BaalChatzaf]

Faith that is not firmly glued to fact is delusion and hallucination.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Xray]

Based on nothing more that an incidental use of a single word ("believe") by NB, Xray attempted to pull a subjective rabbit out of her hat. But the rabbit isn't there, as anyone who has read Nathaniel's books well knows.

Of course the rabbit isn't there, nor is the hat, for there was no attempt on my part to pull anything out of anything.

GHS: Merely because NB wrote that he "believes" something is a virtue does not -- I repeat, does not -- necessarily mean that NB was denying an objective basis for his belief. It does not necessarily mean that he was merely expressing a personal preference.

To clear up a possible misunderstanding on your part: Believing that something is a value or virtue does not exclude giving an objective basis for one's belief.

In my # 1060 reply to you, I wrote:

Xray: The proposition "Values are subjective" recognizes that values are always the result of human choice, that is, something can become "a value" only if an individual or group attribute value to it ("value to whom"). It says nothing about what these values are.

Nor does it exclude giving reasons for one's choice which are based on fact. For example, if my subjectively chosen goal is to have a peaceful relationship with my surroundings, picking a fight with my neighbors over stuff like their teenage kids playing music a bit loud it is not an effective objective means to achieve this goal.

For whether a means to achieve a chosen goal is suitable or not - this CAN be "objectively" examined and evaluated.

Regarding N. Branden: I was not implying that NB has abandoned the notion of objective value, when I wrote about him expressing "his subjective values". It was to illustrate my own position that values can't be anything but subjective, but I realize this could be misread as me implying this was NB's stance on it as well. Thanks for directing my attention to this.

Most people seem to believe that objective values exist.

As for doctrines, they are all based on the idea of objective value.

I found your stance on the value issue interesting since you stated elsewhere (on the 'Moral Certainty' thread) that you "don't believe in values per se". Nor do I.

But if the Objectivist values "Reason, Purpose, Self-Esteem" are no values per se, then what are they?

GHS. One last point....

Writers will often use expressions such as "I believe," or "In my opinion," or 'I think," or "In my judgment," etc., for stylistic or rhetorical reasons -- e.g., to soften the transition between sentences or paragraphs, or to convey a sense of intellectual modesty. To draw a philosophical conclusion from such usages is not warranted, unless one's conclusion is supported elsewhere in the text.

Correct. This is is one of the reasons why I would not use the term 'belief' at all in a definition of "knowledge". Imo treating "knowledge as a type of belief" - see your # 163 post on this thread: http://www.objectivi...ic=8329&st=160 - causes more confusion than clarity.

Separating knowledge from belief will also make discussions with theists a lot shorter.

"You believe in a God? Belief is no knowledge. Therefore any claims you may make regarding a being of whose existence you can have no definitive knowledge are null and void.

For example, should the believer claim "This is God's will", he/she is stating this as fact.

A statement of fact which in turn implies that the being exists that has the will.

But the impossibility of knowing that the being exists reveals a thinking error which derives an alleged fact (God's will) from a mere belief. ("I believe God exists").

Imo the clear separation of belief and knowledge in such discussions makes the theist's lack of empirical evidence stand out in far bolder relief than treating "knowledge as a type of belief" (knowledge as "true and justified belief"), as you suggest in your post # 163 here: http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8329&st=160.

For this almost makes knowledge appear as a subset of belief.

BTW, no standard dictionary definition of knowledge contains the term "belief". How do you explain that?

I don't want to run off topic here and would like to continue this discussion on the thread where it started.

I posted the definitions in # i82 http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8329&st=180

Edited May 15, 2010 by Xray

[George H. Smith]

I found your stance on the value issue interesting since you stated elsewhere (on the 'Moral Certainty' thread) that you "don't believe in values per se". Nor do I.

I don't recall writing this, and I have no idea where to find the relevant post. But I can say with certainty that the meaning you are drawing from my comment is not what I meant.

GHS. One last point....

