The Metacontext of Pancritical Rationalism


Paul Mawdsley

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Paul, I'm lost in space.

I don't know if it's metacontextual space, subcontextual space, or what, but I am, indeed, lost. Could you define these terms? (I know what context means.:-))

Mindy,

In some ways this subject matter is very new to me. I have only started to read about it over the last few days, and have had very little time. On the other hand, the idea of metacontexts and specifically the metacontext of pancritical rationalism (PCR), as I understand it at this point, is the formalization of something I have seen and been writing about the whole time I have been on OL, and thinking about for over 20 years. Rafe Champion has a website dedicated to PCR at: http://www.the-rathouse.com/index.html

See http://www.the-rathouse.com/fullindex.html for his full index.

Champion writes about how Bill Bartley, a student of Karl Popper, extends Popper's ideas to their full epistemic conclusion. In his essay, The Philosophy & Economics of Liberalism Champion writes:

Bartley followed up a clue provided by Popper in his lecture titled 'On the sources of knowledge and of ignorance' (reprinted as the Introduction to Conjectures and Refutations). He explored how unstated assumptions create a demand for positive (certain) justification which can never be met. The solution is to abandon the quest for positive justification and instead to settle for a critical preference for one option rather than others in the light of critical arguments and evidence offered to that point. A preference may (or may not) be revised in the light of new evidence and arguments. This appears to be a simple, commonsense position but it defies the dominant traditions of Western thought which have almost all taught that some authority provides (or ought to provide) grounds for positively justified beliefs. Western epistemology is mostly concerned with theories of justification; in contrast Bartley's non-justificationist stance requires a theory of criticism. Bartley followed Popper and located four forms of non-justificationist criticism; the test of evidence; the test of logic and internal consistency: the check against well-tested scientific theories and the check on the problem.

Three Metacontexts

Bartley published his solution to the logical problem of rationality in The Retreat to Commitment (Knopf, 1962; Open Court 1985) and in 'Rationality versus the theory of rationality' in The Critical Approach to Science and Philosophy (Ed. Mario Bunge, Free Press of Glencoe, 1964). Subsequently he developed an ecological approach to explain the nature and implications of his achievement in 'The philosophy of Karl Popper: Part III. Rationality, criticism and logic' (Philosophia, 1982). He examined the context of arguments to explore how dialogues may be polluted by dogmatism and various of its consequences. He makes a distinction between positions, contexts and metacontexts. A position indicates a theory or belief about something. Positions are adopted or postulated in contexts. Different positions are logically and empirically possible in any context and this raises the question of the attitude that prevails regarding the acceptance and change of positions. These attitudes constitute what Bartley calls metacontexts and he has focussed on three of them:

The Western tradition of justificationism.

The Eastern tradition of non-attachment.

A tradition of non-dogmatic critical preference which he calls 'comprehensive critical rationalism' or 'pancritical rationalism'.

I'm going to have to find time to digest these new (to me) ideas but I find the promise of finding a formal language that fits my own processes exciting. The excitement is, however, tempered by a critical eye. I remember too well how Objectivism promised a formal language that fit to my own processes only to find it had elements that were built to confine my processes to a dogmatic structure. The very definition of pancritical rationalism suggests that the same thing should not happen this time.

Wiki defines PCR as:

A philosophy which denies and rejects harshly the existence of any authority, proof, disproof, or justification, even only with probability, and holds everything open to criticism, including observation (that is, it even rejects the inference "X was observed directly → X is necessarily true" as an appeal to authority), logics and its own very basic positions, such as criticism itself, is pancritical rationalism. Without the need to ever appeal to authority for justification, the pancritical rationalist is able to hold his position with complete integrity, since he is not guilty of relativism or dogmatism. [Full article]

About pancritical rationalism Champion says further:

According to the pancritical rationalists, or exponents of critical preference, no position can be positively justified but it is quite likely that one, (or some) will turn out to be better than others in the light of critical discussion and tests. This type of rationality holds all its positions and propositions open to criticism and a standard objection to this stance is that it is empty; just holding our positions open to criticism provides no guidance as to what position we should adopt in any particular situation. This criticism misses its mark for two reasons. First, pancritical rationalism is not a position, and so it is not directed at solving the kind of problems that are solved by adopting a position on some issue or other. It is concerned with the way that such positions are adopted, criticised, defended and relinquished. Second, Bartley does provide guidance on adopting positions; we may adopt the position that to this moment has stood up to criticism most effectively. Of course this is no help for people who seek stronger reasons for belief, but that is a problem for them, and it does not undermine the logic of critical preference.

