Problem of Universals: Redux

[studiodekadent]

Problem of Universals: Redux

A while ago I posted a question about how Objectivist epistemology dealt with what I referred to as the perceptual problem of universals. By that, I mean commonalities that can be seen with our senses, such as redness. I looked into this further and then found out that conceptualist solutions to the problem of universals are all attacked from the perspective of perceptual properties. To quote as an example, "Even if concepts may be conventional and arbitrary in many ways, they can only be connected to reality if they are based on some abstract features that are really in the objects. Thus, as soon as Rand allows that the terms for features "abstracted" from experience refer to features that are really there, then she has let in some form of Aristotelian realism, whether she wants to or not" (http://www.friesian.com/rand.htm). This is the primary criticism of conceptualism in general, that things having the same properties must have some essence behind it, otherwise conceptualism boils down to the human mind imposing some subjective order on metaphysically undifferentiated 'stuff.'

I then did more research, and found out that Objectivist epistemology does provide a way out of this. As for pointing me to it, I want to thank Dr. Carolyn Ray.

First, lets go back to the color example. As we know, color is the mode of our sensory system's perception of different wavelengths of light reflected off objects. And lets take red apples as the particulars. However, these apples may be a different shade of red! Indeed, there are multiple different shades of red! Do they each have their own essence? And if all those different essences of shades of red are different, why do we call them red? Essences within essences? Conceptualism hence does not assert there is no metaphysical differentiation, indeed it would subscribe to a "snowflake hypothesis" that every particular is metaphysically unique. In the case of red things, they are different shades, or somehow their reflective properties are very very subtly different, hence giving them what is technically a unique color. So hence, the mind is not imposing unnatural differences; rather it is ignoring natural differences.

And here we come to how Objectivist epistemology solves the perceptual problem of universals: the role of relative measurement. All measuring is relative, for example we can see orange is more similar to red than it is to blue. Since every particular is metaphysically unique, there do not have to be any metaphysically identical features within the members of a class. Indeed, if one took every single red apple in the world, I doubt you would find one with metaphysically identical reflective properties (which would imply each molecule or cell in the skin be arranged identically). Does that mean they cannot be called red? Hence, we never notice with our senses anything that is truly identical in every, possibly any, concrete aspect. What is noticed is relative similarity in the sense of "p1 is more like p2 than p3." As Carolyn Ray says, "Sameness is not in things either; the concept refers to the fact that, with respect to some dimension, no distinction can be made using some given measuring instrument" (http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/carolynray/diss/03.html).

Hence, Objectivist epistemology does account for perceptual commonalities. The Friesian's rebuttal is not valid.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Andrew,

Correct. In Objectivism, measurement is the key to identification.

Michael

[jordanz]

Didn't Ayn Rand call this measurement omission (as opposed to relative measurement)? i.e. to get the concept "red" you hold in common certain attributes/measurements and omit than non-applicable ones.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Jordan,

There are two kinds of measurements: cardinal (specific values) and ordinal (placed in hierarchy or priority). Cardinal numbers: one, two, three, etc. Ordinal numbers: first, second, third, etc.

For the measurement omission part of concept formation, first one needs to establish a standard of measurement. This will be type (feature) and system (cardinal/ordinal). The type is called the CDD (conceptual common denominator) and it is included in the genus and differentia of all definitions. Once the differentia is determined (using as part the predetermined standard), it will be able to be measured by that standard, but so that the grouping (concept) applies to all members (referents), the specific measurements are eliminated. I am going from memory, but this means that the measured feature in all members exists in some quantity, but can exist in any quantity.

What Andrew described about red was ordinal measurements (perceived intensity). By measuring the wave-length, we can arrive at the cardinal measurements. But, as red is a sensation and primary percept, its basic definition is ostensive (pointing at it and saying, "That color.")

