Government Funding

[Dennis]

Hello,

I was reading Michael's essay about rights, and towards the end he raised a question that has often troubled me: how is government to be funded if not by compulsory taxes.

The passage which originally caught my attention is the fourth to last paragraph:

How this is to be funded and what to do in emergencies (or what to do about matters like depraved indifference) are still under consideration in my thinking.

Michael was speaking in the context of the government taking care of people who cannot support themselves. However, the question is equally applicable to any government endeavor. I have read Rand's essay suggesting the possibility of a fee on contracts to make them legally enforceable ("Government and Financing in a Free Society", The Virtue of Selfishness). Rand herself said that this was only a suggestion, and I believe there must be room for many other ideas in this area. I wonder if there is any other Objectivist material available on this topic, as it seems a vital one if a person is going to seriously discuss a government which does not impose taxes.

Dennis

Edited November 22, 2007 by Dennis

[syrakusos]

Lottery. (Of course, this puts the government in the gambling business, which is problematic for advocates of laissez faire.)

Payment for office. $1 million for House. $5 million for Senate. $10 million for a cabinet post. Or open it all to bids and auctions. Rich people might have some advantage -- and why not, after all? -- but anyone could sell shares of stock and raise the cash to bid. This model could describe what we have today in that those who vote for a candidate are supposedly willing to pay taxes after the election. This could work all the way down to the local levels for all offices. You might get some small salary or none, but in any event, the money for gaining the office would go into running the office.

User Fees for ports and harbors. I am also a member of the AOPA: the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. They fight hard and win against "user fees" for services like air traffic control. (Planes pay for landing. Typically waived at most places, the fee might be $5 or $15 for a private plane at a county airport but obviously much more to bring that 747 full of freight or passenbers from Heathrow to LaGuardia.) But, I am in favor of such fees, and in that I stand nearly alone.

User fees in general are a good idea for government services. But my advocacy of them is self-serving.

-------------

One problem with a fee on contracts is that protecting the sanctity of contract is supposed to be one of the functions of government. If you have to pay extra for the service, then it is a market service, not a government. And what is a "contract"? Any agreement between two entities is a contract. So, you and I could forego paying the goverment fee and pay a different fee to some other (private) arbitrator? That sonds like anarchy. [We have these today. Check out the American Arbitration Association at http://www.adr.org/ -- ADR: Alternative Dispute Resolution. One reason why I am an anarchist.]

By the same standard, why not pay a "voluntary fee" ahead of time to have the police show up when you need them? (We have this problem now, actually. In some places, if a business owner has a large cash deposit to make, they can get a police escort, but Aunt Shaynah in the ghetto does not get a cop to go shopping with her.) Unless, of course, you decide to pay your fees to private protection agencies. Again, that sounds like anarchy. [Check out ASIS International -- formerly the American Society for Industrial Security -- http://www.asisonline.org/ Their Security Industry Buyers Guide lists over 300 private guard companies including three that I have worked for AKAL, SECURITAS and Allied-Barton. Yet another reason why I support a free market in protection.]

[Guyau]

Welcome, Dennis.

The main right way and its rationale are shown here in this 1987 work:

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...ns/1912.shtml#6

[syrakusos]

Wow, Stephen, I am impressed...

This kind of thinking is important for proprietary communities. As more of these come into existence, there will be wider alternatives in organizational structure. What happens when two or six of these border each other? This must be the case already in Florida, Arizona or California and if not, then they soon will be. One problem now is that these are developed within the context of existing traditions ("laws") whereas you point to a creative way to think this through de novo. Thanks for your hard work.

Mike M.

[Wolf DeVoon]

for the record

First, I would stipulate many independent and competitive security

agencies, not one monolithic 'government.' Lawyers will organize

dispute settlement and many other services that legitimize (by their

reasonableness) numerous private security companies and one national

defense company (a territorial utility with a natural monopoly). I

think this is arguably a free-market economic guesstimate of what will

happen in the long run. Private security companies will be local or

specialized (in cyberspace 'grids,' for instance) and supported

voluntarily by their subscribers. If a security company goes bad,

others can woo their disgruntled customers, much like airlines who

open routes of transport when they perceive fresh demand for a better,

cheaper service.

How to finance the monopoly national defense company (let's call it

the Territorial Executive) is a thrawn conundrum with no good solution

except taxation. How to levy and collect this tax is a core problem.

