Settling the debate on Altruism

[bmacwilliam]

For the altruist the happiness would come as a result of performing the action AND would be dependent on how they perceive the response of others to the action, that is, they will only be happy if the action made "others" happy. This is why there is a problem with acting altruistically - one is dependent on others for their own happiness.

I quite liked George's post on Butler as well, and I tend to agree. But I don't agree with this conclusion of yours. The motivation (once we wisely get beyond the first-level "trivial" self-interest that always must exist) is explicitly to help others, true. I go to the grocery store an buy much more food than I need because I feed my kids too. Yes, I CANNOT be happy if my kids are underfed and miserable if I don't choose this altruism. This is a problem? Hardly.

One big problem, as I see it, is twisting acts of altruism like this back into self-interest to defend a egoist position. This, I often think, is dishonest.

I can see a problem if altruism becomes the primary focus of one's life, I agree. But it's not an either/or.

Bob

Edited March 31, 2010 by Bob_Mac

[tjohnson]

I can see a problem if altruistism becomes the primary focus of one's life, I agree. But it's not an either/or.

I think the real issue is if a government decides it wants to "help people" and the people in power have different ideas about how to help people than us, and how they "help themselves" to the funds used to help less fortunate people, etc. I think Bob's point about it being natural to want to help people closely related to us is an important one and has a firm evolutionary basis. But in modern society our governments are helping people not related to us with our money and in ways we don't agree with and this is very different.

[bmacwilliam]

I can see a problem if altruistism becomes the primary focus of one's life, I agree. But it's not an either/or.

I think the real issue is if a government decides it wants to "help people" and the people in power have different ideas about how to help people than us, and how they "help themselves" to the funds used to help less fortunate people, etc. I think Bob's point about it being natural to want to help people closely related to us is an important one and has a firm evolutionary basis. But in modern society our governments are helping people not related to us with our money and in ways we don't agree with and this is very different.

Yep, I agree. A certain level of enforced altruism can be defended, but it often goes way too far.

Bob

[imurray]

For the altruist the happiness would come as a result of performing the action AND would be dependent on how they perceive the response of others to the action, that is, they will only be happy if the action made "others" happy. This is why there is a problem with acting altruistically - one is dependent on others for their own happiness.

I quite liked George's post on Butler as well, and I tend to agree. But I don't agree with this conclusion of yours. The motivation (once we wisely get beyond the first-level "trivial" self-interest that always must exist) is explicitly to help others, true. I go to the grocery store an buy much more food than I need because I feed my kids too. Yes, I CANNOT be happy if my kids are underfed and miserable if I don't choose this altruism. This is a problem? Hardly.

One big problem, as I see it, is twisting acts of altruism like this back into self-interest to defend a egoist position. This, I often think, is dishonest.

I can see a problem if altruistism becomes the primary focus of one's life, I agree. But it's not an either/or.

Bob

I think the problem here is using the wrong definition of altruism and not the technical philosophical term Comte first coined. There is no twisting back into self-interest in my example - in fact, I made sure to differentiate between "goals and actions" and "taking an interest" to avoid this problem. I don't disagree that acting altruistically may not always be a problem, but if you were an altruist as Comte's conceived it you would be overly dependent on the happiness of others for your own well-being and self-esteem. For example you wouldn't be happy unless your children were happy with what they ate - so you'd feed them sugary-sweet meals all the time just to make them smile. That doesn't help them, it helps you to be happy. An egoist would be happy with the act of giving the children a well-balanced diet. This is a very simple example, I realize.

The key is to understand the important role of "technical" language which belongs to special arts or sciences like philosophy. It should be assumed that the readers on this blog are familiar with the the terms and definitions that Rand used, therefore, it is unfair to say that Rand has somehow violated propriety or has committed an act of barbarism when it comes to her use of the term "altruism". It would seem that it is reasonably explained and defined by both her and Comte. It is okay, however, to point out where she may violate the rules of propriety within the context of her writing without making it explicit or to point out where her definition may be lacking. It is merely confusing to keep attributing different meanings to Rand's technical jargon - that is in itself a violation of propriety.

Edited March 31, 2010 by Panoptic

[bmacwilliam]

For the altruist the happiness would come as a result of performing the action AND would be dependent on how they perceive the response of others to the action, that is, they will only be happy if the action made "others" happy. This is why there is a problem with acting altruistically - one is dependent on others for their own happiness.

