Blame David Hume

[Nicholas Dykes]

He also seems to like the shock value of going against common sense and the obvious. But if you look behind the rhetoric and the words he chooses for his concepts and just focus on the concepts, you often find he says the same thing Objectivism does. Many Popperians die seven deaths on contemplating that fact (and many Objectivists also), but there it is. One day I intend to research this in depth and write about it.

There is a fundamental difference between Popper's view (and Hume's view) and my own (which I don't claim is the Objectivist view). In order for the the Induction Problem, as stated by Popper and Hume, to be a serious problem it is necessary to ignore the Law of Identity and its corollary, the Law of Causality. That, in turn, allows an equivocation which leads to an enormous amount of confusion.

First, let us consider the problem of the white swans. That is a typical example of where induction fails. In the problem, one supposedly sees a number of white swans (100 say) and from that concludes that all swans are white. To conclude such a thing is clearly a logical fallacy. Color is not an essential characteristic of a swan. If a bird with the essential characteristics of a swan that was not white was discovered, it would still be called a swan. Moreover, there is no causal link between any of the essential characteristics of a swan and its color. Therefore, there is no mechanism for predicting that a bird having the essential characteristics of a swan must have a certain color. There is no logical basis for concluding that all swans are white.

The mere repetition of the color white does not strengthen the basis for concluding that swans are white. Whether one had seen a single white swan or 100 white swans, there is no logical basis for concluding that all swans are white. Whiteness is not essential to swan-ness. It should also be noted that it is well known that many other animals come in a variety of colors. Consequently, it would seem rash to conclude that all swans are white. But, this is not really central to the argument. Until one has established that some characteristic is essential to the nature of a thing, there is no reason to believe that that characteristic is the same for all instances of that thing.

Now, compare the swan example with the case of the Sun rising in the morning. The fact that the Earth will continue to rotate on its axis is essentially connected to its fundamental nature as a planet moving through space. In order to see a prediction that the Sun will rise as a mere case of induction, one must first suspend one's knowledge of the nature of the Sun and Earth. One must pretend that they have no essential nature and that the Earth could stop rotating or fly off into space or disappear just as easily as one could find a black swan. Or, one must pretend that it is impossible to know anything or understand anything about anything.

The equivocation comes in equating an example in which a conclusion is fallaciously reached by looking only at the inessential characteristics of a thing and ignoring identity and causality and an example in which the conclusion is drawn by carefully examining the properties of the objects in question. This is exactly what Popper and Hume do. But, the Law of Identity is a fact of everything that exists. To posit an exception to it is to posit that the arbitrary is reality.

Darrell

What you say, Darrell, is both very true and very important.

I noticed the Hume/Popper failure to take account of the Law of Identity when I was studying Popper back in the 1990's and drew attention to it in my essay "A Tangled Web of Guesses: A Critical Assessment of the Philosophy of Karl Popper" (1996); and in my "Debunking Popper" (~Reason Papers~ #24, Fall 1999). I also revisit the issue in my recent philosophical novel ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~.

If you don't have a copy, it's well worth getting H.W.B. Joseph's ~An Introduction to Logic~ out of the library, for he, of course, solved Hume's imaginary 'problem of induction' in 1916 -- precisely by pointing out that Hume's argument was in 'flat conflict' with the Law of Identity. Joseph was, unsurprisingly, an Aristotelian. Secondhand copies of his book can usually be found in the Philosophy section at Booth Books in Hay-on-Wye if you'd like me to try and track one down for you. I go there frequently, it's only about 40 minutes from where I live.

The encyclopaedically well-read George H. Smith drew attention to Joseph in his 1991 collection ~Atheism, Ayn Rand and Other Heresies~ (p. 200). The latter is a really fun read. I would warmly recommend it for anyone wanting a light-hearted, less po-faced look at Objectivism. Nicholas Dykes

Edited August 21, 2008 by Nicholas Dykes

[Daniel Barnes]

In order for the the Induction Problem, as stated by Popper and Hume, to be a serious problem it is necessary to ignore the Law of Identity and its corollary, the Law of Causality.

In fact the Law of Identity is about as relevant to the problem of induction as a fish is to a bicycle.

Here's why: All the LOI states is that in order to exist, a thing has to have an identity.

The LOI is however entirely silent when it comes to what that identity is (that is, its nature), and its corollary is equally silent on how it behaves (that is, its causal relations).

