An axiomatic paradox?

[worldlogicleague]

GS was not making a metaphysical statement. He was deconstructing our metaphysical assumptions. I'm a little surprised this point is being missed.

Paul

He's been trying to say the following in a number of different ways, which is what I'm interested in:

I think premise 1 is wrong. There is no such thing as an object without an observer.

[Paul Mawdsley]

He's been trying to say the following in a number of different ways, which is what I'm interested in:

I think premise 1 is wrong. There is no such thing as an object without an observer.

Is this a metaphysical statement or is it a deconstruction of premise one? As a metaphysical statement it is untenable in the context of a modern educated perspective.

I believe GS is intelligent. My respect for GS's intelligence conflicts with the idea that his was a metaphysical statement. On this basis I began to wonder how I could create a context that integrates my belief in GS's intelligence with his statement. The answer is it's not a metaphysical statement. It's a deconstruction statement.

Premise one, "Existence is independent of consciousness," is an assumption about the nature of existence. The assumption is that there is a particular type of relationship between existence and consciousness: namely that it is independent. This is a profoundly important assumption for psychological development and for philosophical development, but it is an assumption. Based on things GS said in response to other posters, and knowing that he had mentioned the importance of the assumptions that underlie our concepts on another thread, I realized he was not holding an untenable position. He was pulling a Descartes. He was doubting and deconstructing the assumption in premise one.

If we remove the assumed relationship between consciousness and existence, they become undifferentiated and so the statement, "There is no such thing as an object without an observer," makes sense. It is expressing the fact that, at a fundamental level, we come into this world with existence and consciousness undifferentiated. Differentiation is part of development. It is something we do to the contents of consciousness.

Because GS's context is different to those who are busy disagreeing with him, his statement has a different meaning from what has been assumed. The idea that, in reality, consciousness is undifferentiated from existence, but we create differentiation through our assumption of a specific relationship between existence and consciousness, is very different from the idea that "to be is to be perceived." The latter is bad metaphysics. The former is pre-metaphysics and is not inconsistent with Objectivism. In fact, it suggests how Rand's metaphysical axioms emerge in consciousness. Rand's axioms are the fundamental assumptions of consciousness at the root of differentiation. Remove those assumptions/axioms from consciousness and all is undifferentiated. With them, they are the foundation for a profound metaphysical system.

Paul

[worldlogicleague]

He's been trying to say the following in a number of different ways, which is what I'm interested in:

I think premise 1 is wrong. There is no such thing as an object without an observer.

Is this a metaphysical statement or is it a deconstruction of premise one? As a metaphysical statement it is untenable in the context of a modern educated perspective.

... The answer is it's not a metaphysical statement. It's a deconstruction statement.

Premise one, "Existence is independent of consciousness," is an assumption about the nature of existence. ... He was pulling a Descartes. He was doubting and deconstructing the assumption in premise one.

Paul

premise 1. Rand's Primacy of Existence Axiom - from the FAQ on this forum:

"The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists," wrote Ayn Rand in "The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made," "i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity."

Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology describes axiomatic concepts as:

"...the identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts."

So this axiom can't be deconstructed, being a primary fact of reality.

By reading just what's actually in his posts he seems to be simply saying that the universe does not exist independent of consciousness.

Providing examples such as the observation of Pluto in 1930 shows that this is an untenable position (as a postulate in any theory).

Edited September 10, 2008 by worldlogicleague

[Roger Bissell]

He's been trying to say the following in a number of different ways, which is what I'm interested in:

I think premise 1 is wrong. There is no such thing as an object without an observer.

Is this a metaphysical statement or is it a deconstruction of premise one? As a metaphysical statement it is untenable in the context of a modern educated perspective.

... The answer is it's not a metaphysical statement. It's a deconstruction statement.

Premise one, "Existence is independent of consciousness," is an assumption about the nature of existence. ... He was pulling a Descartes. He was doubting and deconstructing the assumption in premise one.

Paul

premise 1. Rand's Primacy of Existence Axiom - from the FAQ on this forum:

"The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists," wrote Ayn Rand in "The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made," "i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity."

Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology describes axiomatic concepts as:

"...the identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts."

So this axiom can't be deconstructed, being a primary fact of reality.

By reading just what's actually in his posts he seems to be simply saying that the universe does not exist independent of consciousness.

Providing examples such as the observation of Pluto in 1930 shows that this is an untenable position (as a postulate in any theory).

GS is not the only one making the argument about "objects" not existing apart from our awareness of them. Believe it or not, there ~are~ Objectivists (or former Objectivists?) out there who believe that entities do not exist apart from consciousness, that entities or physical objects are merely the ~form~ in which our consciousness is aware of whatever-it-is that ~does~ exist independently of us. Carolyn Ray and some of her acquaintances (e.g., David Jilk who made the argument in JARS) have argued a quasi-Lockean view that all that exists is existential stuff that has an identity, and that our cognitive processing of the stuff is what creates objects/entities.