To my mind, the Territorial Executive should be an uniquely public

corporation -- the only one permitted in law with an impersonal,

perpetual charter, which confers no domestic or civil police power but

is legally competent to provide national territorial defense at the

borders. Its shares would be publically traded, mostly held by its

founding 'institutional' subscribers (banks, pension funds, insurance

companies) and their successors with deep pockets. Big players have

most to lose if attacked or invaded.

Assuming that it's a small standing army, enough to patrol the shores

and skies with a large, part-time volunteer reserve force, then taxes

could be reasonably small. The hard question, I repeat, is how to levy

and collect those national defense taxes. Voluntary payment of tax is

not a credible solution, because of the free rider problem. Nor do I

propose that taxes be collected by force or punitive legal process.

Under the Freeman's Constitution, forcible imposition of tax is a

crime against humanity.

Twenty years ago, in USA Inc, I proposed that national defense costs

be apportioned among the 50 states, plus a head tax -- say $100 a year

per adult citizen. The math was okay, but it is an inoperative concept

in pure ancap. We also need to imagine that there are many regions and

communities not unlike (but far more numerous than) the 13

post-colonial American states under the Articles of Confederation,

jealous and suspicious of each other. It is unlikely that 100

city-states and 5,000 rural districts will pay national defense taxes

without grumbling, footdragging, and acrimony ("We're paying too much

based on population, or property value, which has declined, compared

to so-and-so.") Ancap security firms will be similar in attitude to

the customers and local communities they serve. Abide by court

decisions? -- yes, with considerable grumbling about legal fees.

Cheerfully pay national defense taxes? -- no.

So, I think the shareholders of this unique national defense

corporation are going to end up holding the financial bag -- which

means that they will have to pass along the annual 'rights cash call'

(a levy on shares) to their customers and counterparties in the form

of higher prices, maybe 1-2% of GDP. If someone gets tired of

'collecting taxes' as a shareholder, they could sell to another

company or successful speculator (think George Soros or Ted Turner)

who wanted to exercise voting rights in National Defense Inc, and

qualify as a shareholder for possible nomination and election as a

director.

After a long and successful career in business, great men are not

unnaturally drawn to politics and statesmanship. In the manner which I

have described it, they can buy a vote by making big annual cash

contributions to national defense. No man is likely to 'corner the

market' and become tyrant, for the same reason that all historical

attempts to hold a commodity to ransom (like the Hunt brothers making

vast silver buys) have failed and must always fail. Many, many persons

and financial institutions will want a piece of the Territorial

Executive, and every newspaper on earth will be watching its every

tick of its share price.

Berkshire Hathaway is a good metaphor for the Territorial Executive,

with a market cap of $113 billion (1/3 privately held by Warren

Buffett) and its share price in the stratosphere, currently $73,500

per share. See Note 1, below.

This is a pretty important post. I've never previously stated this

theorem of public goods finance, so I reserve the right to revise and

extend my remarks.

NOTE 1. Berkshire Hathaway Inc. is a holding company owning

subsidiaries engaged in a number of diverse business activities, the

most important of which are insurance businesses conducted on both a

primary basis and a reinsurance basis. Berkshire's principal insurance

businesses are GEICO, General Re, Berkshire Hathaway Reinsurance Group

and Berkshire Hathaway Primary Group. Berkshire also owns and operates

a number of other businesses that offer apparel, building products,

finance and financial products and flight services. See

http://www.salon.com/people/bc­/1999/08/31/buffett/

NOTE 2. There is ample historical American precedent for businessmen

funding national security. See http://www.robert-morris.com/ and

http://www.businessweek.com/19­99/99_16/b3625044.htm

NOTE 3. In previous writing ('The End of Fukuyama') I said: "We do not

need a public treasury to provide for national defense or domestic

tranquility. In point of legal fact, the U.S. government is bankrupt,

and it is laughable to hear anyone speak of paying the national debt.

When this becomes irrefutably obvious in 2015, I suggest that we

privatize the U.S. military-industrial complex, rather than remain its

tax slaves. I don't see the point of forbidding foreign ownership,

since U.S. policy is driven by Israel and the Security Council,

cordially treating Russia and China as equals in a balance of power.

Let's talk IPO. Give the Pentagon to Merrill Lynch and let them

syndicate World Cop Inc. I'm sure that Britain, Germany, Japan, and

most of New England will buy a piece, to keep crude flowing northward

from the slave-states of OPEC."

http://www.geocities.com/dv05131970/rule_of_law.html

[Dennis]

Michael,

Thank you for replying to my first post here at OL. I will add more of my own thoughts on the topic in a separate post at a later time.

