A problem with the Objectivist definition of reason

[l_chaim29]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses". This definition, however, leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, as these can only be inferred (in part) from the exisence of one's own awareness of one's own internal states.

[kreso]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses". This definition, however, leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, as these can only be inferred (in part) from the exisence of one's own awareness of one's own internal states.

Since nobody is answering I will give it a try.

When you are introspecting you are still using your own senses, are you not?

When you are identifying states of others (rate of breathing, facial expression, body language etc. and then naming that state or emotion) you can do that only because you are using the data that you previously got and integrated through your own senses.

I don't understand what is strange about that.

Edited August 11, 2008 by kreso

[syrakusos]

... leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, ...

And just which of the five senses is it that you use?

I mean, personally, I suspect that the Randian (versus Objectivist) canon on this is so limited as to be false, but, my own ideas aside for now, just which senses are employed when you determine your internal states?

All perception must be via one or more of the five senses, according to Rand.

Do you smell your own thoughts?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

... leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, ...

And just which of the five senses is it that you use?

I mean, personally, I suspect that the Randian (versus Objectivist) canon on this is so limited as to be false, but, my own ideas aside for now, just which senses are employed when you determine your internal states?

All perception must be via one or more of the five senses, according to Rand.

Do you smell your own thoughts?

Michael,

I have been going on about this precise point but using other words to do so.

I also speculate that we can evolve new sense organs to process information not available to the other five (or however many there really are, when you think about things like sensing balance and gravity).

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Michael Marotta,

I wonder if you're unaware that by using the "Reply" function, you provide a link (the little arrow to the right of the post identification) to the post you're answering, as well as the identity of the person you're quoting.

By using the "Quote" function, all you provide is the words to which you're responding. You don't even tell us to whom you're responding.

On this particular thread, which is short, it isn't that hard to find whom you're quoting and the original context from which you quoted, but on longer threads, it can become difficult, requiring tireseome searching.

Ellen

___

[syrakusos]

Michael Marotta,

I wonder if you're unaware that by using the "Reply" function, you provide a link (the little arrow to the right of the post identification) to the post you're answering, as well as the identity of the person you're quoting.

By using the "Quote" function, all you provide is the words to which you're responding. You don't even tell us to whom you're responding.

On this particular thread, which is short, it isn't that hard to find whom you're quoting and the original context from which you quoted, but on longer threads, it can become difficult, requiring tireseome searching.

Ellen

___

As you can see, though, Ellen, it is a waste of space. I never noticed the little arrow before. It is cute.

Edited August 18, 2008 by Michael E. Marotta

[BaalChatzaf]

I also speculate that we can evolve new sense organs to process information not available to the other five (or however many there really are, when you think about things like sensing balance and gravity).

Michael

We sense we are on the ground by our sense of touch. As for balance, the inner ear is the organ that acts as a "spirit level". The brain does process the inertia of the fluid in the cochlea somewhat differently than it it processes air vibration data, however. We also have in internal sense of pressure within our bodies, and we have pain sensors that are not located on the skin. So we can feel stomach aches and creaky joints. Our additional senses are just as physical as the primary senses: sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste. The underlying physical principles are well known.

As for evolving new sense organs, we do not need to. We can -build them-. The eye is on organ for detecting electro magnetic radiation in a certain range of wave lengths. Radio is a way of detecting electromagnetic radiation in a much longer wave length. We will not evolve organic radio receivers or transmitters because:

1. They do not produce a significant degree of reproductive success. In fact just the opposite. One of the most effective forms of birth control is night time t.v..

2. The energy requirements for such equipment cannot be met by the Krebb Cycle which is how our bodies get heat energy from sugar.

You will also notice that we did not evolve wheels. Our natural motion is bipedal and this after millions of years. No progress there.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited August 18, 2008 by BaalChatzaf

[galtgulch]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses". This definition, however, leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, as these can only be inferred (in part) from the exisence of one's own awareness of one's own internal states.

To go to the source I would recommend that you find a copy of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand.

Also valuable are the articles on The Contradictions of Determinism by Nathaniel Branden in The Objectivist Newsletter.

