Deleted Thread - The Mind-Body Dichotomy in David Kelley’s philosophy

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Deleted Thread - The Mind-Body Dichotomy in David Kelley’s philosophy

Here is a deleted thread with the article by Victor Pross that caused so much controversy and prompted a public apology from him. I have identified most all plagiarisms in the article, but I have not yet examined Pross’s posts on this thead. (I will delete this sentence once I have done so.) I am posting each post separately for ease of editing and loading. This thread was reconstructed from the forum’s automatic Word dump function. I had to reformat it, so there are some small differences from the original format-wise. Content-wise, they are identical. I am glad I am restoring this thread because some good posts were lost before.

Michael

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 14 2006, 03:15 AM

The Mind-Body Dichotomy in David Kelley’s philosophy.

After a careful read, I maintain my position that David Kelley has accepted—or at least proceeds from—the Mind-Body Dichotomy orientation. This is specifically so in regards to his focus on ethical questions, and especially so when it comes to moral evaluation. Kelley unmistakably sieves the Objectivist understanding through the distorting lens of the mind-body dichotomy, via his division between “motives” and “consequences”.*(1.1) His approach is that of a classic deontologist.

In this post, I will demonstrate very clearly why this is so.

First, Kelley states in Truth and Toleration [in regards to moral judgment] that “the particular form of evaluation concerned with what is volitional, with the realm of man-made facts” and then he elaborates thusly:

“Since the fundamental choice is whether to think or not, whether to use our capacity for reason, we must judge people by how they make this choice. In judging an action, therefore, we are concerned not only with its consequences, measured by the standard of life, but also with its source in the person's motives, as measured by the standard of rationality. The question is how to integrate these two factors into a single judgment. Philosophers have proposed various theories about the proper weight to assign consequences on the one hand and motives on the other. The Objectivist ethics, unfortunately, has yet to address this question at any depth. But it's clear that we cannot ignore either factor.”*(1.2)

This is where we find Kelley proceeding from a traditional philosophy perspective, as Utilitarians and Consequentialists maintain that the moral status of an action (i.e., whether the action is morally right or wrong) depends on the action's consequences. In any situation, the morally right thing to do is whatever it will have the best consequences.**(2.1) Take the Utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle: "actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness."**(2.2) Deontologists deny that what ultimately matters is an action's consequences. They claim that what matters with regard to whether an action is right or wrong is why the action was done.**(2.3)

There are, however, many varieties of deontological ethics (e.g., The 'Golden Rule' - "Do unto others as you'd have them do unto you").**(2.4) Immanuel Kant is the most influential deontologist. Rejecting consequentialism, he wrote: "A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes." Even if by bad luck a good person never accomplishes anything much, the good will would like a jewel, still shine by its own light as something which has its full value in itself."**(2.5)

We can see that philosophers have long grappled with the question of how to integrate motives and consequences into a single judgment or else they simply “flip the coin” in preference for one side over the other.*(1.3)***(3) Kelley’s starting point, his whole approach, springs from this Utilitarian base. This being so, Kelley has set himself at variance with Objectivism. “Whether an idea is true or false, and whether it is good or bad, are related issues,” Kelley writes. “But they are distinct, and the issue of truth is primary.*(1.4)

Bam, right there--by conceding the premise of the “motives versus consequences” standard, as seen in the quote above, Kelley accepts the core split between mind and body.

In Kelley’s ethics, the mental (the cognitive) and the physical (consequences) of human action are treated as fundamentally detached and distinctive parts, assigning each its own standard of judgment: the standard of rationality for motives and the standard of life for consequences.*(1.5)

In Kelley’s system, the mental and the physical have been juxtaposed, but not integrated.*(1.6) “If ideas cannot be judged morally in terms of their causes and effects,” Peikoff asks, “why and how can a man’s actions---his bodily movements—be judged morally?” [NOTE FROM MSK: Quote from “Fact and Value.”] David Kelley has never answered that question and, I hasten to add, neither have his Utilitarian friends.

OBJECTIVISM: FULL INTEGRATION.

Any serious student of Ayn Rand’s philosophy knows that Rand rejected the mind-body dichotomy out-right. This permitted her to bypass the traditional “motives and versus consequences” quagmire. And yet Kelley states that Objectivism is “yet to address this question.”*(1.7) Ayn Rand swept aside all the mind-body dichotomy questions that Kelley wishes to resuscitate--because they are false from the outset. The thorough integration of mind and body in Ayn Rand’s philosophy has closed the gaps that were false in the first place—false metaphysically.

For Objectivism, justice requires the moral evaluation of a person “for what he is”---as man is being of “self-made soul.” A man of self-made soul is what a man has made of himself--in thought and action.*(1.8)

“Man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness, and that he may permit no breach between body and mind, between action and thought, between his life and his convictions.” [Man is an indivisible entity—and no breach is to be made of “motives and consequences” as well.]*(1.9)

The mental action leads, and the body follows. This position does not entail the straw man argument that ideas are “agents in the world” whatever the hell that is suppose to mean. As an indivisible sum, it means that a man’s actions derive from his mental state--his ideas, his methodology, his philosophy, the content of his mind, and the manner in which he holds that content, the ideas, determine what a man IS—and this drives his actions. By dividing motives from consequences, aside from his lapse into traditional philosophy, Kelley presents a person’s thinking as having only a vague relationship to the results of his actions.*(1.10)

In Fact and Value, Peikoff wrote:

“There is only one basic issue in philosophy and in all judgment, cognitive and evaluation alike: does a man conform to reality or not? Whether an idea is true or false is one aspect of this question---which immediately implies the other aspects: the relationship to reality of the mental processes involved and of the actions that will result.”

(NOTE FROM MSK: The passage from “Fact and Value” is slightly misquoted. The correct text is: “There is only one basic issue in philosophy and in all judgment, cognitive and evaluative alike: does a man conform to reality or not? Whether an idea is true or false is one aspect of this question—which immediately implies the other aspects I mentioned: the relation to reality of the mental processes involved and of the actions that will result.”)

The above, I submit, is a complete understanding of mind-body integration—as is the totality of Fact and Value.

Do you remember the scene in Atlas where Francisco is explaining to Rearden the moral significance of a steel mill:

"If you want to see an abstract principle, such as moral action, in material form--there it is. Every girder of it, every pipe, wire and valve was put there by choice in answer to the question: right or wrong."

(NOTE FROM MSK: The passage from Atlas Shrugged is slightly misquoted. The correct text is: “If you want to see an abstract principle, such as moral action, in material form—there it is. Look at it, Mr. Rearden. Every girder of it, every pipe, wire and valve was put there by a choice in answer to the question: right or wrong?”)

Concluding on this above quote from Atlas Shrugged: “Justice,” writes Ayn Rand, “is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake the character of men as you cannot fake the character of nature, that you must judge all men as conscientiously as you judge inanimate objects, with the same respect for truth, with the same incorruptible vision, by as pure and as rational a process of identification--that every man must be judged for what he is and treated accordingly…”*(1.11)

********

NOTE FROM ADMINISTRATOR:

* Plagiarized from “David Kelley's Mind-Body Dichotomy in Moral Judgment” by Diana Hsieh. The original passages read as follows:

(1.1)

Kelley clearly filters the Objectivist understanding of moral judgment through the distorting lens of the mind-body dichotomy, courtesy of the division between motives and consequences.

