Life, Awareness and Causality

[Paul Mawdsley]

Ellen raised a topic on another thread that I find most interesting. While my own thoughts on this subject are informed by science, I see it as much a philosophical inquiry as a scientific inquiry because it requires exploring our assumptions about the fundamental nature of causation at the root of scientific investigations. Since causality cannot be observed, and is purely the product of our capacity for building abstract hypothetical models of existence, explorations of its nature are in the domain of intuition and philosophy, not science. However, any application of causal principles must be informed by science to be about the real world.

I agree that a complex nervous system is required for "thinking" -- a term which I don't limit to human cognitive function. But I don't agree with the theory that "complexity" is the key to the emergence of awareness(es). I think that motility, with consequent action-alternatives, is.

The fundamental action alternative for life/awareness is integration or disintegration; existence or non-existence. Can we physically/causally model an entity that acts to maintain (and increase the actualization of?) the integrity of its own existence in the context of local, linear causation, even with considerations of complexity? Or do we need to include non-local, non-linear causation and the part-whole reciprocal dynamics that this causation makes possible in our models? Also, can a purely reactive causation be used to build a model for such an entity that has the apparently proactive nature of life/awareness that reacts to its environment, not by being pushed by antecedent forces, but by processing meaning and striving to maintain integration?

Paul

[Ellen Stuttle]

The fundamental action alternative for life/awareness is integration or disintegration; existence or non-existence.

Paul, I wasn't meaning anything so (deceptively) philosophic as AR's "fundamental alternative." I meant just what I wrote: "action-alternatives."

I'm sorry, but I haven't time to elaborate now. The coming week is slated to be a biggie in my household project (some renovating and refurnishing which we hope to have finished by November 1).

(See my earlier warning of limited time the next few months in a PS to a post from July 30:

Edit: PS: [...] I'm going to have to become scare in listland for the next few months. We have a major renovating and refurnishing project which we'd like to get completed by November, so I won't have much time for posting while that project is still underway.

)

Ellen

___

[Paul Mawdsley]

Paul, I wasn't meaning anything so (deceptively) philosophic as AR's "fundamental alternative." I meant just what I wrote: "action-alternatives."

Sorry Ellen, I didn't mean to imply this was specifically what you were talking about. I took your meaning straight up. These are more the thoughts your post sparked in me. This is why I chose to start a new thread rather than just respond in the existing thread. While I know Rand spoke of this, I was not referring to her views. I was referring to my own images of amino acids being held together by a force-free plasm filament that draws in elements from its environment to maintain (and/or actualize) its integrity

I'm sorry, but I haven't time to elaborate now. The coming week is slated to be a biggie in my household project (some renovating and refurnishing which we hope to have finished by November 1)..

I'm in a similar situation. Three quarters of my main floor has no drywall on the outside walls, we have resized and moved all our windows, and have Typar for siding.

Edited August 18, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[tjohnson]

Can we physically/causally model an entity that acts to maintain (and increase the actualization of?) the integrity of its own existence in the context of local, linear causation, even with considerations of complexity? Or do we need to include non-local, non-linear causation and the part-whole reciprocal dynamics that this causation makes possible in our models? Also, can a purely reactive causation be used to build a model for such an entity that has the apparently proactive nature of life/awareness that reacts to its environment, not by being pushed by antecedent forces, but by processing meaning and striving to maintain integration?

Paul

Could you state this in simpler terms? What do you mean by 'local, linear causation' vs. 'non-local, non-linear causation'?

[Paul Mawdsley]

Could you state this in simpler terms? What do you mean by 'local, linear causation' vs. 'non-local, non-linear causation'?

GS,

Life is busy. Here is a couple of Wiki links if you are interested: Principle of Locality; Nonlocality.