Michael

[UncleJim]

Problem of Universals: Redux

A while ago I posted a question about how Objectivist epistemology dealt with what I referred to as the perceptual problem of universals. By that, I mean commonalities that can be seen with our senses, such as redness. I looked into this further and then found out that conceptualist solutions to the problem of universals are all attacked from the perspective of perceptual properties. To quote as an example, "Even if concepts may be conventional and arbitrary in many ways, they can only be connected to reality if they are based on some abstract features that are really in the objects. Thus, as soon as Rand allows that the terms for features "abstracted" from experience refer to features that are really there, then she has let in some form of Aristotelian realism, whether she wants to or not" (http://www.friesian.com/rand.htm). This is the primary criticism of conceptualism in general, that things having the same properties must have some essence behind it, otherwise conceptualism boils down to the human mind imposing some subjective order on metaphysically undifferentiated 'stuff.'

I then did more research, and found out that Objectivist epistemology does provide a way out of this. As for pointing me to it, I want to thank Dr. Carolyn Ray.

First, lets go back to the color example. As we know, color is the mode of our sensory system's perception of different wavelengths of light reflected off objects. And lets take red apples as the particulars. However, these apples may be a different shade of red! Indeed, there are multiple different shades of red! Do they each have their own essence? And if all those different essences of shades of red are different, why do we call them red? Essences within essences? Conceptualism hence does not assert there is no metaphysical differentiation, indeed it would subscribe to a "snowflake hypothesis" that every particular is metaphysically unique. In the case of red things, they are different shades, or somehow their reflective properties are very very subtly different, hence giving them what is technically a unique color. So hence, the mind is not imposing unnatural differences; rather it is ignoring natural differences.

And here we come to how Objectivist epistemology solves the perceptual problem of universals: the role of relative measurement. All measuring is relative, for example we can see orange is more similar to red than it is to blue. Since every particular is metaphysically unique, there do not have to be any metaphysically identical features within the members of a class. Indeed, if one took every single red apple in the world, I doubt you would find one with metaphysically identical reflective properties (which would imply each molecule or cell in the skin be arranged identically). Does that mean they cannot be called red? Hence, we never notice with our senses anything that is truly identical in every, possibly any, concrete aspect. What is noticed is relative similarity in the sense of "p1 is more like p2 than p3." As Carolyn Ray says, "Sameness is not in things either; the concept refers to the fact that, with respect to some dimension, no distinction can be made using some given measuring instrument" (http://enlightenment.supersaturated.com/essays/text/carolynray/diss/03.html).

Hence, Objectivist epistemology does account for perceptual commonalities. The Friesian's rebuttal is not valid.

Under Objectivism reality is the final arbiter. If you are looking at a red apple then that is what you are looking at. In other words: The thing determines what can be said about it.

[studiodekadent]

Under Objectivism reality is the final arbiter. If you are looking at a red apple then that is what you are looking at. In other words: The thing determines what can be said about it.

Not in and of itself. Things are experienced in a particular way. They have a specific nature, but our classifications of their natures requires comparative, ordinal measurement of things against eachother.

The idea that things fit into categories by virtue of their natures and natures alone (i.e. in a mind-independent fashion) is moderate realism, which Rand rejects in ITOE.

Edited March 7, 2008 by studiodekadent

[UncleJim]

Under Objectivism reality is the final arbiter. If you are looking at a red apple then that is what you are looking at. In other words: The thing determines what can be said about it.

Not in and of itself. Things are experienced in a particular way. They have a specific nature, but our classifications of their natures requires comparative, ordinal measurement of things against eachother.

The idea that things fit into categories by virtue of their natures and natures alone (i.e. in a mind-independent fashion) is moderate realism, which Rand rejects in ITOE.

If the thing does not determine what can be said about it - then what does? God, you, me or them? Absolutely not. I'm not saying this is what you are implying but what you are implying is very unclear.

Yes Ayn Rand uses the idea of standard-of-comparison but that does not deny the physical existence of a real object is whatever it is. When describing what its existence is, is where the standard-of-comparison comes into play.

[studiodekadent]

If the thing does not determine what can be said about it - then what does? God, you, me or them? Absolutely not. I'm not saying this is what you are implying but what you are implying is very unclear.