(1.2)

In the first chapter of

Truth and Toleration

, David Kelley begins his discussion of moral judgment by explaining that it is "the particular form of evaluation concerned with what is volitional, with the realm of man-made facts." He then writes:

Since the fundamental choice is whether to think or not, whether to use our capacity for reason, we must judge people by how they make this choice. In judging an action, therefore, we are concerned not only with its consequences, measured by the standard of life, but also with its source in the person's motives, as measured by the standard of rationality. The question is how to integrate these two factors into a single judgment. Philosophers have long wrestled with this question; they have proposed various theories about the proper weight to assign consequences on the one hand and motives on the other. The Objectivist ethics, unfortunately, has yet to address this question at any depth. But it's clear that we cannot ignore either factor (T&T 9).

(1.3) (quoting David Kelley from “T&T 9”)

“The question is how to integrate these two factors into a single judgment. Philosophers have long wrestled with this question; they have proposed various theories about the proper weight to assign consequences on the one hand and motives on the other.”

(1.4) (quoting David Kelley from “T&T 27”)

“Whether an idea is true or false, and whether it is good or bad, are related issues. But they are distinct, and the issue of truth is primary.”

(Note: Not technically a plagiarism, but the use of the same quote in the present context should be mentioned.)

(1.5)

By accepting the basic terms of the motives-versus-consequences debate, he's accepted its underlying split between mind and body. The basic question of that debate, after all, is whether a person should be judged primarily by the action intended by consciousness (i.e. the mental) or the actual results in existence (i.e. the physical). The mental and physical aspects of human action are treated as fundamentally separate and distinct parts, as only related by chance.

(1.6)

In that case, the mental and physical aspects of human action are juxtaposed but not integrated.

(1.7)

Ayn Rand's rejection of the mind-body dichotomy allows her to bypass the traditional debates about motives versus consequences in moral judgment. It's not that Objectivism has "yet to address this question," as Kelley claims (T&T 9).

(1.8)

For Ayn Rand, justice requires the moral evaluation of a person "for what he is" -- meaning for all that he has made of himself as a human being in thought and action.

(1.9)

… "man is an indivisible entity, an integrated unit of two attributes: of matter and consciousness, and that he may permit no breach between body and mind, between action and thought, between his life and his convictions" (AS 937). (She could well have added "between motives and consequences" to that sentence.)

(1.10) (Diana Hsieh’s

Comment 30

from the discussion thread to the article.)

By dividing motives from consequences, DK falsely presents a person's thinking as having only a tenuous relationship to the results of his actions.

(1.11) (quoting Rand from

Atlas Shrugged

)

“Justice is the recognition of the fact that you cannot fake the character of men as you cannot fake the character of nature, that you must judge all men as conscientiously as you judge inanimate objects, with the same respect for truth, with the same incorruptible vision, by as pure and as rational a process of identification--that every man must be judged for what he is and treated accordingly…”

(Note: Not technically a plagiarism, but the use of the same quote in the present context should be mentioned.)

** Plagiarized from “An Introduction to Ethics, Part 2, Some Objectivist Theories” by Andrew Latus. The original passages read as follows:

(2.1)

Consequentialists

maintain that the moral status of an action (i.e., whether the action is morally right or wrong) depends on the action's consequences. In any situation, the morally right thing to do is whatever will have the best consequences.

(2.2)

"actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness." (

John Stuart Mill's Greatest Happiness Principle

)

(2.3)

Deontologists

deny that what ultimately matters is an action's consequences. They claim that what matters with regard to whether an action is right or wrong is why the action was done.

(2.4)

There are many varieties of deontological ethics (e.g.,

The 'Golden Rule'

- "Do unto others as you'd have them do unto you").

(2.5)

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804)

is the most influential deontologist.

Rejecting Consequentialism:

"A good will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes." Even if by bad luck a good person never accomplishes anything much, the good will would "like a jewel, still shine by its own light as something which has its full value in itself."

*** Plagiarized from The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand by David Kelley. The original passage reads as follows:

(3) (p. 22)

The question is how to integrate these two factors into a single judgment. Philosophers have long wrestled with this question; they have proposed various theories about the proper weight to assign consequences on the one hand and motives on the other.

OL extends its deepest apologies to Diana Hsieh, Andrew Latus and David Kelley.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 14 2006, 03:18 AM

Victor,

I put this in "Chewing on Ideas," since that is what we are going to do.

Later (I'm tired right now).

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: jenright

Aug 14 2006, 08:09 PM

I don't yet see the dichotomy in the quotes from Kelley. Drawing a distinction between motive and consequence is not the same thing as saying "never the twain shall meet," which is what a dichotomy typically does. If I draw a distinction between the height of a rectancle and the width, I am not denying they are both aspects of the same rectangle.

Rand seems to accept at least a distinction between motive and consequence in the following:

"In all fields that the government enters (outside of its proper sphere), two motives—one vicious, the other virtuous—produce the same results." (Fairness Doctrine for Education)

"The men who scorn or dread introspection take their inner states for granted, as an irreducible and irresistible primary, and let their emotions determine their actions. This means that they choose to act without knowing the context (reality), the causes (motives), and the consequences (goals) of their actions." (Philosophical Detection)

"Socialism has been tried on every continent of the globe. In the light of its results, it is time to question the motives of socialism's advocates." (The Monument Builders)

So simply drawing the distinction can't be the issue as such. Or... am I missing something?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 15 2006, 11:23 PM

John,

Your post has exactly the same observation I thought of on the first read of this. I just reread it, and the observation remains.

A mind-body dichotomy means a breach between them or some kind of fundamental conflict that cannot be resolved. Not merely a difference due to different attributes.

In layman's terms, Kelley is saying you have to know whether something exists before you can judge it. If something does not exist, it cannot be valuable, neutral or dangerous, and making such judgment anyway cannot be a proper guide for your actions. I don't see where this leads to a breach. If you don't know whether something exists, how on earth can you judge it?

Victor,

Your quote of Kelley is highly incomplete - even in the passage you quote. It is out of context for the meaning you ascribe to it.

You posit that he claims that different standards apply to ideas (true-false) and actions (good-bad). You must have missed where Kelley stated that life is the standard used as basis of all judgment and where he discussed epistemological value judgments as applying to all ideas. (I can supply quotes from the same work if you like.)

The reason one uses the "true-false" standard for making an initial appraisal of an idea flows from the Law of Identity. This axiom is the cornerstone of rationality. A thing is what it is and has the characteristics it has. Including the mind. The judgment of whether something exists or not is not automatic. Conceptually, it must be made (i.e., volition is involved). The exception is the very primitive perceptual level where the "exists"-"does not exist" call is automatic and implied. The human mind processes ideas that way.

The true-false judgment actually is a value judgment that reflects "good-bad," but in a very, very, very narrow sense. It is so narrow that it is not treated as "morally good or morally evil" because so little choice is involved - only a mental choice about the mental value of the idea. Still, the corruption of this judgment is deadly. When a false idea is accepted as true, this leads to actions that conflict with reality and the holder of such false idea seriously runs the risk of encountering a lethal fact he does not acknowledge. (Nowhere in Kelley's writings does he claim - or even insinuate - the contrary.)

