Settling the debate on Altruism

[tjohnson]

"Such a definition was given in my Manhood of Humanity to the effect that man differs from the animals in the capacity of each human generation to begin where the former generation left off. This capacity I called the time-binding function. (S&S, 539)"-in other words humans able to learn and to teach, meaning they are rational animals.

I am pleasantly surprised that you came up with a quote from Science and Sanity Here is the pertinent section from Manhood of Humanity;

It will be explained later that one of the energetic phenomena of organic chemistry-the "mind," which is one of the energies characteristic of this class of phenomena, is "autonomous," is "self-propelling" and true to its dimensionality. If we analyse the classes of life, we readily find that there are three cardinal classes which are radically distinct in function. A short analysis will disclose to us that, though minerals have various activities, they are not "living." The plants have a very definite and well known function-the transformation of solar energy into organic chemical energy. They are a class of life which appropriates one kind of energy, converts it into another kind and stores it up; in that sense they are a kind of storage battery for the solar energy; and so I define THE PLANTS AS THE CHEMISTRY-BINDING class of life.

The animals use the highly dynamic products of the chemistry-binding class-the plants-as food, and those products-the results of plant-transformation-undergo in animals a further transformation into yet higher forms; and the animals are correspondingly a more dynamic class of life; their energy is kinetic; they have a remarkable freedom and power which the plants do not possess-I mean the freedom and faculty to move about in space; and so I define ANIMALS AS THE SPACE-BINDING CLASS OF LIFE.

And now what shall we say of human beings? What is to be our definition of Man? Like the animals, human beings do indeed possess the space-binding capacity but, over and above that, human beings possess a most remarkable capacity which is entirely peculiar to them-I mean the capacity to summarise, digest and appropriate the labors and experiences of the past; I mean the capacity to use the fruits of past labors and experiences as intellectual or spiritual capital for developments in the present; I mean the capacity to employ as instruments of increasing power the accumulated achievements of the all-precious lives of the past generations spent in trial and error, trial and success; I mean the capacity of human beings to conduct their lives in the ever increasing light of inherited wisdom; I mean the capacity in virtue of which man is at once the heritor of the by-gone ages and the trustee of posterity. And because humanity is just this magnificent natural agency by which the past lives in the present and the present for the future, I define HUMANITY, in the universal tongue of mathematics and mechanics, to be the TIME-BINDING CLASS OF LIFE.

Of course it seems as though it requires rationality to be a time-binder but I would submit that this definition is much more "technical" and specific than simply "rational". I find the word 'rational' somewhat vague and I could argue that I have seen animals behaving rationally and so I don't think that 'rational' provides sufficient differentiation from animals.

[Peter]

General wrote:

Of course it seems as though it requires rationality to be a time-binder . . .

end quote

Popular Science Magazine has a brief article about how *Time* seems stretched out when you are falling to your death. "My whole life flashed in front of my eyes!" They have a guy hooked up and trace his brain patterns by simulating a fall to your death during a long free fall into a net.

I have heard it said that Time is how we consciously experience causality and it is actually not an existent.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

[Xray]

Xray, who would you prefer to accept an act of essential kindness from - an altruist who's professed 'business' is predominantly about duty and obligation to others; or a rational individualist, who reserves the right to be benevolent when he chooses so?

(A clue: the latter is acting out of volition, the first by force.)

Ultimately, only an egoist can be benevolent.

Or put another way: There is none so kind as he who isn't forced to be.

Tony

Tony, if I feel someone is acting "essentially kind" toward me, it does not matter to me whether it comes from a person working in a job where kindness and empathy are an asset (e. g. a nurse), or whether it is unconnected to this like e. g. I am lost in a strange city and someone takes the time to help me.

For being kind toward our fellow men is always a choice. For example, not all people working in so-called "social" jobs are necessarly kind.

On the other hand, people are often attracted toward such jobs because they are empathetic and concerned for the well-being of others. This does not mean they are "selfless altruists"; what Rand ignored was the sense of personal fulfillment which can be drawn from helping others.

Merlin Jetton: I agree. As I recall Ayn Rand was asked at least once if something she did for her husband was altruistic. Her reply was that it was not, and she did it for her own selfish reasons.

It would have been been far more enlightening if Rand had been asked if how she acted toward her husband showed empathy on her part ...

Her crusade against "altruism" reflects the difficulties she had with empathy.

Imo replacing empathy for altruism in this discussion will take things right to the heart of the matter.

Against the backdrop of Rand's difficulty with feeling empathy for others, all the pieces of the puzzle fall into place.

Merlin Jetton Xray speaks the same sort of dichotomous language.

What "dichotomy" do you think I'm using?

My approach to this issue is socio-biological, as I believe an ethics discussions has to take into account those basics.

For as mammals living in groups, we are by no means stranger to acts which involve "serving others". Those acts stabilize both the indvidual and the group.

