Settling the debate on Altruism

[Daniel Barnes]

I’ll try to invoke your rational faculty. You may start to use it when you read my posts.

If you were, you would know that “definitions of "sacrifice" in the dictionary are somehow false” is not my claim. My claim is that dictionary gives common definition of sacrifice as surrender of value, a loss . It also describes the common useage of the word “sacrifice” which means giving up a lesser value in order to get a bigger one, a gain. Obviously one word cannot designate two contradictory concepts. One of them must be an aberration. A cannot be A and non-A the same time and in same respect. In the view of the historical meaning of the concept I argue that sacrifice means loss, not gain. But even if you’re right and this word is polysemous or homonymous, you have to explain how it happened that the same word denotes two contradictory concepts. As far as I know this is unprecedented case in English and in two other languages in which I’m fluent. My explanation is an internalization of altruism. If you have any other bright ideas, you are welcome to share them. Your childish outbursts against Rand or myself are not arguments and will not do.

Firstly, your claim "Obviously one word cannot designate two contradictory concepts" is demonstrably false. As an example, I offer the word "bad", which can mean, depending on context, both bad in the traditional sense, and good.

So that alone is quite enough to completely destroy your argument.

Secondly, even if in the spirit of charity, I bend over backwards and grant you that first false claim, your argument is still destroyed as both Dragonfly and I demonstrate, with particular attention to your cherished 1b. that even then none of the three definitions, 1a., 1b., or 2a. are necessarily contradictory, either internally or between each other.

Finally, even if I was to bend over backwards completely and ignore the fact that your first and second arguments are false, your remaining justification for defining "sacrifice" as a nett loss turns out to be an appeal to a supposed "historical meaning", a claim for which you supply not a shred of evidence. In contrast, I will offer that the historical meaning is the exact opposite to what you claim: that, say, animal, human or other sacrifices were intended as exchanging a lesser value for a greater one - for example, human sacrifices to appease the gods' anger and avoid great natural disasters.

So now that your claims are shown to be triple-false, as far as I can see there is little left to say. So I will try to invoke your rational faculty and get you to at least acknowledge that these counter-arguments have been put to you, even if you seem unable to comprehend them. Mindlessly repeating the same Randian fallacies long after they have been exploded is not argument, and will not do.

Edited March 26, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Brant Gaede]

Lastly, your comparison of reading early scientists, such as Newton, to reading early philosophers once again reveals your profound ignorance of the difference between the natural sciences and philosophy.

I'm quite aware of the difference - philosophy is mostly a symptom of mental illness. I guess that's sort of a thorn in your side, eh? Seeing how you have made a career out of it?

Are you serious? Or is this some kind of joke?

Ghs

It's argumentum ad hominem.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

I find that her "Objective" ethics that outline the moral code of a good Objectivist are fundamentally based on man's life qua man and the "qua" part simply means a good Objectivist. That's about as tautological as you're gonna get.

Bob

I understand that OL is not necessarily a forum for discussing the technical aspects of Rand's metaethics and ethics, but I really wish her critics would take some care to portray her ideas accurately before criticizing them.. Time and again I am finding supposed summaries that leave me scratching my head, wondering who in the hell they are supposed to refer to, since they don't refer to anything I've ever read by Rand. The odd remarks by Bob Mac are but one example of this tendency.

This is a simple matter of intellectual justice. If I knew nothing about Rand other than what I have read in some of these posts, I would think that Rand was a blithering idiot who couldn't argue her way out of the proverbial paper bag. In fact, however, if Rand were still around and active on OL, she could argue anyone on this list, including me, under the table. She might be wrong, but no one would mistake her for the philosophic fool that we find portrayed in some of these posts.

How about this? If you want to show how foolish some of Rand's arguments supposedly are, then how about quoting some passages from her writings that exhibit those fallacies and bonehead mistakes?

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

How about this? If you want to show how foolish some of Rand's arguments supposedly are, then how about quoting some passages from her writings that exhibit those fallacies and bonehead mistakes?

Usually I do. In fact I intend to reply to your earlier criticism of a post of mine shortly. However, like most philosophers, Rand is an often vague and contradictory writer and unclear in her formulations.

In such situations, we must take a punt on what she means.

"Man qua man" is such a formulation. I tend to agree with Bob Mac that "man qua man" probably does amount to simply being an Objectivist.

Let me put it like this: If we were to ask the old girl if being an Objectivist did not represent "man qua man", what do you think she would say?

Edited March 26, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[George H. Smith]

Lastly, your comparison of reading early scientists, such as Newton, to reading early philosophers once again reveals your profound ignorance of the difference between the natural sciences and philosophy.

I'm quite aware of the difference - philosophy is mostly a symptom of mental illness. I guess that's sort of a thorn in your side, eh? Seeing how you have made a career out of it?