One valuable insight is that our consciousness, although dependent for its existence on a functioning brain, has powers of its own!

Not everything that goes on in our minds is dictated by something going on in our brains! It is certainly true, truth being defined as an identification of a fact of reality, that if certain environmental influences trigger our sensory organs that impulses will be carried along afferent fibers of our peripheral or cranial nerves to centers in the brain and we will experience something in our consciousness as a result, perception in the case of stimulation of the retina by light, a sound in the case of stimulation of the auditory organs in our ears, touch, pain, heat or cold, vibration, taste or smell.

But that does not mean that everything that goes on in our minds is dependent on those mechanisms of sensation.

Rand points out that the first level of abstraction is the naming of entities which we perceive in the outside world. I think it also includes fundamental states of awareness within our minds, e.g. whether we are in focus, whether we are dimly aware of something, what we are feeling in the realm of emotion, whether we are using our own judgment or accepting someone elses on some issue, whether we understand some concept such as Avogadro's number or not, the list goes on.

My point is that she does and Objectivism does acknowledge that introspection is a valid means of knowing some aspect of reality, namely concepts having to do with our internal conscious states including both content and processes of our conceptual faculties.

Branden's book The Psychology of Self Esteem discusses some of these issues as well.

Wm

Edited August 18, 2008 by galtgulch

[BaalChatzaf]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses". This definition, however, leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, as these can only be inferred (in part) from the exisence of one's own awareness of one's own internal states.

To go to the source I would recommend that you find a copy of Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology by Ayn Rand.

Also valuable are the articles on The Contradictions of Determinism by Nathaniel Branden in The Objectivist Newsletter.

One valuable insight is that our consciousness, although dependent for its existence on a functioning brain, has powers of its own!

Not everything that goes on in our minds is dictated by something going on in our brains! It is certainly true, truth being defined as an identification of a fact of reality, that if certain environmental influences trigger our sensory organs that impulses will be carried along afferent fibers of our peripheral or cranial nerves to centers in the brain and we will experience something in our consciousness as a result, perception in the case of stimulation of the retina by light, a sound in the case of stimulation of the auditory organs in our ears, touch, pain, heat or cold, vibration, taste or smell.

But that does not mean that everything that goes on in our minds is dependent on those mechanisms of sensation.

Rand points out that the first level of abstraction is the naming of entities which we perceive in the outside world. I think it also includes fundamental states of awareness within our minds, e.g. whether we are in focus, whether we are dimly aware of something, what we are feeling in the realm of emotion, whether we are using our own judgment or accepting someone elses on some issue, whether we understand some concept such as Avogadro's number or not, the list goes on.

My point is that she does and Objectivism does acknowledge that introspection is a valid means of knowing some aspect of reality, namely concepts having to do with our internal conscious states including both content and processes of our conceptual faculties.

Branden's book The Psychology of Self Esteem discusses some of these issues as well.

Wm

Where is measurable empirical evidence to support your claim?

Can you present it?

How about some fact?

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Nicholas Dykes]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses". This definition, however, leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, as these can only be inferred (in part) from the exisence of one's own awareness of one's own internal states.

This is a first-rate challenge, deserving close attention, because one of the great gaps in Objectivism is its lack of a fully-developed philosophy of mind. Rand's ~Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology~ is a brilliant contribution, but it is only 80-odd pages and is merely an ~introduction~ to ~but one~ area of epistemology, albeit a central one, the theory of concepts.

Of the two points raised above, the first is the juicier. The senses are not used in introspection, so how do we integrate into concepts the results of introspection? I think Rand provided the answer. Didn’t she say we examine introspections ~as if~ they were external concretes? Thus the ‘mind’s eye’ integrates lower order observations of internal states into wider abstractions in the same manner that it integrates lower order external perceptions into higher order abstractions. So lack of appetite, absence of motivation, flatness of spirit and indifference to values becomes ‘I’m depressed’, just as observing thousands of varieties of amphibians and reptiles becomes 'herpetology.'

The process is similar when we consider the introspections of others. Their words, their mannerisms, their gestures, their reactions are treated as perceptions which we integrate into conceptual judgements about their inner states -- which we cannot observe directly. We proceed, however, ~as if~ we could, though much more cautiously, because our conjectures depend for confirmation on the person under study.

