A Few Kant Quotes

[Paul Mawdsley]

Paul,

I STRONGLY recommend you looking into holons.

Michael

Michael, you seem to be hinting at something I can't quite grasp. Could you be a little more expressive and assertive?

Michael, I was kidding but thanks. I was reading the Wiki article while you were posting. One of the links at the bottom of the article was to "David Bohm," who's ideas I've spent some time pondering over. A universe built from complex systems upon complex systems is something I've written about before. As you seemed to guess, it's right up my alley.

I still wonder whether the ideas of physical extension (in 3 dimensional space and through time) and embodied actions (as opposed to disembodied actions) are considered to be an important part of holonic model building. If they are not, the same old problems of dualism will remain in the mix.

Paul

[kiaer.ts]

Paul, have you read Stuart Kauffman's Origins of Order?

[Paul Mawdsley]

Paul, have you read Stuart Kauffman's Origins of Order?

I just read a little about it on Amazon. Being somewhat obsessed with questions about the nature of causality, evolution theory is one of my areas of interest. Chaos and complexity theory are another. I've wanted to find a book that takes evolution theory to a higher level of causal complexity.

Thanks again Ted.

Paul

[kiaer.ts]

Oh, I'd also most strongly recommend Isabel Paterson's God of the Machine, probably the best all-round (i.e, style & content) non-fiction book of the 20th Century. I see you know how to find amazon, so I'll refer you there. This and Kauffman are worth 100 OPAR's. If you are interested in Biology you might also want to check out Ernst Mayr's Toward a New Philosophy of Biology: Observations of an Evolutionist and his The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance these are not so speculative, but are highly rigorous. Aristotle comes in for some drubbing, but as a bad influence as an "authority." Indeed, Mayr is an Aristotelian in the Randian sense.

[tjohnson]

Thomas,

I'm still not clear on the meaning of "orders of abstraction." What are orders of abstraction? Does it have to do with the level of abstractness: perceptions being more concretely identified and neutrinos being identified through abstract modeling? Are "confusions" then a matter of assuming one's abstract models have an equal epistemic status to perceptions? Thus, creating a sense of certainty where there is only illusion or delusion.

I think this is a fairly good description of what I'm referring to. Korzybski considers perceptions, feelings, imagining, etc. lower order abstractions and language to be composed of higher order abstractions. If you evaluate a higher order abstraction as if it were a lower order abstraction then you confuse the two. A simple example would be having a very strong belief in God, to the point where you forget that "God" refers to a postulational entity. In extreme cases it can lead to delusions and even hallucinations.

[Newberry]

MSK:

Now the problem with communicating an inner mental state is that it is not sensed with eyes, yet a painting is. But there are connections between sensing a mental state and sensing light. Some forms and color combinations help trigger certain mental states, so a mix between the two is really what is sought. These triggers are actually part of the abstract artist's palatte (the good ones, that is). To be fair, they are also part of the part of any good artist's palatte, but the abstract artist usually puts more emphasis on them (as opposed to, say, forms of entities) because they help trigger the actual subject of his painting (the mental state).

In one way you might say that abstract painters are specialists--like a philosopher who focuses on internal logic but excludes perception.

About the translation of senses, Synesthesia, it occurs in 1 out of 1000 people accordingly to http://www.scientificpsychic.com/workbook/chapter2.htm. On a daily basis I use combination of tools when I work with color: a part how light/color works from direct observation; a part how light/color works from theory; a part how forms and light/color interact; a part how light/color and space interact; and a part how light/colors match my emotional state at the time.

Because abstract art doesn't included objects that we see in reality, it delimits itself more than representational art. The following will give you some idea of similarities and differences.

Abstract Art:

Mood

Tone

Balance

Gesture

Composition

Texture

Color Harmony

Synesthesia

Space

Abstract Forms

Representational Art:

Mood

Tone

Balance

Gesture

Composition

Texture

Color Harmony

Synesthesia

Space

Forms of Things

Laws of Perspective

Proportion of known things

Anatomy

Spatial Relationships

Abstraction of units

Abstract of forms of things

Abstraction of light and shadow.

Light

Details of things

Psychological expressions of the subject (the expression on a painted face)

Color as it pertains to: light, shadow, real surfaces like skin, wood, water, glass, trees, metals, etc. And color as pertains to space.

2D representational art subsumes everything that is possible to the visual artist, abstract art is more limited. [Edit: I am using 2d art and visual artist in the sense of painting and painter.] This makes representational art more complex, demanding, requiring a great deal of knowledge of introspection and external perceptions. Because of its expansive scope of tools it allows for more to go wrong, but in the right hands, it allows for a greater freedom of expression.

Edited August 3, 2008 by Newberry

[BaalChatzaf]

Michael,

Minds are non-physical entities with disembodied actions. I think assuming the mind is an entity is a category mistake. It is assuming a particular category of phenomena are actions caused by a thing called 'mind.' This is misleading to our investigations into the realm of inner experience. It is also the door to interpreting the world through a lens that includes things without physical extension: a world filled with disembodied minds and gods and ghosts.

Although it may apply in common usage, it is far better to drop the label of mind when thinking metaphysically. There are physiological components of the brain that have specific identities, that act and interact in certain ways. The nature of these physical entities, and their corresponding actions, parallel the nature of the components of the psyche, and its corresponding actions. The mind, as such, does not exist. Physical entities acting and interacting are what exists. We have a unique perspective of these entities in action when we observe them introspectively, but we should not make the mistake of assuming that the net effect of things acting and interacting is a thing like other things. These interactions may create a system through their integrated actions but they do not create a metaphysical entity.

This one category error has led to an enormous amount of mistaken metaphysics. Stay with the idea that to be a metaphysical entity requires physical extension (occupied 3 dimensional space through time) and actions require something physical that acts, and this error is avoided.

Paul

Minds are physical effects from physical causes. Everything that exists is physical either as a primordial entity or an effect of physical causes.

Mind is what your brain does. It is not a separate and self-standing object.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[kiaer.ts]

Michael, I have a very minor form of what I have heard referred to as synesthesia, where I associate numbers and letters with colors. I cannot say that I percieve colors simply because I hear a number spoken, but rather if I close my eyes and imagine a single digit it will have a consistent "default" color. I suspect this is an association from early schooling. (I have had full synesthetic effects when using ololiuqui.) What do you know of such minor synesthetic effects? Are you more profoundly synesthetic? I saw a show on "the real superhumans" where synesthetes compared notes. The show skirted whether synesthestic associations were individual or common. I got the impression that each person's associations were subjective, even if certain themes (dark colors with low tones) were common.

[Jonathan]

In one way you might say that abstract painters are specialists--like a philosopher who focuses on internal logic but excludes perception.