I quite liked George's post on Butler as well, and I tend to agree. But I don't agree with this conclusion of yours. The motivation (once we wisely get beyond the first-level "trivial" self-interest that always must exist) is explicitly to help others, true. I go to the grocery store an buy much more food than I need because I feed my kids too. Yes, I CANNOT be happy if my kids are underfed and miserable if I don't choose this altruism. This is a problem? Hardly.

One big problem, as I see it, is twisting acts of altruism like this back into self-interest to defend a egoist position. This, I often think, is dishonest.

I can see a problem if altruistism becomes the primary focus of one's life, I agree. But it's not an either/or.

Bob

I think the problem here is using the wrong definition of altruism and not the technical philosophical term Comte first coined. There is no twisting back into self-interest in my example - in fact, I made sure to differentiate between "goals and actions" and "taking an interest" to avoid this problem. I don't disagree that acting altruistically may not always be a problem, but if you were an altruist in Comte's example you would be overly dependent on the happiness of others for your own well-being and self-esteem. For example you wouldn't be happy unless your children were happy with what they ate - so you'd feed them sugary-sweet meals all the time just to make them smile. That doesn't help them, it helps you to be happy.

I agree with this, and to be clear, I was not accusing you of the "twist".

But look:

"I don't disagree that acting altruistically may not always be a problem"

vs

"This is why there is a problem with acting altruistically "

???

[imurray]

For the altruist the happiness would come as a result of performing the action AND would be dependent on how they perceive the response of others to the action, that is, they will only be happy if the action made "others" happy. This is why there is a problem with acting altruistically - one is dependent on others for their own happiness.

I quite liked George's post on Butler as well, and I tend to agree. But I don't agree with this conclusion of yours. The motivation (once we wisely get beyond the first-level "trivial" self-interest that always must exist) is explicitly to help others, true. I go to the grocery store an buy much more food than I need because I feed my kids too. Yes, I CANNOT be happy if my kids are underfed and miserable if I don't choose this altruism. This is a problem? Hardly.

One big problem, as I see it, is twisting acts of altruism like this back into self-interest to defend a egoist position. This, I often think, is dishonest.

I can see a problem if altruistism becomes the primary focus of one's life, I agree. But it's not an either/or.

Bob

I think the problem here is using the wrong definition of altruism and not the technical philosophical term Comte first coined. There is no twisting back into self-interest in my example - in fact, I made sure to differentiate between "goals and actions" and "taking an interest" to avoid this problem. I don't disagree that acting altruistically may not always be a problem, but if you were an altruist in Comte's example you would be overly dependent on the happiness of others for your own well-being and self-esteem. For example you wouldn't be happy unless your children were happy with what they ate - so you'd feed them sugary-sweet meals all the time just to make them smile. That doesn't help them, it helps you to be happy.

I agree with this, and to be clear, I was not accusing you of the "twist".

But look:

"I don't disagree that acting altruistically may not always be a problem"

vs

"This is why there is a problem with acting altruistically "

???

Agreed, poor choice of words on my part. I should have qualified the statement. Although I think I would be correct to say the latter if there was an understanding that I was using Rand's/Comte's definition, but I'd need to think about that more as I realize the contradiction in my own analysis.

I don't know enough to say I agree with Rand and I have a gut feeling that I don't, but I'm making an attempt to figure out what she meant before I continue to criticize her theory and incur the wrath of George. I'd rather come prepared - at least then I'll know if I have him beat and he's just not admitting it

Regarding the "twist" - I'm impressed by the acrobatics some people employ to get there, but find the core argument to be quite banal.

Edited March 31, 2010 by Panoptic

[bmacwilliam]

Agreed, poor choice of words on my part. I should have qualified the statement. Although I think I would be correct to say the latter if there was an understanding that I was using Rand's/Comte's definition, but I'd need to think about that more as I realize the contradiction in my own analysis.

I don't know enough to say I agree with Rand and I have a gut feeling that I don't, but I'm making an attempt to figure out what she meant before I continue to criticize her theory and incur the wrath of George. I'd rather come prepared

Rand wrote:

"Do you ask what moral obligation I owe to my fellow men? None—except the obligation I owe to myself, to material objects and to all of existence: rationality. I deal with men as my nature and theirs demands: by means of reason...."

"The moral purpose of a man’s life is the achievement of his own happiness. This does not mean that he is indifferent to all men, that human life is of no value to him and that he has no reason to help others in an emergency. But it does mean that he does not subordinate his life to the welfare of others, that he does not sacrifice himself to their needs, that the relief of their suffering is not his primary concern, that any help he gives is an exception, not a rule, an act of generosity, not of moral duty, that it is marginal and incidental—as disasters are marginal and incidental in the course of human existence—and that values, not disasters, are the goal, the first concern and the motive power of his life."