‘As if’ is of course merely a starting point, much more analysis and demonstration is required. But Le chaim29 is certainly correct to challenge the O’ist definition of reason. For, while reason does indeed integrate the material provided by the senses, it does other important things which are not immediately implied by the definition.

I take a look at some of these topics in the chapter on the faculty of reason in my recent book, ~Old Nick’s Guide to Happiness~. For instance, how does one advocate and defend 'volitional consciousness' when it is evident that much of our thinking is done quite unconsciously by the subconscious mind?

We shouldn't worry about these things. Objectivism is in its infancy. So is the science of psychology, and that's been around a heck of lot longer. There's just an awful lot more work to be done.

Nicholas Dykes

[Mindy Newton]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses". This definition, however, leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, as these can only be inferred (in part) from the exisence of one's own awareness of one's own internal states.

This is a first-rate challenge, deserving close attention, because one of the great gaps in Objectivism is its lack of a fully-developed philosophy of mind. Rand's ~Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology~ is a brilliant contribution, but it is only 80-odd pages and is merely an ~introduction~ to ~but one~ area of epistemology, albeit a central one, the theory of concepts.

Of the two points raised above, the first is the juicier. The senses are not used in introspection, so how do we integrate into concepts the results of introspection? I think Rand provided the answer. Didn’t she say we examine introspections ~as if~ they were external concretes? Thus the ‘mind’s eye’ integrates lower order observations of internal states into wider abstractions in the same manner that it integrates lower order external perceptions into higher order abstractions. So lack of appetite, absence of motivation, flatness of spirit and indifference to values becomes ‘I’m depressed’, just as observing thousands of varieties of amphibians and reptiles becomes 'herpetology.'

The process is similar when we consider the introspections of others. Their words, their mannerisms, their gestures, their reactions are treated as perceptions which we integrate into conceptual judgements about their inner states -- which we cannot observe directly. We proceed, however, ~as if~ we could, though much more cautiously, because our conjectures depend for confirmation on the person under study.

‘As if’ is of course merely a starting point, much more analysis and demonstration is required. But Le chaim29 is certainly correct to challenge the O’ist definition of reason. For, while reason does indeed integrate the material provided by the senses, it does other important things which are not immediately implied by the definition.

I take a look at some of these topics in the chapter on the faculty of reason in my recent book, ~Old Nick’s Guide to Happiness~. For instance, how does one advocate and defend 'volitional consciousness' when it is evident that much of our thinking is done quite unconsciously by the subconscious mind?

We shouldn't worry about these things. Objectivism is in its infancy. So is the science of psychology, and that's been around a heck of lot longer. There's just an awful lot more work to be done.

Nicholas Dykes

Isn't it the means of achieving that lowest level of self-observation that is at issue? Aren't we already introspecting when we conclude that our appetite has changed, that our usual motivations are weaker, etc.? I agree that the self-diagnosis of depression is the use of reason, and that the data it comprises are introspective, however, it doesn't, I think, get us any closer to understanding introspective self-observation.

--Mindy

[Brant Gaede]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses". This definition, however, leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, as these can only be inferred (in part) from the exisence of one's own awareness of one's own internal states.

This is a first-rate challenge, deserving close attention, because one of the great gaps in Objectivism is its lack of a fully-developed philosophy of mind. Rand's ~Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology~ is a brilliant contribution, but it is only 80-odd pages and is merely an ~introduction~ to ~but one~ area of epistemology, albeit a central one, the theory of concepts.

Of the two points raised above, the first is the juicier. The senses are not used in introspection, so how do we integrate into concepts the results of introspection? I think Rand provided the answer. Didn't she say we examine introspections ~as if~ they were external concretes? Thus the 'mind's eye' integrates lower order observations of internal states into wider abstractions in the same manner that it integrates lower order external perceptions into higher order abstractions. So lack of appetite, absence of motivation, flatness of spirit and indifference to values becomes 'I'm depressed', just as observing thousands of varieties of amphibians and reptiles becomes 'herpetology.'

