An axiomatic paradox?

[Paul Mawdsley]

Essentially, then, you are a troll. I don't know what value you bring to our table. I don't see how you pay for your discourse or why people here want to give you something for what seems to be nothing in return. For Objectivism, you are a Black Hole.

--Brant

There is more to anyone's perspective than is contained in Objectivism, even Objectivists. GS explores that something more. This makes him more of a star that emits light in a spectrum that Objectivist can't see without the right lenses. This can make him seem like a black hole for he appears to have a gravitational attraction without any visible light.

paul

Edited September 17, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[Roger Bissell]

Essentially, then, you are a troll. I don't know what value you bring to our table. I don't see how you pay for your discourse or why people here want to give you something for what seems to be nothing in return. For Objectivism, you are a Black Hole.

--Brant

There is more to anyone's perspective than is contained in Objectivism, even Objectivists. GS explores that something more. This makes him more of a star that emits light in a spectrum that Objectivist can't see without the right lenses. This can make him see like a black hole for he appears to have agravitational attraction without any visible light.

paul

I don't know whether this applies specifically to GS, but I regard ~anyone~ who argues from a nihilistic perspective as being analogous to the region around the event-horizon of a black hole. There ~is~ stuff that splashes back away from the black hole, and this would include the ideas that nihilists spread. No one can be a consistent nihilist, or they would die/disappear -- as matter into a black hole. That is why, to the extent that they are ~not~ consistent nihilists, that they have continuing effects of one kind or another in the visible universe (i.e., in society), rather than simply fading into oblivion.

The above may or may not also apply to those advocating General Semantics.

reb

[Mindy Newton]

Roger, I believe you somewhat misportray Ray & Radcliffe. They don't say entities don't exist apart from our cognitive processes. Rather they hold that more important metaphysically are edges, to wit:

To understand how we form our concepts of entities, we must ask how we distinguish entities from the stuff around them. One basic premise that would seem to be indisputable is that an entity is a unity. A unity is some part of reality that is bounded by an edge. The question immediately arises,

To what in reality do we refer when we use the concept EDGE?

We argue that it refers to the results of the act of selective attention whereby the subject distinguishes some portion of reality from everything else. Because we construe all entities with edges that--whatever other metaphysical properties they may trace out--are created by the subject's attention, all entities are equal. Some are more interesting than others, but all are bounded by edges of the same type and origin.

I happen to agree with Rand. In the Appendix to ITOE [....]

What Rand seems to appeal to here is the idea of unity. That is my thesis as well, with the addition that it is organization that provides the foundation of unity. Ray & Radcliffe seem to hold that edges provide the foundation of entities. However, I have a partial problem with that. Edges exist within entities as well as distinguish an entity with its background.

It looks to me like there's a metaphysics/epistemology mix-up, at least in Ray & Radcliffe's formulation, if they indeed "hold that more important metaphysically are edges" [MJ; my bold emphasis]. I'd say that organization is what makes something an entity, whereas edges are the primary means by which "we distinguish entities" [R&R], both visually and tactilely.

Ellen

___

Ellen, I (think I) agree with you.

The edge of an entity is its boundary(s). It is the limit(s) of the spatial extension of the entity. Just as the beginning and end of an event are the limits/boundaries/edges of the temporal extent of the event. The edge of an entity is thus an ~attribute of an attribute~ of an entity. It is what limits the extent of the entity, and is thus what we focus on to "mark off" the entity in our field of awareness. But there has to be an entity first in order for us to be able to use this attribute of it (actually this attribute of its attribute of spatial extension) in order to grasp it perceptually. There has to be a ~something~ in order for us to perceive its ~limit~ as setting it apart from ~everything else~ in our perceptual field.

I still say (to Merlin et al) that Ray & Radcliff (and David Jilk in JARS) were arguing that ~all~ entities are simply products of our awareness of reality, and that entities do not exist independently of our awareness. All that exists is whatever-it-is, and entities are the form in which we perceptually grasp this whatever-it-is. That is why (they argue) that there are no metaphysically privileged entities (such as mountains vs. piles of dirt, the latter not being an entity according to Rand).

REB

I don't get the need to reify "edges" for entities. Edges have a large role in perceptual psychology, but to retro-fit all physical things with edges seems backwards. Take a child's ball. Does it have an actual edge? It does perceptually, against a contrasting background. Put the ball against a background that provides no contrast whatsoever, and is there an edge? The ball has a surface. Outwardly, it stops at its surface. Does it also have an edge?