The individual performing the act of serving (e. g. chimp 'grooming' another chimp) does not feel it is getting nothing back in return. What both the groomer (and the groomed) get is the positive feeling of mutual acceptance and an atmosphere of harmony.

Jim inviting his colleage Jack to a cup of coffee at work is doing esentially the same thing.

Would you agree that many acts of serving others are part of human nature?

Edited March 24, 2010 by Xray

[Daniel Barnes]

2. Sacrifice means surrender of value and therefore loss by any definition. If you call exchange of a lesser value to a greater one a "sacrifice" (like in chess) then you define gain as loss. This is contradiction in terms.

You deliberately ignore what all the dictionaries say. So for example the first meaning of "sacrifice" in Collins English Dictionary:

"A surrender of something of value as a means of gaining something more desirable"

The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary:

"The surrender of something valued or desired, esp. one's life, for the sake of something regarded as more important or worthy"

In The Free Dictionary: "Forfeiture of something highly valued for the sake of one considered to have a greater value or claim"

The sacrifice in chess is perfectly in agreement with these definitions, so there isn't any contradiction in terms.

Leonid's style of argument so far consists of three tactics. 1. He comes up with something blatantly false - for example, his assertion that the way "sacrifice" is used in chess, as a means to a gain, is somehow "technical" and only used in chess, when even the very dictionary definitions he cites show it is actually commonly used. 2. When confronted with such problems, he simply ignores them and doggedly continues his earlier false assertion. 3. Repeat 1. & 2.

It is really very odd.

And no, the sub-defintion 1.b Tony pointed out (and that I pointed out myself with a similar example in an earlier post)...

1b. Act of parting with, selling, disposing of, something at a price below its supposed value.

...does not necessarily contradict the definitions 1.a or 2.a!

Why? This is because unlike definitions 1.a and 2.a, the motive for selling something below its supposed value is not stated. Hence, for a real example of 1.b, someone might be selling a $30,000 car for $1000 below its supposed value because they are moving overseas for a new job and in a hurry to leave. Hence the move and the job are greater value than the $1000. So once again one is giving up a lesser value to gain a greater value, thus 1.b can be perfectly consistent with 1.a and 2.a.

So it is clear that there is nowhere a necessary self-contradiction - not in the individual definitions internally, nor even necessarily between them.

Of course this will not stop Leonid from insisting that there is. But I am beginning to doubt anything can...;-)

Edited March 24, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Leonid]

Panoptic "Why can "bank" mean different things in different systems, but "man" cannot?”

Because there is no different system for "man". Not every word is polysemous or homonymous. You cannot arbitrary assign word to concept, unless you want to develop new language.

[Leonid]

Daniel "You deliberately ignore what all the dictionaries say. So for example the first meaning of "sacrifice" in Collins English Dictionary: ""A surrender of something of value as a means of gaining something more desirable"

No, I don't. I specifically mentioned this meaning number of times. My point is that this is not a definition of the concept but an example of common usage which contradicts the concept itself and therefore is wrong. Moreover, the reason for such an inappropriate usage is that altruism became explicit and (which is much more important) implicit dominant philosophy. The idea of sacrifice as good, noble, just and proper action became integrated and internalized to such a degree that people use it in order to designate just about every action. Exactly against this 2000 years old tradition of glorified human sacrifices, that is-offering of man to deity (state, society, race, class etc...) Ayn Rand rebelled.

Daniel:” Why? This is because unlike definitions 1.a and 2.a, the motive for selling something below its supposed value is not stated. Hence, for a real example of 1.b, someone might be selling a $30,000 car for $1000 below its supposed value because they are moving overseas for a new job and in a hurry to leave."

That would simply mean he valuates his time more than car's market value. For him such an exchange is a gain. But you can call it sacrifice if you don't mind to live in the state of cognitive contradictory ambiguity when the same word designates two opposite concepts the same time and in the same respect.

Edited March 25, 2010 by Leonid

[Daniel Barnes]

Panoptic "Why can "bank" mean different things in different systems, but "man" cannot?”

Because there is no different system for "man". Not every word is polysemous or homonymous. You cannot arbitrary assign word to concept, unless you want to develop new language.

What, you mean like this?

This is exactly the problem.

As I have said many times before, the Objectivist project seems to rely on its own special language (as per the above link) and, less well known, what it purports to be its own logic.

This denial of the principle of mutual standards, such as language and logic and insisting on their own version of each enables Objectivists to evade external criticism of their arguments.

This is for the most part an unwitting evasion.

[Daniel Barnes]

My point is that this is not a definition of the concept but an example of common usage which contradicts the concept itself and therefore is wrong.

Here you are effectively setting yourself up as an authority as to what the "right" and "wrong" usages of words are! Can I ask who made you ultimate arbiter of the English language?

