Social metaphysics

[Barbara Branden]

Michael: "Some parts of social metaphysics comes from making wrong choices, but some of this is prewired in our brain."

I think you are forgetting the meaning of social metaphysics. It doesn't have anything to do with appreciating or wanting the approval of others. Of course we all enjoy being approved of.

Kat quoted Nathaniel's definition as follows: "Social metaphysics is the psychological condition of one who holds the minds and perspectives of other people, not objective reality, as the ultimate authority and frame of reference." Whether one considers the concept to describe an actual syndrome or not, it pertains to people who don't look out at the world for knowledge and understanding, but rather they look to the ideas and beliefs of other people -- especially their "significant others." For example, if I were a social metaphysician, I might become a liberal because the people in my social milieu were liberals; I might even become an Objectivist if those in my social milieu were Objectivists; but whatever ideas I held, (in a loose sense of the world "held") it would not be because I had looked at the world and my experience and concluded that those were the ideas that best explained it. The approach to ideas of a social metaphysician cannot be hard-wired into our brains.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Barbara,

You're right. I was stretching the concept a bit. I find myself overreacting these days.

When a person is pushed by a fanatic, he tends to get fanatic on the other end. I have seen so many "Objectivists" posture about and even brag as if approval and things like that didn't mean anything to them, then fall right off into the most banal cattle-mooing of crowd psychology possible, it makes me wonder.

(Could there be something called "crowd metaphysics" or "cattle metaphysics"?)

There is a huge difference between psychology (dealing with what comes built-into the mind) and philosophy (what is chosen), although there is an overlap where one impacts the other. I constantly call others to task for missing this difference.

In this case, I should have been clearer, since I also muddled the difference. The urges I mentioned are psychological (including fads). Social metaphysics is chosen. But I don't see anybody really choosing social metaphysics per se as a way of life. They choose the pleasure from the payoff of their "herding" and "mirror" urges over recognition of reality. They choose immediate pleasure over thinking.

What I encounter with many Objectivists is that they completely deny any value in the pleasure they get from receiving approval or fitting in with a crowd they admire for fear of being branded as a Keating. (These are also the ones who moo the loudest when the crowd gets whipped up.) When I look at reality, I don't see anything at all like what they preach. Still, that is no reason to go to the opposite end.

Thanks for keeping me honest.

Michael

[L W HALL]

Then if I understand what Barbara is saying, the sense of self identity as pertains to the social metaphysician is not one which is arrived at through self searching and learning by the afflicted(?) individual, but one rather which is borrowed or affected with little thought put into it.

The form the prescribed identity is based on is not material to the claim of it being social metaphysics.

L W

[Barbara Branden]

Michael, I agree that many people insist that they care nothing at all for the understanding or the approval of others -- and I don't believe that this is an honest position. It's the equivalent of a writer saying that he (or she) is indifferent to whether or not any reader knows what he's talking about or cares. Why be out there in the world if one is utterly indifferent to it? Why publish is one doesn't care if one is understood or not? I have observed that people who are loudest in declaring: "I don't care what anyone thinks of me," tend to be the touchiest and angriest if they are misunderstood or disliked. The important question is not whether one cares or not, but whether or not this caring is a motivating force in choosing one's actions, words, and opinions.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Barbara,

I think we are fully agreed on this. Here are some random thoughts that bounce around in my head about this, though.

If I am with a person I care a great deal about, I will most definitely do something to cause that person pleasure and then bask in the attention that is returned. But I understand that this is different than trying to become that person's opinion of me. Still, my actions are very much guided by what that person will think of me.

Another point. I have produced many popular music shows in life. If you do not care what people think of you and you are a popular entertainer, you will flop. You will not eat. That's just a reality of the market. You HAVE to please the audience and the competition is stiff.

When honing a show, I always studied audience reactions and had the artists I produced do more of whatever pleased the most. This always worked in creating more success. Obviously, you can get to a point where you compromise the song or the show, so you don't cross that line, but I never felt that this concern was something bad. Conceivably it could be called social metaphysics, though.