It seems like this is a metacontextual error (DID i just say that? ) of interpreting an epistemological fact as a metaphysical one.

Different point: Surely we all recognize that a pile of dirt is an entity, it's just not a mountain. A pile of dirt has characteristics over and above those of the dirt it consists of. It can stop a rolling log, or shield your fire from the breeze. Isn't a pile of dirt exactly like a valley or society?

= Mindy

Edited September 17, 2008 by Mindy

[tjohnson]

I have to disagree, Brant. Nothing comes out of a black hole.

Well some things do but we don't want to go there!

[Paul Mawdsley]

Caution: This post may contribute to the mass of a local black hole. May not be appropriate reading for Objectivists.

We start with empty file folders (whether you consider these to be conceptual entities themselves or contexts that integrate entities and their properties-- all a matter of whether you are applying a part-to-whole or a whole-to-part orientation of consciousness; Rand's vs Popper's epistemic perspectives or everyone vs MSK's perspective; it's the same principle as wave/particle duality) all the time. Starting with an empty file folder is the nature of the academic approach to learning: here is a new word, "epistemology"; now go and figure out what it means-- i.e.: fill the file folder with a concept by using these authors as a guide.

Interesting Paul, as I think I mentioned here before, the work of Northrop is similar to this. He describes 2 basic kinds of concepts, concept by intuition, roughly equivalent to an idea formed from observation, like a pencil, and concept by postulation, which is an idea formed from a symbolic description, like a quark. Then there is a constant interplay between these concepts in our brain which he calls epistemic correlation.

It's great to know someone gets it. I use different language but I can appreciate the parallel in the perspectives despite the lack of common language. In fact, what you have called "concept by intuition" I might call categorical thinking, conceptual thinking, or ITOE thinking. And what you have called "concept by postulation," ironically, I might call intuitive thinking, contextual thinking, or causal thinking. I call it causal thinking because we are able to create entities in our imagination, set the principles by which they act and interact, set the context in which they exist and act, and set them in motion to see how things unfold. This is the process by which a work of fiction is created, by which metaphysical models are created, by which mathematical models are created, by which scientific models are created, and by which intuitive models are created.

This is how, even though mathematics is a creation of the mind, its study is a process of discovery. We set the identity of mathematical entities, set the principles by which they interact, set the context or rules that shape their interactions or relationships, and then we explore and discover the results, often in a moment of inspiration. If it is applied mathematics the final step is to turn back to ITOE thinking and isolate, identify, categorize and communicate the results we discovered, interpreted in the formal language of the given science.

There is a definite interplay between the two types of thinking. One feeds and criticizes the other. Each mode of thought has its own means of discovering and integrating existents, and can feed the other by exposing existents not yet discovered in the other mode. Each mode of thought acts to weed out the errors of the other as contradictions between the two act as internal criticisms that draw attention to weaknesses in the perspective. When there is correlation there is a greater sense of certainty.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

I don't know whether this applies specifically to GS, but I regard ~anyone~ who argues from a nihilistic perspective as being analogous to the region around the event-horizon of a black hole. There ~is~ stuff that splashes back away from the black hole, and this would include the ideas that nihilists spread. No one can be a consistent nihilist, or they would die/disappear -- as matter into a black hole. That is why, to the extent that they are ~not~ consistent nihilists, that they have continuing effects of one kind or another in the visible universe (i.e., in society), rather than simply fading into oblivion.

The above may or may not also apply to those advocating General Semantics.

Does anyone here argue from a nihilistic perspective? I haven't noticed anyone. If not, what's the point?

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Now think of my son who is 8 years old. This week we found ourselves talking about science and philosophy. One of the concepts I introduced him to was "metaphysics." For him, what came first, the label and file folder or the isolation of existents? I think you would agree it's the former.

Paul,

This is more than perspective. We are talking about two different things.

I agree that a concept can be taught by providing a label and filling it. But it is not formed that way. (At least not from what I have seen.)

For a concept to be taught, it must already be formed in the teacher's mind. Targeted observations are then provided by the teacher to the student. For a student to form any concept on his own (i.e., without a teacher or guidebook), he has to go from his own observation.

It doesn't make any sense to me for a person to invent an arbitrary label and then start thinking about what kinds of observations to fill it with at random from the smorgasbord of all existence. In my thinking, concepts (groupings) are originally formed firmly based on noticing differences and similarities. If I learn a concept any other way, then someone else did that work before me.