Are you serious? Or is this some kind of joke?

Ghs

It's argumentum ad hominem.

--Brant

That much I know. What I don't know is whether GS seriously believes that "philosophy is mostly a symptom of mental illness." If he is serious, then I previously overestimated him -- something that I didn't think was possible.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

"Man qua man" is such a formulation. I tend to agree with Bob Mac that "man qua man" probably does amount to simply being an Objectivist."

"Man qua Man" is a very common expression among Aristotelian philosophers -- e.g., I have a book by the Thomist Thomas Higgens titled Man As Man: The Science and Art of Ethics -- so the expression obviously doesn't refer "to simply being an Objectivist." Rand basically meant by it what other Aristotelians (and moral philosophers in general) have meant by it, i.e., man considered in terms of his most fundamental characteristics. e.g., rationality, purposiveness, etc.

Let me put it like this: If we were to ask the old girl if being an Objectivist did not represent "man qua man", what do you think she would say?

I think she would say that you should read her writings on ethics with a modicum of attention.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

Man qua man. I think the first "man" in the formulation is a man and the second "man" is the pure concept man in its most idealistic and deepest formulation referring to essentials. The question is whether Rand's formulation has any practical utility for human being? Or if a better statement is needed for the same reason? If "yes" to the second, what is it?

--Brant

[Brant Gaede]

Lastly, your comparison of reading early scientists, such as Newton, to reading early philosophers once again reveals your profound ignorance of the difference between the natural sciences and philosophy.

I'm quite aware of the difference - philosophy is mostly a symptom of mental illness. I guess that's sort of a thorn in your side, eh? Seeing how you have made a career out of it?

Are you serious? Or is this some kind of joke?

Ghs

It's argumentum ad hominem.

--Brant

That much I know. What I don't know is whether GS seriously believes that "philosophy is mostly a symptom of mental illness." If he is serious, then I previously overestimated him -- something that I didn't think was possible.

Ghs

I prefer Xray by far to that twaddle.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

Man qua man. I think the first "man" in the formulation is a man and the second "man" is the pure concept man in its most idealistic and deepest formulation referring to essentials. The question is whether Rand's formulation has any practical utility for human being? Or if a better statement is needed for the same reason? If "yes" to the second, what is it?

--Brant

If you look at "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that Rand speaks not of "man qua man" per se, but of "man's survival qua man" or (in one instance) of "the survival of man qua man" (which obviously means the same thing). Rand was quite clear what she meant by these expressions, to wit:

"Man's survival qua man" means the terms, methods, conditions and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan—in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice."

Although this is a highly abstract formulation -- Rand says so herself -- it clearly has practical implications. And, contrary to some previous critics, it clearly doesn't refer to simply being an Objectivist. That is one of the most foolish "interpretations" imaginable.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

If I had that Objectivism CD I'd do a search of "man qua man."

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

How about this? If you want to show how foolish some of Rand's arguments supposedly are, then how about quoting some passages from her writings that exhibit those fallacies and bonehead mistakes?

Usually I do.

Of what possible relevance is this vapid article by Greg Nyquist?

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

If I had that Objectivism CD I'd do a search of "man qua man."

--Brant

It's a very handy research tool; indeed, I would almost call it indispensable for anyone seriously interested in her ideas. Doing searches for key words and expressions used by Rand has caused me to reconsider some of my earlier criticisms of her. What we think Rand said, based on material we may have read years ago, can sometimes prove inaccurate.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

If I had that Objectivism CD I'd do a search of "man qua man."

--Brant

FYI, a search of "qua" in The Virtue of Selfishness yielded only five hits, all of them in "The Objectivist Ethics." As I indicated previously, four of these appear in the phrase "man's survival qua man," and one appears in the phrase "the survival of man qua man."

These sparse results frankly surprised me. Like, I suspect, others on OL, I expected to find more hits. Funny how one's memory can play tricks.

Ghs

[Brant Gaede]

If I had that Objectivism CD I'd do a search of "man qua man."

--Brant

FYI, a search of "qua" in The Virtue of Selfishness yielded only five hits, all of them in "The Objectivist Ethics." As I indicated previously, four of these appear in the phrase "man's survival qua man," and one appears in the phrase "the survival of man qua man."

These sparse results frankly surprised me. Like, I suspect, others on OL, I expected to find more hits. Funny how one's memory can play tricks.

Ghs

Maybe Ayn did most of her man qua manning at the Ford Hall Forum. Only thing is I went to many and don't recall any.

--Brant

[George H. Smith]

I prefer Xray by far to that twaddle.

