Two Kinds of "Induction": Important similarities and trivial differences


Daniel Barnes

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You guys are getting there. I'll keep saying it, though, until you get it. Then you will not make so many mistakes in presenting Rand's ideas (there are too many to keep refuting and they keep repeating nonstop). You will probably still misrepresent her meanings because you display hunger to debunk Rand, but at least you will not make so many wrong statements or wrong assumptions.

How are units identified as units? Well, there are similarities and differences. And, aside from direct observation, how are these determined?

I'll give you a hint. The word starts with "m" and means comparing against a standard.

Here is another hint. A direct quote by Rand from ITOE, 2nd, p. 7:

The process of concept-formation is, in large part, a mathematical process.

Mathematics is the science of measurement.

Someday it will sink in. I have high hopes for this.

Michael

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Rand:Mathematics is the science of measurement.

Someday it will sink in. I have high hopes for this.

Michael

Mathematics is the science of abstract structure. Things pertaining to measurement (i.e. based on locally compact linearly ordered sets) are a proper subset of mathematics. Rand's definition completely overlooks Boolean Algebra and Lattice Theory. Rand misses the mark on mathematics in much the same way she misses the mark with logic. She has defined $mathematics and $logic.

Abandon your high hopes and look to real mathematicians for a description of their art, rather than consulting a novelist.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Bob,

I don't agree with your appraisal about Rand. OK? Many here do not.

Anyway, you are showing that you do not have the slightest intention of trying to understand what she meant. Instead of showing that the Empress has no clothes on, you are showing that you don't. You should understand before you criticize. You might know academic math, but you don't know beans about Rand. Of course, I am only going by what is in your posts.

Michael

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You see how easy it is to argue when we believe there is one TRUE definition of something? General Semantics was created with the goal of preventing arguments - encouraging human agreement and progress. There are many definitions of mathematics and any other word possible - some more common than others but so what?

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GS,

(sigh)

If you read my posts, you will find often that I claim there is more than one definition for a word when people start getting belligerent. This has nothing to do with precision in defining a concept. Concepts are one thing. Words are another. I really wish you would learn about this. You keep missing the point altogether.

Michael

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You guys are getting there. I'll keep saying it, though, until you get it. Then you will not make so many mistakes in presenting Rand's ideas (there are too many to keep refuting and they keep repeating nonstop). You will probably still misrepresent her meanings because you display hunger to debunk Rand, but at least you will not make so many wrong statements or wrong assumptions.

How are units identified as units? Well, there are similarities and differences. And, aside from direct observation, how are these determined?

I'll give you a hint. The word starts with "m" and means comparing against a standard.

Here is another hint. A direct quote by Rand from ITOE, 2nd, p. 7:

The process of concept-formation is, in large part, a mathematical process.

Mathematics is the science of measurement.

Someday it will sink in. I have high hopes for this.

Michael

OK, what do you (or Rand) mean by 'a mathematical process'?

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OK, what do you (or Rand) mean by 'a mathematical process'?

GS,

To start with, establishing numerical units, then addition, subtraction, division and multiplication. It goes from there. Rand is also big on measurement in concept formation. (This last statement is for the benefit of those who have not yet understood this.)

Michael

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GS,

To start with, establishing numerical units, then addition, subtraction, division and multiplication. It goes from there. Rand is also big on measurement in concept formation. (This last statement is for the benefit of those who have not yet understood this.)

Michael

How does "establishing numerical units, then addition, subtraction, division and multiplication" function in concept formation of say, an apple?

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Rand is also big on measurement in concept formation. (This last statement is for the benefit of those who have not yet understood this.)

Michael, I for one am well aware that Rand was "big on measurement in concept formation." Would you kindly explain just how her being "big on measurement in concept formation" obviates or eliminates her view that there are true and false definitions of concepts and that forming a true definition depends on correctly identifying the concept's "essential" characteristic(s)?

She just said it again in the extended passage I quoted in post #124 above, the same passage in which she makes a statement which has already been quoted several times -- viz., (her italics) "The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions. --

pp. 48, Expanded 2nd Edition, ITOE

(her italics)

[...] the truth or falsehood of his propositions rests, not only on their relation to the facts he asserts, but also on the truth or falsehood of the definitions of the concepts he uses to assert them, which rests on the truth or falsehood of his designations of essential characteristics.

You have quite a job of explaining away to do to get rid of her own words on the subject. (It isn't as if she made the point only in an incidental statement which might be attributed to careless wording. She made the point several times prominently and insistently.)