Lottery. (Of course, this puts the government in the gambling business, which is problematic for advocates of laissez faire.)

The bigger problem with this idea is that any competing lottery is not going to be taking a cut off the top to support unrelated endeavors, so unless the government restricts others from entering this business, the government will not be competitive. The same is true of any business the government might go into for funding.

Payment for office. $1 million for House. $5 million for Senate. $10 million for a cabinet post. Or open it all to bids and auctions. Rich people might have some advantage -- and why not, after all? -- but anyone could sell shares of stock and raise the cash to bid. This model could describe what we have today in that those who vote for a candidate are supposedly willing to pay taxes after the election. This could work all the way down to the local levels for all offices. You might get some small salary or none, but in any event, the money for gaining the office would go into running the office.

This is an interesting idea that I've never considered before. Each time I try to make a meaningful reply to this idea I find a lot of interesting and seemingly important issues that make a quick reply unreasonable, so I'll have to spend some time thinking about this one. My first impressions are that this idea could not work out though. Can you point me to some other information regarding this idea?

User Fees for ports and harbors. I am also a member of the AOPA: the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association. They fight hard and win against "user fees" for services like air traffic control. (Planes pay for landing. Typically waived at most places, the fee might be $5 or $15 for a private plane at a county airport but obviously much more to bring that 747 full of freight or passenbers from Heathrow to LaGuardia.) But, I am in favor of such fees, and in that I stand nearly alone.

User fees in general are a good idea for government services. But my advocacy of them is self-serving.

User fees were the gist of the article of Rand's that I originally mentioned, and they seem to be the most reasonable form of funding. After all, it makes sense that the people taking advantage of government services should help to foot the bill. However, this doesn't work in all cases. For example, it would be unreasonable to charge user fees on police services since you can't decide when you will need them in most cases.

As a side note, it doesn't seem appropriate for the government to be charging user fees for ports and harbors as these ought to be privately controlled enterprises.

One problem with a fee on contracts is that protecting the sanctity of contract is supposed to be one of the functions of government. If you have to pay extra for the service, then it is a market service, not a government. And what is a "contract"? Any agreement between two entities is a contract. So, you and I could forego paying the goverment fee and pay a different fee to some other (private) arbitrator? That sonds like anarchy. [We have these today. Check out the American Arbitration Association at http://www.adr.org/ -- ADR: Alternative Dispute Resolution. One reason why I am an anarchist.]

This system doesn't need to be anarchy at all. For example, in any contract the parties could specify an arbitrator of their choice and agree to abide by the decision of that arbitrator and pay whatever fees that arbitrator might charge them. However, the arbitrator cannot himself enforce his decisions as the use of force is a government held monopoly, so regardless of who performs the arbitration, it would be reasonable to pay a fee to the government if you want to make sure you can enforce the decision of the arbitrator.

In fact, I see no reason why the government need be involved in arbitration except possibly in the case of investigating fraud by private arbitrators.

By the same standard, why not pay a "voluntary fee" ahead of time to have the police show up when you need them? (We have this problem now, actually. In some places, if a business owner has a large cash deposit to make, they can get a police escort, but Aunt Shaynah in the ghetto does not get a cop to go shopping with her.) Unless, of course, you decide to pay your fees to private protection agencies. Again, that sounds like anarchy. [Check out ASIS International -- formerly the American Society for Industrial Security -- http://www.asisonline.org/ Their Security Industry Buyers Guide lists over 300 private guard companies including three that I have worked for AKAL, SECURITAS and Allied-Barton. Yet another reason why I support a free market in protection.]

There is no reason that a person shouldn't be able to hire private security. Private security presents no problem to the use of force rule so long as they are strictly used defensively. Self defense is a legitimate use of force and being prepared with the resources needed to defend yourself is a reasonable step to take.

The police helping a business owner on his way to the bank is an example of preventative policing, where the police go in advance to the site of a likely crime. This happens all the time and is a perfectly reasonable step for the police to take. The fact that the ghetto is always the site of a likely crime shows a serious problem in society and not a problem with police methodology. Of course, I would like to see crime stopped in the ghetto, but this is a separate issue.

Dennis

[Dennis]

Welcome, Dennis.