So this allows us to help others if we have a "reason" to, but indeed eliminates any possible "moral duty" to do so. As if a moral duty to help someone means he would "subordinate his life to the welfare of others". Of course, that "reason" she speaks of is inevitably the "twist" I mentioned earlier.

To her "sacrifice" is immoral:

"If you wish to save the last of your dignity, do not call your best actions a “sacrifice”: that term brands you as immoral. "

She also writes:

"If you give money to help a friend, it is not a sacrifice; if you give it to a worthless stranger, it is."

Charity is therefore not morally neutral in this case, it's immoral. Other times it's neutral.

She writes:

"If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty."

This is a nice little subtle twist here. She invites us to believe that we value the child and that's why we feed him (which sounds reasonable). She invites us to scorn the woman who only feeds her child because she has a "sense of duty" (makes sense too). Of course she ignores the reality that almost ALL of us feed our children because we value them AND we have a "sense of duty" to take care of them. But, for her having a "sense of duty" EVER to anyone else has to be bad. She's an intelligent, deceptive little creep.

Bob

[dan2100]

(big snip)

Charity is therefore not morally neutral in this case, it's immoral. Other times it's neutral.

She writes:

"If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty."

This is a nice little subtle twist here. She invites us to believe that we value the child and that's why we feed him (which sounds reasonable). She invites us to scorn the woman who only feeds her child because she has a "sense of duty" (makes sense too). Of course she ignores the reality that almost ALL of us feed our children because we value them AND we have a "sense of duty" to take care of them. But, for her having a "sense of duty" EVER to anyone else has to be bad. She's an intelligent, deceptive little creep.

Do you realize how Rand is using "duty" in the above statement? Do you realize how she contrasts duty with obligation?

[George H. Smith]

Agreed, poor choice of words on my part. I should have qualified the statement. Although I think I would be correct to say the latter if there was an understanding that I was using Rand's/Comte's definition, but I'd need to think about that more as I realize the contradiction in my own analysis.

I don't know enough to say I agree with Rand and I have a gut feeling that I don't, but I'm making an attempt to figure out what she meant before I continue to criticize her theory and incur the wrath of George. I'd rather come prepared

Rand wrote:

"Do you ask what moral obligation I owe to my fellow men? None—except the obligation I owe to myself, to material objects and to all of existence: rationality. I deal with men as my nature and theirs demands: by means of reason...."

"The moral purpose of a man’s life is the achievement of his own happiness. This does not mean that he is indifferent to all men, that human life is of no value to him and that he has no reason to help others in an emergency. But it does mean that he does not subordinate his life to the welfare of others, that he does not sacrifice himself to their needs, that the relief of their suffering is not his primary concern, that any help he gives is an exception, not a rule, an act of generosity, not of moral duty, that it is marginal and incidental—as disasters are marginal and incidental in the course of human existence—and that values, not disasters, are the goal, the first concern and the motive power of his life."

So this allows us to help others if we have a "reason" to, but indeed eliminates any possible "moral duty" to do so. As if a moral duty to help someone means he would "subordinate his life to the welfare of others". Of course, that "reason" she speaks of is inevitably the "twist" I mentioned earlier.

To her "sacrifice" is immoral:

"If you wish to save the last of your dignity, do not call your best actions a “sacrifice”: that term brands you as immoral. "

She also writes:

"If you give money to help a friend, it is not a sacrifice; if you give it to a worthless stranger, it is."

Charity is therefore not morally neutral in this case, it's immoral. Other times it's neutral.

She writes:

"If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty."

This is a nice little subtle twist here. She invites us to believe that we value the child and that's why we feed him (which sounds reasonable). She invites us to scorn the woman who only feeds her child because she has a "sense of duty" (makes sense too). Of course she ignores the reality that almost ALL of us feed our children because we value them AND we have a "sense of duty" to take care of them. But, for her having a "sense of duty" EVER to anyone else has to be bad. She's an intelligent, deceptive little creep.

Bob

As surprising as it may seem, I actually think you raise some significant issues that deserve more attention than they often get from Objectivist types. I think Rand was careless at times in how she used the word "sacrifice." I know the subject of "sacrifice" was discussed recently, so I will confine myself to some brief remarks.