Or like people who want to talk about aesthetics but don't deal with the issue that music and architecture "exclude perception" just as much as abstract visual art does.

Because abstract art doesn't included objects that we see in reality, it delimits itself more than representational art. The following will give you some idea of similarities and differences.

Abstract Art:

Mood

Tone

Balance

Gesture

Composition

Texture

Color Harmony

Synesthesia

Space

Abstract Forms

Representational Art:

Mood

Tone

Balance

Gesture

Composition

Texture

Color Harmony

Synesthesia

Space

Forms of Things

Laws of Perspective

Proportion of known things

Anatomy

Spatial Relationships

Abstraction of units

Abstract of forms of things

Abstraction of light and shadow.

Light

Details of things

Psychological expressions of the subject (the expression on a painted face)

Color as it pertains to: light, shadow, real surfaces like skin, wood, water, glass, trees, metals, etc. And color as pertains to space.

I'd add clothing to the list. The form and color of clothing can add a lot of expression to a painting, but some artists chose to avoid taking advantage of it in many of their works. That and realistic environments. Architecture and decor can add to the personality of the characters in a painting, yet some artists choose to paint environments that are sort of blank, staged settings -- more like an arranged still life setting than a realistic living environment. Perhaps an artist who paints nudes leaping through empty space or posing while standing or leaning against undecorated, undifferentiated surface planes does so because he thinks that including clothing and realistic, detailed environments would detract from the expressiveness of the figures, much in the same way that an abstract artist might feel that direct mimesis would detract from the expressive power of his compositions.

2D representational art subsumes everything that is possible to the visual artist, abstract art is more limited. This makes representational art more complex, demanding, requiring a great deal of knowledge of introspection and external perceptions. Because of its expansive scope of tools it allows for more to go wrong, but in the right hands, it allows for a greater freedom of expression.

2D representational art doesn't quite subsume "everything" that is possible to the visual artist. Movie-making/animation subsumes even more, and is therefore the highest art form because, in the right hands, it allows for the greatest freedom of expression. It can combine everything that Michael listed above, along with the element of time, as well as the inclusion of plot, character development, music, and, in today's world, practically unlimited visual special effects. In comparison, painting is so very, very limited and, well, stunted and nearly expressionless. Add 3D glasses to the mix, and movies make paintings look quite antiquated and inadequate.

And there are similar comparisons that we could make. Why write (or read) a poem when a novel allows for the inclusion of so many more expressive options?

Why create or listen to music which doesn't include voice and lyrics? Music is so limited without words.

Why not use instruments to mimic the sounds of things in reality instead of creating mere abstract patterns of sounds? If fact, shouldn't rational, Objectivist composers be doing so already since it would be the quickest way to achieve the Objectivist dream of establishing a "conceptual language" of music? (I image the percussion section making sounds that very closely resemble light footsteps shuffling along, then the creaking of a door opening. Suddenly the trombones join in with the timpani to create the sound of a motor approaching. The footsteps move toward the motor. Hey, it's a person getting into a car that has pulled up to meet him! But wait, what's that sound in the distance? Oh my gosh, it's a siren, played by a clarinet. Let's get out of here, it's the cops! The trombone/timpani engine revs and the piccolos combine with the trumpets to make the sound of tires burning out...What an improvement it would be if music was so objective and mimetic!)

J

[Dragonfly]

LOL. That reminds me of Richard Strauss, who claimed that he could depict a glass of beer in music so accurately that the listener could tell whether it was a Pilsener or a Kulmbacher.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

2D representational art subsumes everything that is possible to the visual artist, abstract art is more limited. This makes representational art more complex, demanding, requiring a great deal of knowledge of introspection and external perceptions. Because of its expansive scope of tools it allows for more to go wrong, but in the right hands, it allows for a greater freedom of expression.

Michael,

I have no problem with this kind of thinking. If you choose a form because you want "a greater freedom of expression," I am all for that. One person writes a novel and another writes a poem. The novel as a form obviously provides "a greater freedom of expression" simply because it can include poems (if for no other reason).

The weakness of making a competition between art forms in order to insinuate that one is superior to the other, however, is what Jonathan mentioned. If you really want to "subsume everything," you have to include time, plot, etc. Cinema does that. So by this standard (if used alone), motion pictures is a far superior art form to 2D representational art. Just like the novel would be a far superior art form to a poem. So if you truly want to be superior, you should make movies, not paintings.

I do not think like this. I find it to be oversimplified. (Incidentally, cartoons would be an even higher art form if we eliminate photographing real things. )

To be clearer, there is nothing wrong with this standard qua standard, and a good artist will decide if he needs a certain form to get an inner vision out. Just like a good consumer will decide how broad he wants to contemplate the universe at that time. But there is a problem with scope if this standard is to be used to be all inclusive. Smaller breadth art forms can be just as intense as larger ones, and larger ones can be just as poor as smaller ones. If what you want at the time is a delicate wine so you can savor the taste and aroma, why do you have to eat a full banquet? And what do you prefer, anyway, a vintage wine or a banquet of poor food? Quality is not included in that standard of superiority.

I do agree with the limitations of abstract art. (I believe it taps into time better by inducing daydreaming more easily than representational art, but that's just a quibble).

What I object to is the condemnation of abstract art as a medium and the claim that it can only represent evil. It may be a limited art form, but the form itself does not come with an intrinsic value judgment built in.

If one wants to preach that, there is quite a burden of proof that needs to be elaborated and it should probably start with man's nature and epistemology. In fact, this is what I have been looking at for a few years now and I have not found intrinsic evil at all. I have simply found a legitimate, albeit limited, art form.

I will grant you that when a person such as an abstract artist bears witness to something he observed that cannot be verified by others (his own mental states), except by the viewers looking inside themselves to see if they find anything similar, this creates an enormous chance for charlatans to step in. I see a lot of faking going on in abstract art. (I suspect this is true of post-modern art, also, although I am simply not all that familiar with post-modern art, except for a few high-profile works, some of which I found slightly interesting, but most of which I found silly or disgusting, and none of which I found moving except for causing me to laugh at the jokes or silliness).

In a sense, recognizing good abstract art calls on a person to be strictly honest with himself on a pre-conceptual level and admit when he is moved or elated or not affected or revolted or induced to enter a certain mental state, rather than force on his emotions what he thinks he should feel. (This same standard applies to representational, obviously.)

To be blunt, I read a lot of abstract art bashing (but not from you, though) that seems more like aping Rand than giving a report based on a true attempt to understand the form. I see no difference in using ones mind between these ape-Rand people and a charlatan abstract artist who throws any old thing on a canvas and says he is creating art and hopes he can get away with it. They are both faking it and not using their own minds.

