Value of ITOE


JennaW

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including alternatives not considered by Rand, or not well described by her, or not ruled out by the arguments she put forward to try to rule them out, parts of it became less clear than they had once been...

Then I guess you know what I mean when I say vague... right off the bat, coming from the background I already do, it is vague in the way that it does not describe the depth of a field, nor cover any alternatives. The thing is, is that I don't fault Rand for that because I do put her in context. As she herself mentioned, knowledge is contextual--- even hers.

For an even longer time, I would have agreed with you that "The Objectivist Ethics" (in The Virtue of Selfishness) was extremely clear. But as I tried to explain moral development, and I learned more about Aristotle and then about other Ancient moral thinkers, the more gaps I saw in some parts of it. What exactly is a principle, for instance? Is being rational or honest or productive just a matter of understanding a proposition that identifies some basic fact about the way human beings function successfully in the world, and sticking with that understanding--or is there a component of skill involved?

I know I most likely think it's clear based on 1) my personal experiences and the depth of them, and 2) my lack of philosophical education in the realm of whatever Selfishness covers. As for the words "rational", I took it to mean "individual and reality-based". "Reality-based" can be a specific term, however reality itself is very complex and contains much phenomena that may be outside of current human understanding or observational powers. "Honest" to me meant "speaking what I know (facts, opinions), within the context of my knowledge and experience" so that if I have an opinion, I don't lie and speak another opinion that I don't have. "Productive" meant "positive contributions to humanity, to life, to the world in measurable workload"--- and that could mean learning, writing, researching, etc.

And of course, I think all of that comes with understanding on a deep level what is real--- as in, other human beings are just as real and their behaviors are just as real, as mine. Perhaps it takes skill to be able to understand reality, and not only that, to understand one's own mind? Does rationality include introspection?

In this way I've taken it for my own, for right now. Maybe when I have more time I can look deeper.

To be continued...

:)

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Then I guess you know what I mean when I say vague... right off the bat, coming from the background I already do, it is vague in the way that it does not describe the depth of a field, nor cover any alternatives.

One reason that ITOE may seem to lack depth for you is that you may be asking too much from it. Epistemology and Cogn-Neuroscience are two different fields, even though Cogn-Neuroscience must ential a rational view of epistemology, similar to Metaphysics and Physics. Epiestemology is the study or theory of the nature and grounds of knowledge epecially with reference to its limits and validity (Merriam-Webster Online). There are actually philosophers who believe that you can't really know anything because the senses can't be trusted (skeptics), philosophers who believe that if a large majority of people claim something isn't true (even though in reality it is) then it isn't true (pragmatist), and philosophers who believe that everything has true essence that is only detectable through some vague form of esp (platonist). I think that the main ideas that Rand wanted to convey in her ITOE is that we gain knowlege by percerving with our senses (which are valid) and by rationaly processing this information with our mind. A is A and we can know it by consciously exploring reality. By studying Cogn-Neuroscience you already assume that the sense are valid and that we can gain knowledge from the world. It is up to Psychology and Physiology to find out how this occurs.

Dustan

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There are actually philosophers who believe that you can't really know anything because the senses can't be trusted (skeptics), philosophers who believe that if a large majority of people claim something isn't true (even though in reality it is) then it isn't true (pragmatist), and philosophers who believe that everything has true essence that is only detectable through some vague form of esp (platonist). I think that the main ideas that Rand wanted to convey in her ITOE is that we gain knowlege by percerving with our senses (which are valid) and by rationaly processing this information with our mind. A is A and we can know it by consciously exploring reality. By studying Cogn-Neuroscience you already assume that the sense are valid and that we can gain knowledge from the world. It is up to Psychology and Physiology to find out how this occurs.

Well, I don't agree with "the skeptics" in that just because you're fooled sometimes (i.e. optical illusions, attentional focus that misses some aspect of environment, etc.) it doesn't follow that you're fooled all of the time. Skeptics in this sense go too far on the fact that just because there is SOME uncertainty, then EVERYTHING ELSE is uncertain. Too much extrapolation.

It seems that pragmatists are doing the same thing in with the appeal to majority thing in terms of opinion. What is theory and opinion is not necessarily fact. HOWEVER, in the realm of science, if there is overwhelming evidence (such as there is in evolution) then you go from opinion and theories about the evidence to the evidence itself. I think there is confusion between what is evidence and what is theory/opinion here; it's not only pragmatists (by your definition) that misses the difference between theories about evidence versus evidence itself. I don't know much about pragmatists--- in linguistics, there's a subfield called pragmatics but I don't think it's the same thing. I've always thought "pragmatic" meant "practical".

I did read Plato ten years ago in philosophy class. I don't remember much of it. Here I think the word "essence" and what it means can get into trouble, and I'm finding that currently, we have a general notion of "essence" but when it's misapplied and diverts from reality, then you have something closer to what Plato said. And, I also think that one can make this (cognitive) mistake and not know it. I kinda see it as mistaking the real for the ideal (or vice versa?) Essentialism of concepts in cognitive science is first refuted by evidence in terms of how humans know the world and use concepts (I can give citations if asked) as in concept formation, the boundaries are fuzzy.

