Settling the debate on Altruism

[anthony]

A few thoughts.

By focusing our attention on one aspect of sacrifice, I believe we are letting the over-all concept escape - the true villain.

If one would call sacrifice either *active*, or *passive*, (that's the closest I can come to nomenclature), one might identify it better.

Passive sacrifice :- Hold in mind the ignorant brutality of men through the ages, taking one of their own, and dedicating their death on an altar to a Being, for the 'good' of their tribe. (One assumes that they "knew" beyond doubt that that deity existed. They "knew" that the majority would benefit from this act.)

It's an easy link to modern Statism, or the advocacy in one's society, and even one's family : that the group holds power over the individual, and the individual must not question this.

To go back to the man or woman on the altar. If he or she believes implicitly that a.)their life is the property of the tribe, and/or b.)they "know" they are going to a special place in Heaven reserved for such sacrificial victims -

then this becomes a complicit act, commonly called self-sacrifice. This introduces 'active' sacrifice.

Except this case is not sacrifice, at all, is it?

The victim is acting in their self-interest, by the standards of their knowledge, and also views their life as the lesser value, vis-a-vis everlasting bliss in heaven. With this faith, he is indeed no victim - and is in fact acting morally, according to O'ism, by trading a lesser value for a higher. If Heaven existed, that is.

But what about the person who knows, or believes differently? Who places great value on their life and the here and now, ie Reality-based values? According to Rand, it is his moral obligation to himself to act to keep, to never compromise, that Value.

Therefore the second culprit, (after passive compliance to force) is the active, willing sacrifice - a person sanctioning his own sacrifice.

By my consruct the Woman with Baby and Hat fits under 'active' sacrifice. Objectively (in reality) the baby has the higher value. To go for the hat, would constitute a self-generated sacrifice. Her system of values is subjectively grounded.

However, while it's certain that Rand had clarity in her own mind using this somewhat strange illustration, she did expose herself to 'unsympathetic' criticism; and those of us concentrating on this one tiny aspect of her important views of Sacrifice, are attempting to build a strawman out of her arguments.(IMO)

(Seems I got a little carried away with my "few thoughts."!)

Tony

[George H. Smith]

However, while it's certain that Rand had clarity in her own mind using this somewhat strange illustration, she did expose herself to 'unsympathetic' criticism; and those of us concentrating on this one tiny aspect of her important views of Sacrifice, are attempting to build a strawman out of her arguments.(IMO)

Tony

The hat example was not a felicitous choice by Rand.

Examples can be very tricky in philosophical arguments. They should serve to clarify a theoretical point by positing a concrete instance in which the variables are kept to a minimum. But the hat example introduces a number of unexplained variables that can leave the reader scratching his head, and that can lead to conflicting interpretations. This is so because complex examples will be interpreted differently by different people, according to their own philosophical views.

The hat hypothetical is a complex example that incorporates assumptions that Rand did not adequately explain beforehand, such as the role played by subjective value judgments in her notion of "sacrifice." When readers spend more time puzzling over your example than they do over the point you wish to clarify with it, then that is a sure indication that the example has not served its intended purpose.

In the Preface to the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains why he deleted the examples he had incorporated into early drafts of his difficult book: "For the aids to clearness, though they may be of assistance in regard to details, often interfere with our grasp of the whole." (Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, p. 13.)

Ghs

[imurray]

I posted this a while back:

From http://aynrandlexico...icon/duty.html:

"The meaning of the term “duty” is: the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest."

From http://aynrandlexico...obligation.html

"Accepting no mystic “duties” or unchosen obligations, he is the man who honors scrupulously the obligations which he chooses. The obligation to keep one’s promises is one of the most important elements in proper human relationships, the element that leads to mutual confidence and makes cooperation possible among men . . . .

The acceptance of full responsibility for one’s own choices and actions (and their consequences) is such a demanding moral discipline that many men seek to escape it by surrendering to what they believe is the easy, automatic, unthinking safety of a morality of “duty.”"

From http://aynrandlexico.../sacrifice.html

"“Sacrifice” is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue...

This applies to all choices, including one’s actions toward other men. It requires that one possess a defined hierarchy of rational values (values chosen and validated by a rational standard). Without such a hierarchy, neither rational conduct nor considered value judgments nor moral choices are possible."

Back to the example:

"If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty."

In the first instance she is "obligated" to feed the child because it is in keeping with her own rationally chosen hierarchy of values.

In the second she has not chosen to feed her child out of an "obligation" to a rationally held value, she feed the child only because society tells her she must, i.e., out of duty.

Therefore, the act of feeding the child is not immoral in and of itself, the irrational/subjective value the mother holds is what is immoral.

Suppose she bought the hat instead of feeding the child. The act is not immoral based on the mother's actions (buying the hat instead of feeding the child). It is immoral because the chosen value is incommensurate with being a rational human. That is to say, valuing a hat more than a child is not a rationally held value because it would not support the continuation of life (in this case).

Rand has purposefully separated actions from values in this example to illustrate the distinction between duty and obligation. You will continue to read the example incorrectly if you continue to conflate the two.

I'd advocate for what some rhetoricians call a "generous reading." In this case that would mean assuming that she wasn't reprehensible enough to advocate that buying a hat is the moral thing to do if you value it more than a child. Come on people, really? You can't, with a straight face, tell me that she would have said this was a rationally held value and therefore moral.

Ian

WhYNOT,

Your example further confuses the point, unfortunately. Belief in the afterlife cannot be an objective/rationally held value. It is strictly a matter of faith and faith does not require intellectual/rational assent. We must keep in mind the importance of the rational individual in Rand's philosophy. What others are arguing is that Rand is suggesting that simply by holding a value, any value, that it is moral to act upon it - that's nuts!