That you are attempting to do this is not surprising to me. In fact you are merely following in Rand's footsteps, where she held that the role of philosophers such as herself was to instruct lesser mortals - such as scientists - as to what words mean. That and saying "A=A" now and again.

The Ayn Rand Lexicon is in effect a kind of Newspeak or Political Correctness - trying to control the language, and thus controlling debate. This sort of thing, i suggest, is the root of Objectivism's both pedantic and authoritarian tendencies.

Moreover, the reason for such an inappropriate usage is that altruism became explicit and (which is much more important) implicit dominant philosophy.

In his role as the The Supreme Minister of Objective Language, Leonid hereby declares the two main dictionary definitions of the word "sacrifice" to be "inappropriate"!

Please ensure all future usages of the term rely on the "conceptually appropriate" meaning, as per the official Ayn Rand Lexicon!

Edited March 25, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Leonid]

Panoptic "Why can "bank" mean different things in different systems, but "man" cannot?”

Because there is no different system for "man". Not every word is polysemous or homonymous. You cannot arbitrary assign word to concept, unless you want to develop new language.

What, you mean like this?

This is exactly the problem.

As I have said many times before, the Objectivist project seems to rely on its own special language (as per the above link) and, less well known, what it purports to be its own logic.

This denial of the principle of mutual standards, such as language and logic and insisting on their own version of each enables Objectivists to evade external criticism of their arguments.

This is for the most part an unwitting evasion.

I don't think so. Objectivism relies on non-contradictory definitions which pertain to reality. As result, Objectivist approach allows to clarify the meaning of words as concept-designators and prevents mental fog, which caused by their ambiguous contradictory usage. Such a usage is always an unwitting evasion

Daniel "In his role as the The Supreme Minister of Objective Language, Leonid hereby declares the two main dictionary definitions of the word "sacrifice" to be "inappropriate"!

This is not Leonid, but Law of Identity which disavows contradictions. This Law is The Supreme Minister of everything.

Edited March 25, 2010 by Leonid

[Daniel Barnes]

That would simply mean he valuates his time more than car's market value. For him such an exchange is a gain. But you can call it sacrifice if you don't mind to live in the state of cognitive contradictory ambiguity when the same word designates two opposite concepts the same time and in the same respect.

Leonid, for the nth time, any dictionary will tell you that "sacrifice" does not necessarily preclude making a gain, but is usually employed for precisely this result!

But of course to you all dictionaries are wrong - full of "mere conventions", as Ayn Rand used to say. And anyone who has not had their language properly purified by Ayn Rand, who alone is the authority as to the true meanings of words, must be forced to live in "the state of cognitive contradictory ambiguity" or whatever other ThoughtCrime the Supreme Minister of Objective Language might care to trump up.

Edited March 25, 2010 by Daniel Barnes

[Leonid]

GS: I find the word 'rational' somewhat vague and I could argue that I have seen animals behaving rationally and so I don't think that 'rational' provides sufficient differentiation from animals. "

Apparently you mean you have seen animals behaving expediently. Rationality means conceptual thinking which animals don't have. That's exactly the reason why they're space but not time-binders.

Edited March 25, 2010 by Leonid

[Leonid]

Daniel "Leonid, for the nth time, any dictionary will tell you that "sacrifice" does not necessarily preclude making a gain,"

Daniel, for the nth time, dictionaries give both definitions and descriptions of word's common usage. This is not always the same thing. In the case of "sacrifice" the common usage sometimes contradicts the very meaning of this word. The reason for this aberration is internalized philosophy of altruism.

[Rich Engle]

I tend to go with the pragmatic explanation for sacrifice. As long as it is not a forced sacrifice. Meaning, a sacrifice is a tactical move--you sacrifice (X) in order to either preserve something you value more greatly, or through being convinced you will make some greater gain. Of course, in real-world-real-human monkey business, you see this done for what might be considered rather odd "values." Values often heavily instilled and not understood--over in the blind compliance or "duty" section.

rde

Huh-huh: he said "duty," huh-huh.

[tjohnson]

GS: I find the word 'rational' somewhat vague and I could argue that I have seen animals behaving rationally and so I don't think that 'rational' provides sufficient differentiation from animals. "

Apparently you mean you have seen animals behaving expediently. Rationality means conceptual thinking which animals don't have. That's exactly the reason why they're space but not time-binders.

'Conceptual', there is another vague term. Can you explain this in more detail?

[imurray]

Daniel "Leonid, for the nth time, any dictionary will tell you that "sacrifice" does not necessarily preclude making a gain,"

Daniel, for the nth time, dictionaries give both definitions and descriptions of word's common usage. This is not always the same thing. In the case of "sacrifice" the common usage sometimes contradicts the very meaning of this word. The reason for this aberration is internalized philosophy of altruism.

