An axiomatic paradox?

[Mindy Newton]

Given his pre-philosophical and pre-scientific context, does what he says fit the evidence and is it internally consistent?

What "pre-scientific context," Paul? GS is claiming that science has shown that the world we observe is manufactured by our nervous systems. And what could "evidence" possibly mean in the context? Internally consistent, what he says most certainly is not. Total solipsism would be the only viewpoint from which he could be internally consistent (except for the problem that total solipsism can't be internally consistently adhered to.)

Ellen

There is a context in which your description of GS's perspective makes sense. The idea is that we have direct access to no reality but the reality of our own consciousness (now we have moved from Berkeley to Descartes). We are existentially alone and solipsistic. We need to connect dots, make categorical or causal assumptions, to realize the existence of another consciousness. From the context of an island consciousness, experience is "manufactured" from building blocks of qualia in the form of perceptions, imaginings, thoughts, feelings, etc. The objects of awareness are isolated patterns in the flow of consciousness. These patterns in the flow of consciousness are the "evidence" on which any knowledge is built.

Once we assume that there is a connection between the objects we have isolated in the flow of awareness and a reality that exists beyond our own consciousness, we have made the first step into metaphysical and scientific thought. With more assumptions about identity, causation, time, space, etc., we can connect the dots (science) or create systematic models of the nature of existence as a whole (metaphysics), which can be turned back to account for the nature of consciousness.

This is not a claim for "total solipsism." It's a claim for the evolution of consciousness out of the solipsism that we can imagine we were born with. The context of a new born, or the best we can conceive of it in thinking about the stages of the development of consciousness, is what I mean by "pre-scientific context." The value of this context is to be found in its ability to illuminate what Jung called "our presuppositions."

Paul

If I'm wrong about this Idealism of GS's being a case of stolen concepts, I wish somebody'd clue me in.

In "to be is to be perceived," the stolen concept is "perceive." Perception implies an object. "...to be perceived" implies what is perceived. Same with "observation," to observe is to focus on something. (If there could be observation of nothing, all it would bring into existence is--nothing.)

Also, without an object of perception, there is no distinction between perception and imagination. The practical consequences of acting on your perceptual knowledge are much different than the consequences of acting as if what you imagine were real!

So the Idealist case must be made without terms like "perceive," "observe" because those terms presuppose the independent existence of objects to be perceived and observed!

=Mindy

Edited September 9, 2008 by Mindy

[Paul Mawdsley]

If I'm wrong about this Idealism of GS's being a case of stolen concepts, I wish somebody'd clue me in.

In "to be is to be perceived," the stolen concept is "perceive." Perception implies an object. "...to be perceived" implies what is perceived. Same with "observation," to observe is to focus on something. (If there could be observation of nothing, all it would bring into existence is--nothing.)

Also, without an object of perception, there is no distinction between perception and imagination. The practical consequences of acting on your perceptual knowledge are much different than the consequences of acting as if what you imagine were real!

So the Idealist case must be made without terms like "perceive," "observe" because those terms presuppose the independent existence of objects to be perceived and observed!

=Mindy

I think you are wrong but understandably so. GS isn't stealing anything. He is deconstructing. He is not making any metaphysical claims. He is rewinding the clock of conceptual development. It is a perspective with philosophical/scientific assumptions removed. It is like imagining the state of a new born prior to the process of psychological separation and object permanence. The objects of perception are there, and they have been differentiated, but they are not yet assumed to be caused by things, existing in a permanent reality, that are separate from consciousness.

The object of such an exercise is not to make any Idealistic metaphysical claim. It is to expose the assumptions we make when we do make metaphysical or scientific claims. It raises the question: How do we get from the state of a new born who's consciousness is not experienced as separate to his environment, and who hasn't yet realized that there is a reality that is independent of consciousness that gives objects a permanent existence, to a state where we are having philosophical disagreements over Rand and Popper's views on induction? The answer is that we make some crucial assumptions, we built systems of thought, the contexts of which are shaped by these assumptions, and we try to claim one context is better than the other.

What are our assumptions?

Paul

PS--What happened to your cart and horse? I had a quip.

[Mindy Newton]

If I'm wrong about this Idealism of GS's being a case of stolen concepts, I wish somebody'd clue me in.

In "to be is to be perceived," the stolen concept is "perceive." Perception implies an object. "...to be perceived" implies what is perceived. Same with "observation," to observe is to focus on something. (If there could be observation of nothing, all it would bring into existence is--nothing.)