So the initial true-false decision could be called "morally good or morally evil" on a survival level if that sense only were meant. But this seriously dilutes the word "evil" to the point of leaving a gaping hole where a term of strong moral condemnation is needed.

The main reason for the initial true-false decision is for a living conscious conceptual organism (human begin) to decide whether an idea is worth pursuing at all. The implication is that only ideas that reflect facts that do exist in reality - or that can exist in reality - are worth pursuing. That is a value, albeit minimal value. But it is a value nevertheless. It is the first exercise of rationality toward a thought, thus the first exercise of man's proper means of survival. Without the initial "true-false" judgment, you run the risk of morally judging that which does not exist as if it did exist.

That's both incorrect and so wrong it's dangerous.

Here is one example of how you got Kelley's ideas mixed up. You said that Kelley assigned:

... the standard of rationality for motives and the standard of life for consequences.

Since you missed his statement about the supremacy of reason being based on the standard of life, you put rationality and life against each other as if they were opposites. They are not opposites for human beings, or for anything else for that matter. They are part of the same organism and both are essential (i.e., as you state, "integrated"). For Kelley, the standard of rationality is built on the standard of life (just like in Rand).

Anyway, let's start at one point and build up from the bottom. Let's start by defining terms. What is your definition of a mind-body dichotomy? Do you mean this expression as it is normally used in Objectivism - as an irreconcilable and antagonistic separation of the mind from the body in basic survival terms?

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 16 2006, 09:51 AM

Michael,

You wrote: "Anyway, let's start at one point and build up from the bottom. Let's start by defining terms. What is your definition of a mind-body dichotomy? Do you mean this expression as it is normally used in Objectivism - as an irreconcilable and antagonistic separation of the mind from the body in basic survival terms?"

I don’t know if there is a formal definition of “mind-body dichotomy”, in a Webster sense that will serve my purpose or the nature of this philosophical discourse. There are various complexities that can only be indicated descriptively. That's what I will do. There is no "one size fits all" definition. However, I don’t mean it in the sense you describe above---because, metaphysically, there is no body-body dichotomy that is “irreconcilable and antagonistic." Metaphysically, the 'mind-body dichotomy' does not exist.

But, epistemologically, [or in terms of advocacy] theory and fact, cognition and evaluation, et al---can be sundered. For example, Kelley claims that one cannot make a moral judgment about an idea (nor about a man who expressed an idea). He declares that one can judge only actions. This is as you say, and as he said. This divorces volition from cognition, and turns "free will" into the faculty that somehow chooses between actions.*(1)

The above, I’m sure, is not satisfactory to your post, but I will have more to say later, as I have been busy. Please stand by. More to come.

NOTE FROM ADMINISTRATOR:

* Plagiarized from Post 6 dated Apr 24 2004 on the Objectivism Online forum by "Bearster" (pseudonym of Keith Weiner). The original passage reads as follows:

(1)

Kelley claims that one cannot make a moral judgement about an idea (nor about a man who expressed an idea). He declares that one can judge only by actions. This divorces volition from cognition, and turns "free will" into the faculty that somehow chooses between actions.

OL extends its deepest apologies to Keith Weiner.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 16 2006, 11:23 AM

Victor,

If we are going to discuss Kelley's ideas, it would be a good thing if we discussed Kelley's ideas, not ones falsely attributed to him. You wrote:

Kelley claims that one cannot make a moral judgment about an idea (nor about a man who expressed an idea).

I know of no place where he ever claimed any of that.

His specific claim is that an idea is judged by the results it produces or has produced. (I prefer to keep this to layman's terms for now.) This is due to two things:

(1) You can't see an idea in the head of another person. You have to see some result of that idea - at the very minimum a person speaking it - to know it is even in there. And when the idea is not acted on by that particular person, if you judge the idea as bad, this is because you have seen what happens when other people have acted on it.

(2) Ideas are abstractions, not entities. They are not causal agents by themselves. They need a person with a will to become a part of a cause (meaning result in some action).

Did you just miss my point above where I talked about the nature of epistemological value judgments?

As to being able to morally judge a man who expresses an idea, I gave a pretty good summary of Kelley's considerations of moral judgment [here]. Kelley's whole point is that a moral condemnation is a serious thing and should not be done lightly. If you blank out evidence, but condemn condemn condemn because you don't like the words you heard, you are not exercising moral judgment responsibly.

A good example (extreme at both ends for clarity) would be the phrase "Kill the infidels!" If you heard Groucho Marx say this on an old TV show, I don't think you would accuse him of being evil. If you heard this out of the mouth of an Islamic fanatic loaded up with explosives in a crowded supermarket, you would judge him as evil. In both cases, it is not solely the idea that is judged, but a host of other information as well.

On the mind-body dichotomy, this has been used in Objectivism in order to describe an erroneous metaphysical fact that needs to be corrected. For example, in Christianity, the "mind" means the soul, and this has an existence apart from the body. Its needs and reality are different than those of the body, often conflicting with them. In Kant, he postulated the existence of a "noumenal" self that was the source of morality. Reason to him flowed from this "noumenal" self, which had a different reality than that of the body.

In both cases, the mind was divorced from the body because the reality of the mind was divorced from the reality of the body. That is what mind-body dichotomy means.

When Kelley talks about the "truth-false" judgment of ideas, he is talking about tying the mind to reality - the same reality that applies to the body. There is no dichotomy because reality is the same for both mind and body. The idea must be true in that reality before it is worth pursuing.

Are you with me up to here?

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 16 2006, 03:01 PM

Michael,

Sloooow down, dude.

I did inform you to stand by as more is to come. But did you feel that I’m ignoring your points made thus far from the snip above?

Before I can post more tonight, let ask a few clarifying questions:

1. Are you arguing for the validity of Kelley’s philosophy—even if it might clash with the Objectivist position in any given area, in which case a hunt for “philosophical truth” is the mandate, and Objectivism is secondary---OR are you arguing for a correct understanding of Kelley’s ideas, those ideas being entirely consonant with and proceeding from Objectivism? I want to understand you fully where you are coming from and the nature of the our talk.

Of course, as you know, I declared that Kelley departs from Objectivism—that is a separate approach then arguing for the cogency of his ideas. What says you?

2. Good ideas, bad ideas, judging others: Are we 'debating' over what a man IS morally [good or bad in the cognitive realm] or if a man can be accurately or appropriately judged? The question of ideas BEING “good or evil” are one thing---and the question of the moral judgment of another human being is another.

I will address this debate on all issues in due course, but these clarifications would help.

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 17 2006, 12:08 AM

M,

You wrote: “On the mind-body dichotomy, this has been used in Objectivism in order to describe an erroneous metaphysical fact that needs to be corrected. For example, in Christianity, the "mind" means the soul, and this has an existence apart from the body. Its needs and reality are different than those of the body, often conflicting with them. In Kant, he postulated the existence of a "noumenal" self that was the source of morality. Reason to him flowed from this "noumenal" self, which had a different reality than that of the body.”

Michael, I’m working on my post now in answer, but let me nip this mind-body thing in the butt right now. Your points here, seen above, are an accurate account of the mind-body dichotomy—descriptively, but not a definition. But, even as it is, it hardly exhausts the others elaborations, ramifications, and applications that this mental orientation, this philosophical postulate, can take—and Kelley’s philosophy IS replete with mind-body implications; it's the implications of the mind-body dichotomy that litters Kelly's philosophy--but not in the Kantian sense. And Kant wasn't the first and final word. I will point this out soon.