What I am implying is that comparative measurement within a context is the key to identification. After all, as Rand said, human consciousness operates on the basis of two core processes: integration (by relative similarities) and differentiation (by relative differences). These processes all require multiple particulars, i.e. more concretes than the concrete one is identifying.

Yes Ayn Rand uses the idea of standard-of-comparison but that does not deny the physical existence of a real object is whatever it is.

Nor am I denying the existence of a real object.

When describing what its existence is, is where the standard-of-comparison comes into play.

Precisely correct. And that is what the problem of universals deals with, i.e. "in virtue of what can the same thing be predicated of these concretes?" I am not denying existence or the idea that things have specific natures and I never did.

[UncleJim]

If the thing does not determine what can be said about it - then

When describing what its existence is, is where the standard-of-comparison comes into play.

Precisely correct. And that is what the problem of universals deals with, i.e. "in virtue of what can the same thing be predicated of these concretes?" I am not denying existence or the idea that things have specific natures and I never did.

It is that things specific nature; i.e., its reality, that determines what can be said about it.

As I said previously. Which is an Ayn Rand quote. "reality is the final arbiter."

Edited April 5, 2008 by UncleJim

[Alfonso Jones]

If the thing does not determine what can be said about it - then

When describing what its existence is, is where the standard-of-comparison comes into play.

Precisely correct. And that is what the problem of universals deals with, i.e. "in virtue of what can the same thing be predicated of these concretes?" I am not denying existence or the idea that things have specific natures and I never did.

It is that things specific nature; i.e., its reality, that determines what can be said about it.

As I said previously. Which is an Ayn Rand quote. "reality is the final arbiter."

One such cite, from Capitalism the Unknown Ideal, page 24, is:

"Since values are established contextually, every man must judge for himself, in the context of his own knowledge, goals, and interests. Since values are determined by the nature of reality, it is reality that serves as men's ultimate arbiter: if a man's judgment is right, the rewards are his; if it is wrong, he is his only victim."

Alfonso (Bill)

[BaalChatzaf]

If the thing does not determine what can be said about it - then what does? God, you, me or them? Absolutely not. I'm not saying this is what you are implying but what you are implying is very unclear.

The object to be described AND the method of observing it determine what can be said about it. All this plus our underlying assumptions of what it is possible to observe constrain the act of observation.

To know an object means to observe it ("see" it, if you will) in some fashion. Observation is the interaction of two or more physical systems. In general the systems are our senses and our instruments. And don't forget the set of assumptions that enable us to interpret what our instruments deliver to our sense. The instruments impose a limitation on what can be known about the object. For example, conventional telescopes can only observe light in the visible, near infra-red and near ultra-violet. They cannot pass x-rays or gamma-rays. To "see" objects in frequencies much lower than visible light or infra-red one must must arrays of radio receivers. To see x-rays, one must use specialized equipment as glass lenses/mirrors as glass does not refract/reflect x-ray emissions.

Let us be more simple. Let us observe the color of common objects. Ah! But in what light. Shall we use sunlight (natural or artificial) which has emission all across the rainbow spectrum (mostly in the green and yellow) or shall we use sodium arc lamps. What you see is not totally determined by the object but also by the ambient light.

The bottom line is that our methods of observations always leave out something. Not only that our instruments are subject to thermal variation so sometimes what we see is not there. For example the uneven heating of the atmosphere causes the "twinkling" effect for starlight. Stars do not twinkle. They only appear to twinkle (think of the well known "bent stick" effect here).

In some cases observation is quite indirect. Consider the electron microscope. What the device does is -synthesize- a visible image of an object (say a glob of viruses) from electrons reflected or emitted by an object. We don't see the electrons. We CAN'T see the electrons. They are too small. What we do see is an -image- created by the device. Holy Immanuel Kant, Batman! But the image cannot be any old image. It is constrained by the properties not only of the device but of the thing observed.

So to answer you question, God has little to do with what can be said about an observed object. Its nature AND the nature of the means of observation AND our underlying epistemological assumptions have everything to do with what can be said about an observed object.

Ba'al Chatzaf

For more information on how electron microscopes work see:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electron_microscope