Writers will often use expressions such as "I believe," or "In my opinion," or 'I think," or "In my judgment," etc., for stylistic or rhetorical reasons -- e.g., to soften the transition between sentences or paragraphs, or to convey a sense of intellectual modesty. To draw a philosophical conclusion from such usages is not warranted, unless one's conclusion is supported elsewhere in the text.

Correct. This is is one of the reasons why I would not use the term 'belief' at all in a definition of "knowledge".

Many words are used in rhetorical expressions; common examples are "God" and "fuck." (God damn it; God only knows; Fuck you; What the fuck are you doing? Etc., etc.)

Would you suggest that these rhetorical expressions have so tainted the ordinary meanings of certain words such that we should no longer use "God" to refer to a supreme being, or use "fuck" to refer to sexual intercourse?

If it works better for you to distinguish between "belief" and "knowledge," then more power to you. As I explain in Why Atheism?,I don't like the distinction because of the implications it has carried throughout the history of philosophy, beginning with the ancient Greeks.

The difference between probable "beliefs" and certain "knowledge" is a matter of degree, not of kind. They occupy different points on the same cognitive scale, depending the degree of justification that has been offered for them. So long as this point is clearly understood, the particular terminology we use is not very important.

Ghs

[rhartford]

The difference between probable "beliefs" and certain "knowledge" is a matter of degree, not of kind. They occupy different points on the same cognitive scale, depending the degree of justification that has been offered for them. So long as this point is clearly understood, the particular terminology we use is not very important.

I agree that "probable 'beliefs' " and well justified "knowledge" fall on the continuum indicated. I am curious about your view of "absolute certainty," which I take to be knowledge of a different "kind" in the sense that a fallible consciousness cannot be wrong about the identified fact. Does absolute certainty, in the sense I defined it, exist? If it does, is this not different than the "certain 'knowledge' " on the continuum?

[Brant Gaede]

I found your stance on the value issue interesting since you stated elsewhere (on the 'Moral Certainty' thread) that you "don't believe in values per se". Nor do I.

I don't recall writing this, and I have no idea where to find the relevant post. But I can say with certainty that the meaning you are drawing from my comment is not what I meant.

Post 93 Feb 24.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

The difference between probable "beliefs" and certain "knowledge" is a matter of degree, not of kind. They occupy different points on the same cognitive scale, depending the degree of justification that has been offered for them. So long as this point is clearly understood, the particular terminology we use is not very important.

I agree that "probable 'beliefs' " and well justified "knowledge" fall on the continuum indicated. I am curious about your view of "absolute certainty," which I take to be knowledge of a different "kind" in the sense that a fallible consciousness cannot be wrong about the identified fact. Does absolute certainty, in the sense I defined it, exist? If it does, is this not different than the "certain 'knowledge' " on the continuum?

"Absolute certainty" is simply the highest degree of certainty. It does not mean "infallible certainty," however, because a fallible mind cannot produce infallible knowledge.

Traditionally, mathemetical truths, such as 2+2=4, have been cited as examples of "infallible" certainty. But skeptics had little problem undercutting such examples. They argued, for example, that we often make errors in addition, so we can never be absolutely (i.e., infallibly) certain that we have not committed an error in any specific instance, including 2+2=4.

The most effective way of rebutting this kind of skeptical argument was to remove infallibility from the picture altogether by denying that is consitutes a proper criterion of knowledge. And this is essentially what modern empiricists, from time of Francis Bacon through the 18th century, did.

I wrote about this subject extensively in Why Atheism? -- often from a historical perspective. The following excerpt from my lengthy discussion of Francis Bacon, though it doesn't directly address your point, is a good indication of how I approach this problem. (I apologize in advance for the length of this passage.)

Ghs, Why Atheism? -- Ch. 7, "The Career of Reason" -- minus formatting and endnotes

Although Bacon and Descartes both rejected the epistemological skepticism of Montaigne and other fideists (according to whom we must rely on faith to attain a certainty that reason is unable to provide), their approaches to this problem were significantly different. Bacon, unlike Descartes, does not attempt to overthrow skepticism with a definitive theoretical refutation; he does not employ the Cartesian method of systematic doubt in an effort to establish an infallible criterion of knowledge, such as the intuitive grasp of clear and distinct ideas. Rather than employ this kind of shortcut, Bacon plots a course to certainty that must be traveled step-by-step, and he insists that we must sometimes traverse the same ground over and over again in order to check our bearings. Certainty, in other words, does not reveal itself to reason in a flash of insight, but is instead an elusive ideal that reason may attain to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the circumstances.