Give me a person who says, "I just don't understand it," any day over one who makes false claims, such as an art form is intrinsically evil. The person using his mind and reporting it can legitimately say he places no value on the form. One cannot evaluate (love or hate) what one does not understand.

This is a point where I have an enormous difference with Rand's thinking. The problem, once again, is not the standard she used, but the scope of application. One caveat. I believe she is one of the few who actually used her own mind in bashing the art form as evil. (It actually can express evil in the right hands.) However, she misfired on the scope.

Her apers do not use her standard, only her scope. They use her pre-packaged evaluations and apply them to everything. (I know because I used to do this.)

This is a premise I have been checking and these conclusions come from the best thinking I can muster from my own observations.

Michael

[Newberry]

MSK:

The weakness of making a competition between art forms in order to insinuate that one is superior to the other, however, is what Jonathan mentioned

But I have been talking about painting. I have never discussed, nor implied a competition between major art forms in my entire life.

Edited August 3, 2008 by Newberry

[Newberry]

MSK:

I do agree with the limitations of abstract art.

Glad you agree.

[Newberry]

Michael, I have a very minor form of what I have heard referred to as synesthesia, where I associate numbers and letters with colors. I cannot say that I percieve colors simply because I hear a number spoken, but rather if I close my eyes and imagine a single digit it will have a consistent "default" color. I suspect this is an association from early schooling. (I have had full synesthetic effects when using ololiuqui.) What do you know of such minor synesthetic effects? Are you more profoundly synesthetic? I saw a show on "the real superhumans" where synesthetes compared notes. The show skirted whether synesthestic associations were individual or common. I got the impression that each person's associations were subjective, even if certain themes (dark colors with low tones) were common.

Hey Ted,

Yes I think it is kind of fascinating tool, but totally subjective. Every mark of color for my painting Artemis was mixed to feel like how certain different chocolates taste; but also integrated to the light, form, movement in the painting. It was fun for me to do, but if I didn't mention it, no one would ever be able guess that by looking at the painting--no matter how sensitive they were. But it is a real part of art, perhaps exclusive to the creator? You associate connections by sensations they evoke.

I think it is also a fun part of responding to art; what kinds of feelings do the colors, elements, subject make you feel. But critics that express their certainty about the quality of the art based on feelings or taste, Robert Hughes for example, leave a lot to be desired.

Michael

Edited August 3, 2008 by Newberry

[Ellen Stuttle]

In science what you can state is that you have no evidence that something [Edit: meaning by "something" some particular something X] exists, therefore you'll proceed on the assumption that it [X] doesn't exist until and unless evidence of its existence turns up. The feature of your formulations which especially strikes me as odd coming from a scientist is that you're the one who's proclaiming certainty while declaiming in your subsequent reply to Roger (post #265) that:

"Certainty is for the charlatans."

I'm not proclaiming certainty. Scientific statements are never certain, but that doesn't mean that we shouldn't make them. It is in mathematics that you cannot state that something is true only while you haven't found yet evidence that falsifies the statement. For example, not finding a counterexample to Goldbach's conjecture doesn't allow us to claim that the Goldberg conjecture is true, it remains a conjecture. That's the essential difference between mathematics and physics, or between analytical statements and synthetic statements.

This side topic has been unexpectedly informative in regard to what has often seemed to me the peculiar similarity between your views on scientific epistemology and Leonard Peikoff's "contextual certainty." I describe the similarity as "peculiar," since I think that the sources of your and Peikoff's respective views are different, and that neither of you would agree with the sources of the other's views. Further, I describe the similarity as one which has "often seemed to me" to exist, since it's hard for me to be sure of what you're saying, given that you have ways of expressing your points in English which I think don't convey what you mean.

To take one example from just the above post -- there are a couple other examples even in that short paragraph, but I'll select just one -- you write:

"It is in mathematics that you cannot state that something is true only while you haven't found yet evidence that falsifies the statement."

The obverse of this claim would be that in mathematics a statement can be considered true "while" you have found evidence that falsifies the statement. But I much doubt that you mean that!

Also: Did you mean the implication that the idea of "falsifying" a theory applies in mathematics? I would say that it doesn't apply in mathematics, because in mathematics, unlike in science, it's possible, precisely, to prove or disprove whether such and so results follow from stipulated starting definitions and axioms. The proof-or-disproof procedure might in some cases involve great difficulty, due to a long and/or complex chain of reasoning being involved; but in principle definitive proof or disproof is possible in mathematics. Since mathematics is propositional-deductive, its conclusions are ascertainable on logical grounds.

In science, by contrast, one has to go find out if the results predicted from theories match observations. Science is evidential; its predictions have to be tested to see if they obtain or not. Thus a result of testing (not necessarily by experimental means, but at least by systematic observation) which is different from the anticipated result is considered a falsifying instance (unless it can be accounted for as observational error, or as allowable anomaly, or as a special circumstance subsumable under the theory). So I have to suspect that you didn't mean the implication that "falsifiability" applies in mathematics but that instead you were attempting to indicate the difference I've described between the disciplines.

Nonetheless, even setting aside problems of wording, if I understand you, you're still proposing a different viewpoint on the truth status of the conclusions of science from mine. You seem to think that it's justifiable to consider the (well-tested) conclusions of current science true without reservation, even though you acknowledge that such conclusions might someday be found incorrect (in whatever respect or degree). My own viewpoint by contrast is that we're never justified in considering the current conclusions of science, however well-tested, unreservedly true. Instead, I view scientific conclusions as always to be considered provisional -- always awaiting further investigation, investigation which in the nature of the case can't ever be considered finished.

Reverting with the above background to the issue which started this side-trip: that of asserting non-existence (of some particular). On my view of science, one is never entitled to assert as unreservedly true the non-existence of some X from the non-existence of which no (at least currently) testable prediction follows. Consider the example of God, which you brought in: you claim the legitimacy of stating as true that God does not exist. But what falsifiable prediction can you think of which would follow from God's non-existence? In short, how would you propose to test God's NON-existence? Finding no evidence which leads you to believe that God does exist is one thing. But stating that the absence of evidence proves the non-existence assertion, I consider scientifically unjustifiable. Yet, if I understand you correctly, that's what you're stating.

(Possibly I should add to try to prevent misinterpretation: I am of the opinion that indeed God does not exist. My point here pertains to legitimate scientific epistemology, on the nature of which I think that you and I differ, not to any belief on my part in the existence of God. I have no such belief.)

Ellen

___

Edited August 3, 2008 by Ellen Stuttle

[Dragonfly]

To take one example from just the above post -- there are a couple other examples even in that short paragraph, but I'll select just one -- you write:

"It is in mathematics that you cannot state that something is true only while you haven't found yet evidence that falsifies the statement."