Leonid,

Do you realize you're not making any sense? You're arguing that Rand created a perfect definition of sacrifice and that any definition that does not agree with it is violating A=A. There are at least two major flaws here: 1. Why is Rand's definition the correct one and the non-Rand definition the contradiction? Why not the other way around? 2. Do you believe that either a dictionary or Rand's lexicon represent some kind of transcendental master texts (bibles if you will) that contain absolute knowledge and truth.

If I write a book and decide to define "man" as a cold blooded reptile and used that definition consistently throughout would the word police come to my home or would I be struck down by lightening? Would my definition be wrong if it made sense within the context of my text?

[Peter]

Rich Engle wrote:

I tend to go with the pragmatic explanation for sacrifice. As long as it is not a forced sacrifice. Meaning, a sacrifice is a tactical move--you sacrifice (X) in order to either preserve something you value more greatly . . .

End quote

The “Goddess of the Market” which I just received in the mail states at the beginning that Rand sought to destroy all philosophical justifications for totalitarianism, especially *altruism*.

I can’t seem to grasp this next, (it’s too late at night but I want to pad my letter) ten year old letter, but you big brains might get a kick out of this somewhat long, single post to the old Atlantis.

Semper cogitans fidele,

Peter Taylor

From: "Rob Bass" <rhbass@philosophers.net>

To: atlantis@wetheliving.com

CC: rhbass@philosophers.net

Subject: Re:ATL: Does egoism undermine itself?

Date: Sat, 22 Jul 2000 14:06:15 -0700

"William Dwyer" <wdwyer@california.net>

> I am referring to his argument that egoism is self-contradictory or self-refuting. Rob argues that one may be better off living in a world in which everyone commits himself to sacrificing his life for the sake of others in an emergency, because if everyone followed this policy, everyone would maximize his chances for survival. Rob stipulates that we cannot avoid acting on the commitment, once it is made. He imagines that everyone takes an "altruism pill", which programs him to follow through on his sacrificial commitment. Based on this example, Rob concludes that since it could well be in our interests -- could well maximize our chances of survival -- to commit ourselves to the sacrifice of our lives under certain conditions, egoism is self-refuting.

[The example Bill is referring to, and that I will be referring to, can be found in http:// personal.bgsu.edu/~roberth/egoism.html . The important section, though others are also relevant, is headed "The Third Problem: Egoism Undermining Itself", about two-thirds of the way down the page.]

You seem to be focusing on the wrong feature of what the altruism pill does in the example. Following the original example, I said,

"Of course, there aren't any real-world altruism pills. But speaking of magic pills is not essential to the main point: they are just a dramatic touch standing for something that is unquestionably real, that people can take steps to bring about changes in their motivations -- through practice, training, acquisition of habits and various kinds of therapy."

What's essential about the altruism pill is not that you cannot abstain from following through on the commitment once it is made, but that taking it is a step that results in altering one's motivations. For the real-world analogue, the relevant question is whether some step or steps that one has a self-interested reason to take could result in changing one's motivations so that one is no longer entirely self-interested.

Saying this assumes that there are some motivations that one could have that are not self-interested, even if one came by them in a self-interested way. I'll spell this out a bit more below.

> Is this a valid argument? Well, either it's in one's interest to commit oneself to a policy of "sacrificing" one's life for the sake of others in an emergency or it isn't.

Of course.

> If it is, then one's commitment is egoistic, because it constitutes the surrender of a lesser value for a greater one. The lesser value would be the choice to preserve one's life instead of surrendering it for the sake of others, and the greater value would one's own increased chances of survival. Alternatively, if it is not in one's interests to make this commitment, then, of course, making it would not be egoistic.

>

> So I don't see how, based on Rob's example, egoism can be said to undermine itself. What am I missing?

What you're missing is the importance of the distinction between self-interested motivation and self-interested outcomes. _Making_ the commitment is self-interested: you increase your chance of survival thereby. It doesn't follow that, once you _have_ made the commitment, your motivation _then_ is (entirely) self-interested. To be clear about this, you need to distinguish self-interested _outcomes_ and self-interested _motivation_. Consider this diagram (a version of which I've posted before):

Serves Does not

one's serve one's

interests interests

Self-

interested

motivation A B

Not self-

interested C D

motivation

Note first that there are real examples for all four of the categories. For category B, at least by way of accident, it is possible for someone to take an action with some self-interested motivation and, even though he has not made a mistake -- that is, it is reasonable for him to act in the way he does -- the actual outcome may be against his interests. Second, for category C, it is possible that someone takes action with some non-self-interested motivation but that the actual outcome serves his interests. (I take it for granted that examples in which self-interested motivation leads to a self-interested outcome [A] and in which non-self-interested motivation leads to an outcome against the agent's interests [D] are easy to come by.)