It's funny that even Rand was aware of an entertainer's need to please an audience. She wrote a short story once called "Her Second Career" where the main character was an actress who was highly attuned to which camera angles best showed her off, etc. I don't remember Rand writing with disdain about doing these things, although the point of the story was that they were worthless if you haven't built them up with your name over time.

Kay Gonda in Ideal also had a press agent. His whole purpose in life was to sell an image of the artist.

I guess where a popular artist turns into a social metaphysician is when he stops understanding that the image on stage is a product produced for public consumption and his personal life as a human being are very different things. I have seen too many artists get so tied up with their public image that they start believing they were that image.

What's funny about Rand is that I never got the impression that she did this when her world was fiction (unless the affair with NB was the start). However when she went into nonfiction, from ALL accounts I have read, I have seen a real struggle as she tried to live up to an image she created and sold as a trailblazing philosopher and keeper of the rational flame.

I certainly see that she was very careful with her public image. You can't be concerned about a public image, either, unless you care deeply about what others think of you. I'm not talking about loved ones, either. This is the general public you care about - those people - everyman.

Do you think there were elements of social metaphysics involved in Rand cultivating a public image, holding herself up as a perfect example of what she created, yet selling the wrong image to the public in the romance department? I simply cannot imagine that she was unaware of the impact disclosure would cause to her public image.

(Am I blaspheming again?)

Michael

[DavidMcK]

I have observed that people who are loudest in declaring: "I don't care what anyone thinks of me," tend to be the touchiest and angriest if they are misunderstood or disliked. The important question is not whether one cares or not, but whether or not this caring is a motivating force in choosing one's actions, words, and opinions.

Barbara, this is one of the most succinct statements I've seen of the real problem. I can remember wondering if an athlete who performed superlatively well, say, during an Olympics (with all the cameras and an audience of millions) was a sign of social metaphysics. Obviously others can bring out the best in us as well as the worst; our choice. Mike, if I can presume to comment, I think the mythmaking began before Barbara and Nathaniel met Ayn Rand, before she was Ayn Rand even; remember how horrible her life was in the Soviet Union. I think 'We the Living' was deliberately an attempt to kill Kira (Rand's alter ego) so that all of Kira's problems would die with her, it just didn't work. Kira was too powerful, and kept resurrecting herself, sometimes in strange and nearly unrecognizable forms (e.g. Dominique).

David

[Roger Bissell]

Quoting Nathaniel Branden again:

Social metaphysics is the psychological condition of one who holds the minds and perspectives of other people, not objective reality, as the ultimate authority and frame of reference.

Michael, the way NB's definition applies to an artist trying to assess the pop market to figure out what songs, books, etc. to aim at the public is this: if the artist gets his assessment of the market from his own first-hand study and understanding of the sales and cultural data that are available, then he is basing his assessment on his grasp of what people like. But if he instead gets that assessment from others (e.g., an opinionated friend, a manipulative relative, an influential big-shot in the industry), if he sets aside his own understanding of the facts of the market in order to curry favor with those others by adopting their assessment of the market and what will sell, then he is being a social metaphysician. (He is also being a social metaphysician if he rebels against those others and acts contrary to their opinions for the sake of being contrary. This is being a Lone Wolf Social Metaphysician, if I recall correctly. It is another way of setting aside one's own understanding of the reality of the market and letting others decide what one will believe and do.)

Pleasing one's mate in bed is not Social Metaphysical any more than it is altruistic. (I thought it was funny hearing how Rand once asked NB whether he was being altruistic, when he was being particularly focused on her pleasure for a while -- as if bringing her pleasure weren't sufficienly enjoyable to him for that time being for it to count as his own selfish enjoyment. Sounds like someone had a self-worth problem!) An example of Social Metaphysics in the bedroom would be setting aside one's first-hand knowledge of what feels good to one and what doesn't, and instead encouraging one's partner to think they were pleasuring you, when they really weren't. That would be allowing your pleasure to be governed by your partner's view of the world -- and specifically what brought you pleasure -- rather than communicating what really brought you pleasure.

Similarly, if you know what the public wants to hear, based on their own reports and buying habits, you have the first-hand data you need in order to provide them more of it and to make a bunch of money doing so. Social metaphysics comes in if you set aside your own judgment in order to curry favor with (or antagonize) others by treating their opinions as more important than yours.