The obverse of this claim would be that in mathematics a statement can be considered true "while" you have found evidence that falsifies the statement.

No, that isn't the obverse of my statement. You can't just maintain the logic of any sentence by inverting the 'nots', English sentences are not the same as formal logic. Example: "he did not die while the doctor had made a mistake [but while he was poisoned]" would become "he did die while the doctor hadn't made a mistake" which is obviously nonsense. The point is that the sentence doesn't mean "he didn't die" - "the cause was that the doctor had made a mistake", but: the cause of his dying is not that the doctor had made a mistake, but a different cause. This meaning will be clear from the context of the sentence. The same is true for the sentence you quoted. Apart from the context, my use of italics was an extra indication of its meaning: "it is in mathematics [as opposed to "in science"] that etc."

Also: Did you mean the implication that the idea of "falsifying" a theory applies in mathematics?

Of course not.

Nonetheless, even setting aside problems of wording, if I understand you, you're still proposing a different viewpoint on the truth status of the conclusions of science from mine. You seem to think that it's justifiable to consider the (well-tested) conclusions of current science true without reservation, even though you acknowledge that such conclusions might someday be found incorrect (in whatever respect or degree). My own viewpoint by contrast is that we're never justified in considering the current conclusions of science, however well-tested, unreservedly true. Instead, I view scientific conclusions as always to be considered provisional -- always awaiting further investigation, investigation which in the nature of the case can't ever be considered finished.

Words, words, words... I do not attach great importance to endless definitions of what the "real" meaning of "true" is. In mathematics a statement is "true" if you can derive it from the axioms used. That kind of "truth" is immutable. In science there is no such immutable "truth", only a best guess. So the practical thing to do is to state our best guesses and call them the truth, knowing that we might be wrong, instead of adding a disclaimer to every scientific statement. That would be superfluous, as it is implicit in all scientific work. The difference with Peikoff's weasely "contextual certainty" is that he more or less suggests that the "contextual certainty" is still valid even if we know better, while we'll just admit that we've been wrong. There is nothing wrong in being wrong, as long as your contribution has helped to advance scientific knowledge, it's all in the game.

Reverting with the above background to the issue which started this side-trip: that of asserting non-existence (of some particular). On my view of science, one is never entitled to assert as unreservedly true the non-existence of some X from the non-existence of which no (at least currently) testable prediction follows. Consider the example of God, which you brought in: you claim the legitimacy of stating as true that God does not exist. But what falsifiable prediction can you think of which would follow from God's non-existence? In short, how would you propose to test God's NON-existence? Finding no evidence which leads you to believe that God does exist is one thing. But stating that the absence of evidence proves the non-existence assertion, I consider scientifically unjustifiable. Yet, if I understand you correctly, that's what you're stating.

Yes, that's what I'm stating. That's the difference with mathematics: in science we don't have to prove non-existence, we may assume non-existence when there isn't any positive evidence for existence. As all scientific statements are based on assumptions, and we don't hesitate to state unequivocally scientific results and laws, we also may unequivocally state the non-existence. We don't hesitate to make positive statements about the structure and properties of DNA, the existence of elementary particles or the dynamics of the solar system. In the same way we don't have to hesitate in making a positive statement about the non-existence of God, Zeus or the teapot that's orbiting Pluto. Of course we might be wrong, and we should admit that if there is good evidence for the existence of those entities.

The essential point is that "truth" in logic and mathematics has a different meaning than "truth" in science. As we're not omniscient we'll never know what the "real" scientific truth is, but that shouldn't stop us from making a best guess and call that the truth, even while we know that we may be wrong. It's just the practical thing to do and philosophers be damned. They just create problems where none existed.

[tjohnson]

Or maybe just quit using 'truth' altogether, except in mathematics.

[Matus1976]

My point is simply that Kant is describing the effects of viewing some phenomenon in nature...

Most of this discussion has focused on this point, Kant does not seem to be talking about the effects of viewing some phenomenon in nature, he seems to be explicitly saying that this should not be something that you are 'viewing' I suppose it all focuses on what he means here:

The sublime is [the] mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense.

So, again, he seems to be saying here that the sublime is a capacity of thinking which is evidence of some 'faculty of mind' (some ability of the persons mind) to 'transcend every standard of sense' By sense, does he mean 'that which is sensible' or a 'sense of perception' (eyes, ears, etc) Either way the interpretation seems bad, if he means 'sensible' than the sublime is a function of the ability of a persons mind to 'transcend the sensible' (i.e. enterain non-sensical thoughts, i.e. thoughts disconnected in every way from reality) this seems to be a metaphysical foundation for the sublime (or the rejection of metaphysics as the foundation for the sublime) where the other interpretation means that he is 'transcending' our ability to percieve reality, which, again, is a disconnection from from physical reality. What do you suggest he means by 'transcending every standard of sense' ?

His view seems to be that the presence of the phenomenon instantly excites the sense of awe. His view does not seem to be that a person looks at a thing which does not instantly excite awe, then contemplates ways in which the thing could be seen as being so complex that it might excite awe, thus trying to coax it into to exciting awe

...

Now, if someone felt a sense of delightful horror and magnitude in looking at a plastic bag floating around in an alley for 15 minutes, I suppose that it could indeed stimulate in them a sense of the sublime. And if someone could look at, say, a simple potato, ponder ways in which it was complex beyond comprehension, work himself up into an emotional lather of delightful horror and incomprehension similar in intensity to that experienced by 17th and 18th century thinkers when viewing the Alps, then, sure, that would probably qualify as experiencing a sense of the sublime. I just don't think it's likely, and I don't think it's what Kant was getting at.

The difference between an immediate reaction of awe, and a reaction of awe due to contemplation is only one of the degree of integrated values. The values which cause the awe are the same, in one person, they might only be newly learning of the ideas that would incur this awe, in another, they may have studied the relevant things thier whole life and thus immediately respond with a reaction of awe. Unless you are saying (or Kant is saying) that this sublime reaction is a reaction to something intrinsic or an 'instinct' which the 'sublime' is supposed to tap into, and is thus universal among normal humans and is automatically awe inspiring in all people. Your comments do seem to suggest this, if so, Kant is a proponent then of the naturalistic fallacy (that something is of higher value merely because humans 'naturally' have it) if this is the only ‘proper’ kind of ‘sublime’ this then implies some supernatural or mystical quality to the evolutionary process which has resulted in that stunning and horrified reaction to views of grand scale, or It's nothing more than argumentum ad evolution. And yet Kant suggests we can feel the sublime at a work of art, so either that art triggers the evolutionary sublime response (which even a feral human should experience) or his criteria for the sublime is completely arbitrary.