I have argued against this view in my recent JARS essay on Rand and "the objective." I'm not ready to post it on the Internet yet, so if you're interested in reading my counter-argument, I'd suggest buying the back issue it appears in. It's really a pretty good essay, if I do say so myself.

REB

[merjet]

[snip]

GS is not the only one making the argument about "objects" not existing apart from our awareness of them. Believe it or not, there ~are~ Objectivists (or former Objectivists?) out there who believe that entities do not exist apart from consciousness, that entities or physical objects are merely the ~form~ in which our consciousness is aware of whatever-it-is that ~does~ exist independently of us. Carolyn Ray and some of her acquaintances (e.g., David Jilk who made the argument in JARS) have argued a quasi-Lockean view that all that exists is existential stuff that has an identity, and that our cognitive processing of the stuff is what creates objects/entities.

I have argued against this view in my recent JARS essay on Rand and "the objective." I'm not ready to post it on the Internet yet, so if you're interested in reading my counter-argument, I'd suggest buying the back issue it appears in. It's really a pretty good essay, if I do say so myself.

Isn't Ray's article as much or more about conceptual boundaries as it is physical boundaries?

Quasi-Lockean view?? Where in ECHU did get that?

I see Locke is not mentioned in the references section of your article. Is he in the body, and if so, what page(s)?

Edited September 10, 2008 by Merlin Jetton

[worldlogicleague]

GS is not the only one making the argument about "objects" not existing apart from our awareness of them. Believe it or not, there ~are~ Objectivists (or former Objectivists?) out there who believe that entities do not exist apart from consciousness, that entities or physical objects are merely the ~form~ in which our consciousness is aware of whatever-it-is that ~does~ exist independently of us. Carolyn Ray and some of her acquaintances (e.g., David Jilk who made the argument in JARS) have argued a quasi-Lockean view that all that exists is existential stuff that has an identity, and that our cognitive processing of the stuff is what creates objects/entities.

REB

I see. Interesting. So the 'Ray position' is over the issue of "objects/entities," and their contention is that they do not exist independently of our consciousness; they are "merely the ~form~ in which our consciousness is aware of whatever-it-is that ~does~ exist independently of us."

So they are not denying the Primacy of Existence axiom, but adding a new assertion:

Rand axiom: The universe exists independent of consciousness; things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity.

'Ray principle': All that exists is existential stuff that has an identity, but our cognitive processing of the stuff is what creates objects/entities; these objects/entities are not independent of consciousness.

At the very least this demands a narrow definition for objects.

From Wikipedia -

Charles S. Peirce succinctly defines the broad notion of an object as follows:

"By an object, I mean anything that we can think, i.e. anything we can talk about."

I would prefer to maintain the broad definition of objects, and use the more closely related entities for this purpose.

Perhaps: entities - anything discrete in form we can think, i.e. anything discrete in form we can talk about.

Or maybe: categorical entities - anything categorically discrete we can think, i.e. anything categorically discrete we can talk about.

This would depend on whether their point is about conceptual (= categorical) boundaries or physical boundaries.

From Wikipedia -

An entity is something that has a distinct, separate existence, though it need not be a material existence.

If their point is about conceptual boundaries, it would beg the question:

Does the independently existing stuff naturally occur in natural categories of existence (of genus and species) independent of consciousness?

If their point is about physical boundaries, it would beg the question:

Does the independently existing stuff naturally occur in discrete forms independent of consciousness?

Edited September 10, 2008 by worldlogicleague

[Ellen Stuttle]

He's been trying to say the following in a number of different ways, which is what I'm interested in:

I think premise 1 is wrong. There is no such thing as an object without an observer.

Is this a metaphysical statement or is it a deconstruction of premise one? As a metaphysical statement it is untenable in the context of a modern educated perspective.

Paul,

Would you classify "science" as "a modern educated perspective"?

GS says that it's "science" that is the basis of his views.

I again repeat his answer to a question I asked him on another thread:

And how do you know that there are stimuli and that there is an environment -- or a nervous system either -- on your views?

We know through science.

I see no reason to doubt, given the history of his posts, that he means this answer (and thus that he sure is employing "stolen concepts," abundantly).

Ellen

___

[merjet]

Ellen,

In post 59 you said, "Um, yeah. As Merlin quipped to you long ago: All the rules change when you enter a science lab."

If you didn't go on memory, how did you find that? I did a search for "science lab" w/o success.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen,

In post 59 you said, "Um, yeah. As Merlin quipped to you long ago: All the rules change when you enter a science lab."