Suppose a large organization of pop music listeners was formed, and they tried to formulate a policy of what they should like in pop music, and they presented this resolution to all the record producers and radio programmers, etc., trying to influence them to make and program according to this policy. A first-hander would look at the real buying habits of the public and say, "Your resolution is fine, but how am I going to pay my bills if I don't give you stuff I know you will buy?" A Social Metaphysician would say, "Gee, thanks, folks, you've saved me a lot of trouble, doing all that sales data analysis. Now I can just make and program music that you say you want, and we'll all be happy."

Rand recognized that Elvis Presley was a "socially objective" preference in the marketplace, even though she didn't like his music. This insight is in her essay "What is Capitalism?" in Capitalism: the Unknown Ideal. It's not Social Metaphysics to recognize the socially objective. It's just a first-hand recognition of the facts of what the most individuals want to spend their money or time on. Capitalists ignore such objective data at their peril.

If a person wants to offer something better to the buying public, that is his privilege. But if they don't want to buy it, despite his best efforts to educate them about its merits and persuade them to give it a try, then he needs to live with that, or find another line of work. If a person wants to try to appeal to a niche market, say, of people with more refined musical taste, again, that is his privilege. But he should realize that he will not make the kind of money that those aiming at the broadest taste will make. And if a person feels that he is committing artistic treason in aiming at the broad public market, then he should stop doing it!

How does this relate to Peter Keating? Am I saying he was not a Social Metaphysician? No. He was one. He actually believed he was making good buildings, but he got the belief not from his own aesthetic judgment, but from the opinions of others he wanted to please. And he wasn't trying to appeal to the market in order to please as many customers as possible, but to appeal to the opinion-makers in order to please them. He wasn't using his own mind and judgment to find out what his customers wanted. He set aside his own judgment of the market, as well as his own standards and preferences, if any, of what was good architecture, and instead internalized the judgment and standards of the opinion-makers.

IMO, there is something worse than giving the public what it wants (even if it's schlocky by your standards), and that is giving the public what someone else says they should have or want (rather than what they want, or what you think they should want). I'll take crass over Social Metaphysics any day!

REB

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Roger,

This is a tangent, but I wasn't just talking about repertoire. When I produce a show, it goes MUCH deeper. And it is not all technical, either. (Although I get into everything, from all the visuals, lighting, arrangements, placement on stage, sound tests, the works - I even try to set an agreeable sequence of keys, making it so that when the atmosphere is similar, the keys are related and when I want a big break in climate, I do something like going from C to F sharp - I could go on all day about this.)

However, what I was talking about with social metaphysics was something like if a male singer had a certain crooked grin and way swiveling his body that got the audience members of the female persuasion highly animated, I would have him place that gesture at strategic moments of a song. (Think about all the metaphorical things Elvis could do with a microphone stand.)

There were many details of this nature that had nothing to do with the music (but some musical things for non-musical reasons also - like choosing a lower key than normal because it brought out a low sexy voice in the refrain, or a higher key that was not completely comfortable for the singer, but a high note at the end, after a suitable dramatic pause, would bring the audience to its feet).

This would go the other way, too. Once I walked right up on stage in the middle of a show - everything stopped - and with an exaggerated gesture of hiding my mouth, I whispered in the singer's ear, "You're boring the people. You can do better than this shit." Then I walked off stage.

It's funny but it's true. He was horrible at that moment and it was going on far too long. He was stunned for a minute, but then he started to smooth over why I stopped the show and even told the public what I said. Then he livened it up and the show did go on - much much better.

When I have produced singers, I always kept in mind one who came to me asking me be produce her. I asked if she was a musician. Her answer, "No, I'm a singer."

Bless her heart, she had no idea how I took that.

Anyway, back to social metaphysics. (And, incidentally, I fully agree with your post.)

Michael

[Barbara Branden]

Michael, let me give an example of what I often do when I'm giving a talk, which pertains to my concern for my audience, but has nothing to do with social metaphysics.