Second, note that if you have an account of what is in a person's interests, then it is possible to reasonably sharply divide what is in one's interests from what is not. For an egoist, the account of self-interest will have to be provided by what I have elsewhere called his basic or core values. In terms of those values, a self-interested outcome can be defined as one that promotes or at least does not harm the core values. This has to be treated as relative to the other options the agent has available. If the available options are limited to 'bad' and 'worse', then 'bad', though it would involve harm to the core values, would still count as a self-interested outcome, since the only alternative is something that involves greater harm to the core values.

Third, note that the kinds of motivations collected under the heading of 'self-interested motivation' may be reasonably unified, presumably by having some kind of reliable connection to self-interested outcomes, but there is no such unity to the class of non-self-interested motivation. They are a grab-bag with no particular unifying feature except that they are not self-interested. Many different things can fit here, including concern for the interests of others, self-hatred, hatred of others, devotion to the glory of God, commitment to institutions and so on. To say that some motivation is not self-interested is not, in my book, to praise it. Nor, for that matter, is saying that some motivation is self-interested equivalent to condemning it. Whether action or motivation deserves praise, condemnation or something else is just a different question, and to be settled on different grounds, than whether the motivation is or is not self-interested. Self-interested motivation is often a good thing. Non-self-interested motivation is often a bad thing. Objections to egoism, at least of the kind I would make, are objections to a narrow and false theory of what matters morally; they are not objections to self-interest per se nor endorsements of anything, whatever it might be, that happens to be opposed to self-interest. (As I have pointed out before, this is entirely standard usage among moral philosophers. Hardly any moral philosopher believes in what Rand called "altruism".)

With these points in hand, we are prepared to approach the central issue. Remember that I have said that an egoist is someone who takes his (non-moralized) interests to be of ultimate value (for himself). You have elsewhere said that you consider that an acceptable definition. The interests in question are, most fundamentally, the basic or core values. If anything else counts as an interest, it is because of its relation to those basic or core values. I have also said that taking his interests to be of ultimate value involves at least allowing them to have veto power over any other concerns. That is, the egoist will not knowingly, deliberately, act in a way that harms his interests if he has any other, more self-interested, option available. I take that to be essential to egoism and to self-interested motivation. (That is, it's a necessary condition for self-interested motivation. It may not be sufficient if there is any non-self-interested motivation that satisfies the condition.) The motivation for an action is not self-interested or not wholly self-interested if the agent would knowingly and deliberately take the action when (a) it would harm his interests and (B) he has some other option that is better in terms of his interests. (If you disagree with that, if you think that a person's motivation in some action may be entirely self-interested but that he may nevertheless knowingly and deliberately act against his own interests when some more self-interested option is available, then I suggest that you're using "self-interest" [and "egoism"] in a highly non-standard way. If that's your position, then, to avoid confusion, you should simply substitute other terms and quit calling your position a version of egoism.)

The main point of the previous paragraph is that there is an essential relation between being an egoist and having self-interested motivation. If a person is so motivated that he is willing (knowingly and deliberately) to act against his interests when there is some more self-interested option available, then he is not an egoist. Return to considering now the situation in the thought-experiment I proposed. A person is faced with a choice in which he can either take or refrain from taking a step that will result in altering his motivations (this is what the "altruism pill" stood for). If he takes the step, his life-expectancy will be greater than if he does not. Taking the step and not taking the step otherwise bear equally on his interests: neither is better or worse for his interests than the other. If we assume that increased life-expectancy is in his interests, then he should, in terms of his interests, take the step. Taking the step can be accounted for -- indeed is required by -- entirely self-interested motivations. He could only have a reason for not taking the step under the conditions stipulated if he were already not entirely self-interested. Suppose that he does then take the step -- which he _must_ do if he is an egoist. Taking the step, though, leads to a change in his motivations. It results in his being willing to risk or give up his life in order to save at least two others. So, if he should find himself in a position where this is possible, he will knowingly and deliberately take action which reduces his life-expectancy. That is, he will refuse to let considerations of his interests have veto power over proposed courses of action, and therefore he is no longer an egoist. In other words, for the envisioned agent, egoism undermines itself. Egoism tells him to take a step that, once taken, will result in his no longer being an egoist. Since egoism is a universal theory -- that is, since it says that everyone ought to be an egoist -- the existence of even one agent who ought not to be an egoist (or, more precisely, who ought to do something that results in his ceasing to be an egoist) shows that egoism is false. And, of course, it is.

Rob

P.S. Below is an extended excerpt from private correspondence that is designed to illustrate the point. The person to whom it was written was making the mistaken claim that any motivation for which a self-interested reason could be given counted, ipso facto, as a self-interested motivation.