Also, without an object of perception, there is no distinction between perception and imagination. The practical consequences of acting on your perceptual knowledge are much different than the consequences of acting as if what you imagine were real!

So the Idealist case must be made without terms like "perceive," "observe" because those terms presuppose the independent existence of objects to be perceived and observed!

=Mindy

I think you are wrong but understandably so. GS isn't stealing anything. He is deconstructing. He is not making any metaphysical claims. He is rewinding the clock of conceptual development. It is a perspective with philosophical/scientific assumptions removed. It is like imagining the state of a new born prior to the process of psychological separation and object permanence. The objects of perception are there, and they have been differentiated, but they are not yet assumed to be caused by things, existing in a permanent reality, that are separate from consciousness.

The object of such an exercise is not to make any Idealistic metaphysical claim. It is to expose the assumptions we make when we do make metaphysical or scientific claims. It raises the question: How do we get from the state of a new born who's consciousness is not experienced as separate to his environment, and who hasn't yet realized that there is a reality that is independent of consciousness that gives objects a permanent existence, to a state where we are having philosophical disagreements over Rand and Popper's views on induction? The answer is that we make some crucial assumptions, we built systems of thought, the contexts of which are shaped by these assumptions, and we try to claim one context is better than the other.

What are our assumptions?

Paul

PS--What happened to your cart and horse? I had a quip.

Go ahead, I'll know what it's about.

An infant who can perceive a rattle is an infant who HAS a rattle. The rattle comes first. Can't perceive what doesn't exist! Can't observe if there isn't anything in existence to be observed. Doesn't matter what assumptions anyone has regarding anything. In his first perception, the infant perceives reality. Much, much later does he frown over the relationship between his mind and that reality. Just as there is no consciousness without something to be conscious of, there is no perception, no observation, etc., without what is perceived, or observed.

You know those alternative assumptions you wrote about, GS is assuming he can start with a perception that doesn't imply it's source, but that wouldn't be perception. He assumes he can start with what he finds in his mind, but that isn't possible. You've empathetically recognized his assumption, allowed it, and then realized it does, indeed make a mess of philosophy. There are no perceptions without the object perceived. That's what "perception" means. It's like saying, what if something existed, but didn't have identity, could we assign it an identity, or would it evolve one, or could we deduce its identity from its relations to other things? (I know that doesn't make sense.) No such thing exists. No perceptions preceed what they are perceptions of.

=Mindy

Edited September 9, 2008 by Mindy

[tjohnson]

Just as there is no consciousness without something to be conscious of, there is no perception, no observation, etc., without what is perceived, or observed.

How about 'consciousness of abstracting' ? That is something one may be conscious of but it is a process, not a thing.

See Science and Sanity

Edited September 9, 2008 by general semanticist

[kiaer.ts]

How about 'consciousness of abstracting' ? That is something one may be conscious of but it is a process, not a thing.

Not strictly an entity, but an existent. In any case, abstraction is abstraction from something. All abstractions are ultimately derived from the perceptual level. Have you not read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology? Why do you post on an Objectivist list with such obvious ignorance of Objectivism? I cannot find a single issue you raise that is not answered in depth in Rand's writing. Perhaps you should stop typing for a few days, and read the material.

[worldlogicleague]

I am not saying there are not forces, energies, etc. external to our nervous system, in fact it is these that we manufacture "objects' from.

OK. Then we are in agreement that things, namely forces and energies, exist independently, regardless of whether they've been observed or not.

What we call 'objects' are actually abstractions in our nervous system, does anyone deny that? You must accept that all we have available to us are abstractions.

I see. The confusion seems to be over the definition employed for 'objects'.

From Wikipedia -

In Philosophy, an object is a thing, an entity, or a being. This may be taken in several senses.

In its weakest sense, the word object is the most all-purpose of nouns, and can replace a noun in any sentence at all. (In ordinary usage, the word has something like this effect, but not as extreme.) Thus objects are things as diverse as the pyramids, Alpha Centauri, the number seven, a belief in predestination, and a fear of dogs.

Charles S. Peirce succinctly defines the broad notion of an object as follows:

"By an object, I mean anything that we can think, i.e. anything we can talk about." [1]

This is how I was defining object in my above post where I said it can refer to unicorns or apples. By this definition forces and energies are objects and by your first point you would have to acknowledge that by this definition, these existential objects exist externally to the nervous system, as you said.