I want to be clear, I want to be understood, I want what I say to be interesting, and I want to reach my audience. Sometimes, it's necessary for me to write out what I want to say, but I usually prefer to speak from notes, so as to be able to improvise; and even if I do have a written text, I often depart from it significantly. I am acutely aware of my audience, in the following way: I notice if they are responding to what I'm saying, and if the response seems especially strong to a parrticular issue, (perhaps in the form of smiles, or heads nodding) I often will speak further about that issue.

For example, I recall once discussing the fact -- which I had intended only as a side point -- that while the repression of painful emotions may dull the pain of those emotions, repression inevitably also dulls our capacity to experience joy -- that all our strong and authentic emotions have links to one another, and that one cannot mute some of them without muting the others, one cannot mute one's emotional response to a particular object without muting one's response to all other objects. As I was speaking, I noticed that some in the audience were listening with an unusual intensity, and that one member seemed to have tears in his eyes. Then and there, I junked most of what I had intended to say on other issues, and concentrated on explaining and amplifying that one. I understood that this effect of repression was much more important to my listeners than what I had planned to discuss, and legitimately so.

I think it's clear that this was not social metaphysics on my part. I was not there to talk to myself, but to people who might gain something from what I had to say. And so I allowed my listeners to be, in effect, my editors, telling me which of the things I wanted to say was most important to them. It would only have been social metaphysics had I discovered that they wanted me to sing the praises of repression and I had done so.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Barbara,

I have a GREAT example of someone who practices pure social metaphysics, divorced from productivity. You start by setting yourself up as a new Objectivist leader. Then you make it an unforgivable offense for anyone ever to question your honesty, regardless of any whoppers you lay on folks or gross manipulation of facts you present. Then you worry a great deal about what your image as Objectivist leader could mean if somebody says you drink too much...

(Time to stop...)

//;-))

Michael

[Paul Mawdsley]

Dragonfly,

I have taken some time to sit back and consider our recent interaction. I can come up with all sorts of rational explanations why I should not feel guilty about what I said, and the effects it had on our discussion, but, it seems, I do feel guilty. In fact, I feel quite shitty about it. What is that all about?

The truth is, as I have said before, I do respect and value your perspective. When I came back to the internet world, there were three people I was hoping to still find here: Ellen Stuttle, Mike Lee, and yourself. I don’t really know any of you but I find great value in each of you. I value the particular twist you each put on your understanding of the world. I also value the way neither of you would let me, or anyone, present a view of the world without it passing your scrutiny and judgement. In short, I value your honesty and intelligence and I value the fact that you keep me honest and require my intelligence.

I have already presented a fine enough explanation for why I do not need to feel guilt. So why do I feel guilty? This may sound a little strange. It certainly sounds strange to me. I feel as though you are a friend and my actions have damaged our friendship. Otherwise, I would not have given recent events another thought. I am quite fine with taking the attitude, “I am just identifying the facts,” when I don’t care about how the person interprets what I say. What has caught me off-guard is the reality that I care.

I am not one to ignore what I see, nor am I one to not say what I think. I recognize there is more than one way to express a thought. When I have expressed a thought in a manner that negatively effects a relationship I value, I am not going to pretend it didn’t happen. What I said was callous and uncalled for. I apologize.

Paul

[Paul Mawdsley]

In "Taking Responsibility" p. 68, Branden says:

"Remember that in philosophy "metaphysics" is one's view of the ultimate nature of reality. To the [social metaphysician], reality is other people. In his or her mind, in the automatic connections of

his or her consciousness, people occupy the place which, in the mind of an autonomous, self-responsible individual, is occupied by reality."

How does the social metaphysician access the minds and perspectives of other people? Does the social metaphysician have some distinct psychological dynamic– orientation of consciousness, interpretive framework, or motivation– that makes him/her susceptible to social metaphysics? Conversely, do people who are not social metaphysicians have a predisposition to developing a different psychological dynamic– ie: do they tend to have a different orientation of consciousness, interpretive framework, or motivation? What does it mean for a mind to replace reality with people? How does the mind replace reality with people? Is our understanding of social metaphysics complete? If so, why do we have all these questions surrounding the topic? Who is John Galt not?

Paul

[Fran]

I think what he means is that rather than looking to reality to tell him/her what is right and what is wrong, what to think, what to believe, what actions to take, the social metaphysician instead looks to people. So he/she believes whatever other people believe, would probably do whatever other people tell him/her to do, etc.