The process is similar when we consider the introspections of others. Their words, their mannerisms, their gestures, their reactions are treated as perceptions which we integrate into conceptual judgements about their inner states -- which we cannot observe directly. We proceed, however, ~as if~ we could, though much more cautiously, because our conjectures depend for confirmation on the person under study.

'As if' is of course merely a starting point, much more analysis and demonstration is required. But Le chaim29 is certainly correct to challenge the O'ist definition of reason. For, while reason does indeed integrate the material provided by the senses, it does other important things which are not immediately implied by the definition.

I take a look at some of these topics in the chapter on the faculty of reason in my recent book, ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. For instance, how does one advocate and defend 'volitional consciousness' when it is evident that much of our thinking is done quite unconsciously by the subconscious mind?

We shouldn't worry about these things. Objectivism is in its infancy. So is the science of psychology, and that's been around a heck of lot longer. There's just an awful lot more work to be done.

Nicholas Dykes

Isn't it the means of achieving that lowest level of self-observation that is at issue? Aren't we already introspecting when we conclude that our appetite has changed, that our usual motivations are weaker, etc.? I agree that the self-diagnosis of depression is the use of reason, and that the data it comprises are introspective, however, it doesn't, I think, get us any closer to understanding introspective self-observation.

--Mindy

Isn't all data partially represented by numbers?

--Brant

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Isn't all data partially represented by numbers?

Brant,

If you include ordinal (not everybody likes to), all measurements of anything can be represented by numbers.

Mindy,

Welcome to OL. You sound independent and intelligent.

Michael

[Mindy Newton]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses". This definition, however, leaves no room for identification or integration of concretes observed through introspection. Neither does it leave room for the possibility of identifying or integrating the concretes of the internal states of others, as these can only be inferred (in part) from the exisence of one's own awareness of one's own internal states.

This is a first-rate challenge, deserving close attention, because one of the great gaps in Objectivism is its lack of a fully-developed philosophy of mind. Rand's ~Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology~ is a brilliant contribution, but it is only 80-odd pages and is merely an ~introduction~ to ~but one~ area of epistemology, albeit a central one, the theory of concepts.

Of the two points raised above, the first is the juicier. The senses are not used in introspection, so how do we integrate into concepts the results of introspection? I think Rand provided the answer. Didn't she say we examine introspections ~as if~ they were external concretes? Thus the 'mind's eye' integrates lower order observations of internal states into wider abstractions in the same manner that it integrates lower order external perceptions into higher order abstractions. So lack of appetite, absence of motivation, flatness of spirit and indifference to values becomes 'I'm depressed', just as observing thousands of varieties of amphibians and reptiles becomes 'herpetology.'

The process is similar when we consider the introspections of others. Their words, their mannerisms, their gestures, their reactions are treated as perceptions which we integrate into conceptual judgements about their inner states -- which we cannot observe directly. We proceed, however, ~as if~ we could, though much more cautiously, because our conjectures depend for confirmation on the person under study.

'As if' is of course merely a starting point, much more analysis and demonstration is required. But Le chaim29 is certainly correct to challenge the O'ist definition of reason. For, while reason does indeed integrate the material provided by the senses, it does other important things which are not immediately implied by the definition.

I take a look at some of these topics in the chapter on the faculty of reason in my recent book, ~Old Nick's Guide to Happiness~. For instance, how does one advocate and defend 'volitional consciousness' when it is evident that much of our thinking is done quite unconsciously by the subconscious mind?

We shouldn't worry about these things. Objectivism is in its infancy. So is the science of psychology, and that's been around a heck of lot longer. There's just an awful lot more work to be done.

Nicholas Dykes

Isn't it the means of achieving that lowest level of self-observation that is at issue? Aren't we already introspecting when we conclude that our appetite has changed, that our usual motivations are weaker, etc.? I agree that the self-diagnosis of depression is the use of reason, and that the data it comprises are introspective, however, it doesn't, I think, get us any closer to understanding introspective self-observation.

--Mindy

Isn't all data partially represented by numbers?

--Brant

No. Numbers can be assigned to whatever can be conceived as a multiple or quantity of some kind. None of our sensory data comes to us in the form of numbers. As far as translating everything into a measurement of some sort, note that not even all lengths are commensurable.