I have problems with Rand's philosophy, no doubt. However, the arguments above that focus on this particular example and the definition of "sacrifice", in my opinion, can all be reduced to nothing more than misunderstandings of Rand's philosophy. Sorry.

[imurray]

Those of you looking for a new angle, let me help you out. This is an excerpt from a famous essay by Stanley Fish: "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser" (in Doing What Comes Naturally, 1989). It's an elegant essay and, I think, you'll immediately see why your arguments reminded me of it.

But the asking of hard questions is not something the theory encourages, and indeed its weaknesses from one point of view are its strengths from another. By defining his key terms in a number of ways, Iser provides himself in advance with a storehouse of defensive strategies. A theory that characterizes reality in one place as a set of determinate objects, and in another place as the product of "thought systems," and in a third place as a heterogeneous flux will not be embarrassed by any question you might put to it. It is a marvelous machine whose very loose-jointedness makes it invulnerable to a frontal assault (including, no doubt, the assault I am now mounting). It is in fact not a theory at all, but a piece of literature that satisfied Iser's own criteria for an "aesthetic object"...

I think you can see how this, after swapping out a few terms, would work rather nicely with your arguments against Rand - if you can find the evidence to back it up.

Ian

[Leonid]

George H. Smith "Subjectively speaking, we always act on our "highest value" in any given action that involves choice. This is true virtually by definition, since if we didn't subjectively value X above other alternatives at a given point in time, we would not have acted to achieve X. "

Not necessarily. 1. Subjective valuation of X above Y doesn't make X more vauable than Y. To claim that is to accept the notion of primacy of consciousness.Standard of value defines value, but in Objectivism such a standard pertains to reality which is human life. This is only standard which could be non-contradictory validated. Therefore any substitution of such a standard to subjective standard will always lead to sacrifice-that is exchange of the greater value to the lesser one.

2. Christian morality which dominated West for 2000 years had been secularized by Kant and Compte. Our world is shaped rather by them than by Christ. Kant's ethics don't recognize any standard of value, only duties. According to this philosophy one shouldn't get any benefit from one’s action. In Kantian world mother Teresa cannot be altruist, only John Galt can. We are living in such a world, and for the proof read any of Obama's speeches or just daily newspapers. Ayn Rand philosophy is the only mean to fight this ongoing carnage of self-abnegation. There are many other people who undermine Ayn Rand, so it is no need for Objectivists to do so.

Edited May 7, 2010 by Leonid

[imurray]

George H. Smith "Subjectively speaking, we always act on our "highest value" in any given action that involves choice. This is true virtually by definition, since if we didn't subjectively value X above other alternatives at a given point in time, we would not have acted to achieve X. "

Not necessarily. 1. Standard of value defines value, but in Objectivism such a standard pertains to reality which is human life. This is only standard which could be non-contradictory validated. Therefore any substitution of such a standard to subjective standard will always lead to sacrifice-that is exchange of the greater value to the lesser one.

2. Christian morality which dominated West for 2000 years had been secularized by Kant and Compte. Our world is shaped rather by them than by Christ. Kant's ethics don't recognize any standard of value, only duties. According to this philosophy one shouldn't get any benefit from one’s action. In Kantian world mother Teresa cannot be altruist, only John Galt can. We are living in such a world, and for the proof read any of Obama's speeches or just daily newspapers. Ayn Rand philosophy is the only mean to fight this ongoing carnage of self-abnegation. There are many other people who undermine Ayn Rand, so it is no need for Objectivists to do so.

Leonid,

George predicated his statement with "subjectively speaking."

I also disagree with attributing our current condition to Kant. If I understand what you're intimating about Obama and his speeches it would be wrong to call his actions "Kantian" as they would most definitely be unethical according to Kant. The idea of an autonomous, rational, human will was important to Kant and to make another man an instrument against his will, i.e., to exploit him or 'mould' him was to fundamentally degrade him, to make him a slave, or to treat him as less than human. The only rules one 'must' follow as a rational human are those that are valid to all rational humans, i.e. rational values - the rest can be opted out of. This is not much different from Rand in this regard.

Edited May 7, 2010 by Panoptic

[anthony]

WhYNOT,

Your example further confuses the point, unfortunately. Belief in the afterlife cannot be an objective/rationally held value. It is strictly a matter of faith and faith does not require intellectual/rational assent. We must keep in mind the importance of the rational individual in Rand's philosophy. What others are arguing is that Rand is suggesting that simply by holding a value, any value, that it is moral to act upon it - that's nuts!

[/quote

Panoptic, you missed my point.

As I see it, ancient, and literal, god-fearing sacrifice was the precursor to the modern collectivist sacrificial mentality; plus, it was our earliest experience of the concept "sacrifice" and these are the only reasons I mentioned it.

I was trying not to get bogged down on the mystical side of sacrifice, apart from raising the point that a true believer is being as 'morally' consistent as he knows how by following through with the actions accorded by his 'knowledge' - but being based on non-reality, and non-reason, his values cannot be objectively moral - thus he is incapable of true sacrifice.

I am in accord with the Randian doctrine, simply : Reality -> Reason -> Objective Values. By definition (Rand's) it is only possible to sacrifice objective values ... not mindless, irrational ones.

Tony

[imurray]

WhYNOT,

Your example further confuses the point, unfortunately. Belief in the afterlife cannot be an objective/rationally held value. It is strictly a matter of faith and faith does not require intellectual/rational assent. We must keep in mind the importance of the rational individual in Rand's philosophy. What others are arguing is that Rand is suggesting that simply by holding a value, any value, that it is moral to act upon it - that's nuts!

[/quote

Panoptic, you missed my point.