However, perhaps you are not using this definition for objects. Maybe by objects you mean -- mental contructs or abstractions formed out of what's been perceived by the senses.

By this definition the forces and energies are existential entities that are abstracted into objects by the observing mind. Then Iwould have to agree with you that 'objects' are actually abstractions in our nervous system and all we have available to us are abstractions, or our objectifying perceptions of the existential reality that exists external to our nervous system. This is interesting to think about but a different question then the independent existence of 'entities' (if you prefer) without need for observation. But this is not a standard definition of objects, though it does highlight why it is so important to start with clear definitions when presenting ideas. I would prefer to stick with the standard definition of objects and use 'perceptual constructs' for what you call objects. Or I would go with the other way of defining objects as existential entities, and so use entities as the all-purpose noun that can be used for both unicorn and apples.

Edited September 9, 2008 by worldlogicleague

[tjohnson]

Why do you post on an Objectivist list with such obvious ignorance of Objectivism?

No sense in preaching to the converted

[tjohnson]

However, perhaps you are not using this definition for objects. Maybe by objects you mean -- mental contructs or abstractions formed out of what's been perceived by the senses.

By this definition the forces and energies are existential entities that are abstracted into objects by the observing mind. Then Iwould have to agree with you that 'objects' are actually abstractions in our nervous system and all we have available to us are abstractions, or our objectifying perceptions of the existential reality that exists external to our nervous system. This is interesting to think about but a different question then the independent existence of 'entities' (if you prefer) without need for observation. But this is not a standard definition of objects, though it does highlight why it is so important to start with clear definitions when presenting ideas. I would prefer to stick with the standard definition of objects and use 'perceptual constructs' for what you call objects.

Good points. I will have to think about this but unfortunately I will be away for 3-4 days, but I will respond.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Mindy,

Of course, there is no cart. And all that remains of the horse is a floating consciousness that is before everything else.

I still think you are making a mistake of interpretation. I agree with your metaphysical claims. I agree with your recognition of my use of empathy, in a broad sense. You are right about everything but GS and my perspectives. You are taking your own perspective of the new born. Take a page from Thomas Nagel and try to put yourself inside the new born's consciousness. The rattle exists but the new born doesn't draw this conclusion, you do. The new born has not made the conceptual leap of concluding separateness and permanence (refer to developmental psych.). Conceiving of oneself as separate from one's environment and object permanence are the first intuitive metaphysical assumptions. Your assertion (which I fully agree with, as long as we can exclude illusions, delusions, hallucinations, etc., which I am not prone to) that "[t]here are no perceptions without the object perceived," is built on a foundation if these first metaphysical assumptions. Without them, we could make no claims about reality. That's GS's point.

Paul

[kiaer.ts]

Why do you post on an Objectivist list with such obvious ignorance of Objectivism?

No sense in preaching to the converted

So what is your motivation here? Are you posting out of an altruistic motive of correcting us fools? If so, you need to understand our foolishness in order to correct us. Are you trying to understand us? Then why argue out of ignorance, when you could be learning the ideas we use?

Have you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology? If so, ask us to explain what you don't understand - the chance to explain would be a value to some of us. If you haven't read it, what are you afraid of? Try it - it won't hurt you.

[worldlogicleague]

Why do you post on an Objectivist list with such obvious ignorance of Objectivism?

No sense in preaching to the converted

So what is your motivation here? Are you posting out of an altruistic motive of correcting us fools? If so, you need yto understand our foolishness in order to correct us. Are you trying to understand us? Then why argue out of ignorance, when you could be learning the ideas we use?

Have you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology? If so, ask us to explain what you don't understand - the chance to explain would be a value to some of us. If you haven't read it, what are you afraid of? Try it - it won't hurt you.

Here is what he said his motivation is in another thread:

I would like to explore some ideas of general semantics and objectivism and contrast and compare them as I

see similar goals in these disciplines, at least potentially. So to begin with I'll use this introductory overview by Kat.

Objectivism holds that there is one reality, the one in which we live. It is self-evident that reality exists and is what it is: our job is to discover it.

GS also holds that there is an unpeakable environment in which we are immersed but it doesn't use the term 'reality'. In general semantics there is a notion called 'multiordinality' which states that many words we use regularly, like 'reality' mean different things on different levels of abstraction. So for example, someone who is hallucinating may 'really' see something which is not there and this is THEIR reality, so even though we live in something independent of our nervous system our only exposure to it is through our nervous system, none the less. Because our knowledge of this 'reality' (some call it WIGO - What Is Going On) comes to us mainly through science, we call this level the event level to denote that it is in a constant state of change as modern science has discovered. Our perceptual process of the event is called the objective level so 'reality' can mean the event level or the objective level and of course these are two very different things.