As Bacon sees the matter, the skeptical argument that we can never achieve certainty amounts to little more than a pretentious bit of futile and self-defeating dogmatism. The skeptic, having proclaimed that infallible certainty is unattainable, never tries to attain it, because he knows that man is a fallible being for whom error looms as an ever-present possibility. To this objection Bacon responds, in effect, "So what? If you define ‘certainty’ in a way that requires infallibility, then the skeptical argument, though valid on its own terms, has no relevance whatever to fallible human beings." Thus, rather than blocking the path to knowledge with an arbitrary and unrealistic definition of “certainty,” we should recognize at the outset that the quest for knowledge is beset with difficulties, and then, through a process of trial and error, we should see whether these difficulties can be overcome. Quoting Bacon:

“Our method and that of the skeptics agree in some respects at first setting out, but differ most widely, and are completely opposed to each other in their conclusions; for they roundly assert that nothing can be known; we, that but a small part of nature can be known, by the present method; their next step, however, is to destroy the authority of the senses and understanding, whilst we invent and supply them with assistance.”

As part of his attack on skepticism, Bacon distinguishes between two kinds of doubt, viz., “particular and total.” Particular doubt -- i.e., doubt that arises in a specific context in regard to a particular knowledge claim – is useful both as a spur to inquiry and as an antidote to the proliferation of error (as when a false conclusion is inferred from a premise which has not been sufficiently justified.). Total doubt, in contrast, is the universal doubt of skepticism, and this is what Bacon regards as a rather cowardly surrender to the difficulties of attaining knowledge.

Skeptics often pointed to the diversity of philosophic opinions as proof that knowledge is unattainable, but Bacon was unconvinced. Nature is infinitely more complex than the mind of man, so the same essential truth may be expressed in different ways by different thinkers. Scientific knowledge, cumulative and open-ended, progresses as one scientist improves upon the contributions of his predecessors. The human intellect is not an infallible instrument – far from it – but to say that an instrument can sometimes fail is not to say that it must necessarily fail in every case. Just as the human hand could not construct architectural wonders without the aid of external tools, so the human intellect cannot attain certainty without the aid of objective methods to test and validate our knowledge claims.

“The unassisted hand and the understanding left to itself possess but little power. Effects are produced by the means of instruments and helps, which the understanding requires no less than the hand; and as instruments either promote or regulate the motion of the hand, so those that are applied to the mind prompt or protect the understanding.”

The skeptic who denies that we can ever attain certainty is like a person who, after observing the limited power of the naked hand, declares that man will never be able to build a cathedral. The skeptic, trapped in a sophistical web of his own making, perpetually whines about the obstacles to knowledge. Bacon suggests that the time of the philosopher would be better spent in devising methods – cognitive instruments, in effect -- that would enable us to overcome those selfsame obstacles.

Thus, if Bacon’s stress on the inherent fallibility of reason does not land him in skepticism, this is because he rejects infallibility as a criterion of certainty. Certainty is something we achieve through sustained mental effort, a laborious and systematic process of trial and error, not something that is revealed to us in a flash of infallible insight. This is not to say that reason cannot arrive at its own certainties, such as the laws of logical inference, but these are a means rather than an end. These are cognitive instruments that must be coordinated, refined, and fashioned by the philosopher-scientist so as to serve as a reliable method in his investigation of nature.

According to Bacon, therefore, certainty is achieved piecemeal through the investigation of particular knowledge claims, not wholesale though a process of deductive reasoning based on clear and distinct ideas. Our ideas, if they are to generate useful knowledge, must be framed according to our experience of nature; and this experience, if it is to be reliable, must be subjected to objective methods of verification.

Ghs