If you didn't go on memory, how did you find that? I did a search for "science lab" w/o success.

I did go on memory, which is why I didn't use quote marks. I think what you actually said was "It all switches when [you enter a science lab?]."

Let's try a search on "switch*"...

No. Ok, how about "flip*"...

Ah, here it is:

[Emphasis added - ES]

I'm replying to post #107. My exposure to Korzybski is limited to what General Semanticist has posted on OL. My initial reactions have been similar to MSK and Ellen. I like Hayek's perspective in The Sensory Order much better.

In the excerpt in #107 Korzybski seems to posit two different worlds and a dichotomy between percepts and the external world. Note the loaded words: "entirely non-existent" and "delusional." But it all flips upon entering the physics lab.

It's on a thread called "Parsing Existence" in the Metaphysics forum.

Ellen

___

[merjet]

Thanks much, Ellen.

[Roger Bissell]

[snip]

GS is not the only one making the argument about "objects" not existing apart from our awareness of them. Believe it or not, there ~are~ Objectivists (or former Objectivists?) out there who believe that entities do not exist apart from consciousness, that entities or physical objects are merely the ~form~ in which our consciousness is aware of whatever-it-is that ~does~ exist independently of us. Carolyn Ray and some of her acquaintances (e.g., David Jilk who made the argument in JARS) have argued a quasi-Lockean view that all that exists is existential stuff that has an identity, and that our cognitive processing of the stuff is what creates objects/entities.

I have argued against this view in my recent JARS essay on Rand and "the objective." I'm not ready to post it on the Internet yet, so if you're interested in reading my counter-argument, I'd suggest buying the back issue it appears in. It's really a pretty good essay, if I do say so myself.

Isn't Ray's article as much or more about conceptual boundaries as it is physical boundaries?

Quasi-Lockean view?? Where in ECHU did get that?

I see Locke is not mentioned in the references section of your article. Is he in the body, and if so, what page(s)?

1. Ray's essay is fundamentally not about boundaries, but about the metaphysical status of entities. Her essay, "Entities, Edges, and Existence," co-written with Thomas Radcliffe and delivered in June 2000 to the TOC Advanced Seminar, was explicitly aimed at arguing, against Rand, that there are no metaphysically privileged entities that exist as entities apart from our cognitive processes. Quoting from the opening paragraphs of the Ray/Radcliffe essay:

We argue that, for some part of reality to be classifiable under the concept ENTITY, it is both a necessary and sufficient condition that there be a knowing subject who abstracts that part from the rest of reality by an act of selective attention. On this view, all entities are equal. This view is in direct disagreement with Rand's contention that "metaphysically they (entities) are not all equal" (IOE, p. 273). Apparently, it is her view in at least part of the discussion portion of the second edition of

Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology

, that entities are unities in virtue of a uniting principle that is independent of any conscious subject’s awareness or attention. She grants entitihood to mountains, but not to piles of dirt...It is our contention that this distinction is not consistent with

a fully-developed Objectivist epistemology

, and that in fact the distinction requires a concession to realism with regard to universals. We shall nonetheless refer to this as "The Received Objectivist View", to be distinguished from the fully

conceptualist

version of Objectivism we put forward here. [underscoring added]

2. I don't know what ECHU is. I also don't know why I called Ray's view "quasi-Lockean." I seem to recall having read ~somewhere~ that she was a big admirer of John Locke and was trying to argue that Objectivism should be revised in a Lockean direction. But I could be confusing her with someone else. So, I will retract my comment about Ray et al promoting a "quasi-Lockean" view.

I do know that Ray's doctoral dissertation explicitly argues for Conceptualism, and in the above-quoted passage, the claims that a fully mature Objectivism would reject Realism on entities and instead hold a "fully Conceptualist" position, viz., that entities do not exist as entities apart from our perception of them. Entities are the ~product~ of the interaction of our cognitive faculties and whatever-it-is out there in the external world. Locke held this position in regard to "secondary" qualities (e.g., color), but was more of a Realist in regard to "primary" qualities (e.g., spatial extension). Peikoff has argued that this distinction is invalid and that both secondary and primary qualities are the product of an interaction between consciousness and existence. Ray et al take this even further and say that not only attributes/qualities are produced by this interaction, but also entities themselves--that these are ~all~ forms of being aware of independent reality, rather than things existing independently in reality.

3. I do not cite, quote, or refer to Locke in my JARS 9/1 essay.

reb

[Paul Mawdsley]

premise 1. Rand's Primacy of Existence Axiom - from the FAQ on this forum:

"The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists," wrote Ayn Rand in "The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made," "i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity."

Rand's Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology describes axiomatic concepts as:

"...the identification of a primary fact of reality, which cannot be analyzed, i.e., reduced to other facts or broken into component parts."