From wikipedia: Essentialism is the belief and practice centered on a philosophical claim that for any specific kind of entity it is at least theoretically possible to specify a finite list of characteristics, all of which any entity must have to belong to the group defined. A member of a specific kind of entity may possess other characteristics that are neither needed to establish its membership nor preclude its membership. It should be noted that essences do not simply reflect ways of grouping objects, essences must result in properties of the object. An essence characterizes a substance or a form, in the sense of the Forms or Ideas in Platonic realism. It is permanent, unalterable, and eternal; and present in every possible world.
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Jenna:

I don't know much about pragmatists--- in linguistics, there's a subfield called pragmatics but I don't think it's the same thing. I've always thought "pragmatic" meant "practical".

The same for "skeptics". I'm a member of a organization of skeptics and have a few meters of skeptic books. But this kind of skepticism is about pseudoscience, quacks, channelers, dowsers, spoon benders etc. Their credo is: "show me the evidence". They certainly don't think that "you can't know anything". I don't know if there are people who really say that you can't know anything, it seems to me to be an unwarranted extrapolation of the fact that we never can be absolutely certain about the physical world. But the fact that for example the senses are not 100% reliable does not imply that they're not reliable at all, we can live very well with high probabilities that are nevertheless not certainties. So in this sense I'm certainly a skeptic and a pragmatist. That there are also some philosophical movements with the same names is rather confusing.

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The same for "skeptics". I'm a member of a organization of skeptics and have a few meters of skeptic books. But this kind of skepticism is about pseudoscience, quacks, channelers, dowsers, spoon benders etc. Their credo is: "show me the evidence". They certainly don't think that "you can't know anything". I don't know if there are people who really say that you can't know anything, it seems to me to be an unwarranted extrapolation of the fact that we never can be absolutely certain about the physical world. But the fact that for example the senses are not 100% reliable does not imply that they're not reliable at all, we can live very well with high probabilities that are nevertheless not certainties. So in this sense I'm certainly a skeptic and a pragmatist. That there are also some philosophical movements with the same names is rather confusing.

There are actually people who believe in that level (you can't know anything) of skepticism. I actually met a whole group of them in college. Also we covered this type of skepticism in my epistemology class in college as well. David Hume and Descartes were two skeptics. Here is a link to Wikipedia about Philosophical Skepticism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_skepticism

and an excerpt from it:

"Absolute Certainty

First of all, in all three arguments -- Hume's, Descartes', and the circularity argument -- the claim is made that we can't prove something or other. We can't prove that sense-data represent an external reality. We can't prove that we're not dreaming. We can't prove that perception, or memory, is reliable. But now ask yourself: just because you can't prove something, does that mean that you don't know it? Or that you aren't justified in believing it? Take Descartes' dreaming doubt as an example. Suppose you're convinced that you can't prove that you're not dreaming, not without begging the question. And you're even willing to admit that mere very slight possibility that you are dreaming right now. However, a non-skepticist might reply, who cares? So what if I can't prove, to Descartes' skeptic, that I'm not dreaming? Who cares if there is a very, very slight possibility that I'm dreaming right now? Does that really matter to my knowledge-claims?

Now, Descartes himself thought it definitely did matter. Descartes wanted absolutely certain knowledge -- knowledge beyond any doubt. And so he thought that if you can raise the smallest doubt about something, then you don't really know it. For example, the dreaming doubt raises the very small possibility that you are not actually reading this article right now; you might be dreaming; and so Descartes would say (at that point -- later he thought he refuted this skepticism) that you don't know you're reading this right now.

So this forces us to ask ourselves: Do we have to have absolute certainty, lacking any doubt whatsoever, in order to have knowledge? That would be the absolutely strongest grade of justification possible. And then we would be saying that knowledge is not just sufficiently justified true belief, but certainlytrue belief.

Many philosophers don't think that such a strong degree of justification is necessary for knowledge. After all, they claim, we can know what the weather is going to be like, just by reading the morning forecast. Sometimes we're wrong; but if we're right then we have knowledge. So they are not particularly worried if they can't prove that they're not dreaming. They think it's extremely unlikely that they're dreaming, and they think they're perfectly well justified in thinking they're awake. And they don't have to know with absolute certainty that they're awake, of course, to be well-justified in believing they're awake. Note too that Descartes himself rejected his skeptical doubts in the end.

Here's a second thing you might observe about skepticism: if the skeptic makes absolute certainty a requirement for knowledge, then you could reply that this observation should be applied to skepticism itself. Is skepticism itself entirely beyond doubt? Isn't it possible to raise various kinds of objection to skepticism? So it would appear; but then no one can know that skepticism is true. So then the skeptic can't know that skepticism is true. But this is actually a bit of a weak reply, because it doesn't really refute skepticism. The skeptic, after all, may be perfectly happy to admit that no one knows that skepticism is true. The skeptic might rest content saying that skepticism is very probably true. That's not the kind of claim that most non-skeptics will be happy to allow."