--Brant

I don't have the highly negative reaction to Xray that I expected after reading some comments about her (shortly after I became active again on OL). If I have some problems with her manner of dealing with Rand's ideas, they aren't especially serious and certainly no worse than I have encountered with other intelligent people who don't like Rand. Many of her questions are quite legitimate, even if they are sometimes presented in a shotgun manner that can prove annoying, and her more reflective comments display a good understanding of philosophical issues. In short, I wouldn't place Xray in the same category as GS at all.

Ghs

[George H. Smith]

Maybe Ayn did most of her man qua manning at the Ford Hall Forum. Only thing is I went to many and don't recall any.

"Man qua man" is a rather arcane expression, especially in articles written for a popular audience, so it's possible that the phrase sticks in our memory and causes us to think that Rand used it far more often than she actually did.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

Of what possible relevance is this vapid article by Greg Nyquist?

Oh, my mistake, I should have been clearer.

I co-run a site, the ARCHNblog, that extensively criticises Objectivism. We do quote Rand directly, a lot. For example, here's the beginning of a series examining Rand's essay "The Ethics of Emergencies" line-by-line. (I admit I need to get on to the next para soon..;-))

So most of the time I do quote Rand in some depth, as does Greg.

[Daniel Barnes]

If you look at "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that Rand speaks not of "man qua man" per se, but of "man's survival qua man" or (in one instance) of "the survival of man qua man" (which obviously means the same thing). Rand was quite clear what she meant by these expressions, to wit:

"Man's survival qua man" means the terms, methods, conditions and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan—in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice."

Although this is a highly abstract formulation -- Rand says so herself -- it clearly has practical implications. And, contrary to some previous critics, it clearly doesn't refer to simply being an Objectivist. That is one of the most foolish "interpretations" imaginable.

Well I quite disagree. It's a perfectly defensible interpretation.

It is very unfortunate that my copy of VOS has been destroyed, and I have not got around to buying another. And I am a bit short of time to mount a full defense.

However I will fire a quick arrow or two, rather from the hip. For example, if "A moral code is a system of teleological measurement which grades the choices and actions open to man, according to the degree to which they achieve or frustrate the code’s standard of value" (ie survival as man qua man), would Rand say that there are other ethical systems apart from Objectivism that might have the same goal, and be just as good a guide to achieving it?

If so, what were they?

[Leonid]

GS: “How do you know they don't form concepts? Why does my dog wag his tail when he hears my car coming down the road? Doesn't it make sense to say he must have some concept of his owners and he is anticipating their arrival? General Semantics is primarily a theory of sanity - not philosophy. I am not interested in Philosophy so I don't read it,”

Well, if you were reading philosophy you’d know the difference between concept, emotion and anticipation. You also would know that in order to communicate concepts one need designators which constitute a language. If you can show that each and every movement of your dog’s tail means certain concept, if you can prove that such movements organized by grammar and syntaxes, then you proved that your dog has concepts and language, In meantime you even don’t know which kind of emotions your dog’s tail movement expresses-maybe dog is happy that you came but maybe it hates you.

[George H. Smith]

If you look at "The Objectivist Ethics," you will find that Rand speaks not of "man qua man" per se, but of "man's survival qua man" or (in one instance) of "the survival of man qua man" (which obviously means the same thing). Rand was quite clear what she meant by these expressions, to wit:

"Man's survival qua man" means the terms, methods, conditions and goals required for the survival of a rational being through the whole of his lifespan—in all those aspects of existence which are open to his choice."

Although this is a highly abstract formulation -- Rand says so herself -- it clearly has practical implications. And, contrary to some previous critics, it clearly doesn't refer to simply being an Objectivist. That is one of the most foolish "interpretations" imaginable.

Well I quite disagree. It's a perfectly defensible interpretation.

It is very unfortunate that my copy of VOS has been destroyed, and I have not got around to buying another. And I am a bit short of time to mount a full defense.

However I will fire a quick arrow or two, rather from the hip. For example, if "A moral code is a system of teleological measurement which grades the choices and actions open to man, according to the degree to which they achieve or frustrate the code’s standard of value" (ie survival as man qua man), would Rand say that there are other ethical systems apart from Objectivism that might have the same goal, and be just as good a guide to achieving it?

If so, what were they?

Rand, like any moral philosopher, believed that her system of ethics is the most consistent development of her premises. What do you expect her to do? Defend her views on ethics while claiming that other ethical systems will do just as well? No moral philosopher would do this.

Any such demand would be absurd, and it does not speak to the point. The original comment about Rand's use of man qua man -- and the one I addressed -- claimed that her use of the phrase is tautological, i.e., that it means the same thing as being an Objectivist. That is utter nonsense. "Man's survival qua man" is part of the foundation from which Rand attempts to build her ethical theory and justify her conclusions. You may think this attempt was unsuccessful -- fine, but that is a different problem altogether.