Ellen

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Food for thought;

If he contend, as sometimes he will contend, that he has defined all his terms and proved

all his propositions, then either he is a performer of logical miracles or he is an ass; and, as

you know, logical miracles are impossible. (264)

CASSIUS J. KEYSER

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Mike:

To start with, establishing numerical units, then addition, subtraction, division and multiplication. It goes from there. Rand is also big on measurement in concept formation. (This last statement is for the benefit of those who have not yet understood this.)

Mike, measurement has nothing to do with either 1) the logically infinite regress of definitions or 2) the truth or falsity of particular definitions.

Show us how measurement avoids the logic of 1). It doesn't even touch on it.

As to 2), Jim says that Britain's parlimentary democracy is "true democracy". Ann says the US constitutional democracy is "true democracy." Ralph says both are false definitions - "true democracy" is proportional representation via coalition, such as in Germany. Saddam says Iraq under his government was "true democracy" as voter participation was far higher than in the US or any of the other countries.

You're telling me measurement is going to solve this argument? Well show us.

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Ellen,

Whew! You finally said the "m" word.

Now, the next step. I know this is going to be difficult to accept, but Rand was using the word "essential" to talk about what she was measuring, not about some kind of "essence." She was not talking about an entity's "thingness," as the essentialists do.

"Essential" in her case means one or more measurable attributes that a group of entities (or existents) has that distinguishes that group from all others. This measurable attribute or attributes can be completely different or they can be measured in such a distinctive manner that this makes the group comparable using a special focus with respect to all other things. This special focus is on two aspects: similarity and difference, i.e., by specifying these two things, the existents are classifiable as a group. This is what "identification" means in Objectivism, not merely slapping a name on an observation.

There are two ways similarity and difference can be specified. One is concrete-bound. Lets call it a hardening of the law of identity. An existent has an essence and that is that. The essence is unique and bears no relation to anything else. A name is tacked on to an observation and that is all. This is what you are claiming Rand is doing.

The other way is to focus on measurable characteristics and parameters of measurement. In other words, standard of measurement. This is actually what Rand is doing. Lots of possibilities will be found this way. Sometimes a characteristic will not exist, for example light waves for a sound. Other times the characteristic will simply be part of a range.

For instance (to state the example once again), you can measure consciousness by comparing the range of rational (man) to the range of the perceptual (dog). There you have a measurement. Rational is the "essential" characteristic because out of a range of possible measurements (consciousness being the standard), it is different. Its reach is greater than other levels of consciousness. Rationality is an end-point of a sliding scale, not a unique "essence" unrelated to all else in reality. This is what the CDD is all about.

You cannot measure "manness" or "tableness" or even "rationalness" or "toeness" or "eyeness" or "earthness" or "treeness" or any of that no matter how you do it.

Now here is the really hard part your posts show that you are having difficulty accepting. Just because focus is on measurable attributes so a classification can be made, the concept still includes all of the other characteristics of the existents in that group. These characteristics are merely not included in the definition, which, along with the word (mental "tag"), is only a manner of making the concept a concrete thing, a mental form, we can use.

To illustrate, back to the concept of "man." Just because he is defined as "rational animal," this does not mean that he does not walk on two legs or has abdominal muscles or can eat meat and plants or other things like that. All of those things are still within the concept of "human being" (the mental integration, the new mental entity our mind creates). They are all part of our knowledge of what a human being is. They are simply not mentioned because there are other creatures that walk on two legs, too, (etc.) and this kind of shared characteristic would overload the mental unit (concept) with too much detail for frequent use. Our minds would simply shut-down from information overload. ("Walking on two legs" could be mentioned, though, in the CDD for "primate.")

In Objectivism, a concept is a form of shorthand for a whole bunch of information, not a form of naming unique metaphysical essences.

Measurement is even the way exceptions are understood. An exception does not falsify a concept (a classification). It can falsify a proposition, depending on the proposition, but not a mental category like a concept. The relationship an exception will have to a category will be "defective" or something like that, not "proof of falseness."

The quote from Rand you provided means "essential" in this measurement meaning, not in the essence meaning you are erroneously trying to ascribe to her.

Just a little bit more and you will have it. (I am not being snide. I am literally trying to see if I can find the words for you to see this. So far I have been a dismal failure.)

Michael

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Bob,

I don't agree with your appraisal about Rand. OK? Many here do not.