Bottom line: We creatively build contexts that allow us to take the facts we experience and connect the dots. This is the creative/intuitive/practical approach to context building. It works from experience up; the last step being to apply words to the images and contexts created. Or we can adopt from others established contexts that we can use to map the facts of experience. This is the disciplined/structural/academic approach to context building. It works from the verbal/symbolic descriptions of images and contexts created by others down; the last step is to connect it to experience. Ultimately, any context is the creation of a human mind intended to integrate the observed facts, based in specific assumptions that define how the facts should be integrated. Any system of thought you can think of, from religion to philosophy to science, is a context creatively built by the human mind intended to integrate the observed facts, based in specific assumption that define how the facts should be integrated.

Our epistemic metacontext is our commitment to how we should deal with the specific assumptions of our religious, philosophical and scientific subcontexts. It is the context that we creatively build to integrate subcontexts, including the facts and the assumptions they contain, based on specific assumptions that define how these contexts should be integrated. Just as we can have abstract concepts of concepts, we can have abstract contexts of contexts, or metacontexts. Justificationism, non-attachment, and pancritical rationalism (see articles) are the three metacontexts, defined by Bartley, that determine the context in which we integrate, interpret and evaluate all subcontexts. PCR assumes any position and any assumption is open to criticism and doubt because we tend to approach psychological certainty with every passed test of criticism and doubt. Certainty, however, is never absolutely attained. It is attained as a contextually justified state of mind. This is what I mean by "contextual certainty?

Paul

Edited by Paul Mawdsley
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Correct me if I'm wrong Paul but when you say 'metacontext' would it be like standing back and examining each person's context? So instead of staying in one's own context one can move to the next level and see it as just one of many contexts?

If I understand you correctly, no. Here's where things can start to get tricky again. While, yes, in a sense this would be a shift to a metacontext because it is a context of contexts, so you have the basic principle right, it's not an epistemic metacontext as I am thinking about it. An epistemic metacontext would be the equivalent of a metaphysical axiom. It is the context in which all other contexts are set, in which all assumptions and facts are integrated into religious, philosophical, and scientific positions, and which allows us to relate all subcontexts to each other. It is our context of contexts and our assumptions about assumptions.

Paul

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Paul

Thanks for all that information. I don't see what appeals to you in this. It seems like a bit of jargon stretched over a lot of psychologising. "Metacontext" is the "attitude" one has toward accepting or rejecting a theory?

For myself, I'm going to continue using "context" in the standard way. But at least now I'll know what people are talking about when they refer to "pancritical rationalism," thanks to you. :rolleyes:

= Mindy

Edited by Mindy
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Paul

Thanks for all that information. I don't see what appeals to you in this. It seems like a bit of jargon stretched over a lot of psychologising. "Metacontext" is the "attitude" one has toward accepting or rejecting a theory?

For myself, I'm going to continue using "context" in the standard way. But at least now I'll know what people are talking about when they refer to "pancritical rationalism," thanks to you. :rolleyes:

= Mindy

Damn!!! :angry: A storm just passed over and crashed my system as I was about to finish posting my reply. I need some :sleep: . I'll respond later.

Paul

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I've learned long ago to save intermediate versions of a post to avoid such disasters...

"I have learned long ago?" That's an odd grammatical mos. :rolleyes:

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That's possible, English is not my native language, but I found some 1300 hits for the phrase, so I thought it would be ok... Hey, I even found a quote of McCain in the New York Times with that phrase!

Well, I certainly never suspected that English was not your native language! "I learned long ago..." would be fine, or "I have learned..." or "I had learned, long ago," (can't recall if it is past perfect, or plusperfect, or what, but your verb tense contradicted your adverbial phrase.)

= Mindy :rolleyes:

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It's simply "I learned long ago." "I've" and "learned" are present and past tenses fighting each other.

--Brant

I have learned that X. This is present perfect of a past action. You completed learning that X. The next time a Martian lands and claims he learned English from our radio broadcasts, you may call him an attainted liar.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Well, I certainly never suspected that English was not your native language! "I learned long ago..." would be fine, or "I have learned..." or "I had learned, long ago," (can't recall if it is past perfect, or plusperfect, or what, but your verb tense contradicted your adverbial phrase.)

In fact I knew the English rule, but apparently it hasn't become part of my automatic English language generator yet... although I must have had some doubts about that phrase, as I tested it with Google. Unfortunately you can't always rely on Google...

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