------

Let me illustrate by considering a character who lives by a principle that (I hope!) you won't take seriously. I'll call him the Bottom Liner. The Bottom Liner guides his action by consideration of "the bottom line" -- money or monetarily denominated assets. He thinks that the only thing that matters in life is the impact on his bottom line. I'm not supposing that he's stupid or unable to take risk or investment opportunities into account. He's perfectly willing to spend more in the present for a higher future pay-off. He's also capable of making hard choices when the best he can do is minimize losses to the bottom line.

Now, saying that he's a Bottom Liner isn't enough to tell how he decides in particular cases. For the moment, I am going to assume that he's a _calculating_ Bottom Liner. He makes a habit of making decisions, whether large or small, by trying to figure out how they will impact his bottom line. Of course, he doesn't literally calculate everything. He doesn't engage in calculation to decide whether it will pay to get out of bed when the alarm goes off (and whether it will pay to calculate whether it will pay and ...). Some things are settled by standing policies. (By standing policies, I mean policies that have been settled upon by calculation at some point. The Bottom Liner may also just have

fallen into certain habits that amount to regularities in his behavior, but are not matters of standing policy. Both habits and policies may, from time to time, be reviewed to assess or reassess their impact on the bottom line.) In others, it just doesn't occur to him to calculate, or a decision has to be made when there isn't time for calculation. Still, it is his habit to calculate whenever he notices that an option, not already settled by a standing policy, may have an impact on his bottom line.

Suppose that at some point it occurs to him to consider the impact of being a Bottom Liner on his bottom line. Initially, since he is a calculating Bottom Liner, this will involve assessing the impact of being a calculating Bottom Liner upon his bottom line. One possible though not very likely outcome of the assessment is that he will conclude that being a calculating Bottom Liner is what's best for his bottom line. A more likely outcome is that he will discover that his constant calculating is bad for his bottom line. It has costs of various kinds that may well outweigh any prospective payoff. If this is the result of his calculation, he will revise the policy or habit of constantly calculating. He will still assess options solely in terms of the bottom line, but will adopt various heuristic devices to determine when calculating does or does not serve his bottom line. He will become a more sophisticated Bottom Liner.

Something like this is apparently what you think my anti-egoist argument amounts to -- an argument for being more sophisticated in the pursuit of one's interests. If that were all there is to it, you'd be quite right that it isn't an argument against egoism. But that is not all there is to it, for, to continue the parallel, there's another possible outcome of the Bottom Liner's assessment. He may discover that _being a Bottom Liner_ is bad for his bottom line. That is, it may be the case that people who guide their actions by some (specific) different principle, one that counts some other factor or factors than impact on the bottom line as relevant to their decision-making, typically do better on the bottom line. Perhaps, for example, by not being Bottom Liners, they are more likely to be trusted and therefore more likely to be offered profitable opportunities.

If _that_ is the upshot of his assessment, the Bottom Liner will have reasons in terms of the bottom line for ceasing to be a Bottom Liner. The reason will speak to him in terms of what he cares about as a Bottom Liner, but after he has understood that that is really the outcome of the assessment, he can no longer remain a Bottom Liner. (It does not matter whether he decides to change his behavior and attitudes in consequence of the new assessment or not. If he does, he will no longer be a Bottom Liner because he will think that something matters besides the bottom line. But even if he does not, he will no longer be a Bottom Liner, for he will, at least in this case, be refusing to do something that he knows is supported by considerations of impact on the bottom line. At this point, it may be that failure to follow the argument or dishonesty or self-deception can keep him from admitting or realizing that he's no longer a Bottom Liner (or a consistent Bottom Liner), but they will not keep it from being _true._

It is this third type of case that is parallel to the argument I presented against egoism, and it is the possibility of a case of this kind that undermines the suggestion that what I am really doing is arguing for some more sophisticated version of egoism.

Now, to repeat what I said elsewhere, I take egoism to be the thesis that, for each person, his own (non-moralized) interests are of ultimate value. At minimum, whatever an egoist may do, he may not, consistently with being an egoist, knowingly act against his interests or treat any other consideration than his interests as being or being part of what has ultimate value.

From that point, the argument is straightforward and proceeds in parallel with the case of the Bottom Liner. It is possible for egoistic assessment to yield the conclusion that being an egoist does not serve one's interests as well as some alternative. This would amount to saying that those who consider something (in particular) other than or additional to their own interests as having ultimate value actually (typically) do better in terms of their interests. With only slight alterations, what I said above about the case of the Bottom Liner applies here as well:

If _that_ is the upshot of his assessment, the egoist will have reasons in terms of his own interests for ceasing to be an egoist. The reason will speak to him in terms of what he cares about as an egoist, but after he has understood that that is really the outcome of the assessment, he can no longer remain an egoist. It does not matter whether he decides to change his behavior and attitudes in consequence of the new assessment or not. If he does, he will no longer be an egoist because he will think that something matters besides his own interests. But even if he does not, he will no longer be an egoist, for he will, at least in this case, be acting in a way that he knows is against his interests. At this point, it may be that failure to follow the argument or dishonesty or self-deception can keep him from admitting or realizing that he's no longer an egoist (or a consistent egoist), but

they will not keep it from being _true._ Rob Bass

rhbass@philosophers.net

[George H. Smith]

GS: I find the word 'rational' somewhat vague and I could argue that I have seen animals behaving rationally and so I don't think that 'rational' provides sufficient differentiation from animals. "

Apparently you mean you have seen animals behaving expediently. Rationality means conceptual thinking which animals don't have. That's exactly the reason why they're space but not time-binders.