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Now think of my son who is 8 years old. This week we found ourselves talking about science and philosophy. One of the concepts I introduced him to was "metaphysics." For him, what came first, the label and file folder or the isolation of existents? I think you would agree it's the former.

Paul,

This is more than perspective. We are talking about two different things.

I agree that a concept can be taught by providing a label and filling it. But it is not formed that way. (At least not from what I have seen.)

For a concept to be taught, it must already be formed in the teacher's mind. Targeted observations are then provided by the teacher to the student. For a student to form any concept on his own (i.e., without a teacher or guidebook), he has to go from his own observation.

So far, you have said nothing that contradicts what I have said.

It doesn't make any sense to me for a person to invent an arbitrary label and then start thinking about what kinds of observations to fill it with at random from the smorgasbord of all existence.

I never said this.

In my thinking, concepts (groupings) are originally formed firmly based on noticing differences and similarities. If I learn a concept any other way, then someone else did that work before me.

I agree.

We were talking about the concept of "metacontext." I was told it was an empty concept to which I disagreed. I see it as a concept, a label and a file folder, that captures patterns and relationships I have been noticing for years. Based on my view, it only makes sense that if others see it as an empty concept, then they have not yet isolated the existents that fill the file folder. Similar to how you describe the relationship between student and teacher above, I attempted to give a brief overview of the concept and suggested some reading to provide "targeted observations" and a rough "guidebook."

Even after this I was told it was an empty concept. I then realized that it requires a different way of orienting consciousness to think contextually from whole-to-part than it does to think conceptually from part-to-whole. If others are trained in thinking conceptually from part-to-whole (as Objectivists are) then they would have difficulty isolating the principles by which contextual whole-to-part thinking operates (from what I gather, a difficulty some Objectivists have with Sciabarra's work because dialectical thinking requires shifting contexts). However, if they have the label and file folder and they do find themselves shifting into contextual whole-to-part thinking at times (I pointed out that Mindy seems to, and I think you do too), then they might discover the principles and realize they already have a label and file folder for them. Who knows?

While concepts are "originally formed firmly based on noticing differences and similarities" that define existents relative to one another, contexts are originally formed by noticing patterns and relationships that define the existent parts relative to the existent wholes. These are the foundations of two distinct but complementary epistemic methods.

The concept of "metacontext" is arrived at by applying the conceptual method to identify elements of the contextual method. If you can't switch easily between the two methods, you can't apply one to the other. We create a model of the conceptual method when we apply the contextual method to understand it. We can then apply the conceptual method to this model to identify its elements, as Rand did to write ITOE. The metacontext is the set of principles the mind operates by, in the contextual mode, when building models and interpreting (as opposed to categorizing) experience. This can't be recognized purely from the conceptual epistemic mode.

I know understanding this requires a lot of epistemic gymnastics. I seem to have a gift/curse for being able to shift and create contexts very freely. What I want at least to communicate is that I see these processes as clearly as you see your own processes which you interpret through the guidance of ITOE. I'm working without a guidebook here but I'm slowly finding my way.

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Paul,

I think in the end we are talking about the same thing.

I like to be precise, so it is necessary for me to understand the difference between concept formation from scratch and concepts that are taught. This is probably because I am a creator and a thinker who practically lives outside the box. ("Take a walk on the wild side." Yeah, baby... that's me...)

Without your questioning, I am not so sure I would have noticed this difference so soon. It's an important one. Thanks for being so metacontextual.

Michael

[Mindy Newton]

Essentially, then, you are a troll. I don't know what value you bring to our table. I don't see how you pay for your discourse or why people here want to give you something for what seems to be nothing in return. For Objectivism, you are a Black Hole.

--Brant

There is more to anyone's perspective than is contained in Objectivism, even Objectivists. GS explores that something more. This makes him more of a star that emits light in a spectrum that Objectivist can't see without the right lenses. This can make him seem like a black hole for he appears to have a gravitational attraction without any visible light.

paul

In this, I strongly disagree. If you have a complaint as to Objectivism's adequacy, state it. I don't see that GS, or you, are exploring anything except issues you haven't yet satisfactorily understood, yourselves. You are now trying simply to disqualify your opponents. "...a spectrum that Objectivist can't see..." is exactly what "metacontext" seemed to be aiming at all along.