As I see it, ancient, and literal, god-fearing sacrifice was the precursor to the modern collectivist sacrificial mentality; plus, it was our earliest experience of the concept "sacrifice" and these are the only reasons I mentioned it.

I was trying not to get bogged down on the mystical side of sacrifice, apart from raising the point that a true believer is being as 'morally' consistent as he knows how by following through with the actions accorded by his 'knowledge' - but being based on non-reality, and non-reason, his values cannot be objectively moral - thus he is incapable of true sacrifice.

I am in accord with the Randian doctrine, simply : Reality -> Reason -> Objective Values. By definition (Rand's) it is only possible to sacrifice objective values ... not mindless, irrational ones.

Tony

Sorry, Tony. You're right - I missed your point when I read your comment the first time. Thanks for the clarification. I was confused by your example. Hmmm, where have we witnessed that before? Haha.

Ian

[anthony]

However, while it's certain that Rand had clarity in her own mind using this somewhat strange illustration, she did expose herself to 'unsympathetic' criticism; and those of us concentrating on this one tiny aspect of her important views of Sacrifice, are attempting to build a strawman out of her arguments.(IMO)

Tony

The hat example was not a felicitous choice by Rand.

Examples can be very tricky in philosophical arguments. They should serve to clarify a theoretical point by positing a concrete instance in which the variables are kept to a minimum. But the hat example introduces a number of unexplained variables that can leave the reader scratching his head, and that can lead to conflicting interpretations. This is so because complex examples will be interpreted differently by different people, according to their own philosophical views.

The hat hypothetical is a complex example that incorporates assumptions that Rand did not adequately explain beforehand, such as the role played by subjective value judgments in her notion of "sacrifice." When readers spend more time puzzling over your example than they do over the point you wish to clarify with it, then that is a sure indication that the example has not served its intended purpose.

In the Preface to the first edition of Critique of Pure Reason, Kant explains why he deleted the examples he had incorporated into early drafts of his difficult book: "For the aids to clearness, though they may be of assistance in regard to details, often interfere with our grasp of the whole." (Trans. Norman Kemp Smith, p. 13.)

Ghs

Ghs,

True; a self-evident illustration of what is meant to be elucidating, turning out to be obfuscatory.

(I'm getting the hang of this philosophy-speak. Not that I think you indulge in it, btw, I admire your own clear thought and language.)

About sacrifice. Can we ever settle any debate here without clarifying objective value? Which means taking on subjectivity.

Not Subjectivism, mind, but subjectivity.

People, it's time I came out of the closet, and bared my soul:

I have a bunch of pre-rational*, subjective values.

THERE, I've said it. (It wasn't so difficult.)

Who, specifically O'ists, can deny that they do too?

Choosing a hat, an auto, a wife(?!); visually, prefering a stark, barren landscape, to a lush, tropical, one. This ice-cream flavour, over that one. Oh, and I just can't stand Donald Trump (don't ask me why) though some consider him a fine Capitalist.

The list is endless.

Personal observations: (In reply to those who believe that subjectivity and Objectivism are mutually exclusive.)

I've found that to disallow this subjectivity in me can be self-alienating, as well as denying myself some pleasures of living.

It seems that the more I consider my subjectivity, the more I find Objectivity. Put one way, rational thought has a 'trickle down' effect onto my emotions, and my unconscious, objectifying them.

In return, an 'ebbing-up' effect from my unconscious mind, has great efficacy on my life and work. "Intuition", maybe?

However, without a strong structure of Objective values, one could (as I came close once) become ruled by the subjective.

Hierarchy, and degree, and context, are, as always, all- important here.

I do not think any subjective 'value' could be elevated to one's hierarchical, objective, value- system, for example. Unless, on the rare occasion that it comes to merit inclusion there. I'm not sure about this one.

Do I need to add that, of course, one should have constantly, a clear and definite delineation between the two?

The scale of values, from the top- most, rational ones, down to lowest subjective ones, that a person holds, is the core of his morality. To fiddle around, evasively raising one above another, within that hierarchy, at whim, or by outside intimidation, constitutes a commission of true sacrifice in Ayn Rand's terms. (As I see it.) "Higher value to lower one."

*'pre-rational', a useful term borrowed from MSK.

Tony

[Xray]

One certain matters, Rand was at the top of her game. For example her view of money is right on point.

In what respect? Wasn't it naive of her to believe in unbridled capitalism?

Baa'l ChatzafShe was correct to prefer capitalism and markets to socialism and collectivism.

Baa'l Chatzaf: Her preference for liberty over the bondage of slavery and unfounded duty is correct.

Child labor, sex slavery, drug trade all operate on capitalist principles, where tremendous profit are made.

Or think of capitalist companies exploiting people via water privatization, where e. g. residents in the Bolivian town of Cochabamba had to pay up to 20 per cent of their income for water.

Ba'al Chatzaf: On some other matters (primarily scientific and mathematical) she was greatly uninformed and just plain wrong.

For example, in calling the Second Law of Thermodynamcis a "story". "I never believed that story", Rearden says in AS.

I just read your post on the other thread where you asked:

Ba'al Chatzaf: Are there any folks on this board who cherish a hope in their hidden heart of hearts that the second law of thermodynamics is wrong?

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8578&st=0&p=97882entry97882

It looks like the consequences of the Second Law of Thermodynamics in regard to the universe are a tough issue even for atheists. ;)

Panoptic: Xray and Daniel,

Let me help you both out. This is an excerpt from a famous essay by Stanley Fish: "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser" (in Doing What Comes Naturally, 1989). It's an elegant essay and, I think, you'll immediately see why your arguments reminded me of it.