'Conceptual', there is another vague term. Can you explain this in more detail?

Speaking of vague terms, I've been hoping that you would define what you mean by "time," and define it in such a way that it is meaningful to say humans can "bind" time. So far, no luck. I suspect that "time-binding" is a metaphor -- and as any good philosopher of language will tell you, to employ metaphors in definitions is rarely a good idea.

Ghs

[Leonid]

Bob_ Mac "It's a little thing called a "Gene".

Evolutionary psychology (PE) is a pseudoscience. It has so many philosophical and scientific flaws that I don't really have time or desire to discuss all of them. However I have to mention at least one objection to PE which relates to our topic.

We're talking ethics here. Ethics or morals are code of values accepted by choice. Biological or gene determinism effectively eliminates Free Will, mind and therefore morals as such. The organisms which their only purpose is to transfer genes don't need any ethics. Animals do just fine without to define "good" and "bad". So if you view people as procreating living machines, don't bother yourself with ethical problems.

Just because there are some questionable and speculative EP ideas doesn't mean that gene-centric behaviour is questionable. These ideas (the ones I speak of) are mainstream evolutionary thought, hardly fringe. Your response only serves to clarify your profound ignorance of science. I have no problem with the criticism of specific ideas, but for a so-called "rational" person to believe that our behavioral traits didn't evolve right along with our physical ones is beyond my comprehension.

"It has so many philosophical and scientific flaws "

I always find it amusing that when evidence suggests a philosophical premise error, then the science that found it must have a philosophical flaw.

"The organisms which their only purpose is to transfer genes don't need any ethics."

Wrong again. What if ethics in our cognitive niche is advantageous to the reproduction and survival of our genes?

"So if you view people as procreating living machines, don't bother yourself with ethical problems."

If you believe otherwise, don't bother yourself with reality.

Bob

I only can repeat that the notion of biological determinism abnegates the concept of free will, mind and morals. If science fails to make a distinction between man and animal, if it substitutes man's conceptual behavior by reproductive drive, then such a "science" contradicts everything known about man as rational being and cannot be taken seriously. Moreover, I think that PE is simply another version of collectivism/altruism in scientific disguise. In the nutshell it claims that man's life belongs to the future generations, and the only ultimate purpose of his life is a transfer of genes which becomes the standard of value. It advocates biological egoism and social altruism. As Richard Dowkins, PE guru and self-proclaimed altruist wrote "I shall argue that a predominant quality to be expected in a successful gene transfer is ruthless egoism...let us try to teach generosity and altruism because we all born selfish". But even he said “I’m not advocating a morality based on evolution" (The Selfish Gene pg2-3). If you’re happy to accept as reality the situation which reduces man to the status of the stud-horse and call PE "science" instead BS, then it's your choice. But don't fool yourself by idea, that such a "reality" has anything to do with man and morals.

Edited March 25, 2010 by Leonid

[Leonid]

Panoptic "Do you realize you're not making any sense? You're arguing that Rand created a perfect definition of sacrifice and that any definition that does not agree with it is violating A=A."

First I never claimed that Rand created definition of sacrifice. Such a definition as surrender of value you can find in any dictionary. My claim that a common usage of the word (not a definition) contradicts its original meaning and the reason for it is internalized altruism. So if one says “I sacrificed 20 years of my life and a lot of money to rise my children"-that doesn't make any sense. Literary it means that he values his time and his money more than his children. For the most of people this is not a case. They simply mean they did right thing. Sacrifice became a catchword, synonym of good deed. And this is the sign that altruism is deeply rooted in the people's minds.

Edited March 25, 2010 by Leonid

[George H. Smith]

As I come to understand Rand's definitions vs. colloquial definitions I am getting a better sense of what she meant and a lot of the confusion is falling away. For instance, after reading some Comte, who coined the term altruism, I now have a better understanding of what Rand means by altruism and I think it's safe to say she was more or less 'true' to his conception of the word.

This is exactly right. We find the following quotation from Comte in "The Objectivist" (August, 1971):

Auguste Comte (1798-1857)

"Positivism alone holds at once both a noble and true language when it urges us to live for others. This, the definitive formula of human morality, gives a direct sanction exclusively to our instincts of benevolence, the common source of happiness and of duty. Implicitly and indirectly it sanctions our personal instincts, as the necessary conditions of our existence, with the proviso that they must be subordinate to those of altruism. With this limitation, we are even ordered to gratify our personal instincts, with the view of fitting ourselves to be better servants of Humanity, whose we are entirely." The Catechism of Positive Religion, trans. R. Congreve (London, John Chapman, 1858), p. 313.