The main right way and its rationale are shown here in this 1987 work:

http://rebirthofreason.com/Forum/ArticleDi...ns/1912.shtml#6

Thank you, Stephen.

Thank you also for pointing out your article. It was a very interesting read. There were a couple of points I was unsure of in your article. First, you wrote:

Members of a successful alliance must come up with a scheme for imposing specific dues. Recourse to a procedure for selecting a representative portion of members to decide on assessments can be expected for large alliances.

One plausibly equitable cost-sharing scheme would have all landowners in the alliance pay a single percentage of their annual rents for real estate (but see Hardin 1982, 90–100). Owners drawing no rents in a given year might instead incur an equivalent lien against their property to be extinguished by future rents or sale. The percentage required to discharge the common security burden could be varied with necessity over the years.

...

Where property rights in land are perfected justly by the existence of an alliance, the alliance has the right to resist secession. It could agree to or acquiesce in a case of secession, but against the just alliance, the individual landowner could have no incontestable right to secede. A unilateral withdrawal of land from the jurisdiction of the alliance or a withholding of the due portion of rents for support of the security burden is essentially a breach of contract by convention. Then reciprocity is ended, and we are back where we began.

...

There are two basic ways in which actual states differ from the just land state. Firstly, they do things, in themselves legitimate, through illicit means such as taxation. Secondly, they do things that, like

taxation, should not be done by anyone; they systematically violate rights.

The dues you speak of are clearly a form of taxation, since a person cannot decide not to pay and cannot secede from the alliance. However, the tax is levied against income from land, whose operty rights exist only because of the alliance, so it is reasonable to demand that the cost of the alliance supporting the owner's right be paid by him. Is this how I should understand your meaning?

--------------------------------

--------------------------------

Another point about your article raised alarms. You said:

Subgroups of individuals within the territory of a land state could subscribe for fees to various ongoing organizations offering to assure public and just vindication of rights (beyond rights in real property). All such organizations would have to dovetail their laws with the law of real property, they would have to recognize the particular real estate titles recognized by the land state, and they would have to derive all their revenues from subscriptions or donations. Each such agency of justice would have to earn public confidence in its justness; otherwise, like individuals, these agencies would have no right, good against third party intervention, to wield retaliatory force (Nozick 1974, 12–18, 133–34, 140; see also Hardin 1982 101–24). George Smith has given reasons for believing such agencies would have economic incentives to reach demonstrably true verdicts (1979, 411–14, 421–24).

What happens in the case where two justice agencies come into conflict? I believe this was the whole point of why Rand believed that the use of force must be a government held monopoly. I give the following two examples.

Suppose two people enter into an agreement and write up a contract. However, these the wording of the contract has an ambiguity in it which neither person recognizes, but which each interprets differently. If these two people each subscribe to different justice agencies, how could this dispute be resolved? Would not a more reasonable solution be to have people entering into an agreement agree at that time on a justice agency to arbitrate any disputes, and register their agreement for a fee, rather than have such agencies work on a subscription system?

A similar dilemma could be suggested where two people, subscribing to different justice agencies, get into a fight which was witnessed by no others, and each claims the other was the agressor. Suppose both agencies investigate, but come to opposite conclusions based on the evidence, each supporting their own subscriber. How will these agencies determine whose assessment is valid to be enforced? The subscribers of each agency would demand that their agency upheld their verdict and failure to do so would result in a loss of business. It seems that there is need of an impartial agency which can, at a minimum, settle disputes of this kind.

Neither of these scenarios considers differences in rules by which such agencies would judge cases and determine punishment.

(I apologize if this material is covered in your references. Unfortunately, I do not have easy access to these materials to read the background to your assertions.)

--------------------------------

--------------------------------

Unfortunately, there seems to be very little discussion of this article in the original thread on RoR. Has there been discussion of it elsewhere?

This article, combined with the original thoughts sparked by Michael Stuart Kelly's article on rights, as well as some other material I've investigated since then, has given me some interesting ideas that I hope to expand on here in the coming weeks.

Dennis.

[BaalChatzaf]

In fact, I see no reason why the government need be involved in arbitration except possibly in the case of investigating fraud by private arbitrators.

Who and how determines whether fraud has occurred? You need a Law above all parties with rules of evidence and the means of enforcing such Law. If you have contending parties making their own law then you will have civil strife and even civil war.

And that is why private forces for determining wrongs, cannot work.