Ilove scallops. The taste of scallops doesn't involve any numbers. It involves the operation of things which could be numbered, as in how many taste buds react to the chemical stimuli of scallops...but the taste of scallops isn't given in numbers at all.

For "number-metaphysicians" note that numbers, counting, and measurement are all secondary to and dependent on some prior classification. A one-to-one correspondence between, e.g., sheep and pebbles depends on having conceptualized sheep and having conceptualized pebbles. Numbers are derivative on concepts, not the other way around.

--Mindy

[tjohnson]

A one-to-one correspondence between, e.g., sheep and pebbles depends on having conceptualized sheep and having conceptualized pebbles. Numbers are derivative on concepts, not the other way around.

I think numbers are symbols used to represent relations. Specifically, 0 and 1 is used to express symmetric relations like identity or equality in the expressions x+0=x and x*1=x. Other number are used to express asymmetric relations like in 2+3=5 and 5>3 etc. All of this has nothing to do with sheep or pebbles, mathematics is a language of relations, order, structure, etc.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

As far as translating everything into a measurement of some sort, note that not even all lengths are commensurable.

Ilove scallops. The taste of scallops doesn't involve any numbers. It involves the operation of things which could be numbered, as in how many taste buds react to the chemical stimuli of scallops...but the taste of scallops isn't given in numbers at all.

Mindy,

Things can only be measured against a standard, so you actually brought up a good point. Things like intensity, time, preference, etc. can be easily measured. As you mentioned, there actually are measurements of taste when you break down the parts that go into making taste possible.

But you hit on something I have been mulling over, top-down versus bottom-up thinking. To a bottom-up thinker, the taste of scallops actually is (and is nothing more than) the sum of the taste buds and their interaction to chemical stimuli, etc., but to a top-down thinker, the taste of scallops has a nature that goes beyond all that and becomes a thing-in-itself (or experience-in-itself in this case).

I would agree that once a thing-in-itself (something to which the law of identity is applicable) exists, there is a quality about it that can be identified, but not measured.

With one cavaet.

When using Rand's method of extracting a fundamental characteristic from the genus and using it to establish the differentia of a definition, there actually is an ordinal measurement that goes on. It goes something like this: Characteristic A of XXXX is more important than Characteristic B of XXXX. (I will leave the standard of comparison aside for now.)

There you have the ordinal 1st and 2nd, i.e, numbers and measurements. This obviously extends to all the other characteristics, so you end up getting a whole bunch of numbers and measurements.

For the record, I believe both top-down and bottom-up thinking are necessary for best understanding and knowledge.

Michael

[Mindy Newton]

As far as translating everything into a measurement of some sort, note that not even all lengths are commensurable.

Ilove scallops. The taste of scallops doesn't involve any numbers. It involves the operation of things which could be numbered, as in how many taste buds react to the chemical stimuli of scallops...but the taste of scallops isn't given in numbers at all.

Mindy,

Things can only be measured against a standard, so you actually brought up a good point. Things like intensity, time, preference, etc. can be easily measured. As you mentioned, there actually are measurements of taste when you break down the parts that go into making taste possible.

But you hit on something I have been mulling over, top-down versus bottom-up thinking. To a bottom-up thinker, the taste of scallops actually is (and is nothing more than) the sum of the taste buds and their interaction to chemical stimuli, etc., but to a top-down thinker, the taste of scallops has a nature that goes beyond all that and becomes a thing-in-itself (or experience-in-itself in this case).

I would agree that once a thing-in-itself (something to which the law of identity is applicable) exists, there is a quality about it that can be identified, but not measured.

With one cavaet.

When using Rand's method of extracting a fundamental characteristic from the genus and using it to establish the differentia of a definition, there actually is an ordinal measurement that goes on. It goes something like this: Characteristic A of XXXX is more important than Characteristic B of XXXX. (I will leave the standard of comparison aside for now.)

There you have the ordinal 1st and 2nd, i.e, numbers and measurements. This obviously extends to all the other characteristics, so you end up getting a whole bunch of numbers and measurements.

For the record, I believe both top-down and bottom-up thinking are necessary for best understanding and knowledge.