So this axiom can't be deconstructed, being a primary fact of reality.

Metaphysically, an axiom is a primary fact of reality. Epistemologically, an axiom is a primary assumption of metaphysics. It cannot be deconstructed from within the metaphysical context of which it is the foundation but it can be deconstructed from an epistemological perspective. Rand writes, " Epistemologically, the formation of axiomatic concepts is an act of abstraction, a selective focusing on and mental isolation of metaphysical fundamentals; but metaphysically, it is an act of integration-- the widest integration possible to man..." (italics in original, ITOE p. 74). Note first of all that Rand distinguishes between the two contexts of thinking about axiomatic concepts: metaphysical and epistemological. Metaphysically, axiomatic concepts are the abstraction of primary facts from all facts. There is no further reduction. Epistemologically, axiomatic concepts are formed through an act of abstraction. What was there before the act of abstraction? Existence, identity and consciousness undifferentiated in one's consciousness.

This is what GS was referring to whether he knew it or not. Regardless, it's what I am referring to now that I've picked up the thread of the thought. Prior to abstracting primary axioms, prior to assuming the differentiation of consciousness and existence, consciousness was undifferentiated. Do you agree? Or do you think a baby is born with an innate differentiation of consciousness and existence?

I should try to head off an equivocation. Developmentally, a child assumes the differentiation between consciousness and existence. This is what Rand would call the child's implicit metaphysics. Rand has systematically treated the processes that lead to these assumptions to raise them to the level of philosophical axioms. This has a higher epistemological status than an assumption because there are systematic checks for internal consistency and objectivity. However, psychologically and existentially-- i.e.: from inside one's subjective perspective-- the assumption of a specific relationship between consciousness and existence is more fundamental and is an act of will that triggers all our integrations. Without this act of will there is no development of implicit or explicit philosophy. Consciousness would remain undifferentiated.

By reading just what's actually in his posts he seems to be simply saying that the universe does not exist independent of consciousness.

By this do you mean that if we make no attempt to understand the context in which he wrote-- i.e.: if we drop the context-- GS "seems to be simply saying that the universe does not exist independent of consciousness?" In one sense this is a very Objectivist thing to do. In another it's not. This seems to be a built-in Objectivist double standard (although it's not confined to Objectivists) that says everyone must consider my context (i.e.: use empathy toward me) but I can drop other people's contexts (i.e.: not use empathy toward others) when it suits my purposes in debate.

Providing examples such as the observation of Pluto in 1930 shows that this is an untenable position (as a postulate in any theory).

This is exactly why I think more work needs to be done to consider GS's context. My contexts says he's too intelligent to make such a claim. He may be struggling to find the right words to express what he sees. I get that. But I don't think this is the only issue. I don't think anyone is showing any particular skill at attempting to understand his context. Everyone is too busy maintaining their own context, telling him where he is wrong, to switch gears and ask: how can what he say make sense?

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

Would you classify "science" as "a modern educated perspective"?

Is this a trick question? Of course it is.

GS says that it's "science" that is the basis of his views.

I again repeat his answer to a question I asked him on another thread:

And how do you know that there are stimuli and that there is an environment -- or a nervous system either -- on your views?

We know through science.

I see no reason to doubt, given the history of his posts, that he means this answer (and thus that he sure is employing "stolen concepts," abundantly).

Ellen,

I think he does mean this answer. It is not a stolen concept. Your question required him to switch frames of reference. Science is not the base of his views on objects and observers. Introspectively deconstructing his own subjectivity is the context in which he arrived at this. When he tried to express these views he was forced into using extrospective language to describe introspective images. This created confusion and caused you to ask your question about how he knows about the extrospective world. To know something about the extrospective world would require a discipline that studies the extrospective realm: science. He was not employing stolen concepts because he was not attempting to maintain a consistent metaphysical perspective. He was causing confusion by switching between epistemological contexts. The concept of meta-cognition, or a meta-context, is called for. His communication would be helped by developing in this area.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

The concept of meta-cognition, or a meta-context, is called for.

As far as I was concerned I made up the term "meta-context." It fit a mental space created by my thinking on the current topic. I decided to search the term and came across an essay that caught my attention. I haven't had a chance to read it all yet but boy is it on topic. Take a look here.

Paul

[BaalChatzaf]

The concept of meta-cognition, or a meta-context, is called for.

As far as I was concerned I made up the term "meta-context." It fit a mental space created by my thinking on the current topic. I decided to search the term and came across an essay that caught my attention. I haven't had a chance to read it all yet but boy is it on topic. Take a look here.

Paul

An interesting looking piece. I am chewing on it now. I plan to read it -very carefully-. After Alan Sokal, you never know what you will find on the printed page.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[worldlogicleague]

This is what GS was referring to whether he knew it or not. Regardless, it's what I am referring to now that I've picked up the thread of the thought.