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 17 2006, 12:16 AM

M,

You wrote: “On the mind-body dichotomy, this has been used in Objectivism in order to describe an erroneous metaphysical fact that needs to be corrected. For example, in Christianity, the "mind" means the soul, and this has an existence apart from the body. Its needs and reality are different than those of the body, often conflicting with them. In Kant, he postulated the existence of a "noumenal" self that was the source of morality. Reason to him flowed from this "noumenal" self, which had a different reality than that of the body.”

Michael, I’m working on my post now in answer, but let me nip this mind-body thing in the butt right now. Your points here, seen above, are an accurate account of the mind-body dichotomy—descriptively, but not a definition. But, even as it is, it hardly exhausts the others elaborations, ramifications, and applications that this mental orientation, this philosophical postulate, can take—and Kelley’s philosophy IS replete with mind-body implications; it's the implications of the mind-body dichotomy that litters Kelly's philosophy--but not in the Kantian sense. And Kant wasn't the first and final word. I will point this out soon.

Victor

[edit] "You wrote and offer: You posit that he claims that different standards apply to ideas (true-false) and actions (good-bad). You must have missed where Kelley stated that life is the standard used as basis of all judgment and where he discussed epistemological value judgments as applying to all ideas. (I can supply quotes from the same work if you like.)"

Those quotes---yes, please.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 17 2006, 12:17 AM

Victor,

To answer your questions, the first is a bit loaded in the "Do you still beat your wife?" manner. For instance, you do not define what you mean by who is an Objectivist and what Objectivist views are, yet you try to use this wording to exclude David Kelley.

Kelley is an Objectivist who has done marvelous work building on fundamental Objectivist premises. His ideas clash more with the developments and interpretations of Peikoff, Schwartz & Co., than they ever did with Rand (despite Peikoff claiming that in OPAR, he added nothing to the philosophy - he did and boy did he).

Kelley discusses many issues that Rand did not cover - especially Evidence of the Senses, a part of which was published in Binswanger's The Objectivist Forum while Rand was still alive. (Kelley was the person who read the poem "If" by Kipling at her funeral a few months after that time.)

He disagreed with some minor points, like everybody. He rejected the obnoxiousness that she sometimes displayed (and a certain line of followers aped to gross exaggeration).

So yes, his work is in line with the fundamental principles of Objectivism. This makes him an Objectivist. Of course, truth and reality take precedence over any nomenclature, but I have yet to see any major clash between Kelley's ideas and the basic principles of Objectivism. (For instance, I see your designation of mind-body dichotomy an issue of semantics, since we appear to be talking about different things and you are not using the term with the traditional Objectivist meaning.)

To answer the second question, there is an argument promoted by Peikoff that moral value is embedded in all ideas together with the cognitive part. Kelley claims you have to know that something exists and what it is before you can assign moral value to it.

If you extend from Peikoff's premise, you can judge a person as evil because you judge that some of his professed ideas are evil.

Kelley argues that ideas can be judged, but on the primary cognitive level that call is only "true or false," and you add the normative part (1) only after that, and (2) after seeing the results of the idea in reality (action). He also claims that much more knowledge than familiarity with some of the ideas in the head of a person is necessary before you can make a proper moral judgment of him.

I have not found this contradicted in Rand's works anywhere so far except for a comment about is and ought in VOS. But apparently there is a context issue over interpretation, so that is not firm conflict.

Michael

Edit: I just saw your second post. We crossed. I will look the quotes up.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 17 2006, 12:24 AM

M,

One more thing...

You wrote: "The true-false judgment actually is a value judgment that reflects "good-bad," but in a very, very, very narrow sense. It is so narrow that it is not treated as "morally good or morally evil" because so little choice is involved - only a mental choice about the mental value of the idea. Still, the corruption of this judgment is deadly. When a false idea is accepted as true, this leads to actions that conflict with reality and the holder of such false idea seriously runs the risk of encountering a lethal fact he does not acknowledge. (Nowhere in Kelley's writings does he claim - or even insinuate - the contrary.)"

This statement here, "Nowhere in Kelley's writings does he claim--or even insinuate--the contrary. Not "claim" or "insinuate"--but the mind-body dichotomy is implicit and, as I said, the implications of it are there in said philosophy. Read very carefully. M, come on, do you want Kelley to come out and say it directly or put an ad in the New York Times?? The whole issue of "moral judgment" [the Marxist Professor side-by-side with Stalin thing] does clash with Objectivism. It's about philosophincal detection.

Soon...

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 17 2006, 12:31 AM

Victor,

The whole issue of "moral judgment" does clash with Objectivism.

If you make that claim, the burden of proof is on you.

(I will admit, without needing too much proof, that the whole issue of "moral judgment" does clash with Peikoff's interpretation of certain aspects of Objectivism.)

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 17 2006, 12:50 AM

M,

Really?

If you claim that Peikoff's 'interpretation' is in question “regarding certain aspects of Objectivism”, the burden of proof would be on you--since you made the claim. Where is it in question? On the subject we are discussing? Some where else?

More…soon…

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 17 2006, 01:09 AM

Victor,

Here are the quotes from The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand I mentioned. (I could probably find more, but please read the work. I can't do all your homework for you.)

On life being the basis of judgment:

p. 15

Ayn Rand held that values are rooted in the fact that living things must act to maintain their own survival. Since I agree with her position, I do not accept any dichotomy between fact and value, or between cognition and evaluation. On the contrary, I hold that values are a species of facts, evaluation a species of cognition.

Do not forget that Kelley uses cognition and evaluation to mean the use of reason. Here is another:

p. 19

Values are thus a species of fact. Evaluation, in turn, is a species of cognition: it is our means of grasping the particular type of fact that values represent. We evaluate something by identifying its relationship to a purpose, which provides us with the standard of evaluation. Since life is our fundamental purpose, it is the all-encompassing standard.

I have already posted the following quote about epistemological value judgments [here]. Please read these posts when I post them.

p. 20-21

In any particular case, therefore, we must decide whether it's worth our while, in light of our purposes, to evaluate a given fact. When we make such a decision, of course, we are passing an epistemological value judgment. We are assessing the cognitive worth of a given fact as the datum to be retained, attended to, explored further. In this attenuated sense, it is true without exception that all cognition involves evaluation; the point follows from the fact that cognition is goal-directed.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 18 2006, 01:46 AM

You wrote: "The true-false judgment actually is a value judgment that reflects "good-bad," but in a very, very, very narrow sense. It is so narrow that it is not treated as "morally good or morally evil" because so little choice is involved - only a mental choice about the mental value of the idea."

*****

Michael,

I’m sorry for not keeping my end of the discussion as I have been busy, but I’m remedying that now. I’m writing a post that will, I think, make my poison absolutely clear—once and for all.

Very ambitious, I know.

A question regarding the above: you say “because so little choice is involved.” Reading the entire paragraph within a given context of your extended meaning—what the hell do you mean by this “so little choice is involved”? How is it that little choice is involved---when it comes to observing the true-false factor, making it a value judgment that reflects “good-bad” but, in your words, a very narrow sense.

Some of your remarks are very problematic, and I have trouble following your intended meaning. Please, clarification.