Unfortunately for this line of argument, the what and how is exactly where Hume's problem begins.

Edited August 21, 2008 by Daniel Barnes

[tjohnson]

Now, compare the swan example with the case of the Sun rising in the morning. The fact that the Earth will continue to rotate on its axis is essentially connected to its fundamental nature as a planet moving through space. In order to see a prediction that the Sun will rise as a mere case of induction, one must first suspend one's knowledge of the nature of the Sun and Earth. One must pretend that they have no essential nature and that the Earth could stop rotating or fly off into space or disappear just as easily as one could find a black swan. Or, one must pretend that it is impossible to know anything or understand anything about anything.

I don't see any need to attribute a "fundamental nature" to a planet moving through space in order to arrive at the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow. If we accept that it has happened for billions of years then obviously we are dealing with a process that takes a long time and so it most likely will not end overnight. But like Bob says, we can expect it to end at some point in time and what does it's "essential nature" have to do with it? It's just part of a process like everything else.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I don't see any need to attribute a "fundamental nature" to a planet moving through space in order to arrive at the belief that the sun will rise tomorrow.

GS,

That's backwards if you do it right. You don't attribute fundamental nature to anything. The fundamental nature already exists independently of you. You merely identify it, and attribute concepts and words to it, for your own informational organization.

Some people try to attribute fundamental nature to reality with their minds, but they don't get very far...

Michael

[Nicholas Dykes]

In order for the the Induction Problem, as stated by Popper and Hume, to be a serious problem it is necessary to ignore the Law of Identity and its corollary, the Law of Causality.

In fact the Law of Identity is about as relevant to the problem of induction as a fish is to a bicycle.

Here's why: All the LOI states is that in order to exist, a thing has to have an identity.

The LOI is however entirely silent when it comes to what that identity is (that is, its nature), and its corollary is equally silent on how it behaves (that is, its causal relations).

Unfortunately for this line of argument, the what and how is exactly where Hume's problem begins.

Daniel, re your 3rd sentence, surely content is irrelevant to logic per se? A single negative instance invalidates a universal affirmative proposition regardless what the proposition asserts.

But please be kind enough to elaborate your last sentence, which rather leaves us dangling.

Nicholas Dykes

[tjohnson]

That's backwards if you do it right. You don't attribute fundamental nature to anything. The fundamental nature already exists independently of you. You merely identify it, and attribute concepts and words to it, for your own informational organization.

Science is about explaining "how things work" but objectivism seems to be about recognizing the "fundamental nature of things", so how to resolve these two viewpoints?

[merjet]

It has rained for four Tuesdays in a row. Therefore it will rain next Tuesday.

Now, this sounds absurd, but there is no logical difference between saying this and the sun has risen X times in the past, therefore it will rise tomorrow.

It is absurd. There have been thousands of Tuesdays when it hasn't rained. Since the sun and earth have existed, how many times has the sun not "risen"? Only somebody like Barnes ignores the difference.

The LOI is however entirely silent when it comes to what that identity is (that is, its nature), and its corollary is equally silent on how it behaves (that is, its causal relations).

Really? The nature of an egg says nothing about what will happen if you throw it against a brick wall?

[tjohnson]

I think this discussion boils down to this: Are the laws of nature discovered or formulated? I say this is a false dichotomy since the relationships are discovered empirically but formulated verbally so the answer is both.

[BaalChatzaf]

Really? The nature of an egg says nothing about what will happen if you throw it against a brick wall?

AOI says the egg shell is the egg shell. It does not say how brittle or strong it is (or isn't). That has to be established by observation. And even if every egg you have ever seen will break if dropped on a hard surface, that does not preclude the existence of an egg with a much tougher shell. It is not self evident that eggs break when dropped on or thrown against a a hard surface.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[merjet]

AOI says the egg shell is the egg shell. It does not say how brittle or strong it is (or isn't). That has to be established by observation.

I wasn't talking about a tautology, but the nature of an egg, which is established by observation.

And even if every egg you have ever seen will break if dropped on a hard surface, that does not preclude the existence of an egg with a much tougher shell. It is not self evident that eggs break when dropped on or thrown against a a hard surface.

What evidence do you have that a normal chicken egg dropped on concrete from a height of, say, 10 or more feet will not break? How much money would you be willing to bet it won't break?

[Daniel Barnes]

Really? The nature of an egg says nothing about what will happen if you throw it against a brick wall?