Science has done a wonderful job with local causation as its guide but the best I can gather is that we lack a mechanism for non-local causation. I have been playing around with a causal mechanism for nonlocal causation--i.e.: a physical mechanism that produces an effect on an entity's behaviour without acting on it with some type of force. In essence it works by the subtraction of force that is otherwise constant, or it can be stated positively as the change in the degrees of freedom available to an entities action potential. This helps us understand how the form of a system can shape the action of its parts. Since the mechanism is controlled by the form of the whole system, it is non-local. It applies to any part-whole causally reciprocal relationship. It applies to how we understand the emergence of life and awareness. It applies to how we interpret quantum mechanics and gravitation. It applies to how we understand the dynamics of the psyche and the physiological functions of the brain. An understanding of the mechanics of non-local causation could change how a lot of things are interpreted. It would be a new piece to the interpretive puzzle.

I will try to get back to you and answer your question better tomorrow.

Paul

Edited August 19, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[Paul Mawdsley]

Local, linear causation, as I use it, is the causation we are all familiar with. It is the causation exemplified by colliding billiard balls. It is local because it requires direct interaction, or a chain of direct interactions, for one thing to cause a change in the action or properties of another thing. It is linear because a line (or lines) can be abstracted through time and space that connects the current actions and properties of a thing (or things) with antecedent actions and interactions of other entities (or other parts of a given entity). It is the type of causation assumed by classical physics and still remains in modern physics with the added twist of fields as causal mediums. Basically, a thing's actions or properties can only be changed by the introduction of some force on this thing(excluding quantum entanglement). Very complex behaviour can be modeled from local, linear causation. Non-linear behaviour can be produced by individual linear actions in complex chains.

Non-local, non-linear causation is not so familiar. We have a vague sense that our context, our environment, our culture plays a role in shaping, limiting, or expanding our possibilities for action. Somehow, living in a capitalist society helps determine our behaviour, making it different than it would be if we lived in a dictatorship, for example. Somehow, the system in which a thing exists helps to shape its behaviour in a way that is not traceable to any local or linear cause. This gives rise to the idea that there may be some sort of non-local, non-linear causation.

Quantum mechanics brings this issue to a head. Anyone who acknowledges the evidence about quantum realities must conclude that there exists some sort of relationship between the form of the whole quantum system and the behaviour of its parts. In a fundamental way this is non-local and non-linear.

The prevailing view is based on the Copenhagen Interpretation. This does not attempt to maintain any realistic model of reality underlying what can be measured, so a quantum entanglement between related particles is assumed without any mechanism for this entanglement. Entanglement binds two particles by their wave function, whereby measured values for one can effect the measured values of the other instantaneously over distances too great for information to travel at relativistic speeds. The Copenhagen Interpretation assumes no communication is required between the particles because there is a collapse of the wave function that binds the two particles. The wave function collapses when a measurement is taken. This collapse causes a non-local, non-linear effect on the measured values of the second particle.

The problem I have is that such non-local, non-linear causation is assumed to be unique to the quantum realm. It's not. It is fundamental to any system that is maintained by a reciprocal causal relationship between the action of the parts and the form of the whole. However, if any realistic mechanism for non-local, non-linear causation is going to be able to account for quantum reality, it must account for non-local effects across relativistic distances without breaking the limits set by relativity.

First things first. We need a model of non-local, non-linear causation as it applies in our everyday world. As a first step in this direction, here are a couple of general principles:

Local, linear causation as a general principle: What a thing (whole) does is determine by the actions and interactions of its physical components (parts) in the context of the degrees of freedom allowed by other things (other same scale entities).

Non-local, non-linear causation as a general principle: What a thing (part) is determines what it does in the context of the degrees of freedom allowed by the system (whole) of which it is a part.

Paul

PS- I will be away until Aug. 24.

[kiaer.ts]

I meant just what I wrote: "action-alternatives."

Ellen, I am curious if you mean here what I see as the nature of volition. I have posted a brief summary of my ideas here.

[Ellen Stuttle]

I meant just what I wrote: "action-alternatives."

Ellen, I am curious if you mean here what I see as the nature of volition. I have posted a brief summary of my ideas here.

Uh, no, not exactly, although there is part of what you say which is along the lines:

"Before we can address the nature of free will, we need to address the nature off will itself [...]."