Michael

If I may insert a note about myself: I am often considered to be too nit-picking in discussions. I'm the sort of person who gets complained against as: you just have to win, don't you! and : you've got an answer for everything! This with scorn and dismissal, of course. I'm not assuming I'll get that response here, I'm hoping very much not, but I do discuss these things very seriously. I hope saying this keeps my posts from being mis-understood. I'm trying to get things right to the nth degree.

So, I'd like to comment first that when you say "extracting a fundamental characteristic from the genus..." I wonder what you mean, exactly? The differentia is manifest only in the subset that is being defined/conceptualized. It isn't explicit in the definition of the genus, of course, and would be an "omitted measurement" in the concept of the genus.

Next, the greater explanatory power of the genus as compared with the differentia is not the sort of measurement that is said to be omitted in Rand's concept-formation. It is differences among the referents of the class. Those are the omitted measurements.

The top-down and bottom-up issue is very big in perceptual psychology, and in cognition in general. The top-down approach, which predominates, presents problems for objectivity in perception, and thus knowledge. If the basic level of cognition requires guidance from pre-existing contents or structures, Plato and Kant have won the day.

--Mindy

[Chris Grieb]

As far as translating everything into a measurement of some sort, note that not even all lengths are commensurable.

Ilove scallops. The taste of scallops doesn't involve any numbers. It involves the operation of things which could be numbered, as in how many taste buds react to the chemical stimuli of scallops...but the taste of scallops isn't given in numbers at all.

Mindy,

Things can only be measured against a standard, so you actually brought up a good point. Things like intensity, time, preference, etc. can be easily measured. As you mentioned, there actually are measurements of taste when you break down the parts that go into making taste possible.

But you hit on something I have been mulling over, top-down versus bottom-up thinking. To a bottom-up thinker, the taste of scallops actually is (and is nothing more than) the sum of the taste buds and their interaction to chemical stimuli, etc., but to a top-down thinker, the taste of scallops has a nature that goes beyond all that and becomes a thing-in-itself (or experience-in-itself in this case).

I would agree that once a thing-in-itself (something to which the law of identity is applicable) exists, there is a quality about it that can be identified, but not measured.

With one cavaet.

When using Rand's method of extracting a fundamental characteristic from the genus and using it to establish the differentia of a definition, there actually is an ordinal measurement that goes on. It goes something like this: Characteristic A of XXXX is more important than Characteristic B of XXXX. (I will leave the standard of comparison aside for now.)

There you have the ordinal 1st and 2nd, i.e, numbers and measurements. This obviously extends to all the other characteristics, so you end up getting a whole bunch of numbers and measurements.

For the record, I believe both top-down and bottom-up thinking are necessary for best understanding and knowledge.

Michael

If I may insert a note about myself: I am often considered to be too nit-picking in discussions. I'm the sort of person who gets complained against as: you just have to win, don't you! and : you've got an answer for everything! This with scorn and dismissal, of course. I'm not assuming I'll get that response here, I'm hoping very much not, but I do discuss these things very seriously. I hope saying this keeps my posts from being mis-understood. I'm trying to get things right to the nth degree.

So, I'd like to comment first that when you say "extracting a fundamental characteristic from the genus..." I wonder what you mean, exactly? The differentia is manifest only in the subset that is being defined/conceptualized. It isn't explicit in the definition of the genus, of course, and would be an "omitted measurement" in the concept of the genus.

Next, the greater explanatory power of the genus as compared with the differentia is not the sort of measurement that is said to be omitted in Rand's concept-formation. It is differences among the referents of the class. Those are the omitted measurements.

The top-down and bottom-up issue is very big in perceptual psychology, and in cognition in general. The top-down approach, which predominates, presents problems for objectivity in perception, and thus knowledge. If the basic level of cognition requires guidance from pre-existing contents or structures, Plato and Kant have won the day.

--Mindy

Mindy; The only question I would ask the people who crictize you is "Am I wrong."

[Brant Gaede]

Mindy,

If we differentiate between data and datum do your comments still stand? That is, you seem to have a lot of datum points as opposed to data. (I can't go much further with this as I'm in over my head.) I'm specifically interested in getting data (datum?) into or out of science.