Prior to abstracting primary axioms, prior to assuming the differentiation of consciousness and existence, consciousness was undifferentiated. Do you agree? Or do you think a baby is born with an innate differentiation of consciousness and existence?

By this do you mean that if we make no attempt to understand the context in which he wrote-- i.e.: if we drop the context-- GS "seems to be simply saying that the universe does not exist independent of consciousness?"

... I don't think anyone is showing any particular skill at attempting to understand his context. Everyone is too busy maintaining their own context, telling him where he is wrong, to switch gears and ask: how can what he say make sense?

Hi Paul, The issue you raise is interesting, but I don't find it in GS's writing. He's had ample opportunity in this thread to make the point that you made about a baby being born with consciousness and existence undifferentiated. He hasn't made it. My job is not to put my words or context in his mouth but to try to understand the arguments he himself is making and to respond to that specific argument. I'm assuming like you he's intelligent and can make his point. He made a post with a single line: "Objects don't exist independently of consciousness." By adding just two words he could have described what you say is his point or context: "Objects don't exist independently of consciousness in babies." However, I can't assume this; I can only take his point at face value in the context it is proposed. So we should just consider it your point on babies and the deconstruction of axioms and take it from there.

Anyway, the primacy of existence axiom was upheld, which is where my interest lies in my responses.

As to babies, their undeveloped awareness of the world doesn't falsify the axiom that the universe does indeed exist independently of consciousness.

I realize you're making this point just as an interesting aside, but I wanted to make that clear. For as Aristotole warned, the content of a theory cannot be successfully communicated, if the learner is in doubt about the truth of the postulates.

Elwood

Edited September 11, 2008 by worldlogicleague

[merjet]

Thanks for replying, Roger.

1. Ray's essay is fundamentally not about boundaries, but about the metaphysical status of entities. Her essay, "Entities, Edges, and Existence," co-written with Thomas Radcliffe and delivered in June 2000 to the TOC Advanced Seminar, was explicitly aimed at arguing, against Rand, that there are no metaphysically privileged entities that exist as entities apart from our cognitive processes.

I wasn't there and it's been a while since I read their essay. So I take what you say at face value for now.

2. I don't know what ECHU is. I also don't know why I called Ray's view "quasi-Lockean." I seem to recall having read ~somewhere~ that she was a big admirer of John Locke and was trying to argue that Objectivism should be revised in a Lockean direction. But I could be confusing her with someone else. So, I will retract my comment about Ray et al promoting a "quasi-Lockean" view.

ECHU = Essay Concerning Human Understanding, by John Locke.

Okay.

I do know that Ray's doctoral dissertation explicitly argues for Conceptualism, and in the above-quoted passage, the claims that a fully mature Objectivism would reject Realism on entities and instead hold a "fully Conceptualist" position, viz., that entities do not exist as entities apart from our perception of them. Entities are the ~product~ of the interaction of our cognitive faculties and whatever-it-is out there in the external world. Locke held this position in regard to "secondary" qualities (e.g., color), but was more of a Realist in regard to "primary" qualities (e.g., spatial extension). Peikoff has argued that this distinction is invalid and that both secondary and primary qualities are the product of an interaction between consciousness and existence. Ray et al take this even further and say that not only attributes/qualities are produced by this interaction, but also entities themselves--that these are ~all~ forms of being aware of independent reality, rather than things existing independently in reality.

Conceptualism is mainly an epistemological doctrine. Holding that "entities do not exist as entities apart from our perception of them" is not a part of it per my understanding.

Oh, Pope Peikoff again. Clearly we can't know about primary qualities apart from consciousness, but that does not imply primary qualities don't exist independently. Common sense says they do. One thing that holds about primary qualities, but not secondary ones, is that we can perceive them by more than one sense. We can perceive extension and solidity by both sight and touch. They are intrinsic properties of an object. Aristotle even noted this (link).

Edited September 11, 2008 by Merlin Jetton

[Dragonfly]

By this do you mean that if we make no attempt to understand the context in which he wrote-- i.e.: if we drop the context-- GS "seems to be simply saying that the universe does not exist independent of consciousness?" In one sense this is a very Objectivist thing to do. In another it's not. This seems to be a built-in Objectivist double standard (although it's not confined to Objectivists) that says everyone must consider my context (i.e.: use empathy toward me) but I can drop other people's contexts (i.e.: not use empathy toward others) when it suits my purposes in debate.

This is exactly why I think more work needs to be done to consider GS's context. My contexts says he's too intelligent to make such a claim. He may be struggling to find the right words to express what he sees. I get that. But I don't think this is the only issue. I don't think anyone is showing any particular skill at attempting to understand his context. Everyone is too busy maintaining their own context, telling him where he is wrong, to switch gears and ask: how can what he say make sense?