I'm currently thinking of "volition," as I use the term, as a synonym for "will." I'm currently using as my working definition: "the effortful molding of action."

As to whether or not there really is free will, I've long had Lockean reservations as to whether the term makes any sense.

In regard to the definition you give --

"The ability to act when external stimuli are sub-determinative is volition." --

I'd say that with organismic voluntary action, "external stimuli" are always "sub-determinative." But this wouldn't eliminate the question of whether the interaction of internal with external stimuli is necessitating or not.

I tend to the opinion that if all factors are included, there is "only one physically possible future."

I'm referring there to a definition of "determinism" provided by Van Inwagen and quoted by Dennett on page 25 of Freedom Evolves:

Freedom Evolves

Copyright © Daniel C. Dennett, 2003

Penguin Books

pg. 25

Determinism is the thesis that "there is at any moment exactly one physically possible future" (Van Inwagen 1983, p. 3).

[The Van Inwagen work cited is: An Essay on Free Will, Oxford: Clarendon Press. I haven't yet read or even acquired that book. I'm relying thus far on Dennett's account of the statement's meaning.]

[Dennett continues:]

This is not a particularly difficult idea, one would think, but it's amazing how often even very thoughtful writers get it flat wrong. First, many thinkers assume that determinism implies inevitability. It doesn't. Second, many think it is obvious that indeterminism--the denial of determinism--would give us agents some freedom, some maneuverability, some elbow room, that we just couldn't have in a deterministic universe. It wouldn't. Third, it is commonly supposed that in a deterministic world, there are no real options, only apparent options. This is false. Really? I have just contradicted three themes so central to discussions of free will, and so seldom challenged, that many readers must suppose I am kidding, or using these words in some esoteric sense. No, I am claiming that the complacency with which these theses are commonly granted without argument is itself a large mistake.

I think I agree with Dennett on these three points. I'll emphasize his third point, from a different angle: I think that it MUST BE the case that there are real options, else knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is impossible. I think that where many accounts of determinism fall apart and result in contradiction is in their denying the existence of real options.

I'm not satisfied with Dennett's further spelling out. I think he skips crucial steps. Also that, because he thinks in terms of "choices" and in computational terms, he misses what seems to me a question overlooked in most of the writings on determinism/free will I know of, which is exactly that of the nature of will.

I realize I'm inviting further questions by saying that much -- and possibly instigating what might become a long debate. Be warned: I am under time constraints and might sit out whatever storm ensues. ;-)

Ellen

___

Edited August 20, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I realize I'm inviting further questions by saying that much -- and possibly instigating what might become a long debate. Be warned: I am under time constraints and might sit out whatever storm ensues.

Ellen,

Would that be according to your real options?

Michael

[Dragonfly]

I think that it MUST BE the case that there are real options, else knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is impossible. I think that where many accounts of determinism fall apart and result in contradiction is in their denying the existence of real options.

But what are really "real" options? If there is at any moment only one physically possible future, there is also only one "real" option. That doesn't make scientific knowledge impossible, certainly not! As we cannot predict our own thoughts, we cannot but think and act as if there are more options possible. There isn't any reason that a deterministic system would not be able to make valid inferences. The counterfactual options, that are not realized, have been used in the deterministic decision making process as theoretical variants. The process itself doesn't know what its decision will be, but ultimately it will arrive at one particular decision, and by definition that was the only real option, although the process (or we) didn't know that in advance.

[Mindy Newton]

Quote of Paul Mawdsley:

Science has done a wonderful job with local causation as its guide but the best I can gather is that we lack a mechanism for non-local causation. I have been playing around with a causal mechanism for nonlocal causation--i.e.: a physical mechanism that produces an effect on an entity's behaviour without acting on it with some type of force. In essence it works by the subtraction of force that is otherwise constant, or it can be stated positively as the change in the degrees of freedom available to an entities action potential.

Would dissipation of heat, by a heat-sink, be an example of "an effect on an entity's behavior without acting on it with some type of force?"