Take, also, the below as another example:

You wrote: “So the initial true-false decision could be called "morally good or morally evil" on a survival level if that sense only were meant. But this seriously dilutes the word "evil" to the point of leaving a gaping hole where a term of strong moral condemnation is needed.

If a “true-false” decision could be deemed “morally good or morally evil”---and on a survival level, you add on to boot—it dilutes the word evil. [??] A survival level. It dilutes the word evil? How? Why?

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 18 2006, 02:54 AM

Victor,

Thanks for asking first before morally condemning!

The choice I mean for an epistemological value judgment actually involves two choices. The first is basically the choice to use the rational faculty in looking at a thought. As the rational faculty is man's basic means of survival, this is what I meant by "at the survival level."

However, take a look at what goes on in your own head. Even for a minute. How many thoughts (ideas) pass through it? Let's just deal with the ones you are fully aware of, not the nebulous ones. Do you have time to pass moral judgment on all of them? Every single one? Do you have time to analyze all of them rationally? Of course not. You have to choose. There are simply too many.

So the first choice is whether to engage reason for an idea or just let it float on by. This constant flow of a large number of disparate ideas is the natural working of the human mind. We can't do anything about the fact that the mind was made that way. We can only do something about what we can choose.

So what happens when we choose to apply reason to an idea? The very first thing is that we decide if it corresponds to reality or not - at least a portion of reality (past, present or future). All this is very fast and still there is not much order to the flow.

Then we make a second choice (now using reason). We decide whether we want to pursue the idea. Often we will not wish to pursue it for a large number of reasons, so we mentally file it away. Often we will want to pursue it so we do.

At this level, it is very hard to attribute evil. The only two choices involved are to engage reason and pursue an idea.

The choice to pursue an idea or not applies to all ideas. As does the choice to engage reason or not.

What does not exist at this level is a high degree of activity. So calling this very basic mental activity "evil" dilutes the word to make it almost meaningless.

Some examples:

If, at this level, we choose not to engage reason but still pursue a thought floating around in our head, we still could be doing something that is not evil at all - like daydreaming for instance. Only if we choose not to engage reason but still pursue a thought, then act on that thought in a manner that we know is counterproductive to life does evil enter the picture.

Three very extreme examples. One man believes in God and suspends his rational faculty through faith, but does nothing. He merely keeps the belief open inside himself "just in case he's wrong when he dies" but basically he lives a rational productive life. Another man believes in God. The way he acts on this is that he goes to church, contributes money and prays, but basically he lives a rational productive life. Another man believes in God. The way he acts on this is that he straps explosives to his body, goes into a crowded public place and blows everybody up.

In the first instance, the choice was so small that evil is a very harsh word for the choice not to engage the rational faculty (especially in light of the rest of his life). It was wrong. But evil? In the second case, the man does no one any harm, so even though he acts and we question the worth of his acts, there is no resulting harm done anywhere. He is still wrong. But evil? In the third case, this is the ugly face of the limits of evil fanaticism.

What we have here are degrees of moral evaluation - one of the important ideas Kelley explores.

To be even more extreme (for the sake of clarity) - You have a slightly overweight man who wants an ice cream cone but doesn't know why and doesn't care to even think about why. Once the thought floats through his head, he latches on to it. He suddenly knows that ice cream cones exist, he wants one and he will do something about it later. Like I said, all this is done very quickly.

The only moral thing he did here was to identify that ice cream cones and his desire exist (true-false), and to make a choice about pursuing the idea later (epistemological value judgment). He used his rational faculty for all this. In thinking about why, however, he decided to suspend his rational faculty. He did not make a good-bad judgment. He refused to think about why he wanted the ice cream cone.

I find it hard to call that refusal the think about why "evasion" or "evil." He has memories of the good taste, etc., but he also has a weight problem, so he has elements, and maybe even a small need, to make a value judgment. He prefers his whim. Technically, I suppose that is evasion, but it is too unimportant within the context of his life to mean much. And it certainly is not evil.

Then you have the suicide bomber. I don't even need to analyze the level of evasion of rational thought needed here to get to that mental stage, nor the amount of evil involved.

Did that help?

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 18 2006, 03:33 AM

M,

Serious chewing, huh?

Yes, the clarification did help a great deal. There are many things I agree with in that post of yours--such as “passing ideas” in and out of the mind, come to be nothing really--least of all being "good" or "evil." Very true. I can go with ya on that.

There is still some confusion as to where you stand. Let's clear it up before I post my "major post."

I suppose the Groucho Marx "Kill the infidel" in the comedy sketch was, yet, another example of what you pointed out in your recent post---that SOME statements [or ideas] and "thoughts passing threw our minds" can't be judged as good or evil.

Further clarification: can ideas be judged as good or evil---yes or no?---and then, follow up with any statement so as to be clear.

Is it not, as it is in Barbara's article, that IDEAS CAN'T BE JUDGED AS GOOD OR BAD--but as either correct or false? Any ideas, that is. Period.

If so, this opens up a lot of problems given your open approval of the article.

Let’s be absolutely clear. I repeat: the assertion is thus: Ideas CAN'T be judged as good or evil---any ideas. This is how I understand Barbara’s article. THIS is the fundamental question.

I only mention Barbara, because, her position on "ideas" rings of Kelley's stance, don't you agree? In any event, you give, just to repeat, a ringing thumbs-up to her points, and that's the main thing I'm observing. Is Barbara's position on “ideas”--that of Kelley's---and is this, in turn, YOUR position?

Let me put it this way:

David Kelley’s philosophy has won converts: “An idea, like an emotional reaction,” writes Miss Branden, “is not a moral agent. Only men and woman are moral agents; only they can be good or evil.”

And Miss Branden also has this to say: “A major source of unjust moralizing and condemnations is the belief that ideas can be either good or evil—that it is not merely people, their motivations, the degree of their rationality, their characters, and their actions that are open to moral evaluation, but also and primarily their ideas and convictions.”

Her conclusion: “And just as mistaken ideas are not proof of evil, so correct ideas are not proof of moral virtue.”

This means ANY ideas, right? Communism to ice-cream desires? Yes? No?

The statements stand as written.

Now--in terms of ESSENTIALS--where do you stand on this?

Victor

***

edit: More thoughts, driving me crazy: Why is Kelley twisting himself into philosophical pretzels, [as I see it] concocting such innocuous examples ---from the passing musings of ice-cream diet breakers to even more nebulous examples. What’s the point of all this? Why? What's the LARGER point?

It just seems like so much deflection from the central issue in how people use their minds—rationally or irrationally. It doesn’t, however, erase this fundamental fact—even if, when considered in isolation, strains of common sense are present in Kelley’s hair-splitting descriptions. But the points are not, I imagine, brought up for no reason---as observations to be cotemplated for their own sake. Right? Then Why?

Why speak of all this? What's his larger point? THAT'S the question. Barbara was so much more direct and clear.

I tend to think an overall moral skepticism is being gently pushed forward—as in: ‘Hey, we can’t really morally judge a person as good or evil”—they are just too “complex” and are thereby exempted from such evaluations. Moral evaluation [in the cognitive realm] gets all blurred away. If not, if you disagree---why, I keep asking, is he bringing up these details of mental flips-and-flops?

Thoughs?