Instead of making a claim, or an argument, and then discussing it frankly, pancritical rationalism reserves the right to answer its opponents simply by saying they "come from a different metacontext." It's just like the old standard, "It may be true for you, but it's not true for me," relativism that attempts to save face when in a failed position.

All joking--from past posts--aside, I have seen no shred of usefulness in the term "metacontext," and I believe the concept of a context has been abused beyond meaningfulness, especially in talk of creating contexts, in the posts here on pancritical rationalism.

That doesn't mean, IMO, you shouldn't continue to "explore" it, etc. But your accusations that people here disagree with you because of a fault in their ability to comprehend, (our need for a "lens," above) or due to a "bias" toward "a traditional western epistemic" represents a pernicious sort of bad faith. If I don't agree with you, point out my error, and we'll argue it out; don't disenfranchise my intellect. I suspect I'll seem too violent in my feelings about this, but that sort of rhetoric is censorial; it cuts at the root of civilization!

I asked you to explain what you meant by "metacontext," etc. I didn't get an explanation--a response, but not an explanation. You say you don't know exactly what these terms mean. OK, but then you should avoid weilding them in discussions, no?

GS was run to ground not long ago. He seems to have no memory of it. What, then, is the point of carrying on a discussion with him? I guess that's the "troll" business. Live and learn.

= Mindy

Edited September 17, 2008 by Mindy

[Ellen Stuttle]

[....] I don't see that GS, or you [Paul], are exploring anything except issues you haven't yet satisfactorily understood, yourselves. You are now trying simply to disqualify your opponents. "...a spectrum that Objectivist can't see..." is exactly what "metacontext" seemed to be aiming at all along.

Instead of making a claim, or an argument, and then discussing it frankly, pancritical rationalism reserves the right to answer its opponents simply by saying they "come from a different metacontext." It's just like the old standard, "It may be true for you, but it's not true for me," relativism that attempts to save face when in a failed position.

Mindy,

That gives me a convenient peg on which to hang a comment I wanted to make earlier but couldn't find anything compressed enough in Paul's posts to use to get at my point directly.

I think that folks are being misled as to the meaning of "pancritical rationalism" by Paul's seeming to see it as very similar to his own views. I agree that Paul sounds like a relativist. (I'm not so sure that Paul actually is a relativist; however, I think that he does sound like one.) But I don't think that Champion is a relativist. I haven't yet read his whole essay which was linked; judging from the parts I've read, he thinks that the critical method gives us the best chances of arriving at truth (though we're never sure we've gotten the correct ultimate theory). As Daniel Barnes has expressed the point, Popperians are sceptics about knowledge but not about truth. Popperians are critics of the post-modern "it's all just a matter of different points of view, with nothing to decide between different views" attitude.

Ellen

___

[Brant Gaede]

If GS contributes to Objectivisn discourse--or any--then what does he bring to the discourse that we may build upon? It ain't Objectivism, of which he knows not and obviously will know not, so what is it? Epistemology--or as he calls it--General Semantics. Epistemology or Semanatics is nothing without the metaphysics. GS is simply nothing except that which we sanction by talking to him. That is why he is here, for our substance, which he feeds upon while giving us nothing to in turn feed upon. He is the evil which we sanction. He is the nothing which we give substance. Of this comment he is not offended--just another smiley-face for a reply. He is not offended for he is not is--not even offended by this.

--Brant

[Roger Bissell]

Concerning Roger’s Initial Post and #14

[...]

Roger, say you are playing “Stardust.” You get distracted by a racket, then get back on the performance, noticing that you had gotten distracted. The event of being distracted was independent of your follow-on noticing that you had been distracted. But it seems mysterious (#14) to categorize the distraction as generating consciousness and the follow-on noticing as observing consciousness. Is that how you would analyze this case?

Hi, Stephen. Let me re-describe the situation you posit. (I find your reference to a distraction as "generating consciousness" to be confusing and inaccurate.)

First I'm focused on playing a song. Then, because of a noise, I redirect my awareness -- either deliberately or involuntarily. Later I realize/notice that I had redirected my awareness.

Now, was the redirecting of my consciousness -- let's call it C-R -- independent of consciousness? Well, ~which~ consciousness?

Independent of the act of consciousness doing the redirecting? Certainly not! C-R was that very act of consciousness which I consciously ~generated~.

But independent of the later act of consciousness noticing that an earlier redirection of awareness had happened? Yes, of course. Through a new act of awareness, I ~observed~ that C-R, that act of awareness that I earlier ~generated~.