Anyway, you are showing that you do not have the slightest intention of trying to understand what she meant. Instead of showing that the Empress has no clothes on, you are showing that you don't. You should understand before you criticize. You might know academic math, but you don't know beans about Rand. Of course, I am only going by what is in your posts.

Michael

I took her at her word literally and verbatim as you quoted her.

I always take people I disagree with at their word, literally and verbatim. I never make charitable re-adjustments to their output --- ever. I intend to take Ayn Rands advice and take people exactly at their word. It is good advice.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Bob,

Then please take a few more of Rand's words at face value, too, if you wish a criticism to be taken seriously by an Objectivist. Just because you isolate a statement, this does not delete all of her other statements from existence.

Michael

It is not her other statements that I contend. It is her ignorant erroneous pronouncements concerning mathematics (MY profession) and physics. If she had stuck to areas in which she was competent I would not be having this conversation with you. I happen to agree with her on matters of economy, money and government. I thought that Francisco's Speech on Money (for example) was right on the money. The only areas in which I have contended with Rand are in the areas of mathematics, science and ethics (which she got wrong). If you read Aristotle's -Nichomachean Ethics- you will see that he regards political science as that science which leads to identifying the Ultimate Good for humans. On a desert island, there is no politics. Aristotle's ta ethika is embedded in a political context from the git go. Man cannot achieve eudamonia in isplation. Maybe Rand should have read Nichomachean Ethics more closely, assuming that she read it at all.

PS. I am taking a course on Aristotle's Ethics right now even as we correspond, at Princeton. So I know whereof I speak.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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Bob,

How about a course in Rand to correct the statements you get wrong?

Michael

What did I get wrong. All my critiques of Rand are on point and quite correct. Her opinions of mathematics and physics are worthless. The same goes for Pope Leonard.

Ba'al Chatzaf

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What did I get wrong.

Bob,

Oversimplification and some forced incorrect meanings leading to gross misrepresentation, then dismissal claiming that your own erroneous speculations of what Rand meant and/or wrote are Rand's ideas. The simple fact is, you got it wrong and did a great job of getting it about as wrong as you can, too. You constantly disparage something in your own head, including your evaluation of her knowledge, not the real-deal.

That's OK, though. You have not shown any actual interest in Rand's ideas except for capitalism and a cherry-pick here and there. Your posts show you to be more interested in making empty blanket derogatory statements about Rand. We all get our jollies somehow.

I take this into account when I read you. I merely comment because newcomers might think this is what Rand is all about. The presence of even a minimally knowledgeable voice about her ideas will help avoid confusion for them.

Michael

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Rand is also big on measurement in concept formation. (This last statement is for the benefit of those who have not yet understood this.)

Michael, I for one am well aware that Rand was "big on measurement in concept formation." Would you kindly explain just how her being "big on measurement in concept formation" obviates or eliminates her view that there are true and false definitions of concepts and that forming a true definition depends on correctly identifying the concept's "essential" characteristic(s)?

She just said it again in the extended passage I quoted in post #124 above, the same passage in which she makes a statement which has already been quoted several times -- viz., (her italics) "The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences, thought and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions. --

pp. 48, Expanded 2nd Edition, ITOE

(her italics)

[...] the truth or falsehood of his propositions rests, not only on their relation to the facts he asserts, but also on the truth or falsehood of the definitions of the concepts he uses to assert them, which rests on the truth or falsehood of his designations of essential characteristics.

You have quite a job of explaining away to do to get rid of her own words on the subject. (It isn't as if she made the point only in an incidental statement which might be attributed to careless wording. She made the point several times prominently and insistently.)

Ellen

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I don't know if this is the right post to reply to, but I completely agree with Rand's comments about truth and definitions, and I really don't know what the controversy is about. (I'm not going to comment on Michael's attempt to address this issue.)

Some seem mystified about what it can mean for a definition to be true.

A definition is a proposition. So is a designation of an essence. Propositions are statements of fact, and thus can either correspond to reality and be true, or not correspond to reality and be false.

In the process of forming a concept, we figure out what, in that context, is the essential characteristic. When we say or think the proposition "Rational animality is the essence of man," we have designated "rational animality" as man's essence, and since the proposition is true, the designation (which the proposition is) is true also. That is why she says designations of essential characteristics can be true or false. If we designated "rational planthood" as man's essence, which we do propositionally as "Rational planthood is the essence of man," this would function as garbage in arguments.