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Rich Engle

Aug 18 2006, 10:30 AM

You guys are taking statistical density to new heights, and that's cool, and I'm just reading. There is one thing that strikes me that maybe I could introduce here... Branden 101, really.

It might be useful to talk about thoughts, vs. ideas. As in when NB talks about thoughts, and the pillar of self-acceptance. "Your thoughts are your thoughts." People have all kinds of thoughts, and often they are ones that suprise them to have. It's the nature of the mind to churn up things that might even repulse you. I think that a lot of people are not completely frank when discussing this, because it is awkward, and embarrassing. MSK got to this a bit (frankly, too) when he talked about wanting to kill the guy that hacked OL. I understand that thought. Of course, he never did and never would (although, if you knew where he was, and it was convenient, I wouldn't be adverse to tuning him up a little...I like a fighting technique called "grounding and pounding..." there's a dark thought I might actually be tempted to act on). But I digress... What I'm saying is that good people have bad thoughts, perverse thoughts, and a big part of self-acceptance is to simply understand that this is the case with most of us, if not all. Are those thoughts evil, or is it just the mind working through it's endless permutations? I don't think thoughts are evil. They may be dark, hideous, perverse. Pathology, on the other hand, allows for evil, because it translates the dark, hateful thoughts into action.

Back to it, boys.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 18 2006, 02:11 PM

Victor,

The ice cream cone was my example, not Kelley's. To be fair, in one example, he did mention the difference between weight loss and the murder of millions of people as having different moral import.

You stated the misunderstanding very clearly:

Let’s be absolutely clear. I repeat: the assertion is thus: Ideas CAN'T be judged as good or evil—any ideas. This is how I understand Barbara’s article. THIS is the fundamental question.

I only mention Barbara, because, her position on "ideas" rings of Kelley's stance, don't you agree?

Let's put it this way for you to understand it better. There is context to what Kelley is saying. He is on one philosophical level and you are thinking on another.

Ideas divorced from action can't be good or bad. But once you have action, you have something that is acting. You can't judge something without having a judge. This is shown in examples. And so on...

You ask why this "hairspilitting." This is not real "hairspilitting." It is looking at epistemology before getting to ethics. There are two reasons for this, from what I understand:

(1) Ethics rests on epistemology and metaphysics. If you get epistemology and metaphysics wrong, the ethics will be wrong—or at least right for the wrong reasons. Thus, you have to know that something exists before you can judge it. This is the minimum condition that applies to all moral judgment.

(2) If the epistemological part is not understood correctly, an easily obtained result is bigotry, chauvinism, sexism, racism, etc., from moral oversimplification. The whole point to making a proper understanding is the word "oversimplification."

Now let's go even deeper into the phrase: "Ideas CAN'T be judged as good or evil" and put in the proper qualification (context) that you haven't seen yet. "On the epistemological level, ideas CAN'T be judged as good or evil."

This follows from the fact that on the epistemological level, nothing can be good or evil. You have to wait until you get to ethics for that.

On an ethical level, you can say an idea is evil, and people do say this, using "evil" in a second sense, one that is more loose. You have to understand that you are talking about the evil effects of people having acted on the idea already (or intending to act on it). The ideas did not and do not act all by themselves. People did and do. You are not talking about the idea in itself. That is why a person is a moral agent and an idea is not.

As far as the need for action, life is self-generating action. If you hold life as your standard of moral judgment, you must involve action by definition. Once you have action, you have something that is doing all the acting. That "something," which is alive, is what is the standard of good and evil, and the action is what impacts that life. Thus the action is what is good or evil. An idea without action is merely a mental tag that corresponds to something that exists or not. It is either true or false on that level. Without action, it cannot be good or evil.

Here is how this works in a very easy case. This example is from Kelley (The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand, p. 31-32). First his words, then a comment or two.

Thus, for example, when Marxist ideas are implemented, they lead to widespread death and destruction through the actions of tyrants like Stalin. It's because the ideas are false that they produce these effects rather than universal brotherhood, peace and prosperity. That is, the truth or falsity of an idea is its essential trait, underlying and explaining its causal powers. Because the effects of Marxist ideas are bad, moreover, we evaluate the ideas as that. The logical pattern of this evaluation is: death, destruction, and tyranny are bad by the standard of human life; therefore that which causes them is bad. It would be a logical inversion to say: the ideas are bad in themselves, therefore whatever they produce must be that—as if we couldn't evaluate Stalin's actions until we knew their ideological basis. Had the same actions been committed by an Attila, whose power did not rest on ideological justifications, the actions would have been equally wrong.

One other point that Kelley raises is that moral evaluations apply to two elements, not just one. The first is the consequences, which he divides into direct and indirect. (The direct consequence of Marxism is the state apparatus based on planned production and distribution of goods according to need. The indirect consequences are death, destruction, and tyranny, because those ideas applied to human nature are incorrect. They are not in line with reality. They are false.)

The second element is intent. Obviously, communism as practiced by Andrei Taganov is vastly different than communism as practiced by Stalin. There is a great deal more to judge than just the ideas. What these men wanted to do with these ideas is a crucial piece of information in making a moral judgment.

Now we come to how an idea permeates a culture. This does not happen in the form of a virus or plague that an evil philosopher unleashes on mankind, where people contract it and are then helpless victims to die in despair until another life-giving philosopher injects a medicinal idea that they unthinkingly absorb like a vaccine or antibiotic. Philosophy is very important and powerful in a culture, but it is not all that.

An idea is adopted by millions and millions of individuals. Each person does his own thinking. Each person acts on the idea and each person has his own intent. There is a great deal of information involved when you get to the point of saying that "death, destruction, and tyranny" are the result of Marxist ideas, thus they are evil.

The usage of the word "evil" here is different than "evil" as a causal agent. In this case, millions of causal agents have implemented the ideas and the results have been observed.

One HUGE misunderstanding about Kelley's ideas (and I suspect this is on purpose, but I want to read more first before making that condemnation) is that since he claims an idea is simply true or false and is not a causal agent (on the epistemological level), then he is claiming that an idea has no causal role. Thus you can't judge it. But ideas do have a causal role and you can judge them by that role. The idea delineates what actions are to be taken. It sets the conditions for cause and effect, so to speak. Reality, of course, will carry out the correct effect to any given cause, regardless of what starts it.

What puts a cause into motion is a causal agent. An idea alone cannot do that. A person must. The person chooses to put a cause into motion and selects which one by selecting an idea. Volition is involved.

Let's go back once again to your statement: Ideas CAN'T be judged as good or evil—any ideas.

As I have shown above, even in Kelley's own words ("because the effects of Marxist ideas are bad, moreover, we evaluate the ideas as that"), ideas can be judged and are. But there is a huge qualification. They must be judged within a context of reality where they correspond to something in reality and actually impact a value in some manner. That means they must involve actual action of some kind. And that also means that the epistemological level of true-false must be present as a prerequisite.

All ideas can be judged like this. This does not mean that they are. And just because not all ideas are judged like I stated, this does not mean that no ideas are.

To simplify, you are taking the statement I quoted from you to mean that morality does not exist. Kelley actually means that morality without volition, does not exist. Thus an idea without an element of volition has no moral import. That is by definition ("code of values to guide man's actions"—you can't have a code that is not based on observed reality for a rational morality).