That is ~all~ that I mean by the distinction between generating and observing consciousness. Any given ~generated~ act of awareness is independent of any given act of consciously ~observing~ that generated act of awareness. And since it ~exists~, it ~must~ be independent in just this way. ~Anything~ that exists, including any generated act of awareness, is independent of any conscious being's act of ~observing~ that existing thing.

REB

[Brant Gaede]

[....] I don't see that GS, or you [Paul], are exploring anything except issues you haven't yet satisfactorily understood, yourselves. You are now trying simply to disqualify your opponents. "...a spectrum that Objectivist can't see..." is exactly what "metacontext" seemed to be aiming at all along.

Instead of making a claim, or an argument, and then discussing it frankly, pancritical rationalism reserves the right to answer its opponents simply by saying they "come from a different metacontext." It's just like the old standard, "It may be true for you, but it's not true for me," relativism that attempts to save face when in a failed position.

Mindy,

That gives me a convenient peg on which to hang a comment I wanted to make earlier but couldn't find anything compressed enough in Paul's posts to use to get at my point directly.

I think that folks are being misled as to the meaning of "pancritical rationalism" by Paul's seeming to see it as very similar to his own views. I agree that Paul sounds like a relativist. (I'm not so sure that Paul actually is a relativist; however, I think that he does sound like one.) But I don't think that Champion is a relativist. I haven't yet read his whole essay which was linked; judging from the parts I've read, he thinks that the critical method gives us the best chances of arriving at truth (though we're never sure we've gotten the correct ultimate theory). As Daniel Barnes has expressed the point, Popperians are sceptics about knowledge but not about truth. Popperians are critics of the post-modern "it's all just a matter of different points of view, with nothing to decide between different views" attitude.

Ellen___

I don't understand Paul. And should I? Or is there a value--anyone--in understanding him? Give me the value--and the understanding and I will send you a hundred bucks. Remember: Both!

--Brant

[Daniel Barnes]

As Daniel Barnes has expressed the point, Popperians are sceptics about knowledge but not about truth. Popperians are critics of the post-modern "it's all just a matter of different points of view, with nothing to decide between different views" attitude.

To reply briefly: The tradition of justificationism is so strong and ancient it is hardly surprising that there is the sort of confusion about relativism and skepticism that Mindy is reflecting. Even those brilliant and famous critics of Postmodernism, Sokal and Bricmont, get the issue deeply wrong. Perhaps Popper's most brilliant defender (and student, and critic) David Miller straightens them out in detail here. I will quote the first para at least to summarise the issue.

"If you can distinguish truth from knowledge, you should be able to distinguish the radical disavowal of truth [which usually takes the form of relativism, or sometimes nihilism] from the radical disavowal of knowledge [scepticism]. The former doctrine is false, but uninterestingly so. The latter doctrine is true. By persistently presenting them as a single doctrine, would-be spokesmen for rationalism are driven to defend the indefensible, and unwittingly to offer the best possible incitement to irrationalism."

FYI: The issue of "metacontexts" does not mean that there is no truth. Rather it shows how certain objective problems, such as the one we call "the problem of induction", lead to different responses within different intellectual traditions. For example, (speaking very broadly) we might say in the metacontext of Western thought, the problem of confusing knowledge with truth has led to justificationism; a "here I stand!" sort of intellectual attachment that leads to various forms of fanaticism. Alternatively we might say in the Eastern tradition, this problem of being unable to arrive at absolute certain knowledge has lead to a detachment; to the idea that the unpredictable world is something that we should remove ourselves from.

Of course, there is a third way; which is the critical tradition, which has had various outbreaks in the course of history, the most famous of which is Ancient Greece.

Anyway will discuss later as I am travelling.

[tjohnson]

If GS contributes to Objectivisn discourse--or any--then what does he bring to the discourse that we may build upon? It ain't Objectivism, of which he knows not and obviously will know not, so what is it? Epistemology--or as he calls it--General Semantics. Epistemology or Semanatics is nothing without the metaphysics. GS is simply nothing except that which we sanction by talking to him. That is why he is here, for our substance, which he feeds upon while giving us nothing to in turn feed upon. He is the evil which we sanction. He is the nothing which we give substance. Of this comment he is not offended--just another smiley-face for a reply. He is not offended for he is not is--not even offended by this.