On the basis of this designation of essence, we form a definition of a concept, e.g., "man is the rational animal." This also is a proposition, and it too is true. If I define man as "the rational plant," that is clearly false, and any reasoning that I engaged in using the concept "man" with "rational plant" as the definition would be utter garbage, in exactly the same way that "rational planthood is the essence of man" would undermine reasoning that used that designation of man's essence for the concept "man" as one used it in that reasoning.

Rand's comments thus make perfect and complete sense to me, and the puzzlement of some of the posters over this...puzzle me completely. Unless they just don't get that you can't define terms any old way you like. The only way you can validly and truly say that "cows are fish," is if you are defining "cows" as bluegills or sharks or tuna or catfish, etc. or "fish" as animals that bear their young live and nurse them. Whatever terms you use in your propositions, your definitions for them have to be referring to facts, and the propositions using them have to be referring to facts -- or your propositions will be false.

That's so elementary, even a General Semanticist should get it.* (Otherwise, how would he hope that we would understand what he is saying!) :-)

REB

* With a tip of the hat to Geiko.

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Roger,

The game is actually simple. It goes like this:

Aristotle was an essentialist. He believed things have metaphysical essences.

Popper called this nonsense. Laws of the universe exist, but not essences.

Rand tried to call this nonsense, but she use the word "essence" in her writing so she contradicted herself.

Popper is superior and Rand is a fool.

All this is done without really covering what concept formation is or any other underlying idea.

Michael

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Ellen,

Whew! You finally said the "m" word.

Now, the next step. I know this is going to be difficult to accept, but Rand was using the word "essential" to talk about what she was measuring,

I'm quite aware that Rand was talking about what she was measuring. I'm familiar with her views on the role of measurement in concept formation.

However, your next is only partly right:

not about some kind of "essence." She was not talking about an entity's "thingness," as the essentialists do.

She was talking about some kind of "essence," not "a special, separate metaphysical essence," like the "extreme realist" and "moderate realist" schools on what a concept refers to; nevertheless, she was talking about a real characteristic. E.g., these statements:

"An essential characteristic is factual, in the sense that it does exist, does determine other characteristics and does distinguish a group of existents from all others"; she also says that, amongst more than one characteristic distinguishing a group of existents from other existents, the essential distinguishing characteristic is "the one on which all the others (or the greatest number of others) depend, i.e., the fundamental characteristic without which the others would not be possible [....] Metaphysically, a fundamental characteristic is that distinctive characteristic which makes the greatest number of others possible."

She goes on to say that "epistemologically, it [the fundamental characteristic which is the essential distinguishing characteristic] is the one that explains the greatest number of others," thus making a claim about the centrality of this characteristic(s) to our understanding of the existents involved.

So although she describes what she calls the "radical" difference between the Aristotelian view of concepts and the Objectivist view as "[lying] in the fact that Aristotle regarded 'essence' as metaphysical [whereas] Objectivism regards it as epistemological," she isn't disagreeing with Aristotle that there is such a factually existing and identifiable feature of a concept's referents. She's fully realist as to whether the characteristics being identified exist (if the concept is valid). She's furthermore even attributing causal importance to the essential/distinguishing/fundamental characteristic(s) in saying that other characteristics depend on, are made possible by, essential/distinguishing/fundamental characteristic(s).

"Essential" in her case means one or more measurable attributes that a group of entities (or existents) has that distinguishes that group from all others. This measurable attribute or attributes can be completely different or they can be measured in such a distinctive manner that this makes the group comparable using a special focus with respect to all other things. This special focus is on two aspects: similarity and difference, i.e., by specifying these two things, the existents are classifiable as a group. This is what "identification" means in Objectivism, not merely slapping a name on an observation.

I don't disagree with the exegesis, but I wonder where you get the idea that even in classical realism, "identification" means "merely slapping a name on an observation." "Identification" in classical realism, both variants, can be tough to make.

There are two ways similarity and difference can be specified. One is concrete-bound. Lets call it a hardening of the law of identity. An existent has an essence and that is that. The essence is unique and bears no relation to anything else. A name is tacked on to an observation and that is all. This is what you are claiming Rand is doing.

No, it is not what I'm claiming Rand is doing.

The other way is to focus on measurable characteristics and parameters of measurement. In other words, standard of measurement. This is actually what Rand is doing. Lots of possibilities will be found this way. Sometimes a characteristic will not exist, for example light waves for a sound. Other times the characteristic will simply be part of a range.