--Mindy

Edited August 21, 2008 by Mindy

[Ellen Stuttle]

I think that it MUST BE the case that there are real options, else knowledge, including scientific knowledge, is impossible. I think that where many accounts of determinism fall apart and result in contradiction is in their denying the existence of real options.

But what are really "real" options? If there is at any moment only one physically possible future, there is also only one "real" option. That doesn't make scientific knowledge impossible, certainly not! As we cannot predict our own thoughts, we cannot but think and act as if there are more options possible. There isn't any reason that a deterministic system would not be able to make valid inferences. The counterfactual options, that are not realized, have been used in the deterministic decision making process as theoretical variants. The process itself doesn't know what its decision will be, but ultimately it will arrive at one particular decision, and by definition that was the only real option, although the process (or we) didn't know that in advance.

DF, I'll answer your post because it cuts close to the core of the differences which I see between your and my views:

You might be right that "f there is at any moment only one physically possible future, there is also only one 'real' option." On this point, I remain unsure. (You're disagreeing with Dennett of course as well as with me if you hold that "determinism," defined as Dennett is defining it, means that there aren't real options.)

It's the epistemological point, however, on which we have the big problem. I see no way that any form of knowledge whatsoever would be possible without an assessing procedure -- which is part of a decision-making procedure -- being a real action sequence, not an illusory action sequence. You seem to think that the issue is our inability to predict the result. I agree that we can't predict the result. But there wouldn't be any process of trying to assess if we knew in advance what we'd conclude. The whole requirement of assessing what's true is because we don't know in advance what we'll conclude. That in the end we might arrive at a particular conclusion* doesn't mean that we don't engage in a real process attempting to know.

* (with some assessing processes, we go on and on asking further questions -- "In science the debate is never over," e.g., as Larry has quipped about the AGW debate)

Ellen

PS: I'm never quite sure if the divergence between you and me on this issue is one of language or if it's a genuine divergence.

___

[Dragonfly]

You might be right that "f there is at any moment only one physically possible future, there is also only one 'real' option." On this point, I remain unsure. (You're disagreeing with Dennett of course as well as with me if you hold that "determinism," defined as Dennett is defining it, means that there aren't real options.)

I don't think I'm really disagreeing with Dennett, it's more a semantic difference about the meaning of "real options". See also Freedom Evolves p.94, about Austin's example of missing a very short putt:

CONRAD [Dennett's critical alter ego]: ...Could Austin have made that very putt? And the answer to that question must be "no" in a deterministic world.

[Dennett:] Very well, if you insist. Maybe there is a sense of "possible" in which Austin could not possibly have made that very putt, if determinism is true. Now why on earth should we care about your question? Aside from idle metaphysical curiosity, what interest should we take in whether or not Austin could have made the putt in your sense?

In other words, the absence of real options in the strict sense is not relevant to our behavior in real life, where the different options are real enough to us.

It's the epistemological point, however, on which we have the big problem. I see no way that any form of knowledge whatsoever would be possible without an assessing procedure -- which is part of a decision-making procedure -- being a real action sequence, not an illusory action sequence. You seem to think that the issue is our inability to predict the result. I agree that we can't predict the result. But there wouldn't be any process of trying to assess if we knew in advance what we'd conclude. The whole requirement of assessing what's true is because we don't know in advance what we'll conclude. That in the end we might arrive at a particular conclusion* doesn't mean that we don't engage in a real process attempting to know.

But where is the problem? Why wouldn't a deterministic process be able to realize an assessing procedure or a decision-making procedure? Some of such procedures are already done by deterministic computers.

PS: I'm never quite sure if the divergence between you and me on this issue is one of language or if it's a genuine divergence.

There may be some semantic differences (as in the example by Dennett), but I think you'll finally arrive at the same conclusions as I. You just have to clear up some mental blocks.

[Paul Mawdsley]

There may be some semantic differences (as in the example by Dennett), but I think you'll finally arrive at the same conclusions as I. You just have to clear up some mental blocks.