AOI says the egg shell is the egg shell. It does not say how brittle or strong it is (or isn't). That has to be established by observation. And even if every egg you have ever seen will break if dropped on a hard surface, that does not preclude the existence of an egg with a much tougher shell. It is not self evident that eggs break when dropped on or thrown against a a hard surface.

Ba'al Chatzaf

What Ba'al said.

And Nick, this is the elaboration you were looking for in my previous sentence.

[Nicholas Dykes]

Really? The nature of an egg says nothing about what will happen if you throw it against a brick wall?

AOI says the egg shell is the egg shell. It does not say how brittle or strong it is (or isn't). That has to be established by observation. And even if every egg you have ever seen will break if dropped on a hard surface, that does not preclude the existence of an egg with a much tougher shell. It is not self evident that eggs break when dropped on or thrown against a a hard surface.

Ba'al Chatzaf

What Ba'al said.

And Nick, this is the elaboration you were looking for in my previous sentence.

"The LOI is however entirely silent when it comes to what that identity is (that is, its nature), and its corollary is equally silent on how it behaves (that is, its causal relations).

"Unfortunately for this line of argument, the what and how is exactly where Hume's problem begins."

Sorry, Daniel, Ba'al's egg illustration doesn't elaborate what I was asking for, namely, where does Hume's problem begin for you? Hume based his argument on the fact that all knowledge is derived from experience. Hence he denied the predictability of future events -- because they had yet to be experienced. This appears to be a purely logical argument, it says nothing about any particular events, whether eggs breaking or billiard balls bouncing. Yet you say Hume's argument ~begins~ with the eggs and the billiard balls. Please explain. Nick

[BaalChatzaf]

Hume based his argument on the fact that all knowledge is derived from experience. Hence he denied the predictability of future events -- because they had yet to be experienced. This appears to be a purely logical argument, it says nothing about any particular events, whether eggs breaking or billiard balls bouncing. Yet you say Hume's argument ~begins~ with the eggs and the billiard balls. Please explain. Nick

Predictions abound, but are not guaranteed to be the case. The history of physical science is laden with busted theories. How is a theory broken? When at least one of its predictions is falsified empirically. All it takes is just one experiment to show that a theory does not make always predict correctly.

So the rule is simple. As long as a theory works use it. When it breaks, fix it or throw it away and make a better theory.

It is basically like learning. We learn through induction. We formulate rules that guide our future behavior. When the rule does not always work we modify. So induction plus learning through failure is how we progress.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dragonfly]

In fact the Law of Identity is about as relevant to the problem of induction as a fish is to a bicycle.

The law of identity is never relevant in philosophical arguments as no one denies that law, and claims that someone violates that law in an argument are mere Objectivist rhetoric and cannot be proved.

[Daniel Barnes]

Sorry, Daniel, Ba'al's egg illustration doesn't elaborate what I was asking for, namely, where does Hume's problem begin for you? Hume based his argument on the fact that all knowledge is derived from experience. Hence he denied the predictability of future events -- because they had yet to be experienced. This appears to be a purely logical argument, it says nothing about any particular events, whether eggs breaking or billiard balls bouncing. Yet you say Hume's argument ~begins~ with the eggs and the billiard balls. Please explain. Nick

Hi Nick

I am puzzled. Do you disagree with the purely logical situation as outlined by Hume? For Hume's problem doesn't mean that things don't have identity; merely that our knowledge of that identity cannot be certain.

Thus there is an obvious distinction to be made between:

1) The identity of a thing

and

2) Our knowledge of that identity

This is the point at which Hume's logical problem begins AFAICS.

For as most here seem to agree, it is simply illogical to conclude that all eggs break on impact with concrete from the fact that you have seen X number of them do so. Same with sunrises. Thus, our theories as to what an egg is, its identity (for example, our expectations of how it will behave in certain situations such as in collision with concrete) are illogical if we hold them with certainty.

This is quite different from merely asserting that something has an identity, which is all the LOI does. However, Popper's point is that if we hold these expectations as to what this identity consists of merely hypothetically, leaving them open to be overthrown by conflicting experience, then there is no logical problem.

But you know this already I assume, so I am not sure why you are asking me to explain.

PS: My turn to ask you a question. Did you see the query I put to you on this thread??