Good observations, Paul. I think GS's arguments so far have been flawed and inconsistent (as I've also argued in this thread before). But I like GS's contributions on this forum, as he is not blustering and pontificating, but seems to be looking for answers by thinking aloud. Therefore I think it's a good idea to try not to dismiss him with a few standard slogans, but to try to find out what he may be looking for. I think you've also made some interesting observations with respect to that question and I like your attitude in this, which is not scoffing nor condescending.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Ellen,

I think he does mean this answer [science]. It is not a stolen concept. Your question required him to switch frames of reference. Science is not the base of his views on objects and observers. Introspectively deconstructing his own subjectivity is the context in which he arrived at this. When he tried to express these views he was forced into using extrospective language to describe introspective images. This created confusion and caused you to ask your question about how he knows about the extrospective world. To know something about the extrospective world would require a discipline that studies the extrospective realm: science. He was not employing stolen concepts because he was not attempting to maintain a consistent metaphysical perspective. He was causing confusion by switching between epistemological contexts. The concept of meta-cognition, or a meta-context, is called for. His communication would be helped by developing in this area.

Paul

Agreed that he wasn't "attempting to maintain a consistent metaphysical perspective." He eschews metaphysical perspectives and isn't aware of his own. He has many times, however, claimed that science is the base of his views on objects and observers.

I think that you weren't paying attention to what was going on on this list for a long while and that you aren't familiar with the history of GS's postings. He's been posting here since June 7, 2007, plenty of time in which to discern where he's coming from. I think he's employed what O'ists call "stolen concepts" over and over in his posts. I also think that the context you're ascribing to him is one you're coming up with. (Also that current research on a neonate's burgeoning apperception of the world doesn't match your views -- but that's a different issue from where GS is getting his views. On the latter, I suggest reading back through some of the history of his posts.)

Ellen

___

Edited September 12, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Paul Mawdsley]

To borrow a term from Objectivism, GS is operating by a different psycho-epistemology (PE) from most on this forum. I think I recognize it more readily than most because I tend to process information about existence in a similar way. Truth is, I may have been somewhat unfair with my criticisms of those who have disagreed with GS. I was so busy trying to understand and defend his PE context that I didn't take the time to fully appreciate the PE context of those who were disagreeing.

At a fundamental level I can differentiate two distinct psycho-epistemological modes by which people operate. A given individual has the capacity to operate by either mode but, like handedness, will generally develop a preference that will make it dominant. I have written about these two PE modes before on OL, from various angles, striving to capture images that I am trying to gently push to take shape in my mind. As I write now I still find myself trying to mold these images and am groping to capture them clearly and persuasively.

In one mode, what could be called the empirical PE mode, awareness is focused on the contents of experience; whether the contents of sense experience or contents of our experience of internal states, such as emotions. The interplay between awareness and will (in my interpretation, two properties of the same thing: the reactive and proactive properties) tends to differentiate and process experience very much according to the principles described in ITOE: by isolating, identifying, categorizing and logically integrating existents. Ironically, considering the disconnect between some Objectivist and some scientists, this is the PE mode on which the empirical method is based. Considering the nature of this forum it is not surprising that this is the PE mode that dominates here. Considering the nature of the educational systems we have all come through, it is not surprising that this PE mode dominates academic thinking in general.

The empirical PE mode takes the position of a strong central context and attempts to broaden this context to accommodate new information and new integrations. I have noted that people who are strongly oriented to this mode have very strong specific recall memory. My thinking is that since memory is linked to context, and since this mode has a strong and consistent central context, and since categorizing is a central component of its processes, specific recall memory is greatly enhanced. (My memory works great. I just tend to remember the strangest things at the strangest times. Its quality shifts with my shifting contexts. A metacontext that allows me to control the shifts of my contexts is very important.)

In what could be called the rational PE mode, awareness is focused not on the contents of experience but on the contents of imagination. The way I experience the process is that my imagination automatically generates a model of existence in a context that parallels experience. This is very much an intuitive process. The distinction, and advantage, of this perspective from that of the empirical PE mode is that one is able to take a god's eye view-- i.e.: an implicitly metaphysical view-- of existence. My senses take in information about the world around me at the periphery of my awareness while I am focused on the worldview that is taking shape in my imagination. The process generates an awareness that is fundamentally holistic. Reality is experienced as a dynamic flow that can be controlled by anticipation and artful action.

The best way to think about this is to consider a highly dynamic sport like hockey. Some players are known for their "vision" on the ice. They seem to be able to see events unfolding all about them at once, consistently anticipating the flow of play, seemingly in directions they are not even looking in. Wayne Gretzky is a prime example of this quality highly evolved. In football, the rational PE mode would tend to gravitate to the quarterback position. (To a lesser skill level, I used to play a similar role as centre-half in soccer: a team general who could, by acting on my "vision" of the field, control the flow of a game.)