Ellen,

I have to agree with Dragonfly. Based on the premises you have accepted, if you are to be consistent, you should arrive at the same conclusions.

I'm currently thinking of "volition," as I use the term, as a synonym for "will." I'm currently using as my working definition: "the effortful molding of action."

[...]

I tend to the opinion that if all factors are included, there is "only one physically possible future."

Are there experiences or assumptions on your part that do not fit with these premises? I find myself in disagreement with both. There is more to "volition" than "will," and causal processes include an ingredient that produces real novelty, not just unpredictability or non-computability. This real novelty built into physical (as opposed to non-physical, supernatural, ethereal, etc.) causation subtly shows its face on many levels, from physics to psychology.

I was reading Jung last night. In his essay, Psychology and Literature (from Modern Man in Search of a Soul, 1933), he says:

Any reaction to stimulus may be causally explained; but the creative act, which is the absolute antithesis of mere reaction, will forever elude human understanding. It can only be described in its manifestations; it can be obscurely sensed, but never wholly grasped.

I don't accept his pessimism regarding explanations of the creative act (or modeling a more complex causation in general) but I concur with the idea that human creativity (another part of volition-- along with assessing and will, and the development of an action skill-set including some novel skills) cannot be modeled by the same reactive causation that leads us to "only one physically possible future." Ironically, accounting for novelty requires more creativity in generating our models of causation.

Paul

[BaalChatzaf]

The fundamental action alternative for life/awareness is integration or disintegration; existence or non-existence. Can we physically/causally model an entity that acts to maintain (and increase the actualization of?) the integrity of its own existence in the context of local, linear causation, even with considerations of complexity? Or do we need to include non-local, non-linear causation and the part-whole reciprocal dynamics that this causation makes possible in our models? Also, can a purely reactive causation be used to build a model for such an entity that has the apparently proactive nature of life/awareness that reacts to its environment, not by being pushed by antecedent forces, but by processing meaning and striving to maintain integration?

Paul

Whatever model you propose it will be bounded and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics, in particular the second law of thermodyhnamics.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I don't accept his pessimism regarding explanations of the creative act (or modeling a more complex causation in general) but I concur with the idea that human creativity (another part of volition-- along with assessing and will, and the development of an action skill-set including some novel skills) cannot be modeled by the same reactive causation that leads us to "only one physically possible future." Ironically, accounting for novelty requires more creativity in generating our models of causation.

Paul,

This paragraph caused a coin to drop in my head. This is what bothers me about determinism. It is reactive only on a metaphysical level. I find the universe to be made up of action and reaction, with the cause of action coming from the top down and the cause of reaction coming from the bottom up.

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Whatever model you propose it will be bounded and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics, in particular the second law of thermodyhnamics.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Whatever causal model is proposed must ultimately explain why the laws of thermodynamics, as well as other physical laws,

exist and are universal. For causation to be of any value it must lead to an understanding of the mechanisms that underlie our observations, theories and laws of nature. It is the principle that guides us when we build "big pictures." If our "big pictures" do not account for everything, if they lead us to conclude that causality is an illusion, then we need to consider changing the causal principle that guides us to fit the facts. I think the big pictures guided by reactive causation don't fit the facts. This is why I am a "causality freak!"

Paul

[BaalChatzaf]

Whatever model you propose it will be bounded and constrained by the laws of thermodynamics, in particular the second law of thermodyhnamics.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Whatever causal model is proposed must ultimately explain why the laws of thermodynamics, as well as other physical laws,

exist and are universal. For causation to be of any value it must lead to an understanding of the mechanisms that underlie our observations, theories and laws of nature. It is the principle that guides us when we build "big pictures." If our "big pictures" do not account for everything, if they lead us to conclude that causality is an illusion, then we need to consider changing the causal principle that guides us to fit the facts. I think the big pictures guided by reactive causation don't fit the facts. This is why I am a "causality freak!"