[Ellen Stuttle]

Barbara wrote several posts back (I'm well behind in reading list discussions):

Whether one considers the concept to describe an actual syndrome or not, it pertains to people who don't look out at the world for knowledge and understanding, but rather they look to the ideas and beliefs of other people -- especially their "significant others."

My point is that I don't think the idea is a legitimate psychological "concept." I think it's an invention not an identification. I think that Nathaniel developed the idea from Rand's "second-hander" in The Fountainhead, which idea itself isn't a proper psychological concept. I have found, in my own experience of and theorizing about human psychological dynamics, no reason to believe that there's any such "syndrome" or "condition" as "social metaphysics" or any such being as a "social metaphysician." Instead what I believe exists is people with varying degrees of ego strength, varying degrees of independence of thought (in varying areas), varying degrees of reliance on authority figures (in varying areas), etc. I've seen no evidence to support a unifying identification based on a hypothetical uniform etiology. My demur against the idea goes much deeper than questioning whether "syndrome" is the correct term or not.* It's a demur against the idea as such. Thus discussions attempting to assess which behaviors are and aren't instances of "social metaphysics" and which persons are or aren't "social metaphysicians" leave me cold, since I don't think there are any instances or cases of the phenomenon or the person-type supposedly being described.

* As I hear the connotations of "syndrome" versus "condition" -- the term Nathaniel used in his reworking of "social metaphysics" -- "condition" sounds more like medicalese than "syndrome." Apparently unlike Adam Reed, I think of "syndrome" as being neutral in model.

Ellen

___

[Dragonfly]

Paul, no need to apologize, I was not offended. I only see no point in continuing a discussion if the argument is going to revolve around the question who is more objective or willing to question his own interpretive framework, that can only lead to an exchange like: "I'm more objective! No, I'm more objective, you're stubborn! etc.", which is not productive and usually degenerates into a shouting match (I've seen that happen often enough). In the past I may have let myself carry away in such situations, but now I try bow out in time. Let us confine us to the proper arguments.

[Paul Mawdsley]

Ellen wrote about the concept of social metaphysics:

*My point is that I don't think the idea is a legitimate psychological "concept." I think it's an invention not an identification. I think that Nathaniel developed the idea from Rand's "second-hander" in The Fountainhead, which idea itself isn't a proper psychological concept.*

I have struggled with the concept of social metaphysics in many ways: I have wondered how I might apply it to understand those around me; I have wondered how it might apply to me; I have wondered what psychological dynamics lie beneath the concept; I have wondered why the concept cannot be anything more than Nathaniel Branden says it is; but I have not thought the concept does not identify anything. It does identify something. It identifies a particular category of observation and experience.

There are a lot of psychological concepts that I tend to see as place-holders: they represent a certain category of observed behaviour until a deeper understanding of the underlying phenomenon is presented. The concept of “instincts” was such a place-holder. As we have come to see the category of behaviour that is defined by the concept of instincts in terms of a deeper understanding of underlying dynamics, we have bypassed the need for the concept. This is how I see social metaphysics.

This is not intended as a slight to NB. I consider concepts such as “conscious,” “subconscious,” and “unconscious” to be of a similar nature. They are place-holders. There is nothing wrong with isolating, defining, and categorizing patterns we observe before us. This is an important step in the scientific and learning process. Personally, I’m not satisfied until I can understand something in terms of the actions and interactions of entities. This is how we take our understanding from philosophizing, or in this case psychologizing, and raise it to science. If and when we can describe the category of behaviour called “conscious” in terms of the actions and interactions of entities, we will have a deeper understanding of the underlying phenomena and will have a science of consciousness.

I tend to find concepts such as “conscious” and “unconscious” to be useful to a point. They are useful in isolating and communicating categories of observation and experience. Like many things that have a value at one stage of development, at a later stage of development they can become obstacles to growth. If we become comfortable with definitions and categories, we can and do become complacent about looking for the underlying truths– ie: what are the entities and how do they act and interact to produce the effects we observe? Answering this question takes us to a deeper, more precise, understanding of existence.