This thread began with Rand's Primacy of Existence Axiom (premise 1). From the FAQ on this forum:

"The primacy of existence (of reality) is the axiom that existence exists," wrote Ayn Rand in "The Metaphysical versus the Man-Made," "i.e., that the universe exists independent of consciousness (of any consciousness), that things are what they are, that they possess a specific nature, an identity."

It seemed like he was disagreeing with this axiom, but he has since said that he is in agreement.

He then said that all we can know about these things that exist independent of consciousness is our internal abstractions, or mental constructs we make out of what we perceive with our senses. This seems reasonable to me.

As to his use of the term reality above, I would prefer to stick with the standard definition of reality as that which exists. It would be irresponsible for a psychologist to tell someone suffering from schizophrenia that the goblin he sees standing next to him is real and he is really seeing something. It is preferable that standard definitions are used and it is called a hallucination. This choice of terminology aside, his GS principle that our mental contsructs of the externally existing reality are relative and give rise to a 'multiordinality' of mental constructs is interesting. But of course, it is our mental constructs that are changing and relative, not the externally existing objects (per se).

Edited September 9, 2008 by worldlogicleague

[Mindy Newton]

...

He then said that all we can know about these things that exist independent of consciousness is our internal abstractions, or mental constructs we make out of what we perceive with our senses. This seems reasonable to me.

As to his use of the term reality above, I would prefer to stick with the standard definition of reality as that which exists. It would be irresponsible for a psychologist to tell someone suffering from schizophrenia that the goblin he sees standing next to him is real and he is really seeing something. It is preferable that standard definitions are used and it is called a hallucination. This choice of terminology aside, his GS principle that our mental contsructs of the externally existing reality are relative and give rise to a 'multiordinality' of mental constructs is interesting. But of course, it is our mental constructs that are changing and relative, not the externally existing objects (per se).

Good and timely analysis, Logic.

Did you notice the vacant formulation, "...all we can know...is our internal abstractions..." read that: "all we can know is what we can know." That's one logical glitch. Then that can be unpacked into assumptions that themselves are wide open to criticism: Knowledge via abstraction is invalid, or inadequate; corollary: Knowledge must be un-processed; and, more interestingly: There is more to know than our knowledge gives us!

GS: Ted doesn't speak for all of us.

=Mindy

[worldlogicleague]

...

He then said that all we can know about these things that exist independent of consciousness is our internal abstractions, or mental constructs we make out of what we perceive with our senses. This seems reasonable to me.

As to his use of the term reality above, I would prefer to stick with the standard definition of reality as that which exists. It would be irresponsible for a psychologist to tell someone suffering from schizophrenia that the goblin he sees standing next to him is real and he is really seeing something. It is preferable that standard definitions are used and it is called a hallucination. This choice of terminology aside, his GS principle that our mental contsructs of the externally existing reality are relative and give rise to a 'multiordinality' of mental constructs is interesting. But of course, it is our mental constructs that are changing and relative, not the externally existing objects (per se).

Good and timely analysis, Logic.

Did you notice the vacant formulation, "...all we can know...is our internal abstractions..." read that: "all we can know is what we can know." That's one logical glitch. Then that can be unpacked into assumptions that themselves are wide open to criticism: Knowledge via abstraction is invalid, or inadequate; corollary: Knowledge must be un-processed; and, more interestingly: There is more to know than our knowledge gives us!

=Mindy

LOL. Well done Mindy. Actually I didn't notice that. All we can know is what we can know. Doesn't take us very far does it lol. Hmm, how can we put this. How about existential reality is always filtered through our mental constructs, which are often changing, relative, and sometimes wrong? Thanks for that!

Edited September 9, 2008 by worldlogicleague

[kiaer.ts]

GS: Ted doesn't speak for all of us.

Mindy, maybe you don't share my contempt for his endlessly repeated nonsense - but do you think it a bad idea for him at least to try to understand the Objectivist position if he is going to post here? To call a man a fool for his current actions is not to call him evil or irredeemable. Is the point of such a forum as this endless back and forth, or better understanding? And if it is better understanding, then is actually reading Rand such a bad idea?

So how about it, GS, have you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, or haven't you?