For instance (to state the example once again), you can measure consciousness by comparing the range of rational (man) to the range of the perceptual (dog). There you have a measurement. Rational is the "essential" characteristic because out of a range of possible measurements (consciousness being the standard), it is different. Its reach is greater than other levels of consciousness. Rationality is an end-point of a sliding scale, not a unique "essence" unrelated to all else in reality. This is what the CDD is all about.

Allowing for the kinda, sorta exegetical style, I don't disagree with the description of her views. (Whether she's correct in her views is another issue. But the exegesis kinda, sorta conveys her approach.)

You cannot measure "manness" or "tableness" or even "rationalness" or "toeness" or "eyeness" or "earthness" or "treeness" or any of that no matter how you do it.

I doubt she'd agree with that as stated, considering her comment:

"Let those who attempt to invalidate concepts by declaring that they cannot find 'manness' in men, try to invlaidate algebra by declaring that they cannot find 'a-ness' in 5 or in 5,000,000." [iTOE, Expanded, pg. 18]

Now here is the really hard part your posts show that you are having difficulty accepting. Just because focus is on measurable attributes so a classification can be made, the concept still includes all of the other characteristics of the existents in that group.

Again, I don't know why you'd think I'd have any difficulty accepting this description of her views, especially considering that I've quoted statements from her saying that the concept includes all characteristics of the categorized existents. I'm fully well aware that she didn't think the essential characteristic was the whole concept.

These characteristics are merely not included in the definition, which, along with the word (mental "tag"), is only a manner of making the concept a concrete thing, a mental form, we can use.

You're right about the status of the word in her theory; the word is just a tag. But the definition for Rand is very far from being "only a manner of making the concept a concrete thing, a mental form, we can use." I repeat the statement from her already quoted a number of times:

"The truth or falsehood of all of man's conclusions, inferences and knowledge rests on the truth or falsehood of his definitions."

And: "the truth or falsehood of his propositions rests, not only on their relation to the facts he asserts, but also on the truth or falsehood of the definitions of the concepts he uses to assert them, which rests on the truth or falsehood of his designations of essential characteristics."

Rand placed tremendous importance on getting definitions correct. She believed that for each concept there is such a thing as "[a]n objective definition, valid for all men," and she believed that getting the definition correct depended on getting the essential characteristic(s) correct. She said that the process of identifying an essential characteristic and defining a concept is contextual; thus the characteristic named and the wording of the definition can change with increasing knowledge. But she thought that at each stage of knowledge there's a right answer.

Here's a brief statement from her own Summary to ITOE:

pg. 85, Expanded Second Edition, ITOE

Just as the process of concept-formation is contextual, so all definitions are contextual. The designation of an essential characteristic depends on the context of man's knowledge; a primitive definition, if correct, does not contradict a more advanced one: the latter merely expands the former. An objective definition, valid for all men, is determined according to all the relevant knowledge available at that stage of mankind's development. Definitions are not changelessly absolute, but they are contextually absolute. A definition is false if it does not specify the known relationships among existents (in terms of the known essential characteristics) or if it contradicts the known. [my highlight]

To illustrate, back to the concept of "man." Just because he is defined as "rational animal," this does not mean that he does not walk on two legs or has abdominal muscles or can eat meat and plants or other things like that. All of those things are still within the concept of "human being" (the mental integration, the new mental entity our mind creates). They are all part of our knowledge of what a human being is. They are simply not mentioned because there are other creatures that walk on two legs, too, (etc.) and this kind of shared characteristic would overload the mental unit (concept) with too much detail for frequent use. Our minds would simply shut-down from information overload. ("Walking on two legs" could be mentioned, though, in the CDD for "primate.")

In Objectivism, a concept is a form of shorthand for a whole bunch of information, not a form of naming unique metaphysical essences.

Again, I'm familiar with her theory of concepts, and I haven't said that in Objectivism a concept is "a form of naming unique metaphysical essences."

Measurement is even the way exceptions are understood. An exception does not falsify a concept (a classification). It can falsify a proposition, depending on the proposition, but not a mental category like a concept. The relationship an exception will have to a category will be "defective" or something like that, not "proof of falseness."

The quote from Rand you provided means "essential" in this measurement meaning, not in the essence meaning you are erroneously trying to ascribe to her.

Was "quote" a typo for "quotes," plural? I've provided lengthy passages from Rand in which she explains in her own words what she means. I recommend that you re-read them. What you're missing here is the reason why she IS an "essentialist" in the sense Popper means when criticisizing the Aristotelian approach to the nature and centrality of definitions. It is that sense of "essentialist" which I am ascribing to her. And it fits like a tailor-made glove.