Quote

But the asking of hard questions is not something the theory encourages, and indeed its weaknesses from one point of view are its strengths from another. By defining his key terms in a number of ways, Iser provides himself in advance with a storehouse of defensive strategies. A theory that characterizes reality in on place as a set of determinate objects, and in another place as the product of "thought systems," and in a third place as a heterogeneous flux will not be embarrassed by any question you might put to it. It is a marvelous machine whose very loose-jointedness makes it invulnerable to a frontal assault (including, no doubt, the assault I am now mounting). It is in fact not a theory at all, but a piece of literature that satisfied Iser's own criteria for an "aesthetic object"...

I think you can see how this, after swapping out a few terms, would work rather nicely with your arguments against Rand. I think it's ironic that the same argument Fish launched against Iser, whose theory revolves around subjectivity and pluralism, has been made against Rand.

Wolfgang Iser was one of the leading figures in the science of literature in the 1970s. I once attended a fascinating guest lecture he held on 'negativity' in Beckett's work. I'm quite surprised to see Iser attacked that harshly by S. Fish.

Fish's criticism is justifed in case Iser actually declared these to be definitions (and not mere connotations and personal associations he (or the literary characters he analyzes) have with a term.

For example, he might have written about a stream of consciousness-scene in a modern novel: "In character X, reality is reflected as a heterogenous flux ...".

Iser was no epistemologist, whereas Rand saw herself as one, evidenced in her writing of ITOE.

Edited May 8, 2010 by Xray

[imurray]

One certain matters, Rand was at the top of her game. For example her view of money is right on point.

In what respect? Wasn't it naive of her to believe in unbridled capitalism?

Baa'l ChatzafShe was correct to prefer capitalism and markets to socialism and collectivism.

Baa'l Chatzaf: Her preference for liberty over the bondage of slavery and unfounded duty is correct.

Child labor, sex slavery, drug trade all operate on capitalist principles, where tremendous profit are made.

Or think of capitalist companies exploiting people via water privatization, where e. g. residents in the Bolivian town of Cochabamba had to pay up to 20 per cent of their income for water.

Ba'al Chatzaf: On some other matters (primarily scientific and mathematical) she was greatly uninformed and just plain wrong.

For example, in calling the Second Law of Thermodynamcis a "story". "I never believed that story", Rearden says in AS.

I just read your post on the other thread where you asked:

Ba'al Chatzaf: Are there any folks on this board who cherish a hope in their hidden heart of hearts that the second law of thermodynamics is wrong?

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/index.php?showtopic=8578&st=0&p=97882entry97882

It looks like the consequences of the Second Law of Thermodynamics in regard to the universe are a tough issue even for atheists. ;)

Panoptic: Xray and Daniel,

Let me help you both out. This is an excerpt from a famous essay by Stanley Fish: "Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser" (in Doing What Comes Naturally, 1989). It's an elegant essay and, I think, you'll immediately see why your arguments reminded me of it.

Quote

But the asking of hard questions is not something the theory encourages, and indeed its weaknesses from one point of view are its strengths from another. By defining his key terms in a number of ways, Iser provides himself in advance with a storehouse of defensive strategies. A theory that characterizes reality in on place as a set of determinate objects, and in another place as the product of "thought systems," and in a third place as a heterogeneous flux will not be embarrassed by any question you might put to it. It is a marvelous machine whose very loose-jointedness makes it invulnerable to a frontal assault (including, no doubt, the assault I am now mounting). It is in fact not a theory at all, but a piece of literature that satisfied Iser's own criteria for an "aesthetic object"...

I think you can see how this, after swapping out a few terms, would work rather nicely with your arguments against Rand. I think it's ironic that the same argument Fish launched against Iser, whose theory revolves around subjectivity and pluralism, has been made against Rand.

Wolfgang Iser was one of the leading figures in the science of literature in the 1970s. I once attended a fascinating guest lecture he held on 'negativity' in Beckett's work. I'm quite surprised to see Iser attacked that harshly by S. Fish.

Fish's criticism is justifed in case Iser actually declared these to be definitions (and not mere connotations and personal associations he (or the literary characters he analyzes) have with a term.

For example, he might have written about a stream of consciousness-scene in a modern novel: "In character X, reality is reflected as a heterogenous flux ...".

Iser was no epistemologist, whereas Rand saw herself as one, evidenced in her writing of ITOE.

It was the argument I was referring to, not its validity in respect to Iser. I am personally a fan of Iser's work.

[Brant Gaede]

One certain matters, Rand was at the top of her game. For example her view of money is right on point.

In what respect? Wasn't it naive of her to believe in unbridled capitalism?

Baa'l ChatzafShe was correct to prefer capitalism and markets to socialism and collectivism.

Baa'l Chatzaf: Her preference for liberty over the bondage of slavery and unfounded duty is correct.

Child labor, sex slavery, drug trade all operate on capitalist principles, where tremendous profit are made.

Or think of capitalist companies exploiting people via water privatization, where e. g. residents in the Bolivian town of Cochabamba had to pay up to 20 per cent of their income for water.

There is no such thing as "unbridled capitalism" even in theoretical anarchical constructs. Rand never advocated any such thing whatever any such thing is. Is it "child labor, sex slavery, [and the] drug trade all [of which] operate on capitalist principles"? Slavery is a "capitalist" principle? A smear is neither an argument nor understanding. The operating basis for capitalism is the protection of individual rights. The moral basis underlying that is rational self interest, etc. If your critique doesn't address the relationship of rights to the economic consequences, you are spinning your let's-get-freedom-wheels in collectivist slime. If you wish to demonstrate that capitalism is not freedom in action but a cruel joke then talk about freedom and how if we give up some of it we'll have more of it. Good luck with that.