From a praxeological (or subjective) perspective, it is literally impossible to "sacrifice" a higher value for a lower value. The very act of choosing X over Y means that one subjectively values X more than Y. If the word "sacrifice" is appropriate at all here, it is in regard to what economists call opportunity costs.

I think most of the problems in Rand's analysis would not have occurred if she had stuck with the Comtean notion of "altruism" as a moral duty to place the interests of others (society or humanity, in Comte's case) above one's own. But, as I have noted before, she didn't always do this. She sometimes dubs as altruistic the free moral choice -- a choice not motivated by a sense of duty -- to give precedence to the interests of others in particular cases.

I think many of the problems here could be rectified with a fairly minor tweaking of Rand's ideas, while still remaining true to her fundamental ethical theory. But on one issue at least I doubt if this is possible. I am thinking of Rand's contention that to "sacrifice" one's own interests for the interests of someone else is always immoral. This kind of conclusion, in my opinion, could only flow from a deontological (i.e., duty-based) form of egoism, and this form would constitute nothing more than a mirror image of the duty-based altruism that Rand so rightly condemns.

A deontological egoism is not the only egoistic alternative to a deontological altruism. I think Rand understood this, as evidenced by her important remarks in "Causality Versus Duty" where she repudiates the notion of moral duty altogether. And though I don't think she ever explicitly says that one has a moral duty, or even a moral obligation, to always value one's interests over the interests of others, the tenor of some of her remarks point in this direction.

Ghs

[imurray]

(big snip)

Charity is therefore not morally neutral in this case, it's immoral. Other times it's neutral.

She writes:

"If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty."

This is a nice little subtle twist here. She invites us to believe that we value the child and that's why we feed him (which sounds reasonable). She invites us to scorn the woman who only feeds her child because she has a "sense of duty" (makes sense too). Of course she ignores the reality that almost ALL of us feed our children because we value them AND we have a "sense of duty" to take care of them. But, for her having a "sense of duty" EVER to anyone else has to be bad. She's an intelligent, deceptive little creep.

Do you realize how Rand is using "duty" in the above statement? Do you realize how she contrasts duty with obligation?

From http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/duty.html:

"The meaning of the term “duty” is: the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest."

From http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/responsibility-obligation.html

"Accepting no mystic “duties” or unchosen obligations, he is the man who honors scrupulously the obligations which he chooses. The obligation to keep one’s promises is one of the most important elements in proper human relationships, the element that leads to mutual confidence and makes cooperation possible among men . . . .

The acceptance of full responsibility for one’s own choices and actions (and their consequences) is such a demanding moral discipline that many men seek to escape it by surrendering to what they believe is the easy, automatic, unthinking safety of a morality of “duty.”"

From http://aynrandlexicon.com/lexicon/sacrifice.html

"“Sacrifice” is the surrender of a greater value for the sake of a lesser one or of a nonvalue...

This applies to all choices, including one’s actions toward other men. It requires that one possess a defined hierarchy of rational values (values chosen and validated by a rational standard). Without such a hierarchy, neither rational conduct nor considered value judgments nor moral choices are possible."

Back to the example:

"If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty."

Restated:

If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, she has not surrendered the higher value in her hierarchy which she has chosen for herself: she values the child higher than the hat which is at the lower end of her chosen hierarchy; but if the hat is on the higher end of her chosen hierarchy then she surrenders this value if she chooses to feed the child (which is on the lower end of her chosen hierarchy) - in this case she would prefer her child to starve, but feeds him only because she feels she must based not on her own choices, but those prescribed by others.

In the first instance she is "obligated" to feed the child because it is in keeping with her own rationally chosen hierarchy of values.

In the second she has not chosen to feed her child out of "obligation", but because society tells her she must (duty).

You could argue that this is not a very good example because any mother who would choose a hat over feeding her child is obviously a psychopath making it overly simplistic, but as an illustration it works fine. Basically it says that it is okay to feel or be "obligated" (moral even) to do something if it was rationally chosen and fits your hierarchy of values - it is not okay to do something that is of lesser value in your rationally selected hierarchy while sacrificing a higher value (this would be done out of a sense of "duty", not obligation - you are only "obligated" to follow your rationally selected hierarchy of values).