Brant, it's just an internet forum. It's fun to read what other people think and it's fun to express one's own views. Why do people have to get up-in-arms?

[Paul Mawdsley]

[....] I don't see that GS, or you [Paul], are exploring anything except issues you haven't yet satisfactorily understood, yourselves. You are now trying simply to disqualify your opponents. "...a spectrum that Objectivist can't see..." is exactly what "metacontext" seemed to be aiming at all along.

Instead of making a claim, or an argument, and then discussing it frankly, pancritical rationalism reserves the right to answer its opponents simply by saying they "come from a different metacontext." It's just like the old standard, "It may be true for you, but it's not true for me," relativism that attempts to save face when in a failed position.

Mindy,

That gives me a convenient peg on which to hang a comment I wanted to make earlier but couldn't find anything compressed enough in Paul's posts to use to get at my point directly.

I think that folks are being misled as to the meaning of "pancritical rationalism" by Paul's seeming to see it as very similar to his own views. I agree that Paul sounds like a relativist. (I'm not so sure that Paul actually is a relativist; however, I think that he does sound like one.) But I don't think that Champion is a relativist. I haven't yet read his whole essay which was linked; judging from the parts I've read, he thinks that the critical method gives us the best chances of arriving at truth (though we're never sure we've gotten the correct ultimate theory). As Daniel Barnes has expressed the point, Popperians are sceptics about knowledge but not about truth. Popperians are critics of the post-modern "it's all just a matter of different points of view, with nothing to decide between different views" attitude.

Ellen

___

I am not a relativist. Nor am I an absolutist. This is a false dichotomy created by too strict an alliance with what I called above, the conceptual epistemic method. The more dialectical approach (read context creating and synthesizing approach) of the contextual epistemic method would hold that we each occupy a relative physical, psychological and philosophical perspective of an absolute reality. Our choice and use of metacontexts helps us to avoid false dichotomies. Taking a position based on a false dichotomy and trying to justify it is a waste of time and effort. So is arguing with someone from the opposite pole of the dichotomy. It is not just relativism. It is dialectics.

A key element in our ability to learn is our ability to shift perspectives, whether physical, psychological or philosophical perspectives, to build a unified picture of the absolute reality. This works like a hologram. Each context is a perspective of the whole of reality like a holographic image contains information about the whole of an object from a particular point of view. Just as our view of the whole object is more clearly rendered when more holographic images are integrated, our view of reality comes closer to the absolute by integrating more contexts.

Do I hold strong positions or contexts? Yes. I am metaphysically objectivist oriented. I have no time for the metaphysical position that existence doesn't exist. I just hold my metaphysical position open to question and refinement through new context generation and integration, and critical error elimination. My position is not absolute but I judge it to be contextually certain. I am empirically science oriented. I just hold the position of modern science to be open to question and refinement through new context generation and integration, and critical error elimination. My position, or interpretation of modern science is not absolute, it is open to reinterpretation from different contexts, but I judge it to be contextually certain. Certainty is greatly increased when we can get our metaphysical and our scientific positions to align. I don't see metaphysics and science to be in disagreement.

One extra note: I don't know if pancritical rationalism is in full alignment with my views. I haven't read enough yet. All I know is there is a strong resonance from what I have read so far and it is helping me find the language to express what I see in images a little better. Sorry if I'm not "compressed" enough for clear communication yet. Generating the contexts and finding language for it that I can use comes first. There is time for refinement and compression.

Paul

[merjet]

GS,

Have you read ITOE? If not, then I recommend you do. It is not a long book. You will have a better understanding of what others say here. You spend a lot of time here. How about reallocating some of it to read the book?

[tjohnson]

GS,

Have you read ITOE? If not, then I recommend you do. It is not a long book. You will have a better understanding of what others say here. You spend a lot of time here. How about reallocating some of it to read the book?

OK Merlin, maybe I will. Too bad it wasn't online like Korzybski's work. I think the copyright expires after 60 years or something.

[Brant Gaede]

If GS contributes to Objectivisn discourse--or any--then what does he bring to the discourse that we may build upon? It ain't Objectivism, of which he knows not and obviously will know not, so what is it? Epistemology--or as he calls it--General Semantics. Epistemology or Semanatics is nothing without the metaphysics. GS is simply nothing except that which we sanction by talking to him. That is why he is here, for our substance, which he feeds upon while giving us nothing to in turn feed upon. He is the evil which we sanction. He is the nothing which we give substance. Of this comment he is not offended--just another smiley-face for a reply. He is not offended for he is not is--not even offended by this.