Kant - "Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including the might of nature which challenges our strength, is then, though improperly, called sublime, and it is only under presupposition of this idea within us, and in relation to it, that we are capable of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that Being Which inspires deep respect in us, not by the mere display of its might in nature, but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted above it."

In other words, Kant's idea of the sublime is absolute greatness, and that our experiences in observing phenomena which, although not absolutely great themselves, instill fear and are beyond comprehension, and thus stimulate a sense of that absolute greatness. In some ways you could say that his concept of the "absolute" aspect of the greatness of the sublime sounds similar to your concept of "the highest form of beauty that can be recognized," with the difference being that you haven't explained, or even begun to define, what you mean by "beauty" or the "highest form" of it. Is your concept of the "highest form of beauty" embodied in something which exists right now in reality, something which is so beautiful that its beauty could not possibly be surpassed, or is your ideal "highest form of beauty" only an idea in your mind which is "detached" from reality since it is embodied in no actual object?

Ok I need to run this through babel fish to translate Kantianism into normal human language.

Kant - "Everything that provokes this feeling in us, including the might of nature which challenges our strength, is then, though improperly, called sublime…”

Translation - "Everything that makes us feel sublime is called sublime, though sometimes improperly.

Comment - ok, what things are improperly called sublime that yet still incur the feeling of the sublime – this implies a ‘right’ kind of sublime, and a ‘wrong’ kind of sublime.

Kant – “and it is only under presupposition of this idea within us, and in relation to it, that we are capable of attaining to the idea of the sublimity of that Being Which inspires deep respect within us”

Translation - “And it is only after we assume before hand that this idea of the sublime is all ready in us that in relation to that idea we are capable of feeling sublime about things which inspire deep respect in us”

Comment - so it is only after we have an idea of the sublime that we can actually feel that something is sublime, this seems contradictory to the first statement, and to the implied naturalistic interpretation above. If the sublime requires the idea of sublimity being explicit in the subjects head, than it follows that at some point the idea must be integrated, and before that one might experience ‘sublimity’ after only some contemplation, and after that, immediately. It is also, again, suggesting that there are things which it is proper to feel sublime about and things that it is improper to feel sublime about.

Kant – “not by the mere display of its might in nature, but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted above it."

Translation – “[These things inspire deep respect] not by the display of their might in nature, but more by the capacity of our mind ‘planted’ in us which enables that estimation of that might WITHOUT fear, and as of regarding our self as exalted above it.”

Comment - Ok, so here is says that the sublime enables the estimation of might WITHOUT fear, so why are you arguing that to Kant the sublime requires fear? He seems to me, as far as anything Kant says can actually make sense, to be saying that the sublime is inspired feeling of deep respect or awe at these big mighty things in a mind which is capable of understanding that big mightiness explicitly WITHOUT fear, and then considering our own state or self (estate?) as exalted above it.

If Kant is arguing that FEAR is an explicit component of the Sublime (it seems to be the previous writers / explorers of the alps that said that) and that fear can only come from great and tremendous things of might in front of nature (which to me suggests cragged mountain ranges) then I can see why you would disavow Kant’s relationship to the acceptance of post modern art. However, these passages don’t seem to support “fear” as a component of the sublime in Kant, and combined with his other comments, still point toward an intense feeling of internal elation in regards to the reaction of gazin on a work of art which the genius that made it could not understand and the viewer themselves could make no sense of.

But there is no 'coaxing' going on, the complexity of the interactions related to a tumbling trash bag in the wind ARE immense and incomprehensible, they are not imaginary. Attempting to contemplate them can certainly drive a mind into a state which 'transcends every standard of sense'

And of course you are wading into mystical territory here, insisting that the sublime is not something you can feel at the 'non-sublime'. There is no absolute 'this is sublime' rule of the universe, and 'this is not sublime' where sentient beings are supposed to appropriately feel the sublime in reaction to those.

I haven't claimed that there is an absolute "'this is sublime' rule of the universe." You've only interpreted me as doing so, much as you erroneously interpreted Janson as misrepresenting Burke.

You said

In other words, the aesthetic feeling of the sublime is not artificially induced -- you don't choose to experience something which is non-sublime as sublime by trying to coax complexity out of it.

If the aesthetic feeling of the sublime is not artificially induced, then what is it? It’s either naturally induced, or supernaturally induced. If it’s naturally induced, I assume then you are referring to natural instinctual emotional response to given stimuli and not the reaction to stimuli based on your own ideas and values. If you mean it is supernaturally induced, and that no individual man has any control over it, and man has no volitional capacity in relation to feeling the sublime. Since Kant later says the sublime requires an idea of the sublime to be incorporated mentally, this does not seem to follow with Kan’t own suggestion. But Kant’s whole premise is that there are things which it is right to feel sublime about which comes from

…the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense.

Who determines what is and is not sublime? The subject himself does...

I agree. When I said that a person doesn't "choose to experience something which is non-sublime as sublime by trying to coax complexity out of it," I meant a thing which was non-sublime to him prior to his trying to coax complexity out of it.

You can’t have it both ways. Does the subject himself choose what is sublime? (by choosing to integrate particular values and ideas throughout life) Or is that which is sublime determined by everything but the subject? (his nature, the universe, social standards, some mystical entity, etc)

The emotional reaction, sublime or not, comes in reaction to what the subject thinks is sublime, not what Kant thinks is sublime, or what the 'universe' thinks is sublime. Kant is saying what he thinks sublime IS, but in reality is preaching what he thinks it OUGHT to be.

…The names used to describe the problem are irrelevant, so, to me, it seems that you are the one preaching what he thinks the sublime "OUGHT to be." It seems that you want to own and protect the word "sublime" and claim that your definition of it is the one and only proper definition, while having no interest in the substance of the problems that the philosophers were interested in.

I’ve said all along that “art” can mean anything you want it to mean, I’ll say the same for sublime, but if you want it to be useful, or have any significance as an idea beyond just being a word, then the emotional reaction of the sublime experience absolutely ought to come from recognizing the highest and most amazingly profoundly beautiful thing to man which implicitly comes from the recognition that man is real and exists in knowable objective reality. The emotional reaction of the sublime is one of the highest emotional feelings a human being can have, and like love or hate, it should come only from the recognition and reaction to the singular most important things to that individual qua man and to man qua man in an objective reality, it should not come from inward contemplation, or blank eyed stairs at the intellectual vomit which is modern art.