An idea can still be dangerous if used, like in the case of the beliefs of savages. And even on that level, in their society, the intent to kill people is evil on some level, so their ideas are evil up to a point. But most people, when given other alternatives, make more rational choices over time than they made before. (This is why Islamic dictators fear and hate the Internet.)

Conclusion: on the epistemological level, ideas are neither good or evil. In the popular sense, an idea is said to be good or evil because there are proper elements that involves the idea, but isn't the idea, in reality with which to judge it by. But what is actually good or evil are those elements, how they impact life, not the ideas all by their lonesomes. There is a strong need to make this precision in concept clear because many people within the Objectivist subculture habitually assign both meanings to the word "evil," but shift from one to the other at whim, always pretending that they are talking about the same thing. In short, they oversimplify so they can condemn more easily—essentially so they don't have to think.

Barbara's call in her article—and Kelley's call—is to stress that moral judgment entails effort. Proper thinking skills must be employed and several sources of evidence must be examined. That takes work and responsibility. Making an oversimplified moral judgment by saying "an idea is evil, so the person holding it is evil" blanks out a huge amount of evidence. It uses both meaning of evil, but pretends that one one is being used. It allows a person to say that "people who present and discuss the unsavory parts of Rand's life and ideas are really trying to destroy Objectivism." Or "Rand produced Atlas Shrugged, therefore she had to have been morally perfect." Or "Islam is evil, so all Muslims are evil." Or in past times "blacks can't read and write, so all blacks are stupid."

And so on.

Neither Barbara nor Kelley are saying moral judgments should not be made. You make a huge injustice by claiming:

‘Hey, we can’t really morally judge a person as good or evil”—they are just too “complex” and are thereby exempted from such evaluations.

Their own words contradict this. All anyone has to do is read them. They are not saying that one should not judge ideas (technically speaking, the effects of ideas) or people. They are saying that making moral judgments is a very serious business. Implicitly, I also think they are saying that many people are mentally lazy. They want to stop thinking so they can get to their emotional fix faster and start condemning stuff all over the place.

I know this post is already long, but I cannot resist one more Kelley quote (The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand, p. 30.) It is one of my favorites. Let's call this the "intent" part in morality—and this is the part I dearly love.

Evaluation and judgment are responses to what exists, sorting the things that pass before us into categories of good, bad, and indifferent. But a rational life, the life of a valuer, does not consist essentially in reaction. It consists in action. Man does not find his values, like other animals; he creates them. The primary focus of a valuer is not to take the world as it comes and pass judgment. His primary focus is to identify what might and ought to exist, to uncover potentialities that he can exploit, to find ways of reshaping the world in the image of his values. This is the essence of Ayn Rand's exalted view of man as a heroic being of unlimited potential. To be a valuer in her sense is to be a creator, not merely a critic. Evaluation and judgment are certainly necessary to the creation of value, but they are means to an end, not ends in themselves. If we drop this context, we run the risk of turning a wonderful vision into a crabbed and carping morality. Moral judgment is an important function in a rational life. It is part of one's daily moral hygiene. But it is not what life is about.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 18 2006, 02:27 PM

I just saw a post from Diana Hsieh that very relevant to the current discussion. Now, I’m not so dim-witted to not realize that Diana doesn’t have a fan base here, but as you all know: just because you don’t like somebody doesn’t mean what they have to say is automatically wrong.

In response to a poster who speaks of Rand’s and Peikoff’s morally condemning all people with wrong ideas—from evading overweight diet breakers to those charming church attending little hunched old ladies…or what have you.

Diana asks: “Where did he [Peikoff] ever say that we should just condemn ordinary people with wrong ideas, whether they've read Ayn Rand or not? In fact, he's said just the opposite on multiple occasions. Moreover, unlike David Kelley, Dr. Peikoff makes a HUGE distinction between regular people (like your wife) and professional intellectuals (like the Marxist professor). If you're going to be a professional advocate of ideas, it's your JOB to make sure that you're not... oh, I don't know... supporting the slaughter of millions.”

She then suggests that all interested to listen to LP's major lecture courses, particularly _Understanding Objectivism_, _The Art of Thinking_, and _Judging, Feeling, and Not Being Moralistic_.

She has then goes on to speak of the “open” or “closed” sysyem of Objectivism: “In addition to the above issues, you do it with the open versus closed system issue routinely, mostly by equating the closed system view with some kind of ban upon new knowledge. That's wrong -- and the work being done by ARI scholars on induction (Dave Harriman, Leonard Peikoff), on the DIM hypothesis (Leonard Peikoff), on the philosophic foundations of calculus (Pat Corvini), on judicial interpretation (Tara Smith), and so on should be an indication of something defective in your understanding of these issues.”

How can we not benefit from these thinkers?

Victor

**********

edit: M,

A most interesting post; you argue your case well. This may very well make you a “worthy opponent.” And that’s a privileged title I don’t bestow just anyone.

I will have much more to say about it, soon—but just a little tid-bit now:

Kelley writes: “Because the effects of Marxist ideas are bad, moreover, we evaluate the ideas as that. The logical pattern of this evaluation is: death, destruction, and tyranny are bad by the standard of human life; therefore that which causes them is bad. It would be a logical inversion to say: the ideas are bad in themselves, therefore whatever they produce must be that—as if we couldn't evaluate Stalin's actions until we knew their ideological basis.”

This part---"It would be a logical inversion to say: the ideas are bad in themselves, therefore whatever they produce must be that—as if we couldn't evaluate Stalin's actions until we knew their ideological basis" strikes me as a logical inversion. It's ideas first--then action.

In the order of precedence, I would say that we couldn’t even evaluate Stalin’s actions—if we couldn’t FIRST evaluate his ideas, or perhaps more to the point: his ideology. We can first morally evaluate ideas, and we need not remain inert every time those ideas pop into new acting agents---waiting for the ideas to be put into action [or not] before we can judge.

That is to say: Are we to be “morally paralyzed” before such a spouting ideologue [who may hold power] in the name of “toleration” to first see if we can “learn something” from this person? “He’s incorrect,” we can say, “but just not evil.” But we must put our bodies in motion, we must make choices, as you say—and those choices are dictated by the content of our minds.

And when the bloody results logically flow from the ideology---then, I suppose, we can all agree, while beholding the carnage before us, sit back and say: “Gee, that was an evil dude.” As the kids say these days: YOU THINK!?

You see my problem here, right?

But I haven’t—yet—fully illustrated my case. This fast little post doesn’t “prove” an epistemological point on my part, but I do see that the approach Kelley is taking will induce a certain 'moral agnosticism' as pointed out above.

More…

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Victor Pross

Aug 18 2006, 02:59 PM

M,

A most interesting post; you argue your case well. This may very well make you a “worthy opponent.” And that’s a privileged I don’t bestow just anyone.

I will have much more to say about it, soon—but I just a little tid-bit now:

Kelley writes: “Because the effects of Marxist ideas are bad, moreover, we evaluate the ideas as that. The logical pattern of this evaluation is: death, destruction, and tyranny are bad by the standard of human life; therefore that which causes them is bad. It would be a logical inversion to say: the ideas are bad in themselves, therefore whatever they produce must be that—as if we couldn't evaluate Stalin's actions until we knew their ideological basis.”