If I were just stuck in one mode or the other I would not be writing this right now. In my late teens I began to notice how this "vision" created by rational PE processes were anticipating and projecting outcomes of events that would then shape my actions according to certain principles or goals. This is what originally sparked my interest in philosophy and causality, even before I knew anything about these things. I then did something that sparked an incredible flow of insight for me. I turned my empirical PE mode to isolate, identify, categorize, logically integrate, and verify the objectivity of the (causal) models of existence produced by my rational PE mode.

This is what was going on inside me when I first came across Rand and NB's work. I was 21. There is no surprise that they both captured my mind. They talked in metaphysical models, grounded in what I found to be a profound principle of causation, and identified and integrated the existents isolated in these models in a very philosophical and persuasive way.

Rand used her rational PE processes to generate her fictions. These fictions are an expression of her vision, of her metaphysical models. Ellen, you describe her correctly when you call her a visionary. It seems, though, that she was more of a empirical PE thinker from how I have heard her described. Maybe its best to describe her as psych-epistemologically ambidextrous or bilateral. Objectivism emerged from the reciprocal dynamic interplay between the holistic vision generated by her rational PE mode and the differentiation and logical integration of her empirical PE mode.

She only wrote about one part of her epistemic process in ITOE. As far as I know, she never identified the epistemic value of her fiction and the processes that created it.

Ellen,

Now we have an outline of the epistemic foundations I am writing from, I'll answer your post.

Agreed that he wasn't "attempting to maintain a consistent metaphysical perspective." He eschews metaphysical perspectives and isn't aware of his own.

I think GS tends to operate predominantly from the rational PE mode, at least on this forum on philosophical matters. Because of the holistic nature of the metaphysical models, or contexts, that the rational PE processes generate, a shift in focus requires a shift in contexts. From the standpoint of someone who operates from the rational PE mode, someone who has shifting contexts to suit the focus of the situation, the development of a metacontext is important. It would provide a consistent central base of judgement. It is the context that contains all contexts and allows the individual to integrate and take control of the shifting.

Incidentally, since empirical PE mode people have a strong central context, they don't have the problem of shifting contexts. They can have the opposite problem: more rigid contexts. More rigid contexts make it hard to capture all of existence in one's vision. Some things cannot be fully understood from a rigid context. A rigid central context creates a picture of reality that lacks dimension.

One context that is made biologically rigid is one's sex. There are some thing men and women will never know due to their biologically rigid context.

Regardless, the dynamic interplay between the two modes generates the greatest insights and brings us closest to the absolutes of reality. Each context is like a holographic image of the whole of reality. The more contexts we are able to adopt into our consciousness, the more detailed is our whole image of reality. But ultimately, we need a metacontext to see the whole picture. It doesn't matter whether you start with a metacontext and add subcontexts (as in empirical PE processes), or start with subcontexts and try to reach for a metacontext (as in rational PE processes), the goal is to create a system in which the parts define the whole and the whole gives context to the parts.

He has many times, however, claimed that science is the base of his views on objects and observers.

Sorry, my use of "his views of objects and observers" was ambiguous. Science is the base of his extrospective views of objects and observers. Deconstruction of his own subjectivity is the base of his introspective views of objects and observers. It was the latter that lead him to say there are no objects without observers. From this context I can't disagree with him unless we make the metaphysical assumption that existence is separate from consciousness. This assumption is implicit in the scientific context. At least, this is my interpretation of things. I'm sure GS will be able to speak for himself.

I think that you weren't paying attention to what was going on on this list for a long while and that you aren't familiar with the history of GS's postings. He's been posting here since June 7, 2007, plenty of time in which to discern where he's coming from.

You are right. I wasn't paying attention for about a year while I was getting my business started. But this is the place where I come to get my philosophy fix. However, if you don't tend to share his PE mode, you won't be able to empathically adopt his perspective to make sense of it. Since I think I share his PE mode, this may have given me insight into his meaning with less information.

I think he's employed what O'ists call "stolen concepts" over and over in his posts.

I think I just decided there is no such thing as "stolen concepts" except in the minds of Objectivists (and those who borrow, not steal, their concept of stolen concepts). It is all a misunderstanding of people who operate via a different PE mode and tend to shift contexts. It's more a matter of Objectivists generally not being good at appreciating and understanding other contexts. They are so sure their one central context is right that there can be no other way of conceiving it.

I also think that the context you're ascribing to him is one you're coming up with.

Of course it is. The same is true for the context you are ascribing to him. We are each making assumptions that are the basis of our interpretations. We each have a theory that requires reality testing.