[Mindy Newton]

GS: Ted doesn't speak for all of us.

Mindy, maybe you don't share my contempt for his endlessly repeated nonsense - but do you think it a bad idea for him at least to try to understand the Objectivist position if he is going to post here? To call a man a fool for his current actions is not to call him evil or irredeemable. Is the point of such a forum as this endless back and forth, or better understanding? And if it is better understanding, then is actually reading Rand such a bad idea?

So how about it, GS, have you read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology, or haven't you?

Ted, no, I certainly don't think it a bad idea, quite the contrary! However, I don't think he needs anyone to inform him of the advisability of doing it. I don't feel contempt for him, though I would if he weren't responsive. If he just kept spouting his Idealist beliefs, and didn't enter into real discussion, I'd join you in your annoyance. To tell you the truth, and at the risk of offending a few people, though I sincerely mean no offence, I think "we" should be able to set him straight efficiently. It's good exercise to engage with sincere people with mistaken beliefs. To tell you the truth, ITOE will create some confusion, in my opinion. Though I think he would forever thank his lucky stars if he learned Obj. philosophy.

=Mindy

[Mindy Newton]

LOL. Well done Mindy. Actually I didn't notice that. All we can know is what we can know. Doesn't take us very far does it lol. Hmm, how can we put this. How about existential reality is always filtered through our mental constructs, which are often changing, relative, and sometimes wrong? Thanks for that!

Help me out? I keep coming upon the word, "existential," and am taken aback. I'm tired of stumbling over this word! I'm wondering if sometimes "experiential" is what is meant? (Don't quote me the definitions, I've looked them up. ;-) )

Otherwise, I'm missing a distinction.

Take the useage above, "existential reality" which is filtered... If it's supposed to be "experiential reality" or "reality as experienced" then I get it. If it means, "existing reality," I am left wondering why the phrase is used, and not just, "reality." (I'm the first to admit the work of sharpening our conceptual equipment is never done.)

=Mindy

[Roger Bissell]

LOL. Well done Mindy. Actually I didn't notice that. All we can know is what we can know. Doesn't take us very far does it lol. Hmm, how can we put this. How about existential reality is always filtered through our mental constructs, which are often changing, relative, and sometimes wrong? Thanks for that!

Help me out? I keep coming upon the word, "existential," and am taken aback. I'm tired of stumbling over this word! I'm wondering if sometimes "experiential" is what is meant? (Don't quote me the definitions, I've looked them up. ;-) )

Otherwise, I'm missing a distinction.

Take the useage above, "existential reality" which is filtered... If it's supposed to be "experiential reality" or "reality as experienced" then I get it. If it means, "existing reality," I am left wondering why the phrase is used, and not just, "reality." (I'm the first to admit the work of sharpening our conceptual equipment is never done.)

=Mindy

Mindy, ~my~ understand is that "existential reality" is a synonym for "the external world" -- as against the "internal" world of our psychological experiences. Rand used this distinction (existential vs. psychological).

I think this is what is referred to in the above quote -- about "the external world" being "filtered" by our senses or our "mental constructs." The assumption, of course, is that because we are conscious of the world through some specific means, we aren't actually aware of it directly, but only ~indirectly~ through "filters" or "distorting" features of our nervous systems. This is, at best, a form of "representational realism" (see John Locke), but more akin to Kant's model.

In any case, I don't agree with this, and neither did Rand or Aristotle or any person holding a theory of direct, perceptual realism.

REB

[worldlogicleague]

If it's supposed to be "experiential reality" or "reality as experienced" then I get it. If it means, "existing reality," I am left wondering why the phrase is used, and not just, "reality." (I'm the first to admit the work of sharpening our conceptual equipment is never done.)

=Mindy

No, you're right. Reality is that which exists so existential reality would be redundant. I saw that too but was compelled to say it for the sake of clarity due to the above changed definition of reality by GS. I was thinking you would pick up on that. ;)

Roger, I must admit that I was wasn't employing that usage of terminology.

Edited September 10, 2008 by worldlogicleague

[BaalChatzaf]

In any case, I don't agree with this, and neither did Rand or Aristotle or any person holding a theory of direct, perceptual realism.

REB

Hold a ten pound granite rock in the palm of your hand. Heft it, look at it. You say it is solid. In fact it is 99.999999999 percent empty space.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Roger Bissell]

In any case, I don't agree with this, and neither did Rand or Aristotle or any person holding a theory of direct, perceptual realism.