Brant, it's just an internet forum. It's fun to read what other people think and it's fun to express one's own views. Why do people have to get up-in-arms?

If that's all it is nobody would be here, not even you. But your reply means what I said. You're not any good for even getting mad. I punched you but it was like hitting a ghost.

--Brant

[Mindy Newton]

I am not a relativist. Nor am I an absolutist. This is a false dichotomy created by too strict an alliance with what I called above, the conceptual epistemic method. The more dialectical approach (read context creating and synthesizing approach) of the contextual epistemic method would hold that we each occupy a relative physical, psychological and philosophical perspective of an absolute reality. Our choice and use of metacontexts helps us to avoid false dichotomies. Taking a position based on a false dichotomy and trying to justify it is a waste of time and effort. So is arguing with someone from the opposite pole of the dichotomy. It is not just relativism. It is dialectics.

Paul

In the above, emphases are added.

"I am not a relativist...It is not just relativism." "...we each occupy a relative...perspective of an absolute reality."

I can't tell what you think you are from the above paragraph.

"This is a false dichotomy..." if it is, prove it is. "...created by too strict an alliance with what I call the conceptual epistemic method..."(paraphrased, see above.) This is another claim without substantiation. It is also an attempt to avoid backing up your claims, by disenfranchising the point of view you disagree with! It's like an ad hominem, (though I don't know if, technically, it is.) It is like saying, "That's what XTZs believe, don't give it another thought!"

You notice that the "false dichotomy" of relativism vs. absolutism was nowhere used until you began railing against it. That's called a straw man argument.

"The more dialectical approach (context-creation and synthesizing)"--again, paraphrased, see above for full quote--here, again, you are using terms you know are not defined for the audience you are speaking to. That's argument from intimidation.

"Our choice...of metacontexts helps us avoid false dichotomies" (paraphrased) Again, you are explaining yourself with terms you yourself can't define, and which you know are (at best) confusing to your audience. Beyond that, you are again attempting to intimidate with jargon, and, the statement, even though only partly definite, is false on its face! If "metacontexts" are different perspectives and/or criteria of evidence, they would tend more to create dichotomies, (different perspectives tend to make a single thing seem different,) and they would be particularly powerless to expose false ones (remembering, I hope, that not all dichotomies are false.)

My point is that good, old-fashioned reason, in the form of logical arguments, presenting facts and analyses in a straight-forward, "western epistemic" way is fully adequate. It is fully adequate because it is based on a sound metaphysics. It is inclusive; there's not a part of reality it doesn't reach.

Your new way of thinking about things is just tired old errors, (some of which I named, above,) dressed up in new jargon. Until it proves itself, it is nonsense. Its value is a legitimate topic of discussion, mind you, but that discussion must examine "pancritical rationalism," before it could become acceptable to use it.

For now, "pancritical rationalism" should be a topic, not a tool.

= Mindy

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Mindy,

I do not find ambiguity in Paul's statement, although some of his language usage tends toward enshrining jargon and that usually puts me in a coma .

I understand him not to be a relativist with respect to metaphysics, of which he holds there is only one reality and it is the same for all of us, but he is a relativist in a different sense toward epistemology, noting that people see reality through different sets of language, ideas and focuses. This makes them perceive reality (the same reality) in vastly different manners, often to the point of expressing their perspectives in diametrically opposite ways. People often say essentially the same thing (underneath), but appear to be at odds (on the surface).

Maybe I'm wrong, but that's the fundament of his thinking as I understand it. The rest builds on these premises. Also, I sense in Paul an interest in trying to see from perspectives that are different than his own for the simple pleasure of experiencing what it feels like.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

[....] You notice that the "false dichotomy" of relativism vs. absolutism was nowhere used until you began railing against it. That's called a straw man argument.

[....] Your new way of thinking about things is just tired old errors, (some of which I named, above,) dressed up in new jargon. Until it proves itself, it is nonsense. Its value is a legitimate topic of discussion, mind you, but that discussion must examine "pancritical rationalism," before it could become acceptable to use it.

For now, "pancritical rationalism" should be a topic, not a tool.

I'll again point out: "pancritical rationalism" is not Paul's term. He claims to see similarity between his views and Rafe Champion's. The similarity is eluding me. Please don't make the mistake of thinking that what Champion is saying is what Paul is saying just because Paul expressed resonance to a term from a Popperian approach (an approach Paul has only barely begun to explore).