--Brant

Edited May 8, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[George H. Smith]

About sacrifice. Can we ever settle any debate here without clarifying objective value? Which means taking on subjectivity. Not Subjectivism, mind, but subjectivity.

As I recall (without rereading all the posts in this lengthy thread), those who have criticized Rand's use of "sacrifice" have quoted dictionary definitions of the word, according to which to sacrifice is to give up something of lesser value for something of greater value. For example, one definition in the American Heritage Dictionary reads: "Forfeiture of something highly valued for the sake of one considered to have a greater value or claim."

One problem here is that there are other definitions of "sacrifice." For example, another definition in American Heritage reads: "Relinquishment of something at less than its presumed value." And in Merriam-Webster's 11th Collegiate Dictionary, we find these definitions: "destruction or surrender of something for the sake of something else." And: "LOSS *goods sold at a sacrifice*"

All of these definitions are consistent with Rand's conception of "sacrifice" as "the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue." Hence there are no compelling linguistic grounds for criticizing Rand's approach.

The only cogent philosophical objection is the argument that it is impossible to surrender a greater value for a lesser value, because if one chooses X over Y, this means that one valued X more highly than Y at the time one's decision was made. If this were not the case, one would not be motivated to choose X at all.

This analysis, as I have said before, is based on a subjective (i.e., psychological) approach to value judgments. It is a mere truism to say that I always act to achieve what I subjectively value most at the time. Rand would not disagree with this. She was clearly thinking of objective values in her discussion of sacrifice.

Nearly 40 years ago, in ATCAG, I drew the following distinction (which is pretty commonplace in philosophy) between two meanings of "value":

From ATCAG, p. 285

We thus see that the concept of value applies to man in two different respects. First, there is the objective sense of "value," in which things are of value to man -- i.e., conducive to his welfare -- whether he chooses to recognize them or not. Second, there is the subjective sense of "value," in which "value" designates the result of an evaluative process; and a man's values, in this case, represent his personal preferences. It is possible, therefore, for a man to value things (in a subjective sense) that are not in fact of value to him (in an objective sense). Man can pursue self-destructive courses of action; he can pursue goals that are detrimental to his welfare. Nature does not provide him with an automatic means of survival.

I have a few more comments, but they are on a different subject, so I will place them in a separate post.

Ghs

[Xray]

About sacrifice. Can we ever settle any debate here without clarifying objective value?

I don't think we can. For "objective value" is the root premise on which Objectivsm is based. The whole ideology rests on it.

In case the premise of objective value should be exposed as an error (= as false), the consequences are dramatic: it would remove Objectivism's basis.

As I recall (without rereading all the posts in this lengthy thread), those who have criticized Rand's use of "sacrifice" have quoted dictionary definitions of the word, according to which to sacrifice is to give up something of lesser value for something of greater value. For example, one definition in the American Heritage Dictionary reads: "Forfeiture of something highly valued for the sake of one considered to have a greater value or claim."

One problem here is that there are other definitions of "sacrifice." For example, another definition in American Heritage reads: "Relinquishment of something at less than its presumed value." And in Merriam-Webster's 11th Collegiate Dictionary, we find these definitions: "destruction or surrender of something for the sake of something else." And: "LOSS *goods sold at a sacrifice*"

All of these these definitions are consistent with Rand's conception of "sacrifice" as "the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue." Hence there are no compelling linguistic grounds for criticizing Rand's approach.

Dictionary entries are only of limited help here. For they frequently offer mere examples of the contexts in which a term is used. I recall looking up the definition of the term "truth" in a dictionary and found the phrase "divine truth" listed in the entry as well. ;)

As for pointing out that there exist no compelling linguistic grounds for criticizing Rand's approach, this of course pulls the ground from under Rand's feet as well, since it was she who made a big case of the "truth or falsehood of definitions".

"The truth or falsehood of all of man’s conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions." (Rand, ITOE, p. 65)

So there was definitely a claim on Rand's part regarding the "truth" or "falsehood" of definitions, which allows the inference that she thought her definitions were the "correct" ones, the "true" ones.

GHS: The only cogent philosophical objection is the argument that it is impossible to surrender a greater value for a lesser value, because if one chooses X over Y, this means that one valued X more highly than Y at the time one's decision was made. If this were not the case, one would not be motivated to choose X at all.

This is my take on it as well. For no one engages in a trade in order to obtain a lower value. Always it is the higher value one wants to get.

This doesn't imply you always get what you have bargained for. You can sacrifice your queen in a chess game and still lose.

Which is why we often hear people complain, in hindsight, "I sacrificed X for Y but it was not worth it".

GHS: This analysis, as I have said before, is based on a subjective (i.e., psychological) approach to value judgments. It is a mere truism to say that I always act to achieve what I subjectively value most at the time. Rand would not disagree with this. She was clearly thinking of objective values in her discussion of sacrifice.

Indeed she was. This is the premise: objective value. Doing the litmus test on it is essential.

Since Rand's 'definitions' cause more confusion than clarity, why not abandon completely, in this discussion, the term "sacrifice" she used?

A few posts ago, I suggested (with a grain of salt) that we could as well use the acronym "Trahifalova" (= "trading a higher for a lower value").

For this would put the key problem far more in relief: what IS the "higher" and "lower" value? Higher/lower value from whose perspective? Suppose Paris Hilton suddenly gives all her money to the poor and then leads a life of spiritual contemplation in the Himalaya, is it possible to "objectively" decide which is the lower value? It is not possible.