In the order of precedence, I would say that we couldn’t even evaluate Stalin’s actions—if we couldn’t FIRST evaluate his ideas, or perhaps more to the point: his ideology. We can first morally evaluate ideas, and we need not remain inert everytime those ideas pop into new acting agents---waiting for the ideas to be put itno action [or not] before we can judge.

That is to say: Are we to be “morally paralyzed” before such a spouting ideologue [who may hold power] in the name of “toleration” to first see if we can “learn something” from this person? “He’s incorrect,” we can say, “but just not evil.” But we must put our bodies in motion, we must make choices, as you say—and those choices are dictated by the content of our minds.

And when the bloody results logically flow from the ideology---then, I suppose, we can all agree, while beholding the carnage before us, and say: “Gee, that was an evil dude.”

You see my problem here, right?

But I haven’t—yet—fully illustrated my case. This fast little post doesn’t “prove” an epistemological point on my part, but I do see that the approach Kelley is taking will induce a certain 'moral agnosticism' as pointed out above.

More…

Victor

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Rich Engle

Aug 18 2006, 03:27 PM

Stalin's "ideology" was, obviously, fascism. Sometimes I'm not sure fascism should even be called an ideology at all. Stalin, like most fascist leaders, was a murderous psychopath. In the case of monsters like Stalin, my view is that we are dealing with pathology, more than ideology. He was a sick monkey.

EDIT: I know I'm stating the obvious, here, but I think it's got some truth in it. Fascism is a forced "ideology." I suppose it has somewhat a life as an actual ideology after it's rolled out, but in Stalin's case, consider what he did in his megalomania- he replaced all religious icons, etc. with an amazing display of paintings, sculptures, etc. of himself. His inner circle (well, there really was no "team," just people trying to keep alive) was in a constant state of trying to stay low and covered- you could do something that you thought would impress Stalin, but if he thought you were becoming too heavily recognized, he had you killed. It is a known fact that murderous megalomaniac psycopaths often have ferocious charismatic qualities- I say fascism is maybe not an ideology because very little conceptualization is used- it is all heavily amplified, larger-than-life craziness. It's what happens when what's inside a dangerous, damaged person gets let loose to the outside.

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Michael Stuart Kelly

Aug 18 2006, 04:33 PM

Victor,

Be careful. The idea of remaining "morally inert" or "morally paralyzed" before a new idea is not Kelley's idea. It is Victor's.

There is nowhere I have read so far that Kelley says you should not morally evaluate an idea if you don't wish to. I seriously doubt I will find a passage like that. This is the mistake I am now seeing his opponents make - and it is so constant that I have grave doubts about the intent behind it from the more fanatical ones. His words simply do not bear that accusation.

What Kelley is saying is that you would judge a person like Stalin as far more evil than you would a new idea. You would judge a new idea according to a specific method and evidence that needs to be looked at. Kelley dealt with all this in Chapter 1 - "Moral Judgment" in The Contested Legacy of Ayn Rand. You will find a fantastic method there for morally judging a new idea. I gave an outline of it [here].

However, you will not find instructions there so you can stop thinking and self-righteously proclaim that a theorist in quantum physics is as evil as Stalin. Or even that the theories behind it are as evil as communism has proven to be. It will make you realize that the theories behind quantum physics need a lot more examination before any harsh moral condemnation (or praise) can be pronounced responsibly.

Somehow, I think the amount of effort needed to think and evaluate as a skill is not very attractive to many Internet gladiators. (I am not referring to you.)

As far as being a "worthy opponent," my own attitude is based on the following Kelley quote (guess from where?, p. 62-63):

Discussion among rational people is best conducted as a partnership in discovering the truth, not as combat or indoctrination.

I am not in the habit of citing posts from another forum, especially SOLOP, but [this one so clearly shows the problem] that it should be mentioned. It is by one of the most reasonable posters over there. (I know that's not saying much, but this guy, Thomas Lee, actually is serious and basically keeps to the ideas.)

Kelley argues that even within the category of evil (as distinct from error) we must treat the units differently based on degree of evil--this is what he means when he talks about the necessity of "reintroducing the measurements" when we apply a concept. That is quite a different proposition. Not only is it an attack on morality, it's an attack on the conceptual level as such.

Why? Because Ayn Rand's theory of concepts says we can treat units as the same when their differences pertain only to differences in measurement (within the appropriate range). For Kelley to say that we must account for differences in measurement when we deal particulars means that differences in measurement are the equivalent of differences in kind...which means that conceptualization is impossible.

This was a good try but a gross misunderstanding of what Kelley was saying (and even a partial misunderstanding of the nature of concepts). The technical error consists of trying to use the same standard for the act in itself of concept formation as you use for employing that concept as a basis for action with other things. I certainly do hope that a person would reintroduce measurements when he applied a concept in doing something. Take "boat" for instance. One that is too small might not get the job done and one that is too big might not float in a a shallow river. He needs the measurements. These are comparative measurements (ordinal numbers, so to speak), but measurements all the same. Without reintroducing some measurements, most concepts are useless in action once the action involves other existents. (Think about preparing a meal without reintroducing measurements while using the concept "food." Dayaamm! The examples are starting to multiply in my brain without measurement! I'm intellectually drowning! Heeeeelp!!!)

The same principle applies to Kelley's idea of reintroducing measurements so we get varying degrees of evil when we make a moral judgment. Making a moral judgment is an action. It is not passive and the act of doing it is not a concept. It requires volition to do that, too. A particular moral judgment may or may not have become automated, but it is not inherently automatic. Willful integration needs to have happened for it to have become automated.

There is no attack on morality whatsoever in saying that a bloody dictator is far more evil than a lapsed dieter, as in Kelley's example. He calls the act of evasion in that example "wrong" and "worthy of blame" for both. "Wrong" would be the super-light version of "evil." We are talking concepts here - the act of suspending the rational faculty, of evading, and how that impacts human life - not just words.

On the contrary to what Mr. Lee implies, I say that assigning a bloody dictator the same degree of blame (evil) as a lapsed dieter takes morality to the funny farm and relieves it of a need to be connected with reality at all.

Mr. Lee's post is an example of how Kelley is misunderstood (mostly on purpose) behind technical sounding double-speak so that people can attack him by attributing ideas and conclusions to him that are just not his ("differences in measurement are the equivalent of differences in kind" for particulars). Very similar to your "morally inert"/"morally paralyzed" thing, but without the technical language.

Michael

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Rich Engle

Aug 18 2006, 05:50 PM

" I say that assigning a bloody dictator the same degree of blame (evil) as a lapsed dieter takes morality to the funny farm and relieves it of a need to be connected with reality at all."

(to theme of "The Hokey Pokey") And that's what it's all a-bout!

That's it, right there MSK. As far as I'm concerned, that's the biggest rub that goes on in O-world.

Sure makes moral judgment easier though-- black and white!

[Michael Stuart Kelly]

Posted by: Kat

Aug 18 2006, 06:36 PM

Michael is doing a wonderful job of explaining this. It is important when you get into into ethics to consider the context and keep a sense of proportion. Thoughts and ideas are basically just raw data until one exercises his volition upon it and the intention to act is set into motion...when a mental action has taken place. That is not automatic.

Again, the idea in and of itself is neither good nor evil, it is the person of free will (a moral agent) grabbing onto a thought and doing something with it who is good or evil. Remember the slogan, "guns don't kill, people do." Ideas are not evil, people are.

Kat