When someone is standing at the edge of a black, bottomless pit, and she experiences a massive sense of horror and incomprehension of magnitude, but she also feels that experiencing the horror and incomprehensible magnitude is supremely delightful, how would you go about explaining why she felt pleasure -- an uplifting, inspiring feeling of freedom and satisfaction -- in experiencing the horror and incomprehension?

I’d say she has some mental problems if she experiences pleasure at experiencing horror and incomprehension. This id say is stronger evidence than anything else at the corruption’s Kant has infused society with if you attribute this to him.

Read his comments on Genuis (someone who creates something great but has no idea why or how he has and can not reliable reproduce it) and Fine Art (that which incurs the sublime where you have no idea why you feel it and is not according to any rules) and the Sublime, a feeling that 'transcends' all sense perception

I'm still in the process of reading Kant, but I think his concept of Genius, and the idea that great art can't be reliably reproduced according to rules, has to do with the idea of originality being a vital aspect of art.

Originality is not sufficient to make good art, originality has no value of it’s own. I could take toilet paper, gold glitter, and lead shot put them in a jar, turn it sideways, and balance on a beam with a large pig fetus on the other end. I guarantee it’s never been done before, but that doesn’t make it good art.

I don't think he's saying that we can't teach and learn artistic techniques, but he's simply observing that originality, by its definition, means that rules are not followed -- a painting is not original if is is made according to an establish formula of how to make that painting. The artist discovers the "rules" as he's creating the painting.

He quote seems quite clear to me.

It cannot indicate scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as nature. Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, [bold]he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to others in such precepts as would put them in a position to produce similar products.[/bold]

Do you think that Michelangelo, or Leonardo Da Vinci do not have the ‘power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically’ I’d bet Da Vinci could reproduce the Mona Lisa to 99% accuracy, and I highly doubt that Jackson Pollack could do the same with one of his works.

Beyond that, artists often admit that they don't know where their ideas come from. Classical composers and modern song writers have talked about their most successful melodies just popping into their heads. How would one teach that? Which rules would one follow in order to make songs pop into one's head. Artist's talk about their creations being largely subconsciously created. Objectivist artist Linda Mann is a good example. And if I'm remembering correctly, even Rand mentioned something about cases of not knowing where an idea came from.

Rand explicitly talks about this as a manifestation of the mind body dichotomy integrated fully within the artist in “The Art of Fiction” where she discusses this sort of ‘divine inspiration’ idea at length in regards to writing fiction, and thoroughly destroys it as an irrational abdication of individual talent. This effect, which is manifested in any expert behavior is routinely clinically identified in chess experts and has been studied thoroughly (look at some of the threads I’ve posted in on “talent” and “genius” here and at Objectivismonline.net) it is in effect a long term memory chunking effect where the rules of the art you are practicing are integrated so fully into your long term memory that they can be accessed with little conscious processing. Chess grand masters, for instance, can remember a randomized chess board no better than an average player. But chess boards which would appear random to a non-player but are actually the result of specific real movies are easily and readily repeatable by chess grand masters, who though they don’t exactly know how they remember all these boards, have actually integrated a sort of algorithm which relates each board and style of movies with minor variations. The same goes for expert musicians, sports players, artists, or technical craftsman. There is nothing mystical about it.

Yes I did read it, you apparently skimmed it looking only for the section that supports your interpretation. That site traced the HISTORY of the word and it's changing usage OVER TIME. If you think that, today, Sublime means something horrible and terrifying, you are disconnected from the modern english language.

Where did you get the idea that I was talking about modern usage of the word "sublime"? We're talking about Kant and other thinkers from long ago, and of their discussions of the sublime. It would be idiotic to expect that they would use a modern layman's definition rather than the definition used by philosophers (and not laymen) of their time.

You were the one that generalized about the opinions on the definition of philosophers and the sublime, I was pointing out it has changed significantly over time.

The modern usage of the word sublime is fine with me, an exalted or reverent feeling at experiencing or recognizing the highest or most beautiful thing once can conceive. The usage advocated by British explorers and writers of the 17th century, as you point out, one of terror and beauty, but yet still experienced at the recognition or reaction to something profoundly beautiful and terrible, is fine as well, since it is grounded in reality. We just need a sufficient opposing term. Kant's usage is the worst and only useless one, since it focuses only on the FEELING and not the thing which caused the feeling.

Do you grasp that the 17th and 18th century thinkers were concerned with trying to understand and explain something that they experienced? They witnessed things in reality, felt a sense of terror and of being overwhelmed, yet they also felt immense pleasure in experiencing the terror and incomprehension. They simply wanted to know why something which evokes a sense of horror causes an immense sense of satisfaction and pleasure. Do you have any ideas to explain such an aesthetic effect, other than that they were evil (and trying to despoil your precious word "sublime")? Do you have a better theory than those that they offered?

I think the 17th and 18th century thinkers and explorer embraced an entirely different mental paradigm about Nature (where any mis step could produce a painful death) which we are rather removed from this now. I don’t conceptually understand that transformation of sublime from great rhetoric, then reverence or royalty in it’s classical usage to simultaneous terror and pleasure, but that does not seem to be what Kant was considering sublime to be. He seemed to be moving away from the definition they used and instead focused on the feeling absent of external influences.

Where exactly are you getting his focus on horror / terror in the sublime from, looking at these earlier quotes I see.

Every affection of the STRENUOUS TYPE (such, that is, as excites the consciousness of our power of overcoming every resistance [animus strenuus]) is aesthetically sublime

Strenous effort is sublime, nothing about terror at magnitude here.

The sublime is that, the mere capacity of thinking which evidences a faculty of mind transcending every standard of sense

The sublime transcends sense.

and the object is received as sublime with a pleasure that is only possible through the mediation of a displeasure.

The sublime is only possible through the MEDIATION of DISPLEASURE

Even your additional quote above

but more by the faculty which is planted in us of estimating that might without fear, and of regarding our estate as exalted above it.

Suggests that as well, it is the faculty of recognizing might without fear.

These Kant quotes seem to suggest that that great art is that which incurs the sublime as well, so where does the terror fit into that idea?

[Matus1976]

War itself, provided it is conducted with order and a sacred respect for the rights of civilians, has something sublime about it, and gives nations that carry it on in such a manner a stamp of mind only the more sublime the more numerous the dangers to which they are exposed, and which they are able to meet with fortitude. On the other hand, a prolonged peace favours the predominance of a mere commercial spirit, and with it a debasing self-interest, cowardice, and effeminacy, and tends to degrade the character of the nation.