Ghs

[tjohnson]

That much I know. What I don't know is whether GS seriously believes that "philosophy is mostly a symptom of mental illness." If he is serious, then I previously overestimated him -- something that I didn't think was possible.

Ghs

Yes, I'm serious.

[tjohnson]

Well, if you were reading philosophy you'd know the difference between concept, emotion and anticipation. You also would know that in order to communicate concepts one need designators which constitute a language. If you can show that each and every movement of your dog's tail means certain concept, if you can prove that such movements organized by grammar and syntaxes, then you proved that your dog has concepts and language, In meantime you even don't know which kind of emotions your dog's tail movement expresses-maybe dog is happy that you came but maybe it hates you.

I'm pretty sure that wagging his tail mean he likes me. You seem to be stating that one cannot form concepts without language, why is that?

[tjohnson]

As for Korzybski's statement about some unnamed philosophers being "mentally ill," this is simply psychobabble of the highest order. I never cared for Rand's proclivity to dub philosophers she didn't like (e.g., Kant) as evil, but she is a model of objectivity in comparison to Korzybski.

To think that you can compare Korzybski's calling philosophers 'mentally ill' to Rand's calling philosophers 'evil' shows your profound ignorance of general semantics. If someone spends many years studying mental illness, as well as mental health, and integrates all his findings in a comprehensive theory of sanity then he is justified in making pronouncements about mental illness. Comparing that to Rand calling someone 'evil' is ...well I hesitate to say.

[dan2100]

Well, if you were reading philosophy you'd know the difference between concept, emotion and anticipation. You also would know that in order to communicate concepts one need designators which constitute a language. If you can show that each and every movement of your dog's tail means certain concept, if you can prove that such movements organized by grammar and syntaxes, then you proved that your dog has concepts and language, In meantime you even don't know which kind of emotions your dog's tail movement expresses-maybe dog is happy that you came but maybe it hates you.

I'm pretty sure that wagging his tail mean he likes me. You seem to be stating that one cannot form concepts without language, why is that?

I don't have much of a problem with dogs or other non-human animals having concepts. My guess is that they do to some degree, though probably much less, by a significant degree, than humans and other sentients. But, again, how would one detect concepts in humans or any other organism?

[dan2100]

Why would that distinction matter here? A theory of sanity (or of pickling cabbage, for that matter) would, I trust, not be absolved from having clear definitions or being subjected to the usual criticisms of other theories.

Well, it seems like George is trying to put general semantics into the category of Philosophy because he keeps bringing them into the conversation. Korzybski always intended gs to be an empirical science of man - one that would have experimentation and practical applications - ie. like promoting general sanity. He spent many years studying mental illness and it's possible semantic causes and treatment while preparing his theory. In short, there is nothing he would have liked better than to have his work subjected to the usual criticisms of other scientific theories. Take physics, for example. What is the definition of an electron? Do you imagine a physicist cares about that? He only care about the measurable relations he can make during interactions with said electrons. But in Philosophy, definitions take center stage and people argue for centuries about the proper definition. This is, in fact, an example of unsanity, according to general semantics.

Actually, no. Physicists -- in my view and from my reading of history and personal experience with them -- do tend toward trying to clearly define things. It's not like, though, they start out with a clear, concise definition of something, such as an electron, and then go out looking for it. Rather, to look at the history of the discovery of the electron and its properties, they seem to get closer and closer to a clear definition via refining their experiments and theories. (And, returning to Rand, she didn't say one should start off with definitions, but that these came pretty much at the end of concept-formation.)

Perhaps an analogy might prove helpful here. One might admit that reality is pretty fuzzy like being in a thick soupy fog -- like the ones London used to suffer a long time ago. Under such conditions, having good vision and good hearing is much more helpful than going out blindfolded with one's ears stopped up, no? The same applies to having clear definitions and clear concepts. (Granted, all within context -- as both Aristotle and Rand would counsel. In other words, sticking with the analogy, one wouldn't use an electron microscope to navigate the streets of a foggy city. In a similar fashion, one's concepts and definitions need not be more precise than the distinctions one might possibly make.)

Regarding philosophy, the problem with dealing with highly abstract concepts -- with the level of abstraction here, following Rand, meaning how easy it is to associate them with concrete entities, concrete processes, and experience -- is that one must, to distinguish them from other concepts, have clear definitions. The reliance on good definitions becomes, in other words, much more important because it gets ever harder to repair to experience. (Of course, as a check, one should be willing to look for examples that illustrate or test one's concepts -- even very abstract ones. Too much philosophy gets very abstract and doesn't bother to see if the concepts have any basis in reality. Rand believed, and I agree, that the ability to reduce abstract concepts back to concrete reality is the way to keep them reality-based -- as opposed to building air castles and attempting to move in. To me, the latter is insane. )