The question here could be if the mother did indeed consider the hat of higher value than feeding the child - would Rand consider her actions moral if she bought that hat? But that's the wrong question. The act is not immoral based on the mother's actions (buying the hat instead of feeding the child)it is immoral because the chosen value is incommensurate with being a rational human, that is, it is not a rational value because it would not support the continuation of life (in this case). Rand, as I understand from this site and my limited reading, did not say that people could do whatever they wanted as some think Nietzsche advocated for his Ubermensch(I don't necessarily agree with that reading of Nietzsche, but that's beside the point). Simply put you can't rationally choose to value doing harm to others because if everyone held a value like that man would not survive.

Ian

[Edited for spelling and minor additions.]

Edited March 31, 2010 by Panoptic

[bmacwilliam]

(big snip)

Charity is therefore not morally neutral in this case, it's immoral. Other times it's neutral.

She writes:

"If a mother buys food for her hungry child rather than a hat for herself, it is not a sacrifice: she values the child higher than the hat; but it is a sacrifice to the kind of mother whose higher value is the hat, who would prefer her child to starve and feeds him only from a sense of duty."

This is a nice little subtle twist here. She invites us to believe that we value the child and that's why we feed him (which sounds reasonable). She invites us to scorn the woman who only feeds her child because she has a "sense of duty" (makes sense too). Of course she ignores the reality that almost ALL of us feed our children because we value them AND we have a "sense of duty" to take care of them. But, for her having a "sense of duty" EVER to anyone else has to be bad. She's an intelligent, deceptive little creep.

Do you realize how Rand is using "duty" in the above statement? Do you realize how she contrasts duty with obligation?

She was all over the place on that one. From traditional usage, to a total perversion, to an outright denial that "duty" even exists.

Rand's conventional usage of the word:

"No man can have a right to impose an unchosen obligation, an unrewarded duty or an involuntary servitude on another man."

Where duty could be described as the compulsion felt to meet one's obligations - that's a mainstream definition.

But that's not good enough for Rand...

Rand's "Strange" definition:

"The meaning of the term “duty” is: the moral necessity to perform certain actions for no reason other than obedience to some higher authority, without regard to any personal goal, motive, desire or interest"

Rand's definition of "duty the destroyer":

"“Duty” destroys reason: it supersedes one’s knowledge and judgment, making the process of thinking and judging irrelevant to one’s actions."

But also:

"My views on charity are very simple. I do not consider it a major virtue and, above all, I do not consider it a moral duty. "

Yeah, well which "duty" would that be?

But then she even DENIES it EXISTS!!:

"In reality and in the Objectivist ethics, there is no such thing as “duty.”

So what's worse? A really dumb argument, or a total and intentional multiple perversion of definitions in order to make a dumb argument?

Bob

[imurray]

But also:

"My views on charity are very simple. I do not consider it a major virtue and, above all, I do not consider it a moral duty. "

Yeah, well which "duty" would that be?

But then she even DENIES it EXISTS!!:

"In reality and in the Objectivist ethics, there is no such thing as “duty.”

Bob

Interesting and problematic as I see it now. In the second example could she have said this because she describes "duty" as an "anti-concept" and therefore it doesn't really exist in and of itself, but is the word given to define an absence of rational thought (which is really no-thing)? The first example seems more problematic, but I think it's reasonable to assume she's speaking of "moral duty" in the common meaning of the term and not in the same abstract way she is using it in the second example. Can George clarify this? Am I way off base? Or was it just an oversight on her part?

[bmacwilliam]

I think many of the problems here could be rectified with a fairly minor tweaking of Rand's ideas, while still remaining true to her fundamental ethical theory. But on one issue at least I doubt if this is possible. I am thinking of Rand's contention that to "sacrifice" one's own interests for the interests of someone else is always immoral. This kind of conclusion, in my opinion, could only flow from a deontological (i.e., duty-based) form of egoism, and this form would constitute nothing more than a mirror image of the duty-based altruism that Rand so rightly condemns.

I totally agree. Or at least in the sense that if it's not always immoral, in fact it (sacrifice) is sometimes moral and not just neutral (not sure if you agree). But nevertheless, even though I also agree that it's a "minor tweak", it's a minor tweak to the ethical foundations which does not leave most of the downstream implications intact, so in this sense "minor" doesn't seem appropriate.

A deontological egoism is not the only egoistic alternative to a deontological altruism. I think Rand understood this, as evidenced by her important remarks in "Causality Versus Duty" where she repudiates the notion of moral duty altogether. And though I don't think she ever explicitly says that one has a moral duty, or even a moral obligation, to always value one's interests over the interests of others, the tenor of some of her remarks point in this direction.