--Brant

Edited August 21, 2008 by Brant Gaede

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

I'm trying to get things right to the nth degree.

Mindy,

This is actually my approach.

Since I am a deep premise-checker (a habit I developed much more seriously than before in my life when I had to pull myself out of drug addiction), this often leads me to conflict with those who prefer preaching or causes or crusades. My own crusade, if one must have one, is to understand. Only after I understand correctly (or think I do) do I let myself consciously evaluate. I call this cognitive before normative thinking, or in simple language, knowing what something is before judging it.

I used to be a Randroid kind of Objectivist, but I no longer am. I still call myself an Objectivist because it is my philosophical starting point. But I have gone the way of using my own mind to check everything, especially Objectivist principles when the emotional load gets heavy. This has led me to re-agree with much of the philosophy and contest some things.

One beef I have had with Objectivism (which does not invalidate the philosophy to me, not by a long shot) is that many practitioners wish to automate the normative part so much that they don't have to think anymore. They just want to react emotionally. (You see this as a caricature in really snarky people.) I tried that in my own manner and reality just about busted me all up into little pieces. But then again, I usually go for things in a big way. The people who get on my nerves are usually more restrained, so they only limit this kind of thinking to certain areas. The standard jargon for this epistemological method is "kneejerk."

I may have one variation from your approach of getting things right, but I do not see this as a bad thing. I am an outside-the-box thinker. I am not afraid to take a line of questioning to a logical end, even if it barbecues sacred cows, and then be wrong. After it is all over, if I discover my approach was wrong, I just say, "Oops." I believe there is great value in such questioning. Despite being wrong at times, often I have found that I am right.

At any rate, I place great value on a person thinking for himself/herself, whether right or wrong. I have a deep-held belief that when people are of goodwill, all intellectual differences get worked out, so I harbor no feelings of threat from an idea per se. If someone disagrees with me, we can discuss it or not. I am still going to think with my own mind and I hope the other person will with his or hers.

I do harbor these feelings of threat with bad character, though, but that's another issue.

So, I'd like to comment first that when you say "extracting a fundamental characteristic from the genus..." I wonder what you mean, exactly?

I am speaking epistemologically and, as I am still in development on this line of thinking, I was not as complete or clear as I should have been. The genus is a concept in its own right and it includes an X number of characteristics. Fish, for example, is a different genus than bird. You specify a kind of fish or bird as a differentia from those categories.

From what I have observed, a distinguishing characteristic has to be present in the characteristics of the genus, but to an undeveloped or less prominent degree. For instance, "rational" for man has to come from "perceptual." It is impossible to be rational without a perceptual base. All animals have a percept-based consciousness. Thus rational (or conceptual) is perceptual, but more developed. It is not a totally new characteristic cut off from the others.

The differentia is manifest only in the subset that is being defined/conceptualized. It isn't explicit in the definition of the genus, of course, and would be an "omitted measurement" in the concept of the genus.

Next, the greater explanatory power of the genus as compared with the differentia is not the sort of measurement that is said to be omitted in Rand's concept-formation. It is differences among the referents of the class. Those are the omitted measurements.

I wasn't trying to use the measurement-omission standard here. I was merely pointing out that ordinal measurement did exist, thus math exists, within the process itself of concept formation. It is impossible to make a judgment of importance, whether normative or cognitive, and eliminate math. This was within the context of whether all data could be represented by math. I guess the correct way of saying it is that math can be applied to all data.

The top-down and bottom-up issue is very big in perceptual psychology, and in cognition in general. The top-down approach, which predominates, presents problems for objectivity in perception, and thus knowledge. If the basic level of cognition requires guidance from pre-existing contents or structures, Plato and Kant have won the day.

I agree if top-down only existed or it lorded over bottom up. I used to think the issue was either-or, so I opted for bottom-up thinking. But the more I pondered it and read about it, the more I was at a loss to understand how a cow emerges from subparticles. Why the form of "cow" in specific? Why not something else in its place? And when there is something else like a different species, why that specific form? Is this just random? Do you say something like "the given" and don't think about it anymore? (While you go about your business finding out the "whys" of the parts of the cow?)