Frankly, who was Ayn Rand to arbitarily decide that e. g. "Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man’s life."

http://exiledonline.com/atlas-shrieked-why-ayn-rands-right-wing-followers-are-scarier-than-the-manson-family-and-the-gruesome-story-of-the-serial-killer-who-stole-ayn-rands-heart/

What do you think of Nathaniel Branden's comment:

"Another aspect of her philosophy that I would like to talk about — one of the hazards — is the appalling moralism that Ayn Rand herself practiced and that so many of her followers also practice. I don't know of anyone other than the Church fathers in the Dark Ages who used the word "evil" quite so often as Ayn Rand." (NB)

The complete article is posted in # 984. Who has not read it yet - it is a must-read imo. One can hardly recognize the former NB who was once a Rand disciple. Branden also calls Objectivism a religion:

"What she was saying, translated into simple English, is: Everything I have to say in the field of philosophy is true, absolutely true, and therefore any departure necessarily leads you into error. Don't try to mix your irrational fantasies with my immutable truths. This insistence turned Ayn Rand's philosophy, for all practical purposes, into dogmatic religion, and many of her followers chose that path." (NB)

He also saw the impossibility in meeting the burden of proof (emphasis mine):

"The true believers might respond by saying, "How can you call it dogmatic religion when we can prove every one of Ayn Rand's propositions?!" My answer to that is, "The hell you can!" Prior to our break, Ayn Rand credited me with understanding her philosophy better than any other person alive — and not merely better, but far better. I know what we were in a position to prove, I know where the gaps are. And so can anyone else — by careful, critical reading. It's not all that difficult or complicated." (NB)

Indeed it is is not difficult or complicated. Careful, critical reading will work just fine.

GHS. Nearly 40 years ago, in ATCAG, I drew the following distinction (which is pretty commonplace in philosophy) between two meanings of "value":

From ATCAG, p. 285

We thus see that the concept of value applies to man in two different respects. First, there is the objective sense of "value," in which things are of value to man -- i.e., conducive to his welfare -- whether he chooses to recognize them or not. Second, there is the subjective sense of "value," in which "value" designates the result of an evaluative process; and a man's values, in this case, represent his personal preferences. It is possible, therefore, for a man to value things (in a subjective sense) that are not in fact of value to him (in an objective sense). Man can pursue self-destructive courses of action; he can pursue goals that are detrimental to his welfare. Nature does not provide him with an automatic means of survival.

Actions have objective consequences. How these are valued depends on the individual.

Aside from that, who is to decide what is "conducive to man's welfare"? For example, a person may decide, given that life is so short anyway, to burn the candle at two ends. For our individual ideas of 'welfare' differ as well, and wanting to reach a biblical age is not necessarily high on everyone's list. Some may even choose non-existence over existence. Again, who is to decide whether their subjective choice is of "objective" value or not? What are those criteria?

For Rand's claim that 'the standard of value is one's life' is an arbitrary choice as well.

Edited May 8, 2010 by Xray

[Dragonfly]

Rand does not equate values with desires.

Rand defines value as "that which one acts to gain and/or keep", in other words, it is the action that defines the value. But she contradicts this with her own examples of the mother with the child: in both cases she mentions, the mother acts to keep the child alive (by not buying the hat), so according to her own definition the child has a higher value than the possession of the new hat. But then she writes "it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve [implying that she would prefer buying the hat] and feeds him only from a sense of duty", so now it's no longer her action that determines her values, but what she would prefer to do, in other words, her actions don't count but her desires. The magic word she uses here is "duty", which she defines as "the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest", as if a mother who would prefer the new hat would save her child only because some "higher authority" had told her to do so (this echoes the religionist's argument that people without religion cannot have morals because you need religion, for example the ten commandments, to tell you what you should do).

People choose to reevaluate and adjust their value priorities all the time. I've done this on many occasions.

Value priorities may change over time, for example because something that seemed at first valuable may turn out to be less desirable than some alternative. But that mother cannot just say to herself "it is rational to value my child higher than a new hat, so from now on the child has a higher value to me". What she can do is to act on that principle, but for Rand this isn't sufficient, the mother has to change her desires, which she cannot do voluntarily, so she would remain immoral even if she can't do anything about it, in which case "immoral" becomes a meaningless term.

What a shame that Rand didn't explore every possible variation and nuance when presenting her brief example. She might have been able to do this in ten pages, and those ten pages would have greatly enhanced the dramatic impact of Galt's Speech, don't you think? Such a digression would have been a real page turner.

That's a literary argument, not a philosophical one. If her example is bad (I don't think it could have been saved anyway by adding ten more pages), she should have omitted it. After all, she gives a whole list of examples, and the speech is far too long anyway - most readers skim or skip it, so it doesn't seem to have such a dramatic impact at all. It would have had more effect by cutting some 90%.

[George H. Smith]

All of these these definitions are consistent with Rand's conception of "sacrifice" as "the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue." Hence there are no compelling linguistic grounds for criticizing Rand's approach.

Dictionary entries are only of limited help here.

Tell that to whoever cited a dictionary definition of "sacrifice" to use against Rand. I was merely responding in kind.

As for pointing out that there exist no compelling linguistic grounds for criticizing Rand's approach, this of course pulls the ground from under Rand's feet as well, since it was she who made a big case of the "truth or falsehood of definitions".

To my knowledge, Rand never denied that the same word can have several different (and correct) definitions, depending on the context in which that word is used.

GHS: This analysis, as I have said before, is based on a subjective (i.e., psychological) approach to value judgments. It is a mere truism to say that I always act to achieve what I subjectively value most at the time. Rand would not disagree with this. She was clearly thinking of objective values in her discussion of sacrifice.

Indeed she was. This is the premise: objective value. Doing the litmus test on it is essential.

Not really. To understand what Rand is saying is one thing; to agree with her is another thing entirely.

You may disagree with Rand over the existence of objective values, but that has no bearing on whether her discussion of "sacrifice" makes sense.

Since Rand's 'definitions' cause more confusion than clarity, why not abandon completely, in this discussion, the term "sacrifice" she used?