Paul

I think you have a problem. Consider the sequence: A is caused by B is caused by C ... . Now, do we stop somewhere (say Z) or do we regress infinitely? If we stop at Z then Z is NOT explained. If we do not stop then we have an infinite regress which is bad news. Telling ourselves that the world is Turtles All The Way Down does not explain much.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Paul Mawdsley]

Would dissipation of heat, by a heat-sink, be an example of "an effect on an entity's behavior without acting on it with some type of force?"

Mindy,

Welcome to OL.

I had to look up what a heat-sink is. According to Wiki:

A heat sink (or heatsink) is an environment or object that absorbs and dissipates heat from another object using thermal contact (either direct or radiant).

[...]

Heat sinks function by efficiently transferring thermal energy ("heat") from an object at high temperature to a second object at a lower temperature with a much greater heat capacity. This rapid transfer of thermal energy quickly brings the first object into thermal equilibrium with the second, lowering the temperature of the first object, fulfilling the heat sink's role as a cooling device. Efficient function of a heat sink relies on rapid transfer of thermal energy from the first object to the heat sink, and the heat sink to the second object.

[...]

In common use, it is a metal object brought into contact with an electronic component's hot surface — though in most cases, a thin thermal interface material mediates between the two surfaces. Microprocessors and power handling semiconductors are examples of electronics that need a heat sink to reduce their temperature through increased thermal mass and heat dissipation (primarily by conduction and convection and to a lesser extent by radiation).

A heat sink transfers "thermal energy ("heat") from an object at high temperature to a second object at a lower temperature with a much greater heat capacity...primarily by conduction and convection and to a lesser extent by radiation." As causal processes conduction, convection and radiation proceed by linear, local interactions. Vibrating atoms transfer energy to other atoms (via conduction or convection) or to the EM field (via radiation) through the addition of physical forces to the medium.

An everyday example of non-local causation that "works by the subtraction of force that is otherwise constant" or by "the change in the degrees of freedom available to an entities action potential" can be found in any space with two doors. Consider a house with a front door and a back door, one of which is closed, but not latched, and the other is slightly ajar. If you close the door that is ajar, the air molecules in the house will have increased degrees of freedom (a relative vacuum) to move and will fill the void. Due to a constant force (air pressure), the air moves as a whole system to fill this void at one door and creates increased degrees of freedom (a relative vacuum) at the other door. This results in the closed door opening without an increase in force being applied to it. It opens because air pressure (i.e.: the tendency for the action of air molecules to fill in empty spaces and transfer kinetic energy to surfaces) which is otherwise constant is removed, and the unbalance in air pressure that results on the two sides of the door causes it to open.

Causally, the effect one door has on the other is non-local and nonlinear. There is no direct line of interactions that lead from one door to the other through the air molecules and the one door affects the other without the addition of a force. Two parts of a system interact causally, via the form of the whole system, without interacting locally and linearly with respect to the mechanics of causation-- i.e.: the action and interaction of the air molecules. Local interactions can cause non-local effects when they are part of a system that undergoes changes to the available degrees of freedom of the connecting medium.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

This paragraph caused a coin to drop in my head. This is what bothers me about determinism. It is reactive only on a metaphysical level. I find the universe to be made up of action and reaction, with the cause of action coming from the top down and the cause of reaction coming from the bottom up.

Michael,

I have a more detailed reply in my head but, in the interest of maintaining balance in my life, I don't have a lot of time to write.

When you distinguish action from reaction, how is action different? Would you say it is somehow proactive--i.e.: the principle of action lies within? I am not satisfied with causal dualism any more than substance dualism. If some actions seem to be proactive and some reactive, is there a way one category of behaviour can account for the existence of the other? Can a fundamentally proactive causation account for observed reactive phenomena where reactive causation does not seem to be able to account for proactive phenomena? That is, can your bottom-up reactions and top-down actions be accounted for with a common causal model?