I have tried to explore the underlying truths behind the concept of social metaphysics a few times. Each time it has been pointed out that: social metaphysics means such and such and should not be considered to mean any more than that. I must admit to trying to show respect to the concept by expanding it rather than simply discarding it. Now, I am beginning to realize the concept of social metaphysics is just slowing down progress. It is time to bypass it.

I have noted a desire, on this forum, to talk about things that many consider to be connected to their understanding of social metaphysics but discussions become derailed when the definition is rolled out. There is an element of psychological dynamics that is being obscured by the label, “social metaphysics.” Social dynamics is truly interesting. Talking about the elements of social dynamics and integrating these thoughts with Objectivist principles is a worthy cause. So maybe we should stop talking about social metaphysics and start focussing on social dynamics.

More precisely we should focus on the psychological processes of social dynamics. I have talked about a concept I have called “intersubjective dynamics.” This is one of my attempts to bypass the confining concept of social metaphysics. I have suggested previously that the empathic perspective each of us is able to generate automatically in response to the evidence of another’s perspective plays a large role in social interactions. Our coping mechanisms in dealing with letting another’s perspective into our soul and our level of self-esteem also play a large role in our development and our social interactions. Intersubjective dynamics is the psychological dynamics of personal perspectives interacting with empathic perspectives in the context of coping mechanisms and levels of self-esteem. It is an attempt to understand the perspective whereby reality is perceived as interacting conscious entities; the realm where other conscious entities slip past one’s defences into one’s soul; the realm of interacting subjectivity. I suggest social metaphysics identifies a category of behaviour that is a particular negative manifestation of intersubjective dynamics.

Michael– as well as others– has been involved in trying to identify the psychological dynamics behind “randroidism.” There is a natural tendency to be attracted to the concept of social metaphysics in this context but the baggage of the concept keeps stopping interesting explorations. Maybe we should try considering a more neutral concept. Intersubjective dynamics does not presuppose healthy or unhealthy; good or evil. It identifies a continuum of behaviour as Ellen suggests. There is healthy and unhealthy development in the intersubjective realm. We can not only talk about unhealthy dynamics that lead to low social self-esteem and ego defences; we can also consider healthy intersubjective dynamics that lead to high social self-esteem and ego robustness. Personally, I found this to be a topic virtually nonexistent in Nathaniel Branden’s work. I think this is because, like the rest of us, he too was trapped by the baggage of the concept of social metaphysics.

Paul Mawdsley

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Paul,

Whenever I get thinking about social metaphysics, I think about a tangent - crowd psychology. As a conductor, part of my training was how to handle crowds and I did a lot of observing over the years (and even did my share in facing down and reversing hostile crowds). What makes people go off like that? I don't know why, but I have learned a lot about how (there is no crowd dynamic without at least one ringleader). btw - Hitler's favorite activity was whipping up a crowd and he could do it well.

To me, however, social metaphysics as used in Objectivism is tied up with the idea of kissing ass, social climbing, competing for status, etc., without production, and on a level of lying to yourself. You convince yourself that sucking up can replace exercising productive talent and when you receive a pat on the head for brown-nosing, you try to accept it as applause for actually producing something.

I would not call that a psychological thing, but a philosophical one (ethics). It is a value choice.

I like your ideas in delving into this, though. I am mulling them over.

Michael

[Ellen Stuttle]

Paul,

I feel that I owe you -- and maybe others as well, but especially you -- an apology for having aroused hopes of a discussion which I can't engage in. On the new Atlantis list, at New Year's, I posted saying that I was intending to drop out from listlife. I really, really meant this. My post-polio "syndrome" -- there's an instance of where I think the term is appropriate in medicalese -- is real, no joke, and getting worse by the day. It has the unfortunate result of producing enough pain in my orbital eye muscles as to make reading as such, and especially reading a computer screen, an ordeal.

However -- best intentions going amuck -- meanwhile I'd become drawn by the posts on SOLOHQ (prior to the split between RoR and SOLOPassion) regarding the pending PARC controversy. Thus, when Michael invited me to join this list, I did so, rather against my self-protective judgment. Net result is that I've ended up posting, especially here, with recollections that contradict the picture James Valliant paints...of Rand, of "the Brandens" (Robert Campbell is correct in mocking this usage, as if the two of them were a single entity), of others (e.g., Kay and Phil Smith, Allan Blumenthal -- whom I knew well enough, who was an important enough figure in my own life, to feel I had to object at Valliant's reference to him, etc.).