I find nothing confusing in how Rand uses "sacrifice." She is very clear about what she means. Moreover, since the altruist doctrines that she was combating frequently refer to "self-sacrifice," it is entirely appropriate for her to use the same terminology.

I will continue this later....

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

People choose to reevaluate and adjust their value priorities all the time. I've done this on many occasions.

Value priorities may change over time, for example because something that seemed at first valuable may turn out to be less desirable than some alternative. But that mother cannot just say to herself "it is rational to value my child higher than a new hat, so from now on the child has a higher value to me".

Why can't she do this?

I drove a motorcycle for years in the L.A. area, until I decided that the risk wasn't worth it. In other words, I rationally reevaluated my priorities, and I stopped driving a motorcycle after doing so.

Again, people do this all the time -- e.g., in regard to smoking, eating better, getting more exercise, etc. And these shifts in value priorities don't always occur "over time." A single decision is sometimes sufficient.

Ghs

[imurray]

Dragonfly: You keep writing the same thing, but have not taken on either George's or my arguments which address the problems you've created in Rand's example.

Xray: George is correct. The right definition is context dependent. This is the same problem you're making for sacrifice - you're not using the right definition in the context of Rand's writing. You are inserting the wrong definition and that is what is leading to the confusion - hence the importance of contextually correct definitions.

You are also, imo, misunderstanding what she means by family, friends, etc. are not primary. She is not saying they're not important, on the contrary in order for them to be of objective value/importance we must first hold primary objective values which allow for those kinds of relationships to begin with.

Brant: Come back when you're not as confused.

Ian

Edited May 8, 2010 by Panoptic

[Dragonfly]

People choose to reevaluate and adjust their value priorities all the time. I've done this on many occasions.

Value priorities may change over time, for example because something that seemed at first valuable may turn out to be less desirable than some alternative. But that mother cannot just say to herself "it is rational to value my child higher than a new hat, so from now on the child has a higher value to me".

Why can't she do this?

I drove a motorcycle for years in the L.A. area, until I decided that the risk wasn't worth it. In other words, I rationally reevaluated my priorities, and I stopped driving a motorcycle after doing so.

Again, people do this all the time -- e.g., in regard to smoking, eating better, getting more exercise, etc. And these shifts in value priorities don't always occur "over time." A single decision is sometimes sufficient.

These are all examples of changing your actions. But the "immoral" mother does exactly the same: she does save her child, but that is not enough to Rand: the mother remains immoral because she still desires buying the hat more than saving her child. So a person who decides to stop smoking or gets more exercise would be immoral if he still craves smoking or would prefer to sit on the couch at home.

[George H. Smith]

Frankly, who was Ayn Rand to arbitarily decide that e. g. "Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man’s life."

http://exiledonline.com/atlas-shrieked-why-ayn-rands-right-wing-followers-are-scarier-than-the-manson-family-and-the-gruesome-story-of-the-serial-killer-who-stole-ayn-rands-heart/

If you expect me to respond to you in a serious way, you will need to do a lot better than to cite that vicious hatchet-job by Mark Ames.

Is this the type of source from which you get your information about Rand? If so, it may be only a matter of time until you link Whittaker Chambers' notorious review of Atlas Shrugged, while asking me to respond to his comment: "From almost any page of Atlas Shrugged, a voice can be heard, from painful necessity, commanding: 'To a gas chamber — go!'"

I want to keep the various topics you raised separate, so I will again continue this in another post.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

People choose to reevaluate and adjust their value priorities all the time. I've done this on many occasions.

Value priorities may change over time, for example because something that seemed at first valuable may turn out to be less desirable than some alternative. But that mother cannot just say to herself "it is rational to value my child higher than a new hat, so from now on the child has a higher value to me".

Why can't she do this?

I drove a motorcycle for years in the L.A. area, until I decided that the risk wasn't worth it. In other words, I rationally reevaluated my priorities, and I stopped driving a motorcycle after doing so.

Again, people do this all the time -- e.g., in regard to smoking, eating better, getting more exercise, etc. And these shifts in value priorities don't always occur "over time." A single decision is sometimes sufficient.

These are all examples of changing your actions.

No, these are examples of reevaluating and changing one's value priorities and then taking the appropriate actions based on the reevaluation.

I just didn't stop riding my motorcycle all of a sudden, for no reason. I gave the matter a good deal of thought first, and it was owing to that thought process that I altered my behavior.

But the "immoral" mother does exactly the same: she does save her child, but that is not enough to Rand: the mother remains immoral because she still desires buying the hat more than saving her child. So a person who decides to stop smoking or gets more exercise would be immoral if he still craves smoking or would prefer to sit on the couch at home.

I have said before that the hat example is complex and therefore potentially confusing; you have mentioned one of the reasons why this is so. Nevertheless, apart from some moral complications, if the hat example is used only to illustrate Rand's notion of "sacrifice," then I don't have a serious problem with it.

Ghs

[imurray]

These are all examples of changing your actions. But the "immoral" mother does exactly the same: she does save her child, but that is not enough to Rand: the mother remains immoral because she still desires buying the hat more than saving her child. So a person who decides to stop smoking or gets more exercise would be immoral if he still craves smoking or would prefer to sit on the couch at home.

Dragonfly,

No. The point is the mother changes her mind out of "duty" not because she rationally decided the child is more valuable and therefore her value is still immoral despite her actions. Your examples are not the same assuming that the individuals rationally decided to value their health more than smoking or being lazy and did not simply act out of "duty". Before you get into "thought crimes" you should be aware that no external authority is going to arrest the mother or label her immoral for feeding the baby (unless she goes around saying "boy I should have bought that hat instead of feeding my kid"). The example is merely to show the difference between acting out of duty and acting out of obligation to objective values.