Ghs

She does state an obligation to oneself, and rationality:

"Do you ask what moral obligation I owe to my fellow men? None—except the obligation I owe to myself, to material objects and to all of existence: rationality."

Bob

[imurray]

I think many of the problems here could be rectified with a fairly minor tweaking of Rand's ideas, while still remaining true to her fundamental ethical theory. But on one issue at least I doubt if this is possible. I am thinking of Rand's contention that to "sacrifice" one's own interests for the interests of someone else is always immoral. This kind of conclusion, in my opinion, could only flow from a deontological (i.e., duty-based) form of egoism, and this form would constitute nothing more than a mirror image of the duty-based altruism that Rand so rightly condemns.

I totally agree. Or at least in the sense that if it's not always immoral, in fact it (sacrifice) is sometimes moral and not just neutral (not sure if you agree). But nevertheless, even though I also agree that it's a "minor tweak", it's a minor tweak to the ethical foundations which does not leave most of the downstream implications intact, so in this sense "minor" doesn't seem appropriate.

A deontological egoism is not the only egoistic alternative to a deontological altruism. I think Rand understood this, as evidenced by her important remarks in "Causality Versus Duty" where she repudiates the notion of moral duty altogether. And though I don't think she ever explicitly says that one has a moral duty, or even a moral obligation, to always value one's interests over the interests of others, the tenor of some of her remarks point in this direction.

Ghs

She does state an obligation to oneself, and rationality:

"Do you ask what moral obligation I owe to my fellow men? None—except the obligation I owe to myself, to material objects and to all of existence: rationality."

Bob

An obligation to oneself with the qualification "qua man". That is to say all rational obligations chosen for oneself should also be held in some regard by others as is commensurate with being a rational human being. We cannot rationally choose values which do harm to others because they would not be rational.

Edited March 31, 2010 by Panoptic

[George H. Smith]

But also:

"My views on charity are very simple. I do not consider it a major virtue and, above all, I do not consider it a moral duty. "

Yeah, well which "duty" would that be?

But then she even DENIES it EXISTS!!:

"In reality and in the Objectivist ethics, there is no such thing as “duty.”

Bob

Interesting and problematic as I see it now. In the second example could she have said this because she describes "duty" as an "anti-concept" and therefore it doesn't really exist in and of itself, but is the word given to define an absence of rational thought (which is really no-thing)? The first example seems more problematic, but I think it's reasonable to assume she's speaking of "moral duty" in the common meaning of the term and not in the same abstract way she is using it in the second example. Can George clarify this? Am I way off base? Or was it just an oversight on her part?

I agree with your interpretation. It's as if an atheist were to say (1) I don't believe that morality comes from God, and (2) I don't believe in the existence of God. There are two different contexts here.

What I find interesting is Rand's statement that she does not consider charity to be a "major virtue." This suggests that she regarded charity as at least a minor virtue, which would be news to me.

Where is that line from? It sounds like it might be from a Q&A session, in which case, depending on the inflection of her voice, Rand may have said "major virtue" in a dismissive tone, thereby indicating that she does not regard it as a virtue at all. In other words, "major virtue" might differ from "major virtue."

I haven't gotten caught up with all the latest posts in this thread, so some of this may have already been covered.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

But also:

"My views on charity are very simple. I do not consider it a major virtue and, above all, I do not consider it a moral duty. "

Yeah, well which "duty" would that be?

But then she even DENIES it EXISTS!!:

"In reality and in the Objectivist ethics, there is no such thing as "duty."

Bob

Interesting and problematic as I see it now. In the second example could she have said this because she describes "duty" as an "anti-concept" and therefore it doesn't really exist in and of itself, but is the word given to define an absence of rational thought (which is really no-thing)? The first example seems more problematic, but I think it's reasonable to assume she's speaking of "moral duty" in the common meaning of the term and not in the same abstract way she is using it in the second example. Can George clarify this? Am I way off base? Or was it just an oversight on her part?

I agree with your interpretation. It's as if an atheist were to say (1) I don't believe that morality comes from God, and (2) I don't believe in the existence of God. There are two different contexts here.

What I find interesting is Rand's statement that she does not consider charity to be a "major virtue." This suggests that she regarded charity as at least a minor virtue, which would be news to me.

Where is that line from? It sounds like it might be from a Q&A session, in which case, depending on the inflection of her voice, Rand may have said "major virtue" in a dismissive tone, thereby indicating that she does not regard it as a virtue at all. In other words, "major virtue" might differ from "major virtue."