REB

Hold a ten pound granite rock in the palm of your hand. Heft it, look at it. You say it is solid. In fact it is 99.999999999 percent empty space.

Ba'al Chatzaf

A ten pound granite rock is in fact both 99.9999999999 percent empty space AND solid.

Its factual solidity is due to the physical state of the 00.00000000001 percent that is NOT empty space.

There is NO conflict between a non-naive scientific realism and a non-naive perceptual realism. They both identify REAL aspects of reality.

REB

[Brant Gaede]

In any case, I don't agree with this, and neither did Rand or Aristotle or any person holding a theory of direct, perceptual realism.

REB

Hold a ten pound granite rock in the palm of your hand. Heft it, look at it. You say it is solid. In fact it is 99.999999999 percent empty space.

Ba'al Chatzaf

A ten pound granite rock is in fact both 99.9999999999 percent empty space AND solid.

Its factual solidity is due to the physical state of the 00.00000000001 percent that is NOT empty space.

There is NO conflict between a non-naive scientific realism and a non-naive perceptual realism. They both identify REAL aspects of reality.

REB

Empty of what? Electro-magnetism?

--Brant

[worldlogicleague]

Roger, I was trying to respond to GS's position:

In general semantics there is a notion called 'multiordinality' which states that many words we use regularly, like 'reality' mean different things on different levels of abstraction. So for example, someone who is hallucinating may 'really' see something which is not there and this is THEIR reality, so even though we live in something independent of our nervous system our only exposure to it is through our nervous system, none the less.

He seems to be saying that our thoughts or mental constructs determine what is reality. I was trying to say that reality is 'filtered' through our mental contructs and we build maps of reality, which are often changing, relative, and sometimes wrong. But reality itself is still independent of consciousness. Its our maps that are changing in this process, not reality. So for example, first science identified Pluto as a planet. Now we identify Pluto as a dwarf planet. But throughout this change in consciousness or mental constructs, Pluto didn't change one bit and was always just what it is, independent of consciousness.

The question of representational realism is yet another interesting question. Even if GS goes on to claim this, even this does not mean that reality is not independent of consciousness.

Edited September 10, 2008 by worldlogicleague

[Paul Mawdsley]

Hold a ten pound granite rock in the palm of your hand. Heft it, look at it. You say it is solid. In fact it is 99.999999999 percent empty space.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Strange thing about empty space...it's full of fields. Strange thing about fields...people think of them as empty spaces they can fill.

"Existential" has the same problem as "fields." Context determines meaning. "Existential" has a very different meaning to an Existentialist than it does to an Objectivist. Existential can mean existence as experienced from within the consciousness of the individual or it can mean existence considered objectively, from an abstract metaphysical perspective, as being all that exists, including consciousness. One context is constructed from one's subjective experience of existence. The other context stands on the outside of one's subjective experience, builds models full of objects, and sees oneself as one of those objects. Which is the correct context? Or was Einstein right? It's all just relative to the perspective of the observer.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

He seems to be saying that our thoughts or mental constructs determine what is reality. I was trying to say that reality is 'filtered' through our mental contructs and we build maps of reality, which are often changing, relative, and sometimes wrong. But reality itself is still independent of consciousness. Its our maps that are changing in this process, not reality. So for example, first science identified Pluto as a planet. Now we identify Pluto as a dwarf planet. But throughout this change in consciousness or mental constructs, Pluto didn't change one bit and was always just what it is, independent of consciousness.

The question of representational realism is yet another interesting question. Even if GS goes on to claim this, even this does not mean that reality is not independent of consciousness.

GS was not making a metaphysical statement. He was deconstructing our metaphysical assumptions. I'm a little surprised this point is being missed.

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

... do you think it a bad idea for him at least to try to understand the Objectivist position if he is going to post here?

Ted,

LOL...

I seriously doubt GS has read ITOE. When he first showed up, I did numerous posts in the manner you have made and it didn't make a dent. GS did not want to read Objectivist literature and he was adamant about it.

But he has stuck around and some of the ideas he has encountered have mellowed him a bit from osmosis.

If you can get him to read ITOE, that would be a blessing. I imagine (but am not sure) that there would be a reduction in his one-liners using exclusively meanings of words from another philosophy and questions like "why do Objectivists think capitalism is good?" (I don't remember if he asked that particular question, but there have been some doozies on that level.)

GS has a good mind, though. And a good heart. He's just a lazy intellectual.

Michael