There has to be a law superior to all contending parties.

And if you have that, you have government force instrumentality including compulsory taxation to maintain it. However unpleasant taxation is, some of it is necessary to maintain the peace. If peace and order in the society needs be maintained (in the case of vehement dispute) by the government then taxation is the price of peace and order. If that is all the government is supposed to do, we should be able to have all the benefits of government for no more than a five percent tax on property and income (my guess). In any case confiscatory taxation such as we have should not be necessary.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Dennis]

Ba'al Chatzaf,

Your first statement shows that you agree with me about the point even though your tone suggests you're debating me about it. There needs to be a law above all others. Did you read the rest of my posts in this thread? I pointed out this problem with private arbitration quite explicitly in my reply to Stephen Boydstun.

Regarding your comments about taxation being required to support the state's use of force, do you have any evidence to support this claim, or is it just your opinion? Stephen Boydstun made an interesting case for why taxation might be reasonable in certain contexts in the article he linked to on RoR. Although I'm not sure I entirely agree with him, his arguments do make some sense and I will have to spend some time considering their further implications (much aside from some other ideas he put forth in the article). At this time, I've seen no other evidence to suggest that taxation is a requirement of a state.

Dennis

[BaalChatzaf]

Ba'al Chatzaf,

Your first statement shows that you agree with me about the point even though your tone suggests you're debating me about it. There needs to be a law above all others. Did you read the rest of my posts in this thread? I pointed out this problem with private arbitration quite explicitly in my reply to Stephen Boydstun.

Regarding your comments about taxation being required to support the state's use of force, do you have any evidence to support this claim, or is it just your opinion? Stephen Boydstun made an interesting case for why taxation might be reasonable in certain contexts in the article he linked to on RoR. Although I'm not sure I entirely agree with him, his arguments do make some sense and I will have to spend some time considering their further implications (much aside from some other ideas he put forth in the article). At this time, I've seen no other evidence to suggest that taxation is a requirement of a state.

Dennis

A first class military costs more than any private firm or group of firms or voluntary association of individuals can afford. The money has to be stolen on a large scale to make a nuclear capable armed force with a triad to deliver hot death to our enemies.

It is simply a matter of dollars and cents.

Furthermore a military defends -the nation- not just a select group of individuals. Since the benefit is general, unless the money is collected generally it will have to be funded by a few. We have a very hard "free rider" problem here. Either everyone pays, or we don't get a national defense. An intermediate position just might be possible. Support the military by voluntary subscription. If a sufficient number of people do not volunteer to pay, then the money is returned and we do not have an army. We means we will be naked prey to the thugs and murderers of the world.

Other than a subscription system, I would ask to propose a voluntary funding scheme that will guarantee that we have a nuclear capable force that can strike anywhere in the world either pre-emptively or reactively.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[Guyau]

Dennis, I thank you, and I thank Michael too, for the comments on my 1987 essay.

Is the assessment on rents at which I arrived, the assessment which would pay for the military defense of the land state (which is at the core of any state), a tax? It is what it is, regardless of whether we call it a tax. But should we think of it as a tax when we are being exact?

The American Heritage Dictionary defines tax as:

1. A contribution for the support of a government required of persons, groups, or businesses within the domain of that government.

2. A fee or due levied on the members of an organization to meet its expenses.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines tax as a pecuniary contribution that shall be made by persons liable, for the support of government. Black’s goes on to say:

In a broad sense, taxes undoubtedly include assessments, and the right to impose assessments has its foundation in the taxing power of the government; and yet, in practice and as generally understood, there is a broad distinction between the two terms. Taxes, as the tem is generally used, are public burdens imposed generally upon the inhabitants of the whole state, or upon some civil division thereof, for governmental purposes, without reference to peculiar benefits to particular individuals or property. Assessments have reference to impositions for improvements which are specially beneficial to particular individuals or property, and which are imposed in proportion to the particular benefits supposed to be conferred. They are justified only because the improvements confer special benefits, and are just only when they are divided in proportion to such benefits.

I suppose that in political philosophy we have some leeway whether we shall use the terms under their general dictionary usage or whether we shall use them as they would be used in law. If we go with the latter, it seems that the rent assessments which fell out of my analysis come to rest somewhere between taxes and assessments.