[George H. Smith]

What do you think of Nathaniel Branden's comment:

"Another aspect of her philosophy that I would like to talk about — one of the hazards — is the appalling moralism that Ayn Rand herself practiced and that so many of her followers also practice. I don't know of anyone other than the Church fathers in the Dark Ages who used the word "evil" quite so often as Ayn Rand." (NB)

I agree that Rand was overly moralistic. Part of the problem here, as I have discussed elsewhere on OL, is that Rand did not have an adequate theory of "morally indifferent" actions. (This has been a major topic in the history of ethical theory.) She greatly overextended the proper domain of moral judgments.

The complete article is posted in # 984. Who has not read it yet - it is a must-read imo. One can hardly recognize the former NB who was once a Rand disciple. Branden also calls Objectivism a religion:

"What she was saying, translated into simple English, is: Everything I have to say in the field of philosophy is true, absolutely true, and therefore any departure necessarily leads you into error. Don't try to mix your irrational fantasies with my immutable truths. This insistence turned Ayn Rand's philosophy, for all practical purposes, into dogmatic religion, and many of her followers chose that path." (NB)

NB does not call Objectivism per se a religion. He distinguishes between the substance of Objectivism and how Rand often presented it, e.g.: "on the one hand she preached a morality of joy, personal happiness, and individual fulfillment; on the other hand, she was a master at scaring the hell out of you if you respected and admired her and wanted to apply her philosophy to your own life."

This is essentially the same distinction, if more vigorously expressed, that I drew in "Objectivism as a Religion."

He also saw the impossibility in meeting the burden of proof (emphasis mine):

"The true believers might respond by saying, "How can you call it dogmatic religion when we can prove every one of Ayn Rand's propositions?!" My answer to that is, "The hell you can!" Prior to our break, Ayn Rand credited me with understanding her philosophy better than any other person alive — and not merely better, but far better. I know what we were in a position to prove, I know where the gaps are. And so can anyone else — by careful, critical reading. It's not all that difficult or complicated." (NB)

NB says nothing about the impossibility of meeting the burden of proof in regard to Rand's ideas; this is merely your self-serving spin on his remarks. Rather, he says that neither Rand nor her followers actually did, or could, prove "every one of Ayn Rand's propositions." (My emphasis.) I agree with this, of course.

Ghs

[Leonid]

Panoptic "I also disagree with attributing our current condition to Kant"

"Whatever increases self-love ought to be rejected from moral philosophy" (Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, 1963, p. 136.)

"So we shall acknowledge that we are under obligation to help a poor man; but since the favor we do implies that his well-being depends on our generosity, and this humbles him, it is our duty to behave as if our help is either merely what is due him" (Ibid., p. 449.) According to Kant, it is a virtue to want the happiness of others, while to want one's own happiness is ethically indifferent,“ since it is something which the nature of man is striving for and a natural striving cannot have positive ethical sense. (Cf. I. Kant,1909, esp. Part I, Book I, Chapter I, § VIII, Remark II, p. 126:) As an ethical principle, the striving for one's own happiness „is the most objectionable one, not merely because it is false,... but because the springs it provides for morality are such as rather undermineit and destroy its sublimity...“ (Ibid. - in particular Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals ; second section, p. 61.) „Rational self-love“ must be restricted by ethical principles, the pleasure in oneself must be battered down and the individual must come to feel humiliated in comparing himself with the sanctity ofmoral laws. (Ibid. - in particular Part I, Book I, Chapter III, p. 165.)The individual should find supreme happiness in the fulfillment of his duty. The realization of the moral principle - and, therefore, of the individual's happiness- is only possible in the general whole, the nation, the state. To be beneficent where one can is a duty; and besides, there are a good many souls so sympathetically attuned that, even without any other motive of vanity or of self-serving advantage, they fred an inner enjoyment in spreading joy around them and can take delight in the satisfaction of others, in so far as this is their work. But I claim that in the case of an action like this, however dutiful and however amiable that action may be, it has no true moral worth...for the maxim lacks moral content, namely, the performance of such actions not from inclination but from duty."

"Be a good citizen. Think about the other guy...In America, we must never forget how lucky we are to have so many men and women who believe - who are willing to put aside their own pursuit of happiness, to subordinate their own sense of survival, for something bigger - something greater...That's the promise of America - the idea that we are responsible for ourselves, but that we also rise or fall as one nation; the fundamental belief that I am my brother's keeper; I am my sister's keeper."

Barak Hussein Obama

Edited May 8, 2010 by Leonid

[Xray]

Frankly, who was Ayn Rand to arbitarily decide that e. g. "Friendship, family life and human relationships are not primary in a man’s life."

http://exiledonline.com/atlas-shrieked-why-ayn-rands-right-wing-followers-are-scarier-than-the-manson-family-and-the-gruesome-story-of-the-serial-killer-who-stole-ayn-rands-heart/

If you expect me to respond to you in a serious way, you will need to do a lot better than to cite that vicious hatchet-job by Mark Ames.

Seasoned debater that you are, you are trying to dilute the message of the Rand quote by discreditng the source who put the quote there. But however you slice it, the Rand quote is evidence of her thinking, regardless of who quoted it.

GHS: Is this the type of source from which you get your information about Rand? If so, it may be only a matter of time until you link Whittaker Chambers' notorious review of Atlas Shrugged, while asking me to respond to his comment: "From almost any page of Atlas Shrugged, a voice can be heard, from painful necessity, commanding: 'To a gas chamber — go!'"

My focus is on the primary source: Rand's own words. Who directs me to them and why is secondary. I want to examine the "objective value" doctrine expressed in ideologies and religions.