Re "relativism vs. absolutism": "pancritical rationalism" is neither.

Also, a question for Paul: Exactly who here do you think is an absolutist?

Ellen

PS: What Paul is most sounding like to me isn't Popperian but Hegelian -- the ultimate One in which all paradoxes of different perspectives are resolved in synthesis, that sort of idea.

I'm all in favor of trying empathetically to understand where another person is coming from, and I'm all in favor of not leaping to conclusions about what the other person means because of that person's using terminology in ways to which one isn't accustomed. But I keep detecting from Paul the view that in case of actually contradictory viewpoints, there's necessarily some truth in both of them. (It is possible for contradictory viewpoints each to contain some truth and some error, or for both to be entirely in error. But that's not the same statement as that there's necessarily some truth in every perspective.)

___

[Mindy Newton]

Mindy,

I do not find ambiguity in Paul's statement, although some of his language usage tends toward enshrining jargon and that usually puts me in a coma .

I understand him not to be a relativist with respect to metaphysics, of which he holds there is only one reality and it is the same for all of us, but he is a relativist in a different sense toward epistemology, noting that people see reality through different sets of language, ideas and focuses. This makes them perceive reality (the same reality) in vastly different manners, often to the point of expressing their perspectives in diametrically opposite ways. People often say essentially the same thing (underneath), but appear to be at odds (on the surface).

Maybe I'm wrong, but that's the fundament of his thinking as I understand it. The rest builds on these premises. Also, I sense in Paul an interest in trying to see from perspectives that are different than his own for the simple pleasure of experiencing what it feels like.

Michael

My problem isn't that he is a relativist--whether he plans to be or not, but that he insults the intelligence and integrity of the people he is talking to when he resorts to such as: "You would believe that, from your 'metacontext.'" And suggests that being convinced of anything, no matter how well supported that belief is, blinds one to certain facts!! That's a deal-breaker when it comes to discussions. I don't think Paul realizes that that is what his "exploratory" theory amounts to. I would wish him to re-think using terms before he understands them, and can, if necessary, explain them. Also, I would very much like to convince him to eschew asserting biases in his opponents when he is not prepared to substantiate the claim.

I would much rather try to get him to see what he's implicitly doing than just ignore what he has to say.

= Mindy

[Mindy Newton]

[....] You notice that the "false dichotomy" of relativism vs. absolutism was nowhere used until you began railing against it. That's called a straw man argument.

[....] Your new way of thinking about things is just tired old errors, (some of which I named, above,) dressed up in new jargon. Until it proves itself, it is nonsense. Its value is a legitimate topic of discussion, mind you, but that discussion must examine "pancritical rationalism," before it could become acceptable to use it.

For now, "pancritical rationalism" should be a topic, not a tool.

I'll again point out: "pancritical rationalism" is not Paul's term. He claims to see similarity between his views and Rafe Champion's. The similarity is eluding me. Please don't make the mistake of thinking that what Champion is saying is what Paul is saying just because Paul expressed resonance to a term from a Popperian approach (an approach Paul has only barely begun to explore).

Re "relativism vs. absolutism": "pancritical rationalism" is neither.

Also, a question for Paul: Exactly who here do you think is an absolutist?

Ellen

PS: What Paul is most sounding like to me isn't Popperian but Hegelian -- the ultimate One in which all paradoxes of different perspectives are resolved in synthesis, that sort of idea.

I'm all in favor of trying empathetically to understand where another person is coming from, and I'm all in favor of not leaping to conclusions about what the other person means because of that person's using terminology in ways to which one isn't accustomed. But I keep detecting from Paul the view that in case of actually contradictory viewpoints, there's necessarily some truth in both of them. (It is possible for contradictory viewpoints each to contain some truth and some error, or for both to be entirely in error. But that's not the same statement as that there's necessarily some truth in every perspective.)

___

Thanks Ellen,

Let me be clear that I don't object to anybody's believing or expressing anything, as long as they step up and discuss, explain, and, if necessary, defend what they actually say. I don't mind talking to Popperians or Hegelians or Kantians or Libertarians under those circumstances. A discussion presupposes certain things. Responsiveness and reason.

Paul is breaching the social contract if he resorts to: you are incapable of realizing the truth of my position; your beliefs prevent you. I'm trying to make that clear. The rash alternative is what I'm not taking.

= Mindy