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It seems that pragmatists are doing the same thing in with the appeal to majority thing in terms of opinion. What is theory and opinion is not necessarily fact. HOWEVER, in the realm of science, if there is overwhelming evidence (such as there is in evolution) then you go from opinion and theories about the evidence to the evidence itself. I think there is confusion between what is evidence and what is theory/opinion here; it's not only pragmatists (by your definition) that misses the difference between theories about evidence versus evidence itself. I don't know much about pragmatists--- in linguistics, there's a subfield called pragmatics but I don't think it's the same thing. I've always thought "pragmatic" meant "practical".

Here is Williams James version of Epistemological Pragmatism from Wikipedia http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_James:

James defined truth as that which works in the way of belief. "True ideas lead us into useful verbal and conceptual quarters as well as directly up to useful sensible termini. They lead to consistency, stability and flowing human intercourse" but "all true processes must lead to the face of directly verifying sensible experiences somewhere," he wrote.

Pragmatism as a view of the meaning of truth is considered obsolete by many in contemporary philosophy, because the predominant trend of thinking in the years since James' death in 1910 has been toward non-epistemic definitions of truth, i.e. definitions that don't make truth dependent upon the warrant of a belief. A contemporary philosopher or logician will often be found explaining that the statement "the book is on the table" is true if and only if the book is on the table.

In What Pragmatism Means, James writes that the central point of his own doctrine of truth is, in brief, that "truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and coordinate with it. Truth is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons." Richard Rorty claims that James did not mean to give a theory of truth with this statement, and that we should not regard it as such. James seems to say incompatible things about truth. In addition to truth being what is good in the way of belief, he also says truth is correspondence with reality, or 'the facts'. But this may be interpreted as viewing the property of truth as correspondence with reality while maintaining that the concept of truth is whatever is good in the way of belief. True to pragmatist spirit, he never purported to be providing the necessary and sufficient conditions for truth.

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Cash Value

From the introduction to William James's Pragmatism by Bruce Kuklick p.xiv.

James went on to apply the pragmatic method to the epistemological problem of truth. He would seek the meaning of 'true' by examining how the idea functioned in our lives. A belief was true, he said, if in the long run it worked for all of us, and guided us expeditiously through our semihospitable world. James was anxious to uncover what true beliefs amounted to in human life, what their "Cash Value" was, what consequences they led to. A belief was not a mental entity which somehow mysteriously corresponded to an external reality if the belief were true. Beliefs were ways of acting with reference to a precarious environment, and to say they were true was to say they guided us satifactorily in this environment. In this sense the pragmatic theory of truth applied Darwinian ideas in philosophy; it made survival the test of intellectual as well as biological fitness. If what was true was what worked, then scientific investigate religion's claim to truth in the same manner. The enduring quality of religious beliefs throughout recorded history and in all cultures gave indirect support for the view that such beliefs worked. James also argued directly that such beliefs were satisfying—they enabled us to lead fuller, richer lives and were more viable than their alternatives. Religious beliefs were expedient in human existence, just as scientific beliefs were.

The Wikipedia article on philosophical pragmatism is here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatism but incomplete. Pragmatics as it relates to linguistics is here http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatics. But to be fair the second line from wikipedia about pragmatism is as follows:

Given the diversity among thinkers and the variety among schools of thought that have adopted this term over the years, the term pragmatism has become all but meaningless in the absence of further qualification

So basically it is who is using it and how which determines what pragmatism means, which is a little ironic :-)

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The same for "skeptics". I'm a member of a organization of skeptics and have a few meters of skeptic books. But this kind of skepticism is about pseudoscience, quacks, channelers, dowsers, spoon benders etc. Their credo is: "show me the evidence". They certainly don't think that "you can't know anything". I don't know if there are people who really say that you can't know anything, it seems to me to be an unwarranted extrapolation of the fact that we never can be absolutely certain about the physical world. But the fact that for example the senses are not 100% reliable does not imply that they're not reliable at all, we can live very well with high probabilities that are nevertheless not certainties. So in this sense I'm certainly a skeptic and a pragmatist. That there are also some philosophical movements with the same names is rather confusing.

There is "philosophical skepticism" and "scientific skepticism". I'm not a philosophical skeptic, but I am a scientific skeptic.

I had to figure that out a while ago--- it seemed like the word "skeptic" had different meanings and I think in terms of science so I was always using it in the way Michael Shermer used it--- as against pseudo-science and supernatural beliefs by saying "show me the evidence".

I think philosophical skeptics say things like "There's no such thing as evidence..." or "It's all in my head" or "How do you know it's evidence?" or similar questions that avoid the notion of evidence.

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