Actually, there is more about war in the Critique of Judgement:

(§48)

Beautiful art shows its superiority in the beautiful descriptions it gives of things that in nature would be ugly or displeasing. The Furies, diseases, devastations of war, etc., may (as evils) be described as very beautiful, as they are represented in a picture. There is only one kind of ugliness which cannot be represented in accordance with nature and without destroying all aesthetic satisfaction, and consequently artistic beauty, namely, that which excites

disgust

. For, in this singular sensation, which depends purely on the imagination, the object is represented as it were obtruding itself for our enjoyment, while we strive against it with all our might. And the artistic representation of the object is no longer distinguished from the nature of the object itself in our sensation, and so it cannot possibly be regarded as beautiful. The art of sculpture, again, because in its products art is almost interchangeable with nature, excludes from its creations the direct representation of ugly objects, e.g. it represents death by a beautiful genius, the warlike spirit by Mars, and permits all such things to be represented only by an allegory or attribute that has a pleasing effect, and thus only indirectly and by the aid of the interpretation of reason, and not for the mere aesthetic judgment.

So much for your simplistic theory that "Kant thought that war is good."

I am a great admirer of the political scientist R.J. Rummel, who frequently cites Kant as the originator of the Democratic Peace theory. In that regard, I still like Kant, but this quote on war is absolutely attrocious. Currently I am reading Thucydides's "History of the Pelopension War" and interestingly Pericles, that admirable yet war mongering Hellene made the same argument when attempting to talk the Athenians into launching an ultimately disasterous war against Sparta. War and the strife and communal struggle involved in it raises the best of human spirit, according to Pericles and Kant - but at what cost? Frankly, I find Kant's preference for the difficulties of fighting a war and the comradarie that evolves with it as a preferable state to peace and commercialism abhorantly disgusting. What an attrocious bag of contradictions this man was. (Perhaps Kant was using the Democratic Peace as an argument against democracy)

Jonathan your rebuttal seems so pale - what on earth does your quote actually have to do with War? The only thing this seems to be saying is that some things in nature which might be ugly or displeasing, like war or disease, may be represented in a beautiful way in a picture. This is hardly a refutation of the sublime beauty Kant found in War, as shown by the original quote above!

[james lee shay]

QUOTE

It cannot indicate scientifically how it brings about its product, but rather gives the rule as nature. Hence, where an author owes a product to his genius, [bold]he does not himself know how the ideas for it have entered into his head, nor has he it in his power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically, and communicate the same to others in such precepts as would put them in a position to produce similar products.[/bold]

Do you think that Michelangelo, or Leonardo Da Vinci do not have the ‘power to invent the like at pleasure, or methodically’ I’d bet Da Vinci could reproduce the Mona Lisa to 99% accuracy, and I highly doubt that Jackson Pollack could do the same with one of his works.

Matus, I don't think the quote Jonathan presents has anything at all to do with copying verbatim a work of one's own. Do you think that reproducing a painting to 99% accuracy corresponds to inventing "the like at pleasure"? I hope that's not your idea of creativity. I haven't read the entire body of text this comes from, but I believe he's talking about the quality of the inspiration and other somewhat unknowable quantities that propel the creation of comparably great work, rather than making a stale copy. The real "brainstorms".

In other words, neither Leonardo nor anyone else has the power to, at will, have significant thoughts of genius comparable to those that resulted in their past creations. For example, Picasso and Braque followed their great and astonishing intuitive insights taken from Cezanne for many years, creating many similar works that often looked identical ( similarly to your example) - but no big new and great ideas for many years. Objectivism's favorite architect, Frank Lloyd Wright, went through very long periods of refining each "brainstorm", as did Mozart, Picasso and others, before having and developing new and great ideas.

When are you going to drop the snide, and also cliched, references to your archnemesis, Pollack? They weaken your remarks considerably. Don't you know anyone else's work that might suffice for your denigration? Do you know anything about Rothko, for instance, or Gorky, a fabulous painter - check him out? (By the way, others who think as you do have called Mark Rothko's paintings "Buddhist tv sets". That is pretty funny! You might use that in another discussion or argument. Sort of like calling Pollack "Jack the Dripper". That's become a cliche, but not the buddhist tv bit.)

When you talk about the Mona Lisa and Pollack, two monstrously big names in art history, things go a little stale and seem unimaginative to me, and I do wonder what you really know about art and have studied and thought about it. Jonathan brings an astonishing well of information to these discussions about art. Check out some of his examples.

Jim Shay

Edited August 5, 2008 by jim

[Ellen Stuttle]

[...] English sentences are not the same as formal logic. Example: "he did not die while the doctor had made a mistake [but while he was poisoned]" [...].

I have to laugh. That isn't an English sentence. Oh, it uses English words, but some guessing is needed to figure out what it possibly means. ;-) I think what it's supposed to mean is: "He died of poisoning, not from his doctor's error."

I'll have to read the rest again later, when I'm not tired, to see if I think you addressed what I was asking. On first reading, I'm not seeing that you did.

Ellen

___

[Matus1976]

"The Father of Modern Art is Immanual Kant (see his Critique of Judgement)"

- Ayn Rand "The Romantic Manifesto" from "Art and Cognition"

Case Closed!

[Roger Bissell]

"The Father of Modern Art is Immanual Kant (see his Critique of Judgement)"

- Ayn Rand "The Romantic Manifesto" from "Art and Cognition"

Case Closed!

Ah yes, the same wonderful essay in which Rand argued that art re-creates reality and that architecture is a form of art even though it does not re-create reality. Kant had some very bad premises, but it's hard to find anything more illogical than that in any of his writings. (And Rand was known as "Miss Logic." Sheesh.)

reb

[Matus1976]

Matus, I don't think the quote Jonathan presents has anything at all to do with copying verbatim a work of one's own. Do you think that reproducing a painting to 99% accuracy corresponds to inventing "the like at pleasure"? I hope that's not your idea of creativity. I haven't read the entire body of text this comes from, but I believe he's talking about the quality of the inspiration and other somewhat unknowable quantities that propel the creation of comparably great work, rather than making a stale copy. The real "brainstorms".

Any technical master can reproduce any creation he has made to a high degree of accuracy, Michelangelo could sculpt the David again, and he could ALSO sculpt a similar piece with a different theme and different execution but with the same exquisite skill, THAT is what it means to be able to recreate the like at pleasure, I used the example of recreating ones own exact work as an even simpler example which also serves as a clear distinguisher between non-objective art and objective art. An expert objective art based artist can recreate his own work with monumental skill and accuracy, and could certainly create another similar great work, yet most modern artists can not because their work has neither objective theme nor objective purpose, and thus can not have an objective course of execution which can be repeatable. Jackson Pollack is a favorite example of mine because his work is so tremendously absurd, Pollack himself could not recreate any of his own works to any high degree of accuracy because they are non objective, they are inherently too random and too whim worshipping, he might as well go into a séance and do 'automatic writing' as far as he willfully controlled the stroke of his arm. Could Pollack recreate another Pollack like painting, sure, but it's because he paintings are so lacking of any objective measure of skill that this is feasible, not because he has a masterful ability of technical execution of paint dribbling.