"In politics we must eliminate Rights, as in philosophy we eliminate causes .... Positivism only recognises duties, duties of all to all. Placing itself, as it does, at the social point of view, it cannot tolerate the notion of rights, for such notion rests on individualism. We are born under a load of obligations of every kind, obligations to our predecessors, to our successors, to our contemporaries. After our birth these obligations increase or accumulate, for it is some time before we can return any service. Where, then, in the case of man, is the foundation on which we are to rest the idea of rights?... Rights, then, in the case of man, are as absurd as they are immoral." Ibid., pp. 331-3.

Comte was exceedingly clear that self-sacrifice is a duty (one that should be enforced by government) to sacrifice our own interests to the greater good of "society" or "humanity." It is fair to say that this was the primary meaning that Rand assigned to the term, though I concede there are places where she waffles a bit in her usage.

Ghs

[imurray]

GS: I find the word 'rational' somewhat vague and I could argue that I have seen animals behaving rationally and so I don't think that 'rational' provides sufficient differentiation from animals. "

Apparently you mean you have seen animals behaving expediently. Rationality means conceptual thinking which animals don't have. That's exactly the reason why they're space but not time-binders.

'Conceptual', there is another vague term. Can you explain this in more detail?

Speaking of vague terms, I've been hoping that you would define what you mean by "time," and define it in such a way that it is meaningful to say humans can "bind" time. So far, no luck. I suspect that "time-binding" is a metaphor -- and as any good philosopher of language will tell you, to employ metaphors in definitions is rarely a good idea.

Ghs

Actually any good philosopher of language, like Wittgenstein, used metaphors all the time, e.g., "language game" or "form of life". There are also 'good' philosophers of language wo say that the essence of language is metaphor - that all words are metaphors. I guess you'd have to explain what you mean by "good" philosophers of language - perhaps you meant to say "those philosophers of language who I agree with".

Edited March 25, 2010 by Panoptic

[Leonid]

GS: "'Conceptual', there is another vague term. Can you explain this in more detail?"

It's not vague but rather complicated. In the nutshell conceptual thinking is the human way to interact with reality.According to Objectivism, concepts “represent classifications of observed existents according to their relationships to other observed existents.” The Objectivist theory of concepts is best described in " Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology" by Ayn Rand

[Daniel Barnes]

It is fair to say that this was the primary meaning that Rand assigned to the term, though I concede there are places where she waffles a bit in her usage.

Rand seems to argue that this original, yet obscure version describing acts almost no-one has ever practiced somehow captures the "essence" of misc. general acts we normally consider altruistic.

"Essence" is one word for it. "Strawman" is another.

[George H. Smith]

Actually any good philosopher of language, like Wittgenstein, used metaphors all the time, e.g., "language game" or "form of life". There are also 'good' philosophers of language wo say that the essence of language is metaphor - that all words are metaphors. I guess you'd have to explain what you mean by "good" philosophers of language - perhaps you meant to say "those philosophers of language who I agree with".

No, I don't consider Wittgenstein to be an especially good philosopher of language, but that's not the point. My comment referred to the use of metaphors in definitions, not to their use in other contexts, where they can be extremely useful. Literal definitions are to be preferred over metaphorical definitions, whenever this is possible. I daresay you will find this advice in almost any elementary text on logic that you care to consult.

As for the claim that "all words are metaphors," that simply robs the term "metaphor" of any meaning, since there remains no literal meaning -- or "polar" term, as a Wittgensteinian might say -- to contrast it with.

Ghs

[Daniel Barnes]

Do you realize you're not making any sense?

No, he does not. But on he goes, regardless.

You're arguing that Rand created a perfect definition of sacrifice and that any definition that does not agree with it is violating A=A.

Yes, he is.

There are at least two major flaws here: 1. Why is Rand's definition the correct one and the non-Rand definition the contradiction? Why not the other way around? 2. Do you believe that either a dictionary or Rand's lexicon represent some kind of transcendental master texts (bibles if you will) that contain absolute knowledge and truth.

1. Because The Supreme Arbiter In Charge Of The Meaning Of Words says so. Anyone that disagrees is cognitively suspect. 2. Clearly only the Ayn Rand Lexicon can be the Holy Book.

If I write a book and decide to define "man" as a cold blooded reptile and used that definition consistently throughout would the word police come to my home or would I be struck down by lightening? Would my definition be wrong if it made sense within the context of my text?

That would depend on whether your definition happened to agree with The Ayn Rand Lexicon;

Edited March 25, 2010 by Daniel Barnes