And now there's a controversy developing over Chris Sciabarra, whom I consider a very dear friend. (Dragon-slayers need dragons to slay: the anti-"Brandens" campaign not having gone as expected, a new dragon is needed. I wonder how much back-stage email and/or phone consultation was involved in selecting Diana as the one to break elist etiquette by divulging comments from personal emails and in deciding on the tactics of thus breaching elist decorum.)

I feel that I've probably made a mistake by ever starting to post here. Maybe my historic reports have done some good in correcting false views. Maybe not. The net result, from my standpoint, is that I feel I have a backlog of "owed" responses which I can't provide.

I was interested by your posts on Nathaniel's list about "social metaphysics." What I thought then, but didn't say (my attention being focused on the debates with "MikePsych"), was that you were trying for a universal theory of human group nature which is impossible to form using an Objectivist context as the basis. As I've said, here and there (on other lists), at no time in the history of my familiarity with Objectivism and the Objectivist social world, have I ever thought of myself as "an Objectivist." From the start (and by that, I mean from the first time I read Atlas Shrugged, two years before I even learned that Objectivism as such was the subject of courses being given by NBI), I considered AR lacking in psychological knowledge -- "naive," as I styled her.

This doesn't mean I didn't love Atlas Shrugged. I loved it; I'd reread it and studied it with care as to the technical details before I then read The Fountainhead, and I still consider Atlas a great work of literary and of intellectual brilliance. But from early in my first reading of Atlas Shrugged I had problems of belief about her delineation of characters -- and then, if anything, I had even worse such problems upon reading The Fountainhead. (I consider the characters in We the Living, which I read soon after I'd read The Fountainhead, her most believable.) Nathaniel says someplace in his contributions to The Objectivist Newsletter that what people object to in Howard Roark isn't the characterization, but the character. Well, yes, when I got around to reading The Fountainhead, the character is exactly what I objected to, though not in the way he meant. I meant not in the sense of a moral objection but of a reality objection: I didn't, and don't, believe the characterization. (Or Dominique's or Keating's or Toohey's -- I come closer to believing Wynand's and closer still to believing that of several minor characters.)

And I didn't, and don't, believe the idea of "social metaphysics" developed from the theme of The Fountainhead. Consider what the idea literally would mean, someone who substitutes other people's opinions for assessing reality: Are we talking about needing a "seeing eye" person to tell the "social metaphysician," for instance, whether a stop light is red or green? The supposed defining characteristic isn't something I can recognize as what I call in categorizations of psychological terminology "a real."

Which isn't to say that giving too much weight to what others think isn't a real. Etc., etc. But I see no unifying "syndrome" or "condition."

On the other hand, I think it's a truth of significant importance to understanding human behavior that we are evolved from a social-simian line. And that for humans, along with other social animals, the group is an essential feature even of who we are. A solitary cat is no trouble to picture. A solitary social-simian is a dead animal, in the majority of cases -- at least until adulthood. Humans couldn't even survive to adulthood without being cared for. Nor would they learn language. (Yes, I think the ability to form language and the impetus to do so is an "instinct" in a sense, but one which requires being taught at least minimally to develop -- what Konrad Lorenz called an "open" instinct.)

I guess my fundamental point here is that I think -- rather along similar lines to MSK's explorings with the "child in the wilderness" hypothesized scene -- that the importance of "others" to the human being isn't, and maybe can't be, properly addressed within an Objectivist framework.

I applaud your efforts to address this. But I think that you might get farther if you'd, so to speak, "start from scratch" and not try to frame your explorations in terms of the O'ist term "social metaphysics."

Ellen

___

[Paul Mawdsley]

Ellen, you say:

*I feel that I owe you -- and maybe others as well, but especially you -- an apology for having aroused hopes of a discussion which I can't engage in.*

I feel the meaning in your words. You owe me no apologies. I was trying to take a piece of you I knew you may not have to give. I thank you for the acknowledgement. I am only sorry I did not get a chance to know you better. Your perspective has a great gravitational pull for me, as I see it does for others as well. If you keep writing here, I will surely try to steal your time and attention by writing about something you would find difficult to resist responding to.