As most readers here know, Ayn Rand and most modern libertarians opposed any form of taxation, at least in the most just state that might eventually be reached. But what was Rand’s definition of a tax? She writes that they “represent an initiation of force.” She writes in her 1964 essay "Government Financing in a Free Society"

“What would be the proper method of financing the government in a fully free society?”

This question is usually asked in connection with the Objectivist principle that the government of a free society may not initiate the use of physical force and may use force only in retaliation against those who initiate its use. Since the imposition of taxes does represent an initiation of force, how, it is asked, would the government of a free country raise the money needed to finance its proper services?

In a fully free society, taxation—or, to be exact, payment for governmental services—would be voluntary. . . .

For the reasons given in my essay, the assessments on rents would not be an initiation of the use of force. It is false that owners of land (in the general economic sense) have ownership already perfected against all rational contests to those ownerships independently of the land state at the core of the state. The claim of any such perfect property right would be false, so no such right is infringed by the assessment.

Because Rand’s characterization of taxes as entailing the initiation of force is so widely presumed by readers here, it is probably best to decline calling these fundamental assessments on rents a tax. Dennis sensibly writes:

“The dues you speak of are clearly a form of taxation, since a person cannot decide not to pay and cannot secede from the alliance. However, the tax is levied against income from land, whose property rights exist only because of the alliance, so it is reasonable to demand that the cost of the alliance supporting the owner’s right be paid by him. Is this how I should understand your meaning?”

The second sentence, exactly so. Concerning the first, I would say a little more than I have already in this post. As it happens in my own personal case, I have never owned any real estate. I’m just a renter. It’s not so bad. If my landlord did not want to pay the land state’s assessments on his rents, he would have to sell the house and become a renter. In his case, he would go to a nice home for seniors and continue his good and very free life. My serious point is that I don’t see liability to such an assessment on rents as necessarily a great burden to people’s freedom and well-being.

Unknown to me are the macroeconomic differences that would come from financing national defense by assessments on rents rather than by income tax (and inflation).

Dennis, I will try to respond at least little to the rest of your thoughtful post shortly.

[Brant Gaede]

While I appreciate the philosophical problem of dealing with government funding and attempts here to suggest ways and means, we need involuntary taxation so we'll continue to be pissed off at government. This creates an immunizing effect. The trick is to make government smaller and taxes lower, but not to get rid of either all together, which we ("we" being future generations) probably can't anyway.

--Brant

[Guyau]

Another point about your article raised alarms. You said:

Subgroups of individuals within the territory of a land state could subscribe for fees to various ongoing organizations offering to assure public and just vindication of rights (beyond rights in real property). All such organizations would have to dovetail their laws with the law of real property, they would have to recognize the particular real estate titles recognized by the land state, and they would have to derive all their revenues from subscriptions or donations. Each such agency of justice would have to earn public confidence in its justness; otherwise, like individuals, these agencies would have no right, good against third party intervention, to wield retaliatory force (Nozick 1974, 12–18, 133–34, 140; see also Hardin 1982 101–24). George Smith has given reasons for believing such agencies would have economic incentives to reach demonstrably true verdicts (1979, 411–14, 421–24).

What happens in the case where two justice agencies come into conflict? I believe this was the whole point of why Rand believed that the use of force must be a government held monopoly. I give the following two examples.

Suppose two people enter into an agreement and write up a contract. However, these the wording of the contract has an ambiguity in it which neither person recognizes, but which each interprets differently. If these two people each subscribe to different justice agencies, how could this dispute be resolved? Would not a more reasonable solution be to have people entering into an agreement agree at that time on a justice agency to arbitrate any disputes, and register their agreement for a fee, rather than have such agencies work on a subscription system?

A similar dilemma could be suggested where two people, subscribing to different justice agencies, get into a fight which was witnessed by no others, and each claims the other was the agressor. Suppose both agencies investigate, but come to opposite conclusions based on the evidence, each supporting their own subscriber. How will these agencies determine whose assessment is valid to be enforced? The subscribers of each agency would demand that their agency upheld their verdict and failure to do so would result in a loss of business. It seems that there is need of an impartial agency which can, at a minimum, settle disputes of this kind.

Neither of these scenarios considers differences in rules by which such agencies would judge cases and determine punishment.

(I apologize if this material is covered in your references. Unfortunately, I do not have easy access to these materials to read the background to your assertions.)

Dennis, concerning this, the second part of your post, I’m going to bow out and urge reference to the principal works on these topics, which I will list.