[Nicholas Dykes]

Sorry, Daniel, Ba'al's egg illustration doesn't elaborate what I was asking for, namely, where does Hume's problem begin for you? Hume based his argument on the fact that all knowledge is derived from experience. Hence he denied the predictability of future events -- because they had yet to be experienced. This appears to be a purely logical argument, it says nothing about any particular events, whether eggs breaking or billiard balls bouncing. Yet you say Hume's argument ~begins~ with the eggs and the billiard balls. Please explain. Nick

Hi Nick

I am puzzled. Do you disagree with the purely logical situation as outlined by Hume? For Hume's problem doesn't mean that things don't have identity; merely that our knowledge of that identity cannot be certain.

Thus there is an obvious distinction to be made between:

1) The identity of a thing

and

2) Our knowledge of that identity

This is the point at which Hume's logical problem begins AFAICS.

For as most here seem to agree, it is simply illogical to conclude that all eggs break on impact with concrete from the fact that you have seen X number of them do so. Same with sunrises. Thus, our theories as to what an egg is, its identity (for example, our expectations of how it will behave in certain situations such as in collision with concrete) are illogical if we hold them with certainty.

This is quite different from merely asserting that something has an identity, which is all the LOI does. However, Popper's point is that if we hold these expectations as to what this identity consists of merely hypothetically, leaving them open to be overthrown by conflicting experience, then there is no logical problem.

But you know this already I assume, so I am not sure why you are asking me to explain.

PS: My turn to ask you a question. Did you see the query I put to you on this thread??

Yes, Daniel, I saw it, but it required rereading my essay and rereading Popper's chapter too. Sorry, I should perhaps have told you that I'm kinda busy right now, and don't have time to do that, though my recollection of Popper's bilious and unscholarly rant appears rather different from yours, but then, I last read it 15 years ago. However, I've created a file and a reminder to have a look back over it. But don't hold your breath.

You did say, "There is no way of logically deciding a definition is true or false." I don't know why you put 'logically' in there. Suppose I say, 'an orange is a fruit, it grows on tress, and, depending on variety, it's roundish, yellowish, sweetish and consists of an outer skin with an inner core in segments.' What has ~logic~ got to do with deciding whether that definition is true or false? One would simply examine oranges and decide if the definition was accurate. If I had said 'all oranges are sweet' you might triumphantly have produced a Seville orange (the black swan of the orange world), in which case I would have gracefully acknowledged that I had been mistaken, because I know that negative instances contradict universal affirmative propositions. Seville oranges are sour. That's where ~logic~ comes in.

The problem with Popper, as with Hume, and with Popperians generally, is that they are sceptics who deny the possibility of certain human knowledge. You present them with a lump hammer and say 'hit your thumb with it,' and they reply, 'just because every known instance of belting your thumb with a hammer has resulted in pain does not mean that if I thwack my thumb with this hammer pain will result.' Talk about LOL. If that's what Popperians call logic, good luck to them.

The point is that the ~nature~ of a normal thumb -- one allows for birth defects, anaesthesia, etc -- is such that if it is struck with a heavy object, such as a hammer, it's owner will experience pain. And that is certain. Try it.

As to your post above, you say,

"...there is an obvious distinction to be made between: 1) The identity of a thing, and, 2) Our knowledge of that identity."

Yes, but so what? There's a distinction between my knowledge of oranges and the identity of Seville oranges. (I know, I learned the hard way, when young.) It is only by our ~observation~ of things that we establish the ~identity~ of things. All knowledge is indeed based on experience. Identity is something we discover. Dr Johnson knew that if he

struck his thumb with a hammer it would hurt, even though he was entirely ignorant of the 20th century discoveries of Melzack and Wall about pain. Johnson's knowledge was primitive, but it was still ~knowledge~. Concepts are open-ended, knowledge grows. And, contrary to Popper's oft-repeated aphorism, we absolutely ~do~ know what we are talking about when we say 'hitting your thumb with a hammer hurts.'

"Popper's point is that if we hold these expectations as to what this identity consists of merely hypothetically, leaving them open to be overthrown by conflicting experience, then there is no logical problem."

That doesn't sound very like Popper. Do you have a citation for it?

It's half past midnight here, too late for this really. Goodnight. Nick

[Daniel Barnes]

You did say, "There is no way of logically deciding a definition is true or false." I don't know why you put 'logically' in there.

It was in reference to the defective Randian claim that "The truth or falsehood of all of man’s conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions."

I put it there to distinguish Rand's use of "truth" from meaning conventionally true. Recall that Rand derides the idea that meanings of words are simply conventions. Recall she also claims that "The fundamental concept of method, the one on which all the others depend, is logic." Thus she is suggesting that definitions can, and indeed must, be logically decided as to their truth or falsity.