*Maybe my historic reports have done some good in correcting false views.*

It is not about just correcting false views. It is like having a guided tour of a great historic battlefield from someone who witnessed the battle from a position of relative neutrality. The value of your historic reports comes from both your witnessing the events and from the understanding and meaning you found in them. You make quite a valuable lens.

*I was interested by your posts on Nathaniel's list about "social metaphysics." What I thought then, but didn't say (my attention being focused on the debates with "MikePsych"), was that you were trying for a universal theory of human group nature which is impossible to form using an Objectivist context as the basis.*

(PsychMike had a way of doing that.)

You are right on both counts: I was, and am, trying for a universal theory of human group nature; and it is impossible within the Objectivist context. But there is more. You know my ambitions extend considerably further that just a universal theory of human group nature. And, while I agree such a theory is impossible within the current Objectivist framework, I believe it fits in the realm of possibility within Objectivism’s fundamental principles. It is the fundamental principles, starting with the Objectivist view of causality, that I align myself with. That there are some gaping holes in Objectivism’s model of reality, especially its view of human nature, is clear to me. If Objectivism is an open system, this is not a problem. If Objectivism is not an open system, it is based on a contradiction. Rand can’t set the principles of Objectivism to include the primacy of existence, and then say it is only what she says it is without falling into contradiction.

For almost twenty years, since I broke Rand’s psychological grip, I did not think of myself as an Objectivist. If my thoughts were not stirred by Michael contacting me, and by the spirit of this forum, I would probably still be saying, “I am not an Objectivist.” But I must say I’ve enjoyed rediscovering the disowned Objectivist in me. As long as I can maintain my renegade status, I’ll continue to call myself an Objectivist. Ellen, I don’t think our relationship to Objectivist status is so very far apart.

*I think that you might get farther if you'd, so to speak, "start from scratch" and not try to frame your explorations in terms of the O'ist term "social metaphysics."*

Starting from scratch is what I do by nature. It’s how my mind works. I build my perspective from fundamental principles. The problem is, if I want to communicate my perspective, I have to frame it in terms of concepts that others are accustomed to. Otherwise, I’m just another nut with a wacky point of view. (No hecklers please! That includes you, Dragonfly.)

Ellen, I don’t really know you but I consider you a friend. You strike me as the sort of person I always hoped I would find in the world. I have been lucky enough to find a few. In a sense you sold me on coming to this forum where I have come to meet other good people. Your name caught my eye when I was evaluating this site. Your name here said this is a place I want to be. If you no longer post here, I will miss you. Keep well.

Thank-you,

Paul

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Paul,

Your view of causality is seeping its way into my thinking. (I intend to read that those two threads in "Metaphysics" again, very slowly and carefully.) It is extremely important, so please keep at this. I noticed the following words from your post above:

That there are some gaping holes in Objectivism’s model of reality, especially its view of human nature, is clear to me. If Objectivism is an open system, this is not a problem.

On Objectivist Living it most definitely is a open system. Don't worry about closed-system control-freaks. They have no say here.

btw - I echo your touching words to Ellen.

Michael

[Barbara Branden]

Ellen, I'm so sorry that you'll no longer be posting here. I'll miss you. Your posts have been important to me, and valuable. You are a wise lady, and I hope we may stay in touch. Take good care of yourself.

Barbara

[Roger Bissell]

Ellen, I agree with Paul, Mike, and Barbara. I really have appreciated your posts, and I'll miss you. Please stop in again whenever your eyes feel OK and your curiosity gets the better of you!

Best,

Roger

[Dragonfly]

I certainly will miss Ellen's posts too. I'll admit that I always felt a stab of excitement when I saw that there was a new post from her, there was always something interesting to read. We can only hope that some miraculous improvement in her condition will enable her to participate again in the future.

[Robert Campbell]

Ellen,

Your historic reports have done a lot of good.

You will be missed here.

Robert

[Jody Gomez]

Ellen,

Sometimes cliches become such, because they work, so forgive this one, but:

You will be sorely missed.

All my best to you,

Jody