An easy place to begin, which you mentioned already, is with Rand’s 1963 essay “The Nature of Government,” where she discusses the sorts of conflicts that you raise. This essay is readily available. It is in her book The Virtue of Selfishness and in Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal.

The most important work on these issues of evidence and procedure is Robert Nozick’s 1974 book Anarchy, State, and Utopia. The first part of this book deals with these issues. That part was written in 1972. It was this work that first got me to give a thought to the idea of private protective associations as agencies of justice, an idea that was being advocated by some libertarians. I always agreed with Nozick and still do.

Murray Rothbard and David Friedman were the most well-known and steadfast proponents of modern libertarian anarchism. I think their books are still available. These would be books such as For a New Liberty by Rothbard and The Machinery of Freedom by Friedman.

Rothbard’s periodical The Journal of Libertarian Studies is available for free online. The premier issue of that journal contained important rebuttals to Nozick’s analysis and ethical elements. Through the years, that journal continued to carry essays against Nozick’s treatment.

The 1979 essay by George Smith in that journal is here: http://www.mises.org/journals/jls/3_4/3_4_4.pdf

Other references are given, as you know, at the appropriate points of my 1987 essay. Sorry that I can’t pursue discussion of the issues you raise, Dennis, in the second part of your post.

I wrote only one more essay in political philosophy. That was in 1988. That is the essay “Human Rights and Game Strategies” which was published in 1994 and which is reprinted in three parts over at the SOLO site.

http://www.solopassion.com/node/1981

http://www.solopassion.com/node/1986

http://www.solopassion.com/node/1992

Since 1988 I have given my effort to other areas of philosophy, and it is with them I will continue. That is one of the main problems I have found in life: there are too many good things in it.

[Dennis]

Dennis, concerning this, the second part of your post, I’m going to bow out and urge reference to the principal works on these topics, which I will list.

Stephen,

Thank you very much for your replies to my comments and questions. I will do my best to look up the references you have given me on this topic, although living in Japan, English references are not always easily available. I will start with the materials available on the web.

As you say, there is too much good in life. My primary interests take me in directions other than philosophy, so I don't have as much time as I would like to study any part of this fascinating field. I thank you greatly for the time you've taken to help me better understand a question that I have often pondered.

Dennis

[syrakusos]

As a side note, it doesn't seem appropriate for the government to be charging user fees for ports and harbors as these ought to be privately controlled enterprises.

Please separate the assertion from the asserter. You asked about voluntary funding and I offered some options. I see many of the same problems with them, which is why I am not a governmentalist. That said, I hasten to point out that governments exist for reasons based on who we are and who we think we are: governments are not imposed on us by Martians. Given that there will be governments, how should one be structured? As Ayn Rand favored voluntary funding and as this is perfectly consistent with other assertions of Objectivism, the problem can be addressed.

If all ports are private and if all coastline is private ("riparian rights" etc.) how would the government get its own resources in and out of the country? The coast guard, the air force, they all need bases. If the government can operate a coastal base or airport (or spaceport, etc.) then can it not charge people for the use of this facility as a port of entry?

Would we want to allow such a restritction that all persons coming into the country must pass through a government port and pay a fee for entry and exit?

If there are no public places, then the question is moot.

How would a government meet with an ambassador from another government except as that visitor passes through government facilities. (I was a kid when Krushchev came to the United States and other butchers have been the guests of our government as well. This is a security risk if you ask me.)

Anyway, the question here is funding. Of necessity, it has veered into other related areas. Myself, I work in private security. I argue from "is" to "ought." These government debates always start with some a priori "ought" and that goes nowhere. If you want to argue that, I suggest another thread or topic. If you want to establish some kind of Narragansettist state as a precondition for discussion, then we can continue.

On the matter of lotteries, all that matters to the consumer is the odds of winning. The government can spend its profits any way it wants. I understand that if you are running a "pure" game in which the game supports only its own operations, you will have a market edge, but I point out that markets are inherently pluralistic. The government could market its lottery on the basis of patriotism. Some people would respond to that. I am morally opposed to the war in Iraq, but I have written a few checks to the Red Cross and USO and I just took two batches of materials to a local ROTC for distribution at Walter Reed, etc. In short, people do in real life spend money in non-austrian ways.