Then I came across an idea I started entertaining, which is to claim one governance (as in laws of nature or whatever you want to call universal principles) comes from the bottom up, and the other from the top down.

An instance of looking from the top-down view would be the principle of the holon (discussed recently elsewhere here on OL), i.e., a whole system that is part of a greater whole, but made up less significant whole systems. This seems to be the way the universe is constructed. In other words, I think there are principles in reality that identify how form works, not just the parts.

I also find "law of identity" to be too vague at times, as it is sort of an interface governing both top and bottom. To be clearer, I don't think top-down can exist without bottom-up and vice-versa. I believe they are interconnected in much the same manner the fundamental axioms of existence and identity are. "To be is to be something," as Rand would put it. But that "something" has a form and its form is not just a random accident. In fact, an existent with a specific form can be categorized with other similar existents with the same form because they exist in that form. That form is part of them. There are principles that can be identified. (The human species, for example, is not a bunch of unrelated individuals who are similar only in our minds. Top-down there is reason, upright body, five senses, etc., and bottom up there is DNA.)

It's almost master-of-the-obvious stuff, but I cannot imagine form predominating over content just as I cannot imagine content predominating over form. An existent has both and both define it.

As to Plato and Kant's formulations, I believe they were way too top-heavy. I want to stress, however, that my own familiarity with their work is predominantly second-hand from Rand's blasts and from discussions. I need to read them and they are on my reading list (but not at the top ).

Michael

[Xray]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses".

Per this definition, a dog for example possesses reason too. For dogs can identify, integrate and also categorize.

A lion can identify and mentally abstract a gazelle from an adult cape buffalo and know which "category" is more likely to yield a meal.

Edited September 14, 2009 by Xray

[merjet]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses".

Per this definition, a dog for example possesses reason too. For dogs can identify, integrate and also categorize.

This is another example of Xray's extensive pattern of misquotes and distortions. Following are the first two quotes about reason here.

Reason is the faculty that identifies and integrates the material provided by man’s senses.

Reason integrates man’s perceptions by means of forming abstractions or conceptions, thus raising man’s knowledge from the perceptual level, which he shares with animals, to the conceptual level, which he alone can reach.

It could hardly be more clear that Rand refers to humans and only humans. Yet according to Xray, Rand is talking about dogs. So according to Xray's perverse "logic", a dog is human.

[Dragonfly]

Objectivists typically define reason as "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses".

Per this definition, a dog for example possesses reason too. For dogs can identify, integrate and also categorize.

This is another example of Xray's extensive pattern of misquotes and distortions.

This is another example of Objectivists who cannot read. Xray wrote "Per this definition, a dog for example possesses reason too.", referring to the definition given by l_chaim29: "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses", and she's of course right that this definition also applies to a dog, and that's all she says. That Rand may mean this only for humans is totally irrelevant, Xray's post just shows that this meaning is not warranted by the definition, as it does not exclusively apply to humans.

[merjet]

This is another example of Objectivists who cannot read. Xray wrote "Per this definition, a dog for example possesses reason too.", referring to the definition given by l_chaim29: "the faculty which identifies and integrates the data provided by one's senses", and she's of course right that this definition also applies to a dog, and that's all she says. That Rand may mean this only for humans is totally irrelevant, Xray's post just shows that this meaning is not warranted by the definition, as it does not exclusively apply to humans.

This is another example of a critic who cannot read. The alleged definition was not written by Ayn Rand. It was attributed to "Objectivists typically", which is highly ambiguous. It was also an obvious distortion of what Ayn Rand in fact said.

Isn't it amazing that Dragonfly acts like it is fine to use "Objectivists" and simultaneously declare that Ayn Rand's words are irrelevant?

Edited September 14, 2009 by Merlin Jetton

[Dragonfly]

This is another example of a critic who cannot read. The alleged definition was not written by Ayn Rand. It was attributed to "Objectivists typically", which is highly ambiguous. It was also an obvious distortion of what Ayn Rand in fact said.

Then you should attack l_chaim29, because it was he who gave that definition, Xray was merely responding to his post. But it's apparently imperative to seize any occasion to bash Xray.