Your top-down "cause of action" reminds me of David Bohm's causal interpretation of quantum theory with its idea of a pilot wave, that is shaped by the whole system, guiding a particle's intrinsic energy. I will make some time later to outline Bohm's novel approach to thinking about causation, its relation to interpreting quantum theory, and its relation to what you are saying.

Paul

Edited August 26, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[tjohnson]

This results in the closed door opening without an increase in force being applied to it. It opens because air pressure (i.e.: the tendency for the action of air molecules to fill in empty spaces and transfer kinetic energy to surfaces) which is otherwise constant is removed, and the unbalance in air pressure that results on the two sides of the door causes it to open.

Hmmm...seems to me that pressure and vacuum are two sides of the same coin, so to speak. When a wing generates lift is the air underneath the wing pushing it up or is the vacuum above lifting it. Six of one, half dozen of the other.

[Paul Mawdsley]

This results in the closed door opening without an increase in force being applied to it. It opens because air pressure (i.e.: the tendency for the action of air molecules to fill in empty spaces and transfer kinetic energy to surfaces) which is otherwise constant is removed, and the unbalance in air pressure that results on the two sides of the door causes it to open.

Hmmm...seems to me that pressure and vacuum are two sides of the same coin, so to speak. When a wing generates lift is the air underneath the wing pushing it up or is the vacuum above lifting it. Six of one, half dozen of the other.

I was thinking two sides of the same door.

Pressure is caused by the action of things in the context of reduced degrees of freedom. Vacuum is caused by the action of things in the context of increased degrees of freedom. Things in action tend toward lower pressure --i.e.: maximum degrees of freedom. This is generally associated with the idea of entropy. However, if the form of the whole system of which a thing is a part shapes the pattern of the degrees of freedom available to the action of the thing, it can increase order rather than increasing entropy. Existence becomes a balance and continual evolution between increasing order and increasing entropy. Causally, this could be considered one of the principles that gives rise to such increases in order as life and awareness.

Paul

PS- I remember being taught that the vacuum above the wing is responsible for most of the lift. I took some sort of bird course.

Edited August 27, 2008 by Paul Mawdsley

[Paul Mawdsley]

Question: Would the two doors in my post above be said to be classically entangled? Does a measurement of the spin of one cause the other to have the opposite spin? I guess it depends on which way the doors are hung.

[Paul Mawdsley]

GS,

I know your comment about a wing and lift was not intended to be taken so seriously but it sparked a line of thought for me. I decided to refamiliarize myself with the dynamics of lift. Here's what I found on "How Planes Fly":

So how does a thin wing divert so much air? When the air is bent around the top of the wing, it pulls on the air above it accelerating that air down, otherwise there would be voids in the air left above the wing. Air is pulled from above to prevent voids. This pulling causes the pressure to become lower above the wing. It is the acceleration of the air above the wing in the downward direction that gives lift.

It seems that the relative pressure difference between the air above and the air below the wing contributes somewhat to lift but the flow of air that is created by air rushing to fill the void from higher above the wing is responsible for most of the lift. The article speaks of it in terms of Newton's 3rd law but I tend to picture it in terms of systematic redistribution of air particles resulting in increased degrees of freedom above the wing. My picture is my tendency to illustrate reality causally in my imagination-- i.e.: in terms of the actions and interactions of physical things. It is my attempt to illustrate the underlying dynamics represented by Newton's 3rd law in this specific case.

This is different from the standard image of the 3rd law which sees an object react because another object has reduced its degrees of freedom to the point of forcing it to change its motion. It seems the 3rd law of motion can represent reactions caused by both a decrease and an increase in degrees of freedom for an entity. Physical laws may obscure our pictures of underlying causal dynamics when we label some category of phenomena and stop seeking greater underlying detail. For me, I don't feel I understand something in the physical world until I can picture the dynamics in terms of the actions and interactions of the physical components of the observed systems. Modern physics is at odds with this approach. I'm not convinced modern physics is right.

Paul

[tjohnson]

Interesting article. I think you could sum it up by saying that a certain amount of the air moving across the top of the wing is redirected downward and provides some upward thrust, normally called 'lift'.