The Mint and Bureau of Printing and Engraving and the Treasury would be other opportunities. As an economic entity, surely the government has the right to manufacture its own obligations. I can print my own money, strike my own coins. So can they. They can then sell these for the profit via aggio ("seignorage") for the service. The US Mint was almost shut down in 1800 and 1802 by republicans who objected to the waste, but a century later Neil Carothers' Fractional Money solved that problem: circulating precious metals is wrongheaded; instead, circulate obligations. Thus, the goverment could sell tokens, backed up by its own services.

In The Peace War science fiction stories of libertarian Vernor Vinge, the government of New Mexico operates their legislature as a tourist attraction.

[BaalChatzaf]

In a republic (res publica) the government must be public and it will require public space to operate. Government and its venues are among the few things the plural possessive "our" properly applies. Everything is is "mine", "yours" "his" "hers" or "theirs" (joint ownership).

For a government to fulfill its primary function of defense, it must have guaranteed access to sea and sky which are inherently non fenceble. No private party owns either the sea or sky. Why? Because no private part made the sea or sky.

Ba'al Chatzaf

[syrakusos]

No private party owns either the sea or sky. Why? Because no private part made the sea or sky. -- Ba'al Chatzaf

Wrong on both counts. That is why I reference "riparian rights." The law does recognize first that land contiguous to the sea goes UNDER the sea and such rights continue. How far is a detail of the law. Conversly these same laws recognize that anyone else can walk along a shoreline, even if you "own" it. That may be a contradiction caused by non-objective traditionalism and if so it needs to be addressed. However you cannot just claim that no one owns the water. Certainly no one created the land but we divvy that up nicely. So the non-creatiion argument does not hold (ahem) water.

Also res publica means "the public thing" or "the public object." res... rebus... rerum... amo amas amat and all that.

Edited December 8, 2007 by Michael E. Marotta

[BaalChatzaf]

No private party owns either the sea or sky. Why? Because no private part made the sea or sky. -- Ba'al Chatzaf

Wrong on both counts. That is why I reference "riparian rights." The law does recognize first that land contiguous to the sea goes UNDER the sea and such rights continue. How far is a detail of the law. Conversly these same laws recognize that anyone else can walk along a shoreline, even if you "own" it. That may be a contradiction caused by non-objective traditionalism and if so it needs to be addressed. However you cannot just claim that no one owns the water. Certainly no one created the land but we divvy that up nicely. So the non-creatiion argument does not hold (ahem) water.

Also res publica means "the public thing" or "the public object." res... rebus... rerum... amo amas amat and all that.

No one owns the high seas, the vasty deeps. First of all, no human made them. Second of all, they are too big to defend against contenders as the Japanese found in during the Pacific War.

The source of ownership is making the thing owned by one's labor or finding the thing in nature by one's efforts. Holding by force is not ownership. It is possession and can be contended by force.

No one owns the skys. All claims to air rights are conventional and can be contended. The idea of a building owner forbidding a plane flying over his digs at 30,000 ft msl is ludicrous. If such an owner attempted to shoot down planes flying over his digs he would soon find himself bombed from the air.

You can't own what you can't hold and control.

Ba'al Chatzaf

Edited December 8, 2007 by BaalChatzaf

[syrakusos]

No owns the high seas ... The source of ownership is making the thing owned by one's labor or finding the thing in nature by one's efforts. Holding by force is not ownership. It is possession and can be contended by force. No one owns the skys. All claims to air rights are conventional and can be contended. ... You can't own what you can't hold and control.

That is a mess of contradictions and non sequitars.

If I see a stranger on the street and give him a fountain pen is it not his? He did no labor and did not find it "in nature" i.e. in the unihabited wilds. Yet he now owns it and can so claim in any court. He has acquired title.

Your 16th century view of the "high seas" (so-called) does not hold water in the modern world of international treaties to define fishing rights. In fact such treaties go back to fishing in the 16th century off the coast of what is now Nova Scotia and Newfoundland. The "high seas" are much like the grazing commons of old ... just because the village shared them did not mean that someone from France could bring a herd over. So too with the high seas. Much of it is defined by international law and that make it property.

Of course controlling your airspace to 30000 feet is hard but air space is very real real estate in New York City. Thirty feet or thirty thousand the principle is the same.

As you say to "own" something you must be able to control it. However necessary that seems insufficient as all property would come down to theft. We have conventions that define control.

This comes back to the problem of government funding. Can the govenrment own a park? How about the land around its own buidlings? How much land? Can it rent or lease the space or charge for admission to the buildings? What principle of objective law would be violated if it costs a million dollars to visit Congress?