I haven't gotten caught up with all the latest posts in this thread, so some of this may have already been covered.

Ghs

Since Rand did some charity in her lifetime she wouldn't dismiss all charity. She said once (FHF) she sent money to support Israel regarding the Yom Kippur War. She and Frank took people into their California home. Etc. She also benefited when young from some of the same.

--Brant

Edited March 31, 2010 by Brant Gaede

[Xray]

But also:

"My views on charity are very simple. I do not consider it a major virtue and, above all, I do not consider it a moral duty. "

Yeah, well which "duty" would that be?

But then she even DENIES it EXISTS!!:

"In reality and in the Objectivist ethics, there is no such thing as “duty.”

Bob

Interesting and problematic as I see it now. In the second example could she have said this because she describes "duty" as an "anti-concept" and therefore it doesn't really exist in and of itself, but is the word given to define an absence of rational thought (which is really no-thing)? The first example seems more problematic, but I think it's reasonable to assume she's speaking of "moral duty" in the common meaning of the term and not in the same abstract way she is using it in the second example. Can George clarify this? Am I way off base? Or was it just an oversight on her part?

I agree with your interpretation. It's as if an atheist were to say (1) I don't believe that morality comes from God, and (2) I don't believe in the existence of God. There are two different contexts here.

What I find interesting is Rand's statement that she does not consider charity to be a "major virtue." This suggests that she regarded charity as at least a minor virtue, which would be news to me.

Where is that line from? It sounds like it might be from a Q&A session, in which case, depending on the inflection of her voice, Rand may have said "major virtue" in a dismissive tone, thereby indicating that she does not regard it as a virtue at all. In other words, "major virtue" might differ from "major virtue."

I haven't gotten caught up with all the latest posts in this thread, so some of this may have already been covered.

Ghs

Xray:

If you should find the time to address my # 316 post to you on the 'Moral Certainty' thread, TIA. http://www.objectivi...pic=8291&st=300

Ghs: It would take a substantial essay to address all the issues you raise that post. You will need to narrow it down to one or two points.

Okay. I'll start with point one which I have brought over here since the current discussion is about 'virtue':

GHS: My ideas about "virtue" are more fixed and definite than my ideas about "value" (in the generic sense), but I will need to postpone that discussion for a later time.

Xray: What do you think of Rand's Cardinal Virtue list: "Rationality, Productiveness, Pride"?

I'm interested in your fixed and definite ideas about "virtue".

"Virtue" does no figure in my personal ethics at all, since the term is too loaded connotatively in my mind with "morally prim and proper" behavior, with morality standards "by society" being imposed on the individual.

Edited March 31, 2010 by Xray

[imurray]

But also:

"My views on charity are very simple. I do not consider it a major virtue and, above all, I do not consider it a moral duty. "

Yeah, well which "duty" would that be?

But then she even DENIES it EXISTS!!:

"In reality and in the Objectivist ethics, there is no such thing as “duty.”

Bob

Interesting and problematic as I see it now. In the second example could she have said this because she describes "duty" as an "anti-concept" and therefore it doesn't really exist in and of itself, but is the word given to define an absence of rational thought (which is really no-thing)? The first example seems more problematic, but I think it's reasonable to assume she's speaking of "moral duty" in the common meaning of the term and not in the same abstract way she is using it in the second example. Can George clarify this? Am I way off base? Or was it just an oversight on her part?

I agree with your interpretation. It's as if an atheist were to say (1) I don't believe that morality comes from God, and (2) I don't believe in the existence of God. There are two different contexts here.

What I find interesting is Rand's statement that she does not consider charity to be a "major virtue." This suggests that she regarded charity as at least a minor virtue, which would be news to me.

Where is that line from? It sounds like it might be from a Q&A session, in which case, depending on the inflection of her voice, Rand may have said "major virtue" in a dismissive tone, thereby indicating that she does not regard it as a virtue at all. In other words, "major virtue" might differ from "major virtue."

I haven't gotten caught up with all the latest posts in this thread, so some of this may have already been covered.

Ghs

Xray:

If you should find the time to address my # 316 post to you on the 'Moral Certainty' thread, TIA. http://www.objectivi...pic=8291&st=300

Ghs: It would take a substantial essay to address all the issues you raise that post. You will need to narrow it down to one or two points.

Okay. I'll start with point one which I have brought over here since the current discussion is about 'virtue':

GHS: My ideas about "virtue" are more fixed and definite than my ideas about "value" (in the generic sense), but I will need to postpone that discussion for a later time.