(Note: from the metaphysical view the general principles that shape a given view of existence are existents to be isolated and identified in one's metaphysical models. These principles are arrived at through inductive inference and the test for the validity of these inferences is whether or not the worldview created is consistent with the evidence. Whereas the test for premises in a deductive argument is non contradiction between the each of the premises-- the parts-- and the evidence, the test for an inductive inference is non contradiction between the whole system and the evidence.)

Paul

PS--Dragonfly, I appreciated your comments.

Edited September 13, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[BaalChatzaf]

(Note: from the metaphysical view the general principles that shape a given view of existence are existents to be isolated and identified in one's metaphysical models. These principles are arrived at through inductive inference and the test for the validity of these inferences is whether or not the worldview created is consistent with the evidence. Whereas the test for premises in a deductive argument is non contradiction between the each of the premises-- the parts-- and the evidence, the test for an inductive inference is non contradiction between the whole system and the evidence.)

Paul

PS--Dragonfly, I appreciated your comments.

Deduction is not a definite mode of validating premises. If no logical contradiction is derived, that is no guarantee that the premises are true. If a contradiction is derived it says that the set of premises cannot be totally satisfied by fact. It tells you something is wrong, but not exactly what.

Empirical checking does not guarantee the truth of premises either. A collision with fact again indicates one of the premises is false.

The duality is this: Deduction is a valid way to get from premises to conclusion. It does not guarantee the truth of the premises (i.e. the -soundness- of the derivation). Deduction only assures the validity of the argument, not its soundness. Empirical corroberation does not guarantee the truth of the premises but empirical refutation tells tells you one of the premises is wrong. This is the basis of Rand's saying: Check your premises.

By the way, you should include -abduction- with inductive reasoning. Abduction ( a term invented by C.S. Peirce) is hypothesizing to possible to cause. Given the evidence, produce a cause (hypothetical) that can account for the evidence seen.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Ellen Stuttle]

He has many times, however, claimed that science is the base of his views on objects and observers

Sorry, my use of "his views of objects and observers" was ambiguous. Science is the base of his extrospective views of objects and observers. Deconstruction of his own subjectivity is the base of his introspective views of objects and observers. It was the latter that lead him to say there are no objects without observers. From this context I can't disagree with him unless we make the metaphysical assumption that existence is separate from consciousness. This assumption is implicit in the scientific context. At least, this is my interpretation of things. I'm sure GS will be able to speak for himself.

I hope he will respond, though I doubt that he, any better than I, will follow your "explication" of what's going on in his head.

Ellen

___

[tjohnson]

Wow, you step out for a few days and everybody talks about you behind your back! I just finished catching up on all these posts. I think the problem is with the term 'existence'. The primacy of existence axiom assumes that existence is not ambiguous but I claim it is. I think that this proposition should be reformulated to something like this;

1. There are processes that occur independent of our consciousness.

2. Consciousness is a process

3. Consciousness is not one of said independent processes, ie. we can direct this process.

[merjet]

Here's another perspective on the primacy of existence.

http://www.objectivistliving.com/forums/in...ost&p=52336

[Paul Mawdsley]

I hope he will respond, though I doubt that he, any better than I, will follow your "explication" of what's going on in his head.

It seems my meaning is clear as mud. It's frustrating but I have come to expect and accept this. I'm actually surprised there is any genuine communication at all between people. Ultimately, it requires two people to generate resonant contexts, a shared mental space. It requires effort, knowledge and skill from each party.

When two people are discussing established ideas that each have studied, there is some chance of a common interpretation. When they are exploring new directions, directly interpreting experience, using words in new contexts without an established common definition, the chances are much greater of communication not being established. It requires the chance meeting of minds that happen to be thinking about the same things in similar ways, using the same words, without a pre-existing map for guidance. They usually end up either arguing without understanding or agreeing to disagree. There is much evidence of this on this forum as well as others.

Having rigid contexts helps communication but destroys creativity. Having more flexibility in shifting contexts helps creativity but can all but destroy communication. Initiating communication of new contexts requires knowledge of existing contexts that are shared (established paradigms and schools of thought) and skill in explaining how these transition into new contexts as is traditionally done in academia; or skill at artistic expression as Rand demonstrates with her fiction. Reception of what is communicated requires knowledge of existing contexts that are shared and skill in generating contexts that integrate all the elements of what is being communicated; or skill at artistic appreciation as each of us has done reading Rand's fiction. However it works, it does require effort, knowledge and skill from each party. If there is a breakdown in any of these requirements, there is a breakdown in communication.

We clearly have a problem establishing communication. I suggest we not try too hard and let's see if our artistic communication skills eventually find a way to click. If not, you can continue to remain blissfully ignorant of what I am talking about and I can remain blissfully ignorant of what you would think if you understood.

Paul

PS-- Welcome back GS.