But there is no way of doing this. It does not work as advertised...;-)

Suppose I say, 'an orange is a fruit, it grows on tress, and, depending on variety, it's roundish, yellowish, sweetish and consists of an outer skin with an inner core in segments.' What has ~logic~ got to do with deciding whether that definition is true or false?

Precisely my point.

The problem with Popper, as with Hume, and with Popperians generally, is that they are sceptics who deny the possibility of certain human knowledge. You present them with a lump hammer and say 'hit your thumb with it,' and they reply, 'just because every known instance of belting your thumb with a hammer has resulted in pain does not mean that if I thwack my thumb with this hammer pain will result.' Talk about LOL. If that's what Popperians call logic, good luck to them.

Popperians have no special meaning for logic. We use the same meaning as most logicians. Objectivists, however, do have their own special meaning.

Concepts are open-ended, knowledge grows.

I do not see any basic conflict between this and Popper's position, other than that Rand insists on self-contradictory jargon about "contextual certainty." This amounts to saying all our present knowledge is uncertain. The irony is that she so violently attacks the very position she unwittingly holds!

Popper's point is that if we hold these expectations as to what this identity consists of merely hypothetically, leaving them open to be overthrown by conflicting experience, then there is no logical problem.

That doesn't sound very like Popper. Do you have a citation for it?

It's paraphrased from Objective Knowledge, I will supply a ref later. I am surprised you don't think it sounds like him, I can't see what is unusual about it.

It's half past midnight here, too late for this really. Goodnight. Nick

Good morning!..;-)

Edited August 22, 2008 by Daniel Barnes

[tjohnson]

Suppose I say, 'an orange is a fruit, it grows on tress, and, depending on variety, it's roundish, yellowish, sweetish and consists of an outer skin with an inner core in segments.' What has ~logic~ got to do with deciding whether that definition is true or false? One would simply examine oranges and decide if the definition was accurate.

Wait a second, if I was using your definition of oranges to go and examine them then of course I will look for things that have the characteristics included in your definition. If I come back and say I found this orange which is different from your definition then it isn't a orange then is it??

[Mindy Newton]

Had David Hume not lived, it is very likely that Kant, The Evil One, would be more than a minor footnote in the history of philosophy. So why not blame Hume?

I've long argued this very point, and now consider the answer rather simple: Rand just doesn't know what she's talking about. She hasn't studied Hume or Kant in any detail, and doesn't really know - or want to know - the main problems involved that these men were wrestling with. Recall in the ITOE (p304-5) what she called "the big question of induction" - the problem central to Hume's critique, and therefore Kant's - she admits she "couldn't even begin to discuss - because...I haven't worked on that subject enough to even begin to formulate it...". That's right: for all her overwrought invective aimed at Hume in her writings, she can't even begin to formulate a response to what is considered his central question! Further, with breathtaking naivety she adds "...it would take an accomplished scientist in a given field to illustrate the whole process [of induction] in that field." Rand doesn't seem to realise the problem of induction is a logical problem, not something "a scientist in a given field" can "illustrate the whole process in that field." With that in mind, what more do you need to know about Rand vs Hume - and by extension, Rand vs Kant?

Let me try to defend Rand on this one. Kant's reaction to Hume was shock that religious beliefs had no claim to being reasonable on Hume's terms. He set out to do what was necessary to defend religious beliefs, and he ended up discrediting human cognition and cloaking reality itself in the process. Hume didn't aim at what Kant "achieved." I think Rand was entirely correct in pointing to Kant as a destroyer. The effects of his thought support her unequivocally.

--Mindy

[Daniel Barnes]

Kant's reaction to Hume was shock that religious beliefs had no claim to being reasonable on Hume's terms.

Sez you...;-) There's a very well argued case that Kant was coming to the defence of Newton, for example.

You would be better to address the point at issue, Mindy, which is not "Is Kant evil?", but "why do Objectivists obsess about Kant when it was Hume that set Kant off in the first place?"

My answer to that question is that Rand simply did not understand Hume's problem. Conveniently we have her own testimony to this fact, which one would think would settle the issue. This does raise, however, a second question which is: if Rand didn't understand Hume, how could she be relied on in her judgement of Kant?

[BaalChatzaf]

H.W.B Joseph solved Hume's 'problem of induction' in 1916 in his ~Introduction to Logic~. I pointed this out in two essays on Popper (1996 & 1999) and reiterate it in my recent book ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. Blatant plug? Absolutely!

Nicholas Dykes

There is no "problem of induction". Induction is a heuristic for making generalizations from specific instances. It is NOT a generally valid mode of inference. There is no guarantee that generalizations that flow from instances by induction will be true for all times, places and conditions.

Is there a "problem of boiling". We can't make toast by boiling stuff in hot water.

Is there a "problem of walking"? We can't get to the moon on foot.

So what is the problem of induction?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Darrell Hougen]

Now go to Humes example about sun rises. Someday the sun (most likely) will become a red giant and vaporize the earth. Then there will be no more sunrises. Five billion years of sunrises cannot guarantee the sun will always rise.

Exactly true. Induction is not a valid form of reasoning. But, no one said that the sun will always rise. The only assertion was that the sun will rise tomorrow.

Evidently you think that you know something about the nature of the sun if you are willing to predict that the sun will probably become a red giant in five billion years. That's quite an extrapolation. But Hume says that not only are we not allowed to extrapolate five billion years into the future, we can't even extrapolate until tomorrow. His conclusion is based on the false assumption that our knowledge and hence our predictions are based on induction (which, as we have seen, is an invalid form of reasoning).

Darrell

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Darrell,

Induction most certainly is a valid form of reasoning. Since when is establishing categories not validly rational?

I do wish some terms would get defined.

Induction is not a valid form of deduction. I can go that far. I cannot go so far as to claim that deduction is the only valid form of reasoning.

Michael

[Darrell Hougen]

Now go to Hume's example about sun rises.

Ba'al, perhaps we could try an even simpler example:

It has rained for four Tuesdays in a row. Therefore it will rain next Tuesday.

Now, this sounds absurd, but there is no logical difference between saying this and the sun has risen X times in the past, therefore it will rise tomorrow.

This is true as stated but rests upon the false assumption that the conclusion that the sun will rise tomorrow is based on induction.

Darrell has already agreed with Hume's logical argument. From there, I think he has then mistakenly ended up in a simple petitio, in that he claims prior "understanding" despite the fact the whole point of debate is how "understanding" came about in the first place.

Let's try a simple example. I watch a game of pool (billiards). I notice that the cue ball strikes one of the other balls and that the other ball moves. I can see that the only thing moving in the vicinity of the other ball is the cue ball. Therefore, I conclude that the other ball moved because it was struck by the cue ball. The conclusion is that if a billiard ball is struck by the another ball, it will move. This is a universally quantified statement that I know is true under the conditions under which I observed the event.

Of course, I might, on occasion, be fooled by some cheap parlor trick, but, in general, I simply deduce the relationships between things in the world by observing them. I don't need to observe each event multiple times in order to understand it. It is sufficient to observe it once in order to deduce the principle involved.

The only exception to the above rule occurs when there are multiple factors involved in a particular kind of process. In this case, I may need to observe the process several times in order to deduce, by process of elimination, which factor or factors are related to the process and what those relationships are. If it is a scientific experiment, I may try to hold some factors constant in order to simplify the problem. However, even if I cannot hold any factors constant, I may be able to deduce, by observing the varying strengths of the factors involved, which are really the causes of the event and which are non-causal factors or additional results of the causal factors.

Of course, many things in the real world are complex and therefore must be observed under a number of conditions in order to understand their nature. This may give rise to the appearance that the process involved in understanding them is inductive in nature. But, as we have seen, the process of understanding is really deductive in character. Our confidence is built up not by mere repetition, but through the knowledge that we have properly accounted for every important factor involved.

Sometimes, scientific theories (and other conclusions) must be revisited later, not because they were derived by invalid methods, but because some factor was neglected. In particular, if the conditions under which the experiment is performed are varied greatly from the conditions in use originally, additional factors affecting the nature of the process may be discovered. This does not affect the validity of the original conclusions under the original conditions. The original conclusions are still a valid approximation. It merely points out the danger of extrapolation to conditions very different from those in existence when the original experiment was performed.

Darrell

Edited August 22, 2008 by Darrell Hougen

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Whenever this problem of induction comes up, I know it's a cheap shot, but the itch gets to me.

We KNOW that falsifiability has worked perfectly in the past, but if all goes according to "problem of induction" standard, that says nothing about it working in the future. Who knows? It might not work tomorrow. Right?

Michael