Ellen

PS: It's CCD (Conceptual Common Denominator), not CDD.

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Rand is also big on measurement in concept formation. (This last statement is for the benefit of those who have not yet understood this.)

Michael, I for one am well aware that Rand was "big on measurement in concept formation." Would you kindly explain just how her being "big on measurement in concept formation" obviates or eliminates her view that there are true and false definitions of concepts and that forming a true definition depends on correctly identifying the concept's "essential" characteristic(s)?

[skipping the rest of my reply, which Roger quoted just a couple posts above]

You have quite a job of explaining away to do to get rid of her own words on the subject. (It isn't as if she made the point only in an incidental statement which might be attributed to careless wording. She made the point several times prominently and insistently.)

Ellen

___

I don't know if this is the right post to reply to, but I completely agree with Rand's comments about truth and definitions, and I really don't know what the controversy is about. (I'm not going to comment on Michael's attempt to address this issue.)

Roger, LOL -- almost hysterically in fact; no, not at you; because it's small wonder you don't know what the controversy is about. Possibly no one except me and Daniel and MSK (sorta-kinda) does. I'd expect that you would completely agree with Rand's comments about truth and definitions. What started the long debate on Rand re "essence" and "definition" was Michael's claiming that Popper and Rand object to Aristotelian methods for the same reason and Daniel's and my saying, no, from Popper's perspective, Rand's in the same camp he was criticizing. All of this long discussion is trying to explain to Michael WHY Popper would have called Rand's approach "essentializing," just as he called Aristotle's. I expect you'd agree about how Popper would have seen it, though you'd side with Rand's approach and not with his.

Ellen

___

Edited by Ellen Stuttle
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Ellen,

A definition is true without the "essence" including ALL of the characteristics of the grouping. This is where we are disagreeing.

For Aristotle, the essence included everything. For Rand, it merely meant difference(s) from other entities (and measurable differences at that). She highlighted the differences and called them essential to the concept.

The Aristotle form is what Popper complained about and Rand did not do that. I already mentioned all this in comments on "Two Kinds of Definition" and ITOE. I suppose I could repeat it if it would do any good.

Yes, Rand used the word "essence." But this word had a different meaning for her than for Aristotle, unless she was talking specifically about his meaning. The concept was different. You are making it as if the concept is the same. Her concept of "essence" is closer to Popper's "universal law" than Artistotle's "essence."

Differences do exist metaphysically and that is why a concept can be formed. But the difference is not the entire concept. The entire concept is all the referents, and that implies all knowledge about them. Rand called this difference "essence" as in "essential characteristic." Aristotle would all the sum of ALL the information the essence and even attribute that essence with a specific nature as a separate indivisible thing.

And guess what? Even Popper admits that differences exist. Propositions about them can even be falsified.

I don't do as you do. I try not to at least. When I am wrong, I try not to hand out advice. It looks silly. In your shoes I personally would find it wiser to take my own advice and reread the material and try to see if I am missing something rather than hand out that particular piece of advice to others, but, hey. That's me.

You are missing something... er... essential. You are attributing a meaning to Rand that is simply not there and repeating quotes a thousand times will not put it there.

Michael

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Roger,

The game is actually simple. It goes like this:

Aristotle was an essentialist. He believed things have metaphysical essences.

Popper called this nonsense. Laws of the universe exist, but not essences.

Rand tried to call this nonsense, but she use the word "essence" in her writing so she contradicted herself.

Popper is superior and Rand is a fool.

All this is done without really covering what concept formation is or any other underlying idea.

Michael

You don't even understand what it was Popper objected to in Aristotle's approach.

And Rand didn't call Aristotle's view of "essence" "nonsense," just wrong.

I certainly think that Popper was the superior philosopher to Rand, but I do not think Rand was a fool (at least on epistemology; her private life isn't the subject at the moment).

All this wouldn't have been gotten into if you hadn't fought like a bulldog insisting that Popper and Rand were saying the same thing about Aristotle. Maybe if you'd just realized that Daniel especially -- he's been studying Popper a long time -- and probably I as well are better informed on Popper than you, who have read a few things only (and I think you read those quickly), and if you're being told, no, you misinterpreted, maybe you should pause to think, hm, maybe I did misinterpret and you should have slowed down and re-assessed the situation. Lot of trouble might have been spared. And maybe we'd have even gotten somewhere by now discussing something substantive.

Ellen

PS: I'd posted this before I saw your post above, which I think has reached the point of gibberish.

___

Edited by Ellen Stuttle
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