In other words, neither Leonardo nor anyone else has the power to, at will, have significant thoughts of genius comparable to those that resulted in their past creations.

You are wrong, genius is neither mystical nor supernatural, but is in fact a superlative integration of a significant degree of skills cultivated over a very long period of training with a particular kind of practice which involves continually pushing oneself past ones own skill level. Leonardo did not sit idly by waiting for inspiration to hit him like a lightning storm, this is an interpretation of creative genius borne explicitly FROM Kant, nobody in the renaissance era embraced this absurd notion. One could hire Leonardo to create a great work of art and he would in fact do exactly that, he would not say 'well, you must wait until I am struck by inspiration!' Far from sitting around waiting for some magical insight, Da Vinci strikes me as a man who was unable to keep up with all the creative inspirations he had.

It is the modern artist today who embraces the mind body dichotomy that roles around in his bedroom wailing and waiting for that mystical divine word of genius to move his brush for him or spew words on his ledger, if they have little technical knowledge of the skill they are trying to tap into, it amounts to hardly anything more than unintelligible automatic writing, if they have a great degree of technical mastery cultivated over time, they will be able to execute their inspiration well, but will attribute it to the mystical or divine, and not thier own integrated long term memory, values, and subconscious processing.

From Wikipedia

Da Vinci was an Italian polymath, having been a scientist, mathematician, engineer, inventor, anatomist, painter, sculptor, architect, botanist, musician and writer.

...

Leonardo has often been described as the archetype of the "Renaissance man", a man whose seemingly infinite curiosity was equaled only by his powers of invention.[1] He is widely considered to be one of the greatest painters of all time and perhaps the most diversely talented person ever to have lived.[2]

...

Perhaps fifteen of his paintings survive, the small number due to his constant, and frequently disastrous, experimentation with new techniques [hardly the mark of a man sitting around waiting for divine inspiration]

....

In 1466, at the age of fourteen, Leonardo was apprenticed to one of the most successful artists of his day, Andrea di Cione, known as Verrocchio. Verrocchio's workshop was at the centre of the intellectual currents of Florence, assuring the young Leonardo of an education in the humanities. Other famous painters apprenticed or associated with the workshop include Ghirlandaio, Perugino, Botticelli, and Lorenzo di Credi.[7][10] Leonardo would have been exposed to a vast range of technical skills and had the opportunity to learn drafting, chemistry, metallurgy, metal working, plaster casting, leather working, mechanics and carpentry as well as the artistic skills of drawing, painting, sculpting and modelling.

...

At this time Leonardo wrote an often-quoted letter to Ludovico, describing the many marvellous and diverse things that he could achieve in the field of engineering and informing the Lord that he could also paint.

...

Leonardo continued work in Milan between 1482 and 1499. He was commissioned to paint the Virgin of the Rocks for the Confraternity of the Immaculate Conception, and The Last Supper for the monastery of Santa Maria delle Grazie.[7]

...

Leonardo, with his assistant Salai and friend, the mathematician Luca Pacioli, fled Milan for Venice, where he was employed as a military architect and engineer, devising methods to defend the city from naval attack.[7][4]

So I really wonder how often da Vinci told his commissioners and military officers that he must sit around and wait for divine inspiration to hit him.

For example, Picasso and Braque followed their great and astonishing intuitive insights taken from Cezanne for many years, creating many similar works that often looked identical ( similarly to your example) - but no big new and great ideas for many years. Objectivism's favorite architect, Frank Lloyd Wright, went through very long periods of refining each "brainstorm", as did Mozart, Picasso and others, before having and developing new and great ideas.

This is what you consider evidence for divine inspiration? A artistic genius like da Vinci or Wright do not sit around waiting for that flash of sudden significant genuis to hit them, they have many thousands of flashes cultivated by their deep knowledge and interest in that subject, and then pick and choose which they consider of value and cultivate those into the masterpieces we become familiar with. It is the mystic who thinks these things come by magic, and who stares blankly at his canvas waiting and waiting for that muse to sing to him.

When are you going to drop the snide, and also cliched, references to your archnemesis, Pollack?

Never, Pollack sucks, and he was an ass hole who got someone killed.

"When I am in my painting, I'm not aware of what I'm doing." - Pollack

Nuff said

They weaken your remarks considerably.

Don't you have anything better to do than attack someone who is attacking Pollack? It weakens your remarks considerably.

Don't you know anyone else's work that might suffice for your denigration? Do you know anything about Rothko, for instance, or Gorky, a fabulous painter - check him out? (By the way, others who think as you do have called Mark Rothko's paintings "Buddhist tv sets". That is pretty funny! You might use that in another discussion or argument. Sort of like calling Pollack "Jack the Dripper". That's become a cliche, but not the buddhist tv bit.)

I'm not really interested in expanding my intellectual horizon of shitty painters, thanks for the tips on who to avoid though.

When you talk about the Mona Lisa and Pollack, two monstrously big names in art history, things go a little stale and seem unimaginative to me, and I do wonder what you really know about art and have studied and thought about it. Jonathan brings an astonishing well of information to these discussions about art. Check out some of his examples.

Jim Shay

I've certainly no PhD in Art History, but the fact that you imply some technical expertise is required in order to judge the quality of a work of art is Kantianism and post modernism in it's purest form and the exact mentality that has enabled this trash to become considered art, this condescending mentality that you have, and your snide implications that if one can not appreciate spilled dribbled paint or a piece of rubbish bound by horse hair as art that it is some mystical failing on their part and that they are just too narrow minded to see what 'true art' is.

[james lee shay]

Matus, you right about my "talking down" to you about art history, I suppose. Sorry about that. Honestly, though, I think that if you want to argue about abstract art and Kant effectively you need to broaden things. And in my first reply to you I mentioned the late, unlamented Victor. Your comments about car crashes, your refusal to look at Gorky or Rothko or other abstract artists, and so on, do remind me of his approach to things.

With regard to creativity, I remember N Branden saying something like the following in '72 or '73: "It's not particularly difficult to have creative ideas. But, making something of your ideas is very hard." And the great architect, Mies van der Rohe, said, "I don't want to be great, I want to be good." In other words, many, many people can sit around sparking off ideas all day, like the conceptualist/dada piece in your posting, but making something of it and really building your ideas into something is the real job. And that's why Wright concentrated on the Prairie Houses for 25 long years, and Braque and Picasso worked on analytical cubism for 7 years with very little obvious variation.

Jim Shay

Edited August 5, 2008 by jim