Xray: What do you think of Rand's Cardinal Virtue list: "Rationality, Productiveness, Pride"?

I'm interested in your fixed and definite ideas about "virtue".

"Virtue" does no figure in my personal ethics at all, since the term is too loaded connotatively in my mind with "morally prim and proper" behavior, with morality standards "by society" being imposed on the individual.

I'm sorry, but I missed the point you were trying to make and I don't mean this sarcastically. Could you restate it as a statement maybe?

Edited March 31, 2010 by Panoptic

[George H. Smith]

Xray:

If you should find the time to address my # 316 post to you on the 'Moral Certainty' thread, TIA. http://www.objectivi...pic=8291&st=300

Ghs: It would take a substantial essay to address all the issues you raise that post. You will need to narrow it down to one or two points.

Okay. I'll start with point one which I have brought over here since the current discussion is about 'virtue':

GHS: My ideas about "virtue" are more fixed and definite than my ideas about "value" (in the generic sense), but I will need to postpone that discussion for a later time.

Xray: What do you think of Rand's Cardinal Virtue list: "Rationality, Productiveness, Pride"?

I'm interested in your fixed and definite ideas about "virtue".

My notions of "virtue" and "vice" are the standard ones found in the Aristotelian tradition and the vast majority of other traditions as well. A virtue is a morally good habit, whereas a vice is a morally bad habit.

Virtues and vices are dispositions to act in a certain manner; they are character traits, so to speak. This is why we can say that a person committed an immoral act (i.e., an act that violates a moral principle) without necessarily condemning the person himself as an "immoral" or "bad" person.

.

The later applies only when immoral behavior is a person's characteristic way of acting. (Btw, I have some problems with the term "immoral," as it is commonly used in many cases, but that's a topic for another discussion.)

Thus, although it is true in a sense that virtues, as Rand says, are the means by which we achieve and maintain values (this is a paraphrase; I don't have the quote in front of me), to use this as the definition is inadequate, because it fails to incorporate the habitual feature of virtues.

The classical approach to virtue and vice that I have sketched here has interesting implications for moral education and moral psychology.

Ghs

[dan2100]

Since Rand did some charity in her lifetime she wouldn't dismiss all charity. She said once (FHF) she sent money to support Israel regarding the Yom Kippur War. She and Frank took people into their California home. Etc. She also benefited when young from some of the same.

--Brant

I think there are two separate issues here: what did Rand do in terms of charity and what were her views on charity. Just as someone might say "honest is the best policy" and present cogent reasoning for this yet, on occasion, lie and deceive, I wouldn't go too far in confusing the two. (Also, one would have to know her motives, too, for doing what looks like charity. I'm sure she could present some convenient rationalizations here. )

Finally, for those who'd want to test her views via her life, I'd always caution against this. That a moral philosopher fails to live up to her or his stated moral theory doesn't necessarily mean that that theory has failed -- any more than a scientist who makes up data means that the scientific method is bunk.

[Dragonfly]

Thus evolution, metaphysically considered, refers to the process of gradual change itself, not to the causes of that process. We cannot say that a given series of changes was "caused" by evolution, since that would mean, in effect, that a series of changes was "caused" by a series of changes.

In fact every cause can be seen as a series of changes. What biological evolution of course implies is the mechanism that drives these changes (in general random variation in the genes with natural selection). One can study the details of this process for specific cases, but there is nothing wrong in considering the general principle of that process as the cause of the existence of all living beings on Earth (and not for example the divine creation of each species nor generatio spontanea).

[imurray]

What biological evolution of course implies is the mechanism that drives these changes (in general random variation in the genes with natural selection).

I think you have to be careful here. Evolution is not the mechanism that drives changes. Evolution is the name of the theory of how and why organisms change. The mechanism that drive the changes would be things like mutation, genetic drift, etc.

Edited April 1, 2010 by Panoptic

[Dragonfly]

I think you have to be careful here. Evolution is not the mechanism that drives changes - it is the name given to the process.

I didn't say that, I said it implies that mechanism, meaning that it is not just some random changes.

[imurray]

I think you have to be careful here. Evolution is not the mechanism that drives changes - it is the name given to the process.

I didn't say that, I said it implies that mechanism, meaning that it is not just some random changes.

Sorry, that's how I read it.

[tjohnson]

Um, it seems to me that the word 'evolution' can mean both the theory and the process the theory describes? One has to look at the context to determine which meaning is indicated.